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2ABSTRACT
The goal of this thesis was to address the problem of the paucity of measures for 
assessing the socio-cognitive abilities of primary school-aged children by presenting three 
such measures and their coding manuals, the Happe’s Strange Stories (HSS), the Affect 
Task (AT) and the Child Reflective Functioning Scale (CRFS). The psychometric 
properties of the three measures were assessed to determine whether they can be used to 
obtain reliable and valid assessments of children’s theory of mind, affective 
understanding and reflective functioning. The assessment of the psychometric properties 
of the measures was based on the performance of subsamples of 200 children aged 5 - 1 1  
recruited from schools and referrals to outpatient Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Clinics in London and surrounding areas, on the HSS, AT and CRFS. In addition to the 
measures of mentalisation, children completed the Child Depression Inventory, the State 
and Trait Anxiety Scale, Harter’s scale of self-esteem, and the Child Attachment 
Interview. Parents completed the Child Behaviour Checklist and the Child Adaptive 
Functioning Scale.
The findings indicate that: 1) the interrater reliability, internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability of the measures were generally robust; 2) on the whole, children’s 
socio-cognitive abilities, as measured on all the tasks, showed significant positive 
correlations of moderate strength with intelligence and expressive language abilities; 3) 
children with siblings showed significantly better performance on the AT Justification 
Scale, but contrary to expectations, children living in single parent families performed 
significantly better on the HSS and CRFS; 4) children’s socio-cognitive abilities were 
implicated in depression, anxiety and adaptive functioning; 5) socio-cognitive abilities in 
general were associated with attachment security; 6) reflective functioning appears to 
have a complex relationship with affective and behavioural difficulties, and children with 
exceptionally low or high reflective functioning appear more likely to have affective and 
behavioural difficulties.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of children’s capacity to mentalise, including the capacity to 
consider the thoughts, feelings and intentions of others, as well as their own, in everyday 
interactions, and especially in close relationships, is increasingly recognised. The 
development of children’s capacity to mentalise, also referred to as socio-cognitive 
abilities, or mind-mindedness, has become the central focus for researchers from a theory 
of mind perspective, as well as for researchers focusing on the development of affective 
understanding, and more recently for researchers using the new reflective functioning 
perspective. These researchers strongly suspect that these abilities are linked to social- 
and interpersonal functioning, as well as to self- and emotional regulation and to 
psychopathology. At the same time, it remains to be seen whether empirical evidence will 
be in line with this theoretical expectation. At this stage, the lack of reliable measures of 
more complex mentalisation has become a major obstacle to further research, and to date 
there have been relatively few attempts to develop standardised child measures which go 
beyond the assessment of symptomatology, behaviour and adaptation, to measuring the 
development of mentalisation. Without such measures, we are not able to test theories of 
the development of mentalisation during childhood, or derive empirically tested theories 
of the developmental relationship between children’s socio-cognitive, behavioural and 
adaptational difficulties. The period of middle childhood in particular seems to have 
suffered from a lack of empirical research regarding the developmental changes in theory 
of mind and mentalisation, including representations and understanding of self, others, 
and relationships. This also has implications for child psychotherapy outcome studies, in 
that researchers have had to rely largely on measures of symptomatology and behaviour, 
even when the therapeutic aim was to produce internal changes in mentalisation. This 
situation also has potentially serious consequences when we consider that some types of 
therapies may be prematurely rejected by the scientific community, because of a lack of 
sufficiently nuanced measures.
With a few exceptions such as Harter’s work (1999) on self-esteem from a 
cognitive psychological perspective and the recently developed Child Attachment 
Interview developed by Target and collaborators (Target, Fonagy, Shmueli-Goetz, 
Schneider & Datta, 2000), work on other measures of mentalisation is still in progress, 
and there is an absence of published data on the psychometric properties of other
12
measures.
Theory of mind researchers have drawn attention to a wealth of empirical 
evidence confirming the often startling abilities of very young children to consider the 
minds of others, but they have also largely neglected the primary school years, and the 
majority of theory of mind tests have proven insufficiently complex to do justice to the 
range of abilities and deficits that need to be studied in this age group. The sheer 
complexity and diversification of abilities from the time children start school to adulthood 
have undoubtedly contributed to the impasse theory of mind researchers have reached in 
the assessment of older children, as well as in identifying theory of mind deficits 
associated with depression, behavioural difficulties, disturbances of personality and affect 
regulation.
In this context, research findings using the new paradigm of reflective functioning, 
developed by Fonagy and Target in collaboration with their colleagues (George Moran, 
Miriam and Howard Steele, Anna Higgit, Gyorgy Gergely, Efrain Bleiberg and Elliot 
Jurist), are promising and the model has been shown to have the necessary complexity 
and sensitivity for identifying the difficulties in mentalising associated with adult 
psychopathology. The questions raised are now; 1) whether it is possible to adapt 
reflective functioning assessments for use with primary school-aged children; 2) whether 
it is possible to demonstrate that these measures can be reliably coded and are stable over 
time; 3) whether reflective functioning provides any additional information when 
compared with more basic tests of theory of mind; and 4) how performance on measures 
of theory of mind, emotional understanding and reflective functioning relates to age, IQ, 
attachment, adaptation and psychopathology.
The aim of this study is to address this problem by developing psychometrically 
robust measures of mentalisation for use with primary school-aged children. The 
reliability and validity data of three measures of mentalisation will be presented: 1) the 
Happe Strange Stories (HSS: Happe, 1994), a theory of mind measure designed to assess 
the capacity to consider intentions rather than purely literal meaning in communication; 
2) the Affect Task (AT: Fonagy, Target, M. Steele, H. Steele, Charman, et al., 2000), a 
test of the complexity, depth and interpersonal dimensions of affective understanding 
using a reflective functioning perspective; and 3) the Child Reflective Functioning Scale 
(CRFS: Target, Oandasan, & Ensink, 2001), adapted from the Adult Reflective 
Functioning Scale and designed for use with interview data obtained using the Child 
Attachment Interview (CAI: Target et al., 2000). A large part of the work that will be 
presented here involved the development of reliable coding systems for all three
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measures, with the aim of developing and standardising a battery of child psychotherapy 
outcome measures. The links between mentalisation and performance on measures of 
psychopathology and adaptation will also be investigated, as well as the overlap and 
differences between theory of mind, affective understanding, and reflective functioning.
Different Approaches to Mentalisation
In looking back over the last 100 years, it is possible to discern a growing interest 
in the capacities of humans and perhaps some of our close animal relatives, to consider 
the minds and intentions of others. As Whiten (1994) points out, this interest arose from 
diverse perspectives; thus the different terms used may involve incompatible 
conceptualisations of mind or may refer to very different levels of penetration into the 
minds of others (see Table 1).
In recent years, researchers and theorists using the theory of mind paradigm have 
made significant contributions to our knowledge of how children develop an awareness 
and understanding of the intentions of others, as well as their abilities to think about then- 
own minds, and those of others. At the same time, psychoanalysts, cognitive 
psychologists, attachment researchers, and other developmentalists have developed 
theoretical and empirically based models and tools for thinking about the development of 
mentalisation about self and others, and its relationship to the organisation of the self and 
relationships. Regarding terminology, when referring to these abilities, mentalisation is 
the term used by theory of mind researchers such as Morton (1989), and this term is also 
used within the psychoanalytic tradition. Other developmentalists refer to these abilities 
as socio-cognitive and socio-emotional abilities, because they see them as the cognitive 
aspect of social or emotional skills. They may thus use terms like social understanding 
(Dunn, 1988), emotional understanding (Denham, 1998), social intelligence (Thorndike, 
1920) or emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1993).
There are significant commonalities between attachment researchers, 
psychoanalytic theories of the development of mentalisation and self and early 
developmentalists who stress the importance of the mother-infant interaction in the way 
that the self and relationship patterns become organised. More recently, Fonagy, Target 
and co-workers introduced the reflective functioning model (Fonagy, H. Steele, Moran, 
M. Steele, & Higgitt, 1991; Fonagy et al., 1992; Fonagy, Target, H. Steele, & M. Steele, 
1998). In their model of reflective functioning, they reconceptualise the attachment model 
through the integration of selected concepts and findings from the theory of mind model, 
mother-infant developmental research and psychoanalytic theory.
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Table 1
Different Terms used for Mentalisation (adapted from Whiten, 1994)
Terms Authors
Linking and mental mechanisms (Freud, 1911,1933)
Consciousness of the feelings of 
their fellows, social intelligence
(Thorndike, 1911,1920)
Folk psychology (Wundt, 1916)
Depressive position (Klein, 1935,1940)
Phantasy (Isaacs, 1991)
Naive psychology (Heider, 1958)
Alpha function (Bion, 1962a, 1962b)
Second-order intentionality (Dennet, 1971)
Intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979,1980, 1998)
Theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978)
Metarepresentation (Pylyshyn, 1978)
Belief-desire reasoning (Davidson, 1980)
Mindreading (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1994)
Mentalising (Morton, 1989)
Perception of intentionality (Dasser, Ulbaek, & Premack, 1989)
Social-referencing (Feinman, 1991)
Mentalistic theory of behaviour (Pemer, 1991a)
Representational theory of mind (Pemer, 1991b)
Mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 1998)
Emotional intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Goleman, 1995)
Reflective functioning (Fonagy etal., 1998)
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Affect and Cognition:
Developmental Questions and Insights from Neuroscience
The relationship between affects and reason has preoccupied philosophers and 
psychologists. Affect and reason are generally seen either as essentially opposed to each 
other or as integrated. In the field of psychology, the former view is represented by 
theory of mind (Tomkins, 1981) who stresses that affects are expressed through facial 
expressions and function as a primary biological motivating mechanism, and also his 
student, Ekman et al. (1972), who proposes that the five basic emotions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear and disgust occur universally and cross-culturally. Others like 
Lazarus (1984) have argued that cognition is an essential component in affective 
experience, but this notion is rejected by other psychologists like Zajonc (1984) who have 
argued that is possible to have affects without cognitions.
In Chapters 1 and 2 the dominant paradigms presently used in empirical research 
and theory to understand children’s developing capacities to mentalise will be introduced. 
More specifically, the theory of mind approach will be introduced in Chapter 1. In 
Chapter 2 the focus will be on the current research findings regarding the development of 
affective understanding, as well as attachment theory and research. The relatively new 
reflective functioning model will then be presented. In Chapter 3 the question of the 
assessment of cognitive emotional abilities or emotional intelligence will be addressed, 
and the approach used to evaluate the three measures that will be used in this thesis, will 
be presented.
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CHAPTER 1
ASSESSING THEORY OF MIND IN PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILDREN: 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
One of the most important achievements of modem 
developmental psychology has been to draw attention to 
the universal and astonishing capacities of young 
children to mind-read: it appears incontrovertible that by 
four years of age, children interpret behaviour in terms 
of the agent's mental states. In John Morton’s chilling 
phrase, they “mentalise they convert behaviour they
see others perform, or that they themselves perform, into 
actions driven by beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, 
knowledge, imagination, pretence, deceit, and so on. 
Behaviour is instantly, even automatically, converted 
into what the agent may be thinking, planning or 
wanting. (Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1996, p. 158)
Theoretical and Historical Background
During the past 15 years, cognitive developmental psychologists focusing on the 
development of theory of mind have provided us with startling evidence of the abilities of 
very young children to understand their own behaviour, as well as that of others, based on 
beliefs and desires. Furthermore they have also presented fascinating observations and 
experiments suggesting that from early infancy we attribute intentionality to people. The 
term theory of mind has come to designate a specific domain of inquiry and research for 
philosophers, cognitive developmentalists and primatologists, with the broad goal of 
understanding the ability, which may or not be exclusively human, to predict and explain 
the actions of self and others based on their knowledge, beliefs and desires.
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Philosophy o f Mind and Theory o f Mind
Philosophy of mind has to a large extent informed the terms of reference, the 
terminology, the priority issues and major debates of theory of mind research. Following 
the collapse of behaviourism in the 1960’s, the philosopher, D. Lewis (1966) introduced 
the notion that our access to the minds of other people (and also to our own mental states) 
is mediated by an implicitly held theory of the functioning of the human mind. Interest in 
the developmental acquisition of theory of mind abilities developed much later in the 
1980’s with the re-emergence of the Rationalist and Empiricist debate and competing 
theories of folk-psychological abilities as innate or learned. The philosopher Fodor 
(1992) has been one of the most influential proponents of the theory that theory of mind 
abilities are innate and develop through a process of maturation rather than through 
learning. Subsequently the introduction of Simulationist accounts of the development of 
our mind reading abilities by philosophers such as Gordon (1992a) posed an additional 
challenge to the orthodox theory-theory account, stimulating further interest in 
developmental research.
The philosophical proposal that intentionality or “aboutness” is a defining feature 
of mental phenomena, first introduced by Brentano (1924), has also come to be a central 
concern for theory of mind researchers. The central postulate is that mental attitudes, 
such as beliefs and desires, are “about” some state of affairs. Based on these ideas, 
Dennett (1987) proposed the notion of the “intentional stance”, that is, that we assume 
that people’s behaviour can usually be explained and predicted by reference to their 
beliefs and desires. He provides the following description of the strategy used in the 
intentional stance, “....first you decide to treat the object whose behaviour is to be 
predicted as a rational agent, then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, 
given its place in the world and purpose, then you figure out what desires it ought to have, 
on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to 
further its goals in the light of its beliefs” (p. 17).
The introduction of these ideas around intentionality from philosophy of mind into 
developmental psychology has contributed to the unique character and appeal of theory of 
mind. It has stimulated a substantial body of research on the early emergence and 
development of intentionality in infants, and it is intriguing and productive to think of the 
development of children’s mentalising, as well as the intergenerational transmission of 
mentalising abilities in these terms (Fonagy, H. Steele, & M. Steele, 1991; Fonagy, M. 
Steele, Moran, H. Steele, & Higgitt, 1992). On the other hand, it has also contributed to a 
state of affairs in which the child is treated more as a philosopher and a philosophical
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construct than as a child who develops mentalisation capacities in the context of affective 
relationships within the family.
Historical Roots o f Theory o f Mind within Developmental Psychology
The preoccupation with the development of children’s abilities to understand that 
other people have a psychological and not just a physical existence, and with children’s 
discovery that one mind can interface with another through intentional signals, can be 
traced back to the very early developmentalists such as Baldwin (1906). Piaget’s 
reworking of Baldwin’s theories (Piaget, 1967/1972), and his work on thinking, 
egocentrism, empathy and role taking, made a substantial contribution to understanding 
the development of children’s theory of mind (Bretherton, 1991). He suggested that a 
developmental shift takes place at age 7 or 8 when children become capable of 
distinguishing thoughts from reality, and also capable of decentring and taking the 
perspective of others into account.
With the rise of behaviourism under J. B. Watson (1930), a barren period followed 
in which there was little interest in the development of children’s mentalising abilities. In 
the 1960's and 1970's, the cognitive revolution was associated with renewed interest in 
children's social cognition in the application of Piaget's ideas on cognition to the arena of 
social phenomena (Chandler, 1982). Interest in how children come to participate in and 
understand the social world was reflected in research topics such as person perception, 
perspective taking, the ability to infer another person's thoughts, feelings, perceptions and 
intentions, psychological causality, as well as moral judgement. This interest broadened 
to examining the importance in social interactions for social cognitive development, and 
the relationship of social behaviour and peer relationships to social cognitive 
development, and the development of self-concept (Lamb & Sherrod, 1981).
Theory o f Mind Pioneers
It was Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper (1978) speculating on whether 
chimpanzees could have a theory of mind that provoked the exciting debates and drew 
attention to the development of theory of mind. They claimed that there was evidence 
suggesting that chimpanzees had an understanding of some of the mental states of the 
human actors in the laboratory. This stimulated philosophers and psychologists to think 
about what it means to possess a theory of mind of another creature, and what could be 
regarded as evidence of theory of mind. This undertaking initially proved surprisingly 
difficult and it was only after Wimmer and Pemer (1983) provided a clear experimental
paradigm with the invention of the now famous false-belief task that theory of mind 
research took off.
The false-belief task focuses on a character, Maxi, who helps his mother unpack 
the groceries and leaves a bar of chocolate at a specific place with the idea that he will 
come back later and eat it, but while he is out of the room his mother puts the chocolate 
somewhere else. At this point, children are asked to imagine where Maxi will look for his 
chocolate when he re-enters the room. Given that the child knows where Maxi’s mother 
put the chocolate, the task requires the child to inhibit his own knowledge about the real 
whereabouts of the chocolate and think about what Maxi would think based on what he 
knows, and thus to realise that Maxi has a false-belief. Pemer (1991b) considers this to 
be indicative of a representational theory of mind. The fact that children passed this task 
between the ages of 4 and 5, created somewhat of a stir in the world of developmental 
psychology, given that it now seemed that theory of mind abilities emerged 2 or 3 years 
earlier than would be expected based on Piaget’s theories.
Attention subsequently shifted to looking at earlier manifestations of theory of 
mind abilities such as the understanding of desire (Pemer, 1991a; Wellman & Woolley,
1990), pretend play (Dunn, 1988; Lillard, 1993), the emergence of emotional 
understanding in the family context (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade,
1991) and the role of language in theory of mind development. At the same time, others 
such as Premack (1990), and Astington and Gopnik (1991) were attempting to define and 
delineate the development of intention and the understanding of intentionality, considered 
a cornerstone of theory of mind (Dennett, 1987; Frye, 1991; Pemer, 1991a; Wellman, 
1993). Subsequently, researchers such as Bretherton (1991), Frye (1991) and Premack 
(1990) asked questions about the origins of theory of mind and intentional understanding 
in infancy. It is these investigations that led theory of mind researchers to integrate 
findings from infant communication studies and intersubjective theories of development 
(Bretherton, 1991), and also to consider also the implications of results coming from 
social attribution studies (Premack, 1990). More recently, interest has shifted to 
understanding the relationship between theory of mind, executive function (Pemer & 
Lang, 2000), and social affective competence, as well as to understanding the 
neurological and developmental relationship between cognition and affect (Klin, Schultz, 
& Cohen, 2000).
Different Theoretical Positions
A number of competing theoretical accounts of the development and nature of
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theory of mind have been proposed. These include theory-theory accounts, simulation 
accounts and nativistic accounts, with many accounts adopting some aspects of these 
three theories, but with different emphases. Furthermore, accounts from somewhat 
different theoretical perspectives, such as intersubjective and social-functionalist 
accounts, have also been very influential. More recently, the emphasis has shifted away 
from the experimental testing of theories, to an empirically driven approach based on the 
use of fMRI studies.
These different theoretical accounts will be briefly summarised.
Theory-Theory Account
Premack and Woodruffs initial view (1978) that it is a theory that the child 
develops, now represents the most widely accepted perspective on the process of the 
development of a theory of mind (Astington & Gopnik, 1991). The growth and 
elaboration of the child’s theory of mind is seen as the result of “theory building” as the 
child reviews and reorganises his or her existing theory in order to account for new 
“evidence” in the environment. Accordingly, Astington and Gopnik state that, “the 
mechanism of development [...] is internal to the theory-formation process itself [...] and 
driven by both internal factors, such as a “drive for simplicity”, and external factors, such 
as accumulating evidence” (p. 40). This process of theory formation and testing is seen 
as underlying the development of children’s understanding of the mind.
From this perspective, developmental changes are seen as reflecting major 
theoretical shifts and reorganisations affecting many different areas simultaneously. The 
emergence in infants of a symbolic capacity at 18 months of age is regarded as an 
example of such a shift, as is the development of false-belief understanding around the 
age of 4. According to Astington and Gopnik (1991), the theory-theory position is 
corroborated by both the findings that success on false-belief tasks coincides with the 
recognition of false-belief in oneself and the recognition of the distinction between 
appearance and reality. This view is also in line with research findings that the child’s 
current theory is initially quite “resistant to evidence” and that counterfactual evidence 
does not lead straight away lead to the transformation of the theory, but requires multiple 
occurrences.
Gopnik and Astington (1988) are both learning theorists, but while Gopnik (1996) 
maintains a child as scientist account of the acquisition of theory of mind, Astington and 
Jenkins (1995) argue that what children learn is not a theory but rather cultural 
explanations and social roles, in short, the folk psychology of their particular culture. 
Astington (1994), in the Vygotskyan tradition, develops the position of Bruner (1990) that
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children learn to give meaning to what people do in the process of acquiring the ability to 
construct narratives about themselves and others. She considers that children come to 
regard themselves as intentional beings and begin to communicate intentionally because 
their spontaneous gestures are treated as if they are intentional by their parents. In the 
same way, children learn from their parents to attribute mental states to themselves and to 
others, and that others also have similar emotions and thoughts.
Gopnik (1996) argues that children, like scientists, make and review theories 
based on available evidence. Like modular theorists, Gopnik and her co-workers 
(Gopnik, Capps, & Meltzoff, 2000) consider the theory formation mechanisms to be 
innate and designed to construct revisable causal maps of the world, but they reject the 
notion that the subsequent acquisition of theory of mind is determined primarily by 
maturational processes. This group of investigators attribute rich cognitive structures to 
infants (Gopnik et al., 2000), and propose that, in addition to the theory formation 
mechanism, infants possess certain innate theories (or something very much like a 
theory), including an initial starting state theory of the movement of objects, as well as a 
theory of people and actions (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). This 
allows them to make predictions, and is the foundation of later theory of mind 
development.
Like the intersubjectivists, Gopnik et al. (2000) propose that babies are bom 
assuming an important link between themselves and others, that their own internal 
feelings and those of others can be represented in the same way, and that there is a link 
between their own feelings and the actions of others. They consider Meltzoff and 
Gopnik's (1993) findings that babies show an interest in imitating a range of facial 
gestures, as evidence that babies have an ability to map their own facial sensations onto 
the visual display of, for example, someone sticking out their tongue. In this way these 
representations are thought to be linked, and this process is argued to also be present in 
other very early social behaviour, or primary intersubjectivity, as described by Brazelton 
(1982), by Trevarthen (1979, 1980) and by Tronick and Cohn (1989). In addition, 
Gopnik et al. conclude that there is a link between die capacity of infants to imitate facial 
expressions, and both the development of empathy and theory of mind.
Simulation Theory
Like Goldman (1992) and Gordon (1992a), Harris and collaborators (Harris, 
Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989) argue that the “theory metaphor” provides a 
seriously misleading characterisation of children’s developing abilities to understand 
other minds. The simulationist position is that humans are able to understand others, not
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by applying concepts and theories, but through the process of imaginative identification 
with another person’s perspective (Carruthers & Smith, 1996). The argument is that we 
are intuitively aware of our own mental states and that we all have in common mental 
states such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It follows that we can simulate another 
person's experience, actions and reactions through a process of identification (Harris et 
al., 1989), a process which does not require us to have either implicit or explicit theories 
of mind. Simulation accounts differ somewhat with regard to whether this process 
requires conscious awareness of the first-person states which are extrapolated to the other 
person, or whether the process of imaginative identification could, in fact, take place 
without conscious awareness (Gordon, 1992a) so that it would not be accessible to 
inquiry.
Wellman and Bartsch (1989) have reviewed theory-theory accounts and 
simulationist accounts on the basis of data from experimental studies and developmental 
observational research in naturalistic settings. Their findings confirm that 2-year-old 
children can report their own mental states; however, this is initially limited to the 
reporting of desires, and there is no evidence that they report beliefs or thoughts. This is 
contrary to what we would expect from a simulationist perspective; it is more compatible 
with the theory-theory account that young children have to develop a sense of 
representational nature of mental states. It would seem that such mental states require 
more than just experiencing and reporting them, and that young children first have to first 
develop a conceptual understanding of such states within a broader naive psychological 
framework. Wellman and Bartsch stress that they do not deny the importance of 
children’s experience of mental states in their developing understanding of mind. They 
argue rather that the evidence supports a characterisation of an early desire-based theory, 
broadening to a later belief-desire theory.
Theory o f Nativism
Proponents of the theory of nativism maintain that innate mechanisms in the brain 
mediate “theory of mind”. The maturation of these mechanisms are seen as underlying the 
growth and limitations of children's understanding of their own and other minds. 
Nativists such as Baron-Cohen, Leslie and U. Frith (1985), Leslie (1987), as well as U. 
Frith, Happ6 and Siddons (1994) have formulated their ideas through the study of autism. 
Their research points to neurologically based deficits, and has arguably contributed to the 
conclusion that an innate neurological “theory of mind” substrate is responsible for the 
emergence of theory of mind capacities.
Leslie (1986) proposes that already at 3 or 4 months an infant's theory of body
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mechanism (ToBy) comes into play, processing information about objects based on their 
mechanical properties and leading to the distinction between agents and non-agents. He 
considers that the first theory of mind mechanism comes into being shortly afterwards, 
and that at roughly 6 to 8 months of age infants become capable of processing 
information about agents and their goal directed actions. This is seen as paving the way 
for engagement in interactive events such as joint attention, and social referencing, with 
the second theory of mind mechanism maturing at between 18 and 24 months. This 
module is regarded as enabling the child to produce metarepresentations.
Baron-Cohen and Swettenham (1996) argue for the existence of an innate 
mindreading system, or social brain, that has evolved specifically to enable the attribution 
of mental states to agents. They consider that from the outset, when children are 
developing an understanding of the mind, the eyes and surrounding areas are of particular 
importance.
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001) have put forward the 
argument that there are two evolutionary determined specialised neurocognitive 
mechanisms that have evolved to interpret the movement of agents and objects. 
Following Dennett (1987), they argue that humans, from infancy on, use folk (or 
intuitive) psychology to deduce the cause of an agent’s actions, and that they use folk (or 
intuitive) physics to deduce the cause of a non-agent’s movement. In their most recent 
paper, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) differentiate between two levels of theory of mind 
abilities. The first level is designated as “low-level skills” that are present from infancy 
and include the ability to: 1) identify agents (Premack, 1990); 2) determine whether an 
agent is looking at you (Baron-Cohen, 1994); 3) determine if the agent is expressing a 
basic emotion, as well as the type of emotion (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972); 4) 
demonstrate shared attentional skills such as following gaze and pointing gestures 
(Tomasello, 1995); 5) express concern or basic empathy when another person is 
distressed and respond appropriately to other emotional states (Saami, 1999); and 6) 
being able to identify another’s basic goals and intentions (Premack, 1990). The second 
level is designated as “higher level social intelligence” and includes: 1) being able to 
attribute a range of mental states to oneself and others, such as pretence, deception and 
belief (Leslie & Keeble, 1987); 2) being able to recognise and respond appropriately to a 
range of more complex emotions (Cook, Greenberg, & Kusche, 1994); 3) being able to 
link mind-reading to action and language (Tager-Flusberg, 2000); 4) being able to use 
mindreading to predict and even manipulate the behaviour of others (Whiten, 1991); 5) 
knowing what is appropriate in different social contexts and what others will think of our
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behaviour; and 6) empathic understanding of other minds in social relationships and 
communication.
Social Functionalist Perspective
Dunn (1993, 1994) has greatly contributed to our present understanding of the 
development of children’s mentalisation. She has contributed many chapters to books on 
theory of mind development and is frequently quoted by theory of mind theorists; 
nonetheless, she is more of a social cognitivist and would probably not identify herself as 
a theory of mind theorist. The explanation for this is that Dunn and her colleagues (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski, et al., 1991; Dunn & Brown, 1993) have collected fascinating 
longitudinal evidence of children’s developing social abilities manifested in everyday 
close relationships with parents and siblings. Evidence from these and other studies by 
Dunn and colleagues (Deater-Deckard, Dunn, O'Connor, Davies, & Golding, 2001; Dunn, 
2000, 2002; Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000) have provided invaluable data indicating 
that, in the context of their close relationships, children show an interest in, and 
understanding of, the connections between inner states and behaviour much earlier than 
experimental work with false-belief tasks would lead us to expect. Her work has also 
drawn attention to individual differences in the development of understanding other 
minds, and suggests that the quality of family relationships, including the extent to which 
parents use mental state words, may contribute to these differences.
Intersubjectivity
Whiten (1994) points out that the notion of intersubjectivity is a term borrowed 
from philosophy of mind and applied to parent-infant interaction. Intersubjective theories 
are based on studies of the micro-structure of the vocalisations, gestures and facial 
expressions observed when infants and parents interact. These theorists conclude that 
what is observed can best be described as a meeting of minds or, literally, the sharing of 
subjective states. Trevarthen (1979) defines intersubjectivity as the mutual adjustments 
of conscious voluntary agents (subjects) to one another’s mental states. He suggests that 
a primitive intersubjectivity exists from birth, (Trevarthen, 1980).
While intersubjectivity did not initially appear in the indexes of the principal 
theory of mind monographs (Harris et al., 1989; Pemer, 1991a; Wellman, 1990), this 
situation changed when interest turned to the origins of intentionality in infancy. At this 
point Bretherton (1990) began contributing to key theory of mind texts, and introduced 
the term “theory of mind” in her studies analysing the communicative abilities of infants. 
Bretherton and her co-workers (Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghley-Smith, 1981) as well as 
Stem (1985) interpret the data as showing that from very early on infants take an active
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stance in initiating and terminating social engagements with their caregivers. Examples 
include early facial imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) and turn taking (Stem, 1985). 
Bretherton (1991) introduced the notion that with infants of 2 to 8 months, the caregiver's 
“rich interpretations” of the infant's social behaviour as meaningful are cmcial and create 
an intersubjective domain that eventually leads the infant to behave socially in an 
intentional manner.
Like Trevarthen (1979), Bretherton (1991) uses the term secondary 
intersubjectivity to refer to the capacity that develops at around 9 months to consider 
intentional interactions involving shared topics or objects. According to her, secondary 
intersubjectivity marks the emerging ability to understand others as psychological beings 
and reveals a rudimentary (experienced, nonreflective) theory of mind. Bretherton refers 
to a large body of research evidence suggesting that infants are capable of intentional 
communication; this research evidence forms the basis of her theory. It will be presented 
in more detail in the subsequent section in which the focus will be on the developmental 
determinants of theory of mind in infancy. Experimental and observation evidence of the 
ways infants use gaze direction, repair failed communication bids and use the affective 
expression of their parents in ambiguous situations (Bretherton, 1991), will also be 
considered.
New Contributions from JMRI Studies
C. Frith and U. Frith (2000), on the basis of their own extensive research and a 
review of research to date, conclude that the existing evidence points to the involvement 
of the medial frontal cortex and the temporo-parietal junction in studies where volunteers 
have to make inferences about the mental states of others.
These studies also indicate that the medial frontal cortex is involved in monitoring 
our own thoughts, actions and feelings. A PET study involving mental state attribution 
and in which volunteers read Happe’s Strange Stories (Happe, 1994) showed activation of 
the medial frontal cortex, in particular Brodman’s area 8 and the adjacent area 9 (Esteves 
et al., 1994). A similar pattern was observed in a fMRI study using cartoons and in which 
the mental states had to be taken into account, as well as what another person would 
know; this study also points to the involvement of Brodman’s area 8 in mentalisation 
(Goel et al., 1995). There is evidence that the temporo-parietal region is also activated 
when interpreting biological motion (C. Frith & U. Frith, 2000), but not mechanical 
motion. This could be seen as broadly supporting both the large body of work on the 
early development of intentionality detection abilities in infants and also the theory that
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these abilities have their developmental precursors in the interpretation of causal 
biological motion.
Studies of the brain regions involved in theory of mind tasks have also provided 
evidence that there is an overlap between those areas involved in mental state reasoning, 
as well as those areas involved in affective processing and predispositions to respond. 
This is seen as reflecting the survival and adaptive advantages that these capacities 
provide in terms of interpreting and predicting the behaviour of others and in making 
quick distinctions about potential friends or foes. On the basis of these studies, Klin et al. 
(2000) suggest that mentalising is an outgrowth of social-affective experiences, thus 
reversing the direction of earlier proposals put forth by researchers such as Baron-Cohen 
(1988) who argued that it is theory of mind mechanisms which make possible reciprocal 
social engagement and communication. Klin and colleagues reject the notion that 
specific theory of mind mechanisms are necessary for social development, and at these 
are neurobiologically pre-determined. They point out that from an evolutionary 
perspective, it would be peculiar if social engagement and relationships, so essential for 
survival, were dependent on the development of relatively sophisticated theory of mind 
abilities. It is much more likely that it would be based on a highly redundant and plastic 
system, rather than on a single mechanism, and indeed they suggest that there are many 
different types and pathways to social behaviour and competencies. They conclude that 
to focus separately on thought and feeling is probably artificial and unhelpful in the 
context of social engagement. Moreover, they consider these different elements as being 
integrated to such an extent that they cannot be fully understood in isolation.
Klin et al. (2000) regard social competence as multifaceted, involving both 
primitive and more sophisticated cognitive aspects that act synergistically. They draw 
attention to the fact that there is a component to social engagement which requires the 
processing of fast-shifting facial expressions, voice inflections and posture and which is 
automatic, immediate and intuitive. This process takes place at the same time as more 
sophisticated aspects of social engagement involving pretence, teasing, humour, irony, 
and metaphor. These conclusions are consistent with other findings (Esteves et al., 1994) 
that subjects show autonomic responses to different facial expressions even when they are 
unable to identify the face even when the face is masked. It is also consistent with 
LeDoux’s work (1996) on the fear response from which he draws the conclusion that 
there are two routes for processing emotions: a “fast and dirty” route that involves 
autonomic response and action, and a “slower” more reflective route involving 
recognition. Depending on which route is impaired, this can lead to recognition without
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emotion, or emotion without recognition.
Current Models and Status of Research 
on the Developmental Determinants of Theory of Mind
In the next section, the different accounts of theory of mind development from 
early infancy on will be presented, followed by a review of empirical evidence. A large 
body of empirical research has been stimulated by the debates between proponents of 
differing accounts of the nature and development of theory of mind, as well as by the 
attempt to test hypotheses regarding the links between theory of mind deficits and autism.
Theory o f Mind and Infancy
Without the luxury of language as a tool to assess the presence of mentalising 
during infancy, researchers and theorists must essentially rely on interpretations of infant 
behaviour observed in natural or experimental conditions. Current theories have been 
influenced by empirical evidence coming from two very different child development 
literatures. The first can be referred to as the “cognitive competency model” and involves 
social attribution studies in the tradition of Heider and Simmel (1944). The studies focus 
on how children perceive the movement of relatively simple objects such as geometric 
shapes, and investigate under which minimal conditions they attribute social agency to 
the objects. The classic study by Heider and Simmel drew attention to the fact that we 
readily use anthropomorphic explanations such as hitting, chasing or playing to account 
for the movements even of geometric shapes, as long as the movement maps onto our 
expectations and experiences of how people interact. The findings suggest that when the 
contact was short and rapid, it was interpreted as hitting, but when it lasted longer, it was 
interpreted as loving, suggesting that we systematically attribute positive and negative 
valences to contact between agents. When the shapes moved in a contingent fashion, but 
without contact, a psychological relationship or communication was attributed them.
Findings based on this paradigm have been challenging to integrate with a second 
source of data, that of complex evidence of the early social, affective and communicative 
behaviour of infants. This involves observational data of abilities as they emerge 
developmentally and it is thus more difficult to clarify the exact process involved. 
Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore in constructing a model of early social 
development. The two models are complex and will be briefly presented.
Perception o f Movement Model
The findings that infants as young as 6 and 12 months can differentiate self­
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propelled objects (Premack, 1990) and goal directed behaviours (Gergely, Nadasdy, 
Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Leslie & Keeble, 1987), have led a number of theorists to conclude 
that infants are hardwired to perceive intentional movement. This is regarded by a 
number of theorists as the foundation of social cognitive abilities and theory of mind 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994a; Premack & Premack, 1995).
Premack and Premack (1995) have proposed an account of the development of 
mentalisation which stresses the connection between social competence and theory of 
mind. They propose a theory that distinguishes between three hierarchically organised 
systems. The first system is defined as a perceptually based “intentional system” in 
which objects that are self-propelled and move in a goal directed fashion are seen as 
intentional, whereas induced movement in objects that are not self-propelled is seen as 
causal. In this system, intentionality is seen as intrinsically associated with action, rather 
than as a mental state which is how it may generally be regarded by adults. Premack and 
Premack’s position is that infants are hardwired to interpret perceptual input concerning 
movement in these ways, and that they distinguish between intentional movement of self- 
propelled objects and causal movement of non-self-propelled objects. The second system 
is cognitive in nature and is defined as a “social system”; it involves the evaluation of the 
interaction between intentional objects. A negative or positive valence is attributed to the 
interaction depending on whether or not it is judged to be social (hitting or helping) and 
whether its intensity is positive (caressing) or negative (hitting). The third system is 
defined as “theory of mind” and involves the representation and interpretation of social 
interactions in terms of basic states of mind such as desires, beliefs and emotions.
Social-Affective Experiential Model
Instead of seeing infants as being hardwired to analyse movement in their 
perceptual field as per the perception of movement model, Spelke and colleagues 
(Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995) argue that infants have inborn abilities to see 
humans as different from other objects and agents, and they interact with them using 
different principles and with different expectations. Supporting evidence for this position 
includes findings that infants give preferential attention to faces (Johnson, Dziurawiec, 
Ellis, & Morton, 1991) and that they imitate people and not inanimate objects (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1983a, 1983b).
There is a significant body of experimental evidence suggesting that from very 
early on, infants have particular expectations of humans. Evidence that infants expect 
humans to react in a contingent fashion comes from a number of studies, including that 
using the well known still-face paradigm (Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton,
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1978). When mothers who have been interacting with their infants in a playful way 
assume a still face, infants as young as 2 months have been shown to first make attempts 
to continue the interaction and then to protest vigorously. That babies expect reciprocity 
in social interaction is evident in imitative games of infancy such as peek-a-boo 
(Trevarthen, 1979), and studies suggest that infants as young as 9 months have an 
understanding of the roles involved in maintaining joint activity. Imitation is regarded as 
a precursor of reciprocal engagement, and new-born infants have been shown to imitate 
facial and hand gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), as well as the emotional expressions 
of adults; they also respond with interest when adults imitate them (Field, Healy, 
Goldstein, & Guthertz, 1990).
There is evidence that infants of as young as 3 months show sensitivity to gaze 
monitoring and it has been noted that infants look less at adults who turn their head, or 
close and avert their eyes (A. J. Caron, R. Caron, Roberts, & Brooks, 1997). By 5 
months they can follow the gaze of another person towards what becomes an object of 
joint attention (Butterworth, 1991), and by the age of 6 months they are able to engage in 
a vocal dialogue involving tumtaking and emotional communication (Ricks, 1989). There 
is evidence that at 9 months infants use pointing with the intention to communicate a 
request (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979).
As Wellman and Lagattuta (2000) point out, what is in dispute is not that infants 
display these social behaviours, but rather how to interpret these actions. Most infant 
development researchers observe a transition in the social interactions of infants between 
8 and 14 months, which is thought to reflect changes in the awareness of self and others. 
Some theorists interpret the evidence as suggesting that infants have an intentional 
understanding from very early on (Premack, 1990; Trevarthen, 1979). Others, including 
modularists like Leslie (1994) and Baron-Cohen (1994), place the emergence of an 
intentional understanding at the end of the first year, as do Tomasselo (1995) and 
Bretherton (1991).
Wellman and Lagattuta (2000) make the observation that if it were the case that 
infants showed intentional awareness of persons, this would fit well with the findings 
reviewed earlier, namely that at this time infants show an ability to follow visual gaze, 
engage in social referencing and communicate with simple gestures and single words. 
However, they opt for a more cautious interpretation in suggesting that infants begin to 
recognise regularities in human movement, which sets the stage for later intentional 
interpretations. They contend that infants learn by the end of the first year that human 
arms, for example, move towards objects, and so begin to understand components of the
30
object-directed aspect of intentional action. While they make it clear that it is possible 
that infants do indeed acquire understanding of intentionality earlier on, they point out 
that the most cautious interpretation places the emergence of intentional understanding in 
the latter half of the second year. Bartsch and Wellman (1995) interpret this evidence as 
indicating that, at this early stage, infants understand that people have subjective 
experiences such as desires and emotions.
Theory o f Mind o f Toddlers during the Pre-School Period
Pioneer theory of mind researchers have drawn attention to the remarkable fact 
that pre-schoolers from diverse cultures all around the world are able to predict the 
actions of test characters like Maxi, indicating that they are able to understand that Maxi 
will be guided by a false-belief in looking for the chocolate. This is regarded as evidence 
that at age 4 children use the triad of beliefs, desires and actions central to everyday 
psychology as well as a causal explanatory system that is also referred to as a belief- 
desire reasoning framework (Fodor, 1987; Wellman, 1990).
Other tests of these abilities include unexpected transfer and deceptive box tasks 
in which, for example, pencils are transferred from a pencil case to a candy box, after 
which the child is asked where someone will look for pencils when they enter the room 
and see the pencil case and candy box. A review of studies using over 500 false-belief 
conditions with different procedural conditions confirms that regardless of the different 
conditions employed, children’s chances of succeeding at this task increase dramatically 
as they get closer to age 4 (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). As Wellman and Bartsch point 
out, the earlier pre-occupation with designating age 4 as the critical point in the 
development of theory of mind led to the simplistic conclusion that a mentalistic 
understanding of people was an all or nothing affair, and could be reduced to one single 
component, the understanding of false-belief. Like Dunn (1988) they helped to redress 
this imbalance by providing data obtained in more naturalistic contexts.
Wellman and Bartsch (1988) analysed the development of children’s early use of 
mental stage terms in order to examine whether or not this would be shown to be in line 
with laboratory based findings that children’s mentalistic understanding emerges only at 
the age of 4. Their findings suggest that children develop a primitive understanding of 
inner states and the motivations for actions long before they understand belief. At 18 
months of age, children use words such as “want” and “mad” to refer to desires and 
emotions, but they only begin to use “think” and “know” to refer to thoughts and beliefs 
by 3 years of age. They argue that children use a primitive desire psychology to think
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about themselves and others and that at the beginning of the pre-school years, children 
already have a subjective psychological understanding of people. There is also laboratory 
evidence suggesting that very young children can understand that different people may 
have different emotions and desires (Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994); this evidence 
includes a charming foodpreference study showing that 2-year-olds are able to take into 
account an adult experimenter’s preference for broccoli even when the toddlers 
themselves prefer fishcrackers (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Wellman and Bartsch 
conclude that developmental data corroborate the hypothesis that a substantial 
transformation in children’s conceptual thinking takes place at around age 4. However, 
the change happens gradually, starting with early mentalism based on an understanding of 
desires at 2 years of age, followed by references to thinking at 3 years of age leading to a 
belief-desire understanding that emerges gradually until it is well-established at the age of 
4.
Research by Dunn and her co-workers (Dunn, 1988; Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 
1987; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991), using a combination of observational data 
collected in naturalistic settings as well as theory of mind assessments, has provided us 
with invaluable information about the development of children’s understanding of 
themselves and others. Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski et al. (1991) in a study focusing on 
the period between 33 and 40 months of age, found a statistically significant shift in the 
use of causal references centering on internal states. Initially, children mostly made 
causal references in the context of talk about behaviour and actions, but by 40 months of 
age there was a predominance of causal references centering on internal states in 
conversations with their mothers as well as siblings. Dunn and colleagues also 
investigated whether this growth seemed to take place primarily in contexts motivated by 
self-interest, or in more reflective-pretend situations where children were less concerned 
with overt goals or were pretending, or in positive situations where children were sharing 
humour, playing or expressing caring or concern. The results indicate that at 33 months 
of age causal discourse was as likely to be related to self-interest as to reflective-pretend, 
but that by 40 months of age, children were more likely to use causal explanations in a 
reflective-pretend context. In the specific context of conflict, they found a substantial 
increase in children’s use of reasoning with their antagonists, but somewhat sadly, this 
was used in the service of self-interest, rather than for conflict resolution or for taking into 
account the other person’s goals and desires. The study also included tests of the 
understanding of the feelings of others, as well as false-belief assessments (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995), and the results showed that the frequency of use of causal discourse at
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33 months of age was related to performance on the false-belief task 7 months later. 
Furthermore, children who used causal discourse in disputes performed better on the 
assessment of inner state understanding at 40 months of age. Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, 
et al. have also shown that false-belief performance at 40 months was correlated with 
individual differences in children’s connectedness (the degree to which the speaker takes 
the other speaker into account) in their conversations with friends when assessed 7 
months later.
In another study, Youngblade and Dunn (1995) found that individual differences 
in joint pretend play were correlated with children’s performance on false-belief tasks. 
More specifically, the frequency with which children take on the roles of others was 
correlated with the ability to explain the actions of others in terms of false-belief 
understanding. Kavanaugh, Eizenman, and Harris (1997) have shown that most children 
begin to engage in pretend play before their first birthday. By 24 months, they are 
already engaging in a range of pretend behaviours, and by 30 months, they use the term 
“pretend” and show that they understand that when others pretend, it is not for real. 
Pretend play, with its endless explorations and discussions of what the different 
characters may or may not do, is a core feature of friendships between the ages of 4 and 5. 
Dunn (1988) also suggests that it transforms the quality of friendships, and fosters an 
understanding of social roles, social rules and other minds.
At a theoretical level, there are still unresolved differences in the way pretend is 
understood. Leslie (1987) argues that like theory of mind, pretend involves meta- 
representation. Pemer (1991a, 1991b) disputes this explanation and points out that 
engaging in pretend only requires secondary representations, which he also refers to as 
prelief. Lillard (1993) adds a cautionary note in stating that the ability of young children 
to make the real-pretend distinction should not be equated with an understanding of 
pretend as a mental state.
Humour in children has been relatively neglected as a focus for understanding the 
development of theory of mind, in spite of being a core aspect of adult relationships. Not 
surprisingly, differences in the use of humour by very young children in their family 
relationships have been found to be related to their performance on false-belief tasks, with 
frequent jokers performing better than their more serious peers (Woodworth, 1993). 
Dunn, Brown, and Beardsall (1991) note an increase in the use of jokes between 33 and 
47 months of age. The content of jokes has also been found to differ depending on the 
relationship, suggesting that children are already aware that their siblings and mothers 
find different things funny. For example, jokes with siblings often involved the
33
disgusting and the forbidden, whereas these topics were perhaps wisely avoided when 
joking with their mothers. A number of researchers (Dunn, 1988, 1999; Tizard & 
Hughes, 1984) have concluded that humour and the playful context in which it occurs 
provide opportunities for social learning. Dunn (1988) argues that, like pretending, the 
playful atmosphere permits a distancing which sustains the child’s innovating capacity 
and allows them to happily try things out. Furthermore, she points out that humour 
allows the child to explore the limits of insult, criticism and the expression of disgust in 
an emotional relationship, and to discover another type of intimacy through the sharing of 
absurdities and humour.
Theory o f Mind at Six and Beyond
Impressive though the abilities of pre-schoolers to understand the beliefs and 
desires of others may be, they are only a fraction of the abilities which adults use in 
everyday communication, work, love, play and art. Except in emotionally charged 
contexts, pre-school children struggle to know what others may feel and think (Flavell, 
Green, & Flavell, 1995), and it is only during the primary school years that children 
develop the more general ability to know when others are thinking, as well as imagine 
what they may be thinking. By the end of the primary school period, children have 
generally also developed a more nuanced understanding of the behaviour and thoughts of 
others as individual, based on personal characteristics which are likely to be stable over 
time, and depending on knowledge, experience, tastes and personalities (Wellman & 
Lagattuta, 2000).
At the same time, children begin to display the capacity to talk about their own 
thoughts (Wellman, 1990) and, increasingly, to think about themselves in mental state 
and trait terms rather than mainly in terms of their physical attributes, abilities and 
context (Harter, 1999; Wellman, 1990). These shifts are apparent in their self- 
representations and reflect the capacity to form higher order generalisations based on their 
behaviour, performance and interpersonal relations (Harter, 1999). In contrast to younger 
children who describe themselves in absolute terms, for example, as always being nice, 
older children begin to describe their qualities as more mixed, depending on the situation. 
While this may help to protect them from all-out negative self-evaluations, their growing 
critical abilities also present new challenges to their self-esteem. If we accept Harter’s 
model of self-esteem as reflecting the ability to reconcile aspirations with actual abilities 
or qualities, the question is whether this ability is associated with theory of mind.
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Theory o f Mind and Language Development
Recent research reveals interesting causal links between language acquisition and 
intentionality. There is evidence that joint attention in infants of 1 year and younger, 
considered an early manifestation of an awareness of others as intentional agents (Baron- 
Cohen, 2000b), predicts language acquisition (Sigman & Ruskin, 1999). Tager-Flusberg
(2000) has suggested that this is because early word learning depends on the 
interpretation of words and communicative gestures as intentional acts. At the end of the 
pre-school period, language abilities have been shown to be associated with theory of 
mind performance on false-belief tasks (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Happe, 1995; Tager- 
Flusberg, 1996). Moreover, J. G. De Villiers and P. A. De Villiers (1999) found that 
language abilities, especially complement syntax, predicted variance in later performance 
on false-belief tests. In general, language based representational systems have advantages 
in that they provide both a syntax which facilitates thinking about human behaviour and 
symbolic representations elaborate enough to overcome experiential evidence which 
would otherwise be compelling (Pemer, 1991b). Language also opens a door that gives 
access to interactions in which children can get to know the minds of others (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991).
Research involving subjects with autism, Asperger syndrome, deafness and 
language delays indicates that the relationship between verbal IQ, theory of mind test 
performance and actual social abilities can be complex, especially when psychopathology 
enters into the equation. Theory of mind performance is generally correlated with verbal 
ability (Happe, 1995), but a gap between performance on theory of mind tests and real- 
life social abilities has been noted (U. Frith et al., 1994). Klin et al. (2000) and Tager- 
Flusberg (2000) suggest that language can be used as a kind of scaffolding by high 
functioning autistics to “hack out” solutions to theory of mind tests; however, autistics do 
not have the ability to use these capacities spontaneously as passers normally do. Indeed 
Klin et al. call attention to the need for a theory of mind in action. This they argue would 
involve a series of additional skills, including the ability to react intuitively to inflections 
and tone of voice as well as to fast-changing emotional expressions such as those 
measured by Baron Cohen’s Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, 1997).
Individual Differences
There is new evidence confirming that the quality of the early attachment to the 
caregiver has a significant impact on theory of mind development (Fonagy, Redfem, & 
Charman, 1997). There are also considerable individual differences in the pace of theory
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of mind development depending on factors such as family composition and emotional 
climate, as well as parenting practices and competencies with regard to talking about 
emotions and their causes.
Youngsters with siblings seem to be at an advantage in acquiring theory of mind, 
and there is evidence that 3 to 5-year-olds with siblings pass false-belief tasks earlier than 
only children of the same age (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Pemer, Ruffman, & Leekman, 
1994). At this stage it is not clear whether these advantages are temporary or enduring, 
and whether the gap closes or opens up during the primary school years. Play 
experiences with older siblings (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) and interactions with older 
people generally (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; C. Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, 
Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996) have also been observed to contribute to 
children’s early understanding of beliefs and mental states. The advantage of having 
siblings may be partly due to the additional opportunities for pretend play, especially role- 
play (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). The latter provides an excellent opportunity to 
imagine and begin to understand the beliefs, desires and actions of others, and has been 
shown to predict false-belief understanding (Astington & Jenkins, 1995).
The extent to which families talk about feelings and their causes has been shown 
to be predictive of children’s abilities in this regard at age 3 and of affective perspective 
taking at age 7 (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991). These positive influences are in 
contrast with the negative impact of growing up in families with high negative affect or 
with parents who have a high need for control and who are especially intolerant of any 
adverse behaviour (Denham, Renwick-DeBardi, & Hewes, 1994; Dunn & Brown, 1994).
Sex-differences in performance on theory of mind tasks are generally in line with 
findings of female advantages in folk psychology (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Halpem, 1992) There is certainly 
evidence that already by age 2, girls talk more extensively about emotions (Dunn et al., 
1987), but this may partly be because parents tend to talk more about the causes and 
consequences of feelings to girls (Haden, Haine, & Fivush, 1997; Reese, Haden, & 
Fivush, 1993). The findings are not conclusive, however, and it is not clear until what 
age these differences persist (Dunn & Brown, 1993).
Theory o f Mind, Social Adaptive Functioning and Psychopathology
Following the interest in the account of autism as a deficit in mentalisation, a 
number of studies were conducted to explore whether theory of mind difficulties were 
also evident in other clinical groups which present with social difficulties. With the
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exception of schizophrenics, who showed marked difficulties on second order theory of 
mind tests during acute episodes (Corcoran, 2000), there were no positive findings, and 
depressives showed no impairments on second order tests. Happe and U. Frith (1996) 
also did not fmd evidence of deficits on second order tests in conduct disordered children 
aged 6 to 12, although as they themselves observe, a more challenging theory of mind 
test, such as the Strange Stories, might have been more appropriate. They noted that there 
was evidence of problems in mentalisation in interpersonal contexts and concluded that 
children with conduct disorder may not have a theory of mind deficit, but rather a 
distorted theory of mind or a theory of nasty minds, based on their experience of growing 
up in environments where negative reactions predominate. Problems with executive 
control, rather than theory of mind, were also considered as an alternative explanation. 
Similarly, Blair and co-workers (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1996; Blair, Jones, Clark, & 
Smith, 1997) found no theory of mind deficits using the Strange Stories with psychopaths 
who had committed first degree murders, leading them to the conclusion that psychopaths 
have deficits in empathy, rather than in theory of mind (Blair, 1997).
Such deficits in empathy should arguably also be associated with measurable 
deficits in mentalisation about others, and findings by Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy, 
Target, M. Steele, & H. Steele, 1997) suggest that this is indeed the case. Using measures 
of attachment and reflective functioning, this group of researchers have found evidence of 
significant deficits in mentalisation in borderline patients (Fonagy et al., 1998), as well as 
in psychopathic and non-psychopathic prisoners who have committed first degree 
murders (Fonagy et al., 1997). These findings suggest that there are indeed significant 
mentalisation deficits in some non-autistic clinical groups with social difficulties, when 
compared with normal controls. It may well be that the lack of significant findings with 
regard to theory of mind deficits in populations with psychosocial difficulties is due to the 
measures being pitched at too low a level.
Evidence from neuroimaging studies point to considerable overlap in the areas 
involved in affective processing and theoiy of mind, and there appears to be a 
neurofunctional loop involved in their integration in social responses (Damasio, 1994; 
Klin et al., 2000). Seen from this perspective, a number of different scenarios could 
explain social and interpersonal difficulties, and it is here that research is evolving.
Theory o f Mind and Executive Control
Authors such as Wimmer and Haiti (1991) have suggested that as the child 
acquires increasingly sophisticated mental state concepts, a better understanding of his or
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her own mental states, as well as a better control of mental processes, should follow. This 
hypothesis has also been used by researchers to explain the co-occurrence deficits in self- 
control and theory of mind that are associated with schizophrenia (C. Frith & Corcoran, 
1996) and autism (Carruthers & Smith, 1996). Executive control is used as a label for 
processes involved in the control of behaviour such as planning, co-ordinating, and 
controlling sequences of action (Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991) and can be said to 
refer to the ability to focus on a specified goal despite distracting alternatives. Results 
from a number of studies broadly support the notion that executive function and theory of 
mind are linked (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Gordon & Olson, 1998; Hughes, 1998; 
Pemer & Lang, 2000), although there are some exceptions (Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, & 
Boshart, 1997). Pemer and Lang (2000) have recently attempted to clarify the 
developmental relationship between theory of mind and executive function by reviewing 
the data samples pertaining to autistic versus normal subjects. They conclude that all 
recent brain imaging evidence suggests that common regions are involved in theory of 
mind and executive function, and that there is substantial experimental data supporting 
the view that there is a direct link between the two. At this point, the exact nature and 
direction of the relationship remains unclear.
Controversial Issues in Assessing Theory of Mind in Older Children
It is unlikely that theory of mind researchers would argue today that children of 4 
years old have fully developed mentalisation abilities, i.e., at the same level of 
sophistication as adults. At the same time, the legacy of the research which has equated 
theory of mind acquisition with passing false-belief tasks has persisted at a 
methodological level. The limitations of using standard second order false-belief tasks 
with children above the age of 6 have been conclusively demonstrated (Happe & U. Frith, 
1996). As is reflected in Table 2, the vast majority of available theory of mind measures 
assess skills which children have generally mastered by the time they are 4 years old, and 
it is evident that there are few tests pitched at the 6 year old level and beyond. 
Unfortunately, promising exceptions like Happe’s Strange Stories, which is said to be 
pitched at an 8 year old level, have predominantly been used in studies of autism, and 
there is no data on the performance of normal and other clinical samples.
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Table 2
Some Tests o f Theory o f Mind (Adaptedfrom Baron-Cohen, 2000)
Test of Theory of Mind Authors Age o f 
passing
Understanding of different desires 
as in food preferences
Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997 18 months
Seeing leads to knowing Pratt & Bryant, 1990 3 years
The functions of the brain Wellman & Estes, 1986 3-4 years
The mental physical distinction Wellman & Estes, 1986 3-4 years
Tests of deception Sodian & U. Frith, 1992 4 years
First-order false-belief tasks Wimmer & Pemer, 1983 4 years
The appearance reality distinction Wellman & Estes, 1986 4 years
Recognising mental state terms 
in a list
Baron-Cohen & Goodheart, 1994 4 years
More complex causes of emotions 
(i.e., desires and beliefs)
Harris et al., 1989 4-6 years
Second-order false-belief tasks Happe, 1993 6 years
Understanding metaphor, sarcasm 
and irony
Happd, 1994 8 years
Reading mental states from 
the expression in the eyes
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 6-12 years
Faux pas recognition Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998 Adult
Reading complex mental states 
in the eyes
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997 Adult
Understanding what another Goel et al., 1995 Adult
would know
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Promising results from a study of children’s theory of memory (Fabricius & 
Schwanenflugel, 1994) demonstrate that it is possible to conduct research into these 
developing capacities and that older children have the ability to think about what 
contributes to the construction of their theory of mind. The results show a developmental 
trend in the capacities of children aged 6 to 8 to appreciate the impact of participation in a 
card-sorting task on recall. At the moment, very little is known about the abilities of 
children to use meta-cognitive abilities and to consider the mental processes underlying 
their own mental states as well as that of others in everyday caring and conflictual 
exchanges. The apparent complexity of defining older children’s mentalisation capacities 
has probably contributed to the dearth of research attempting to map the 
development of mentalisation through the school years to adulthood, as well as to the 
absence of literature regarding mentalisation and theory of mind in older children. Part of 
the challenge is to find meaningful markers and valid assessments of these changes in 
children’s abilities and cognitions regarding perceptions and affective states in others and 
in themselves, especially as they affect interpersonal processes. The emphasis in these 
assessment tasks needs to shift from the prediction of action towards understanding 
mental processes and the capacity to use this understanding in interpreting affective and 
interpersonal processes.
Limitations of Theory of Mind Research and Theories
On the whole, one of the major limitations of theory of mind research has been its 
cognitive bias and its relative neglect of the development of affective understanding, that 
is to say, the broader relationship between theory of mind and affect regulation. This 
criticism echoes that of Klin and colleagues (Klin et al., 2000), that what is lacking is a 
theory of mind in action. Furthermore, there is no theory of normal and abnormal 
development. As a result, there is no effective model for understanding the role of theory 
of mind in affective and behavioural disorders, other than disorders with a strong genetic 
component, such as autism, which is associated with severe deficits in socio-cognitive 
skills. The conceptual links and empirical evidence linking theory of mind to affective 
cognition and regulation will be considered in more-detail in Chapter 2.
Another limitation in theory of mind research is that the development of self- 
understanding has been largely neglected. All the tests to date have focused on 
understanding the mental states of others, and there are no theory of mind measures 
focusing on children’s understanding of their own affects and mental states. In this thesis, 
an attempt will be made to address this gap by introducing a measure, the Child
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Reflective Functioning Scale (CRFS: Target et al., 2001), which assesses mentalisation in 
respect to the self, as well as to others.
The review of studies investigating whether or not theory of mind deficits are 
associated with psychosocial problems has also revealed a lack of age appropriate and 
more nuanced theory of mind measures. The measures generally used assess relatively 
low level skills. This suggests that theory of mind researchers have failed to consider 
whether or not these tests would be appropriate for detecting the more nuanced 
mentalisation deficits which likely to be associated with psycho-social difficulties.
Finally, another limitation is the neglect of theory of mind development in school 
age children, particularly its development beyond the acquisition of second order 
representation. Traditional theory of mind tasks have frequently focused on the correct 
labelling of outcomes and on the prediction of action, rather than on children’s ability to 
appreciate the mental processes involved. With a few exceptions, theory of mind 
theorists and researchers have shown little interest in the subsequent development of 
mentalisation.
Conclusion
Theory of mind researchers have provided us with compelling evidence of the 
early development of children’s theory of mind: 1) the early emergence of intentionality 
in infancy; 2) false-belief understanding at around 4 years of age; and 3) understanding of 
intentionality in everyday communication. The studies focusing on theory of mind 
deficits in individuals with autism have contributed to our understanding of the 
prerequisites for theory of mind development. More recently, neurological studies are 
breaking new ground and providing data that allow for a reassessment of the current 
understanding of the dynamic relationships between theory of mind, affect, executive 
function and social adaptation. Despite these significant contributions and promising 
recent developments, a number of limitations have been identified. The principal 
problems are the absence of a model of psychopathology and the neglect of a theory of 
self. In addition, the absence of more sophisticated tasks is impeding research and 
advances in our understanding of the development of a more sophisticated, adult-like 
theory of mind involving cognisance of the interpretative nature of mentalisation. It is 
clear that new methods for studying the mentalisation capacities of older children need to 
be developed.
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CHAPTER 2
AFFECTIVE UNDERSTANDING, ATTACHMENT AND REFLECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LINKS 
WITH THEORY OF MIND
This chapter will focus on three domains of research and theorising that overlap 
with, or that have integrated important concepts and findings from the paradigm of theory 
of mind, namely that of affective understanding, attachment and reflective functioning. It 
will be argued that research addressing affective understanding, as well as attachment 
theory and research, complement empirical and theoretical contributions derived from the 
theory of mind paradigm. Lastly, the new reflective functioning paradigm that exploits 
the interface between the three previous paradigms, and that presents an attempt to 
integrate relevant findings and concepts from these paradigms, will be presented.
This chapter will introduce each of the three theoretical domains, discuss the way 
each domain links theoretically to theory of mind and overlaps with or complements this 
paradigm, before discussing the empirical research that clarifies the relationship between 
the paradigms. This review of the literature will lead to the elaboration of hypotheses that 
will be used to consider the validity of the test instruments used.
Affective Understanding
Over the past twenty years, an impressive, systematic and nuanced body of 
knowledge centering on affect and, more specifically, on children’s affective 
understanding, has emerged. The resulting emotional understanding model complements 
the work on theory of mind in many ways. Furthermore, the findings from the large and 
rapidly growing body of research in this area underscore the contribution of 
environmental factors, especially factors within the family, in the development of a range 
of different mentalising capacities having to do with the understanding of affects in the 
self, others, and also in the context of relationships. The conclusion and evidence that 
relational factors contribute significantly to children’s capacities to mentalise about 
emotions present a healthy challenge to the biological determinism favoured by many 
theory of mind researchers.
Undeniably, the most radical challenge to simple biological determinist accounts 
comes from research linking the quality and complexity of parents* abilities to mentalise 
about their early relationships with their own parents (when measured before the birth of
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their children) with the future emotional understanding and theory of mind abilities of 
their children. In addition, it is apparent that affective understanding is much more 
heterogeneous than is suggested by its treatment in theory of mind literature. The extent 
to which researchers and theorists have managed to both identify different aspects of 
affective understanding, and collect evidence suggesting that different factors may predict 
different skills reflects the sophistication of the research and the richness of the domain 
under investigation. Equally promising is the delineation of the more sophisticated skills 
used in understanding mentalisation, affects, beliefs, thoughts and desires and their 
impact on close relationships and on intrapsychic processes. This shift extends and 
redefines the subject and the objectives of research and theory to include more complex 
levels of mentalisation, whether seen in terms of theory of mind, cognitions about 
affective and relational processes or reflective functioning.
In what follows, the aim will be to present a comprehensive review of the field of 
affective understanding, but rather to focus on introducing the key theories and findings 
related to emotional understanding that overlap with, and complement those of the theory 
of mind paradigm. The focus will be on affective understanding as it is derived in the 
course of development, as well as those factors that are likely to impact on the 
development of this understanding. Furthermore, the evidence that processes occurring 
within the family and close relationships affect the development of affective 
understanding will be considered, as well as the theories regarding the possible processes 
involved.
Different Theories and Overlap with Theory o f Mind
While the notion of developing a theory of mind remains attractive, the narrow 
conceptualisation of theory of mind as being primarily concerned with thoughts and 
beliefs at a relatively basic 4-year-old level, along with the neglect of affect, has resulted 
in the findings associated with this paradigm being of limited interest except with regard 
to autism. Given that emotions can be regarded as intentional states in much the same 
way as beliefs (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002), there is no theoretical 
justification for this neglect.
As outlined in Chapter 1, one of the major contributions of the theory of mind 
literature has been the robust evidence that at age 2 children focus on desires, goals and 
intentions, but that as they get closer to 3 years of age, they increasingly take into account 
the beliefs of others and what others know and think. This capacity to be sensitive to 
various appraisal processes has been shown to be the case whether the focus is on
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children’s emotional judgement or on spontaneous references to mental states. What 
relevance does this finding have for a model of the development of children’s affective 
understanding? Dunn’s (1988) observations suggest that the development of the ability to 
conceive of other minds in terms of a belief-desire psychology is in fact paralleled by a 
shift in children’s ability to understand the social world. From a theory of mind 
perspective, this development is seen as reflecting either a growing sophistication of 
children’s understanding of mental representations (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Bartsch 
& Wellman, 1995; Pemer, 1991b) or maturing skills at simulating the appraisal another 
child might make (Harris et al., 1989; Gordon, 1986, 1992b). As Harris (2000) points 
out, these accounts fail to identify possible facilitators of the development of these 
abilities, and development is seen only in terms of cognitive maturational processes. It 
has become clear from Dunn’s (1988) contributions that children’s developing 
understanding of others emerges in the context of social affective relationships and 
communicative interactions within the family. The questions that remain do not concern 
children’s theory of mind capacities per se, but rather the development of children’s 
capacity to understand affects in themselves and others, as well as in interpersonal 
relationships. In addition, there are also questions regarding the different bio-psycho- 
social factors that impact on, and contribute to this development, as well as the 
relationship between cognition and affect in this process.
In the course of this review, the names of researchers cited in Chapter 1, such as 
Dunn, Bretherton, Wellman and Harris (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 
1986; Dunn, 1988; Wellman, Harris, Baneijee, & Sinclair, 1995) will recur. These 
developmentalists have made important contributions to both theory of mind and 
affective understanding literatures. Researchers and theorists such as Campos (1983), 
Denham (1998), Dunn (1988) and Saami (1999) have developed empirically based 
models of the development of social and affective understanding in children. These 
models generally share the functionalist premise that emotions have interpersonal and 
intrapersonal regulatory functions. They also share the social-constructivist premise that, 
as Saami puts it, “...we learn to give meaning to our context dependent experience via 
our social exposure and our cognitive developmental capacities” (p. 12). The social 
context that these researchers have in mind is one in which the specific individual aspects 
of relationships are considered to be as important as other factors, such as gender and 
power relations. These models can be seen to contrast with nativist accounts of theory of 
mind development, in that it is relationships, rather than the maturation of innate modules, 
which are considered as driving the development of emotional understanding.
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The role of self-concern in developing the skills necessary for understanding 
affective signals and affective processes in relationships, and the dialectical relationship 
between the development of these abilities and a sense of self, self-efficacy and self­
regulation, are the central concerns of most theorists in this area. This concern with the 
development of the self can be seen as complementing the theory of mind notions that 
infants come to have a sense of the self as a “physical agent” (Leslie, 1994b), that in then- 
second year they show the beginnings of an awareness of the self as an “intentional 
agent" (Wellman & Phillips, 2001), and that by 3 to 4 years of age they show an 
understanding of the self as a “representational agent” (Pemer, 1991b; Wellman, 1990).
Dunn (1988) has proposed a functionalist “relationship” model of social 
understanding in which “development starts from the child’s interest in and 
responsiveness to the behaviour and feelings of others” (p. 186). She regards child 
factors such as the child’s agency and motivation to achieve goals in what is inevitably a 
social context of family relationships, as well as the child’s access to and participation in 
parental and family talk about emotions, as two central factors in the development of 
social understanding. Her model gives weight to the child’s developing sense of agency 
and self, to the cognitive changes which facilitate participation in discourse and argument 
and to “the affective significance of the tension between this self-concem and the child’s 
relationships with other family members” (p. 186). Dunn has been clear in her rejection 
of what she considers to be deterministic accounts in which emotional understanding is 
seen as determined by the quality of attachment relationships. She points to the empirical 
evidence that there is considerable variety in child outcomes regardless of parent factors, 
and suggests that relationships with siblings, friends and other adults can fill in the gaps 
left by inadequate relationships with their parents.
Denham (1998) places more emphasis on parental coaching and on the learning 
that takes place in relationships with parents. She regards parents* emotional 
expressiveness, their investment in explaining the causes of affects and the 
appropriateness of their affective responses to those of their children as central to the 
development of affective understanding. In a related vein, Harris (2000) has argued that 
parental expressiveness and narrative elaboration concerning incidents that are 
emotionally loaded are crucial, because they provide narratives which act as organisers of 
affect and affective memories for the child. Narratives about emotionally loaded events 
are thus thought to provide the mental scaffolding which helps the child to think about 
similar events when he or she subsequently encounters them. The argument is that 
parental elaboration nurtures the development of cognitive skills involving encoding and
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recall, as well as autobiographical memory (Bruner, 1990; Fivush, Haden, & Reese,
1996) of emotionally charged episodes. In line with this, other researchers have 
concluded that narrative capacities are central to the development of the self and 
emotional organisation (Stem, 1985; Wolf, 1990), as well as to emotional and 
behavioural regulation (Slade, 1994). Children’s language skills also make possible what 
Neisser (1991) has called the “extended and remembered self’, which is considered to be 
based on narratives and memories. Indeed, the self can be seen as partially linguistically 
constructed, a process which, as Harter (1999) points out, is highly interpersonal and 
which has been referred to as the narrative co-construction of the self (Crittenden, 1994; 
Nelson, 1993). In this process, semantic memory of parental narratives is seen as 
underlying children’s perceptions of their traits; episodic memory of events is seen as 
underlying their knowledge of emotion scripts surrounding these events; and finally, 
autobiographical memory is seen as codifying experiences specific to the self.
These different contributions to the field , of affective understanding, i.e., the 
detailed investigation of family and relationship factors and the mechanisms of their 
impact on the development of affective understanding in childhood, contrast strongly with 
nativistic accounts of theory of mind development, as presented in Chapter 1. Before 
turning to a review of these relationship factors, the relationship between affect and 
cognition will be considered in order to clarify the role of cognition in emotional 
processes.
Different Aspects and Levels o f Affective Understanding
What is affective understanding? Research indicates that far from being a singular 
ability affective understanding is multifaceted, and a multitude of skills and abilities have 
been delineated. These include: 1) the ability to identify and label emotion expressions 
(Camras & Allison, 1985; Denham & Couchoud, 1990; Ekman et al., 1972; Field & 
Walden, 1982), as well as the capacity to decode and label complex emotional reactions 
based on facial expressions, body language and vocal qualities (Saami, 1999); 2) 
possessing a vocabulary of emotion words and mastering emotion language, thus being 
able to use emotional labels to communicate about emotions (Bretherton et al., 1986; 
Denham, 1998; Saami, 1999) and closely related to. the mastery of emotion scripts which 
are considered to be learned and to provide a sense of predictable sequences following 
certain events (C. Lewis, 1994; Russell, 1991; Saami, 1999); 3) knowledge of the 
common situational elicitors of emotion and the ability to understand the emotional 
consequences of these situations (Denham, 1998; Denham & Zoller, 1991; Dunn &
Hughes, 1998; Fabes, Eisenberg, Nyman, & Michealieu, 1991; Hams et al., 1989; M. 
Lewis & Michalson, 1983; Strayer, 1986); 4) being able to consider the intentions and 
inner states of others (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000); 5) the capacity to take into account 
unique information about others which may influence their emotional reactions (Gnepp, 
1989; Gnepp & Gould, 1985), including information concerning the cultural background 
of the person, their personality, disposition, likes and dislikes, hopes and desires, past 
experience, or the information that they have available to them; 6) the capacity to 
understand differences between inner-feelings and outer-expression and to understand 
social and cultural practices, as well as personal motivations for dissemblance (Denham, 
1998; Saami, 1999); 7) the capacity to understand complex emotions and to consider 
mixed emotional reactions (Harter & Buddin, 1987); 8) the capacity to appreciate the 
impact of time on affective reactions; 9) becoming aware of emotion regulation strategies 
(Altshuler & Ruble, 1989; Beaver, 1997; Bemzweig, Eisenberg & Fabes, 1993; Denham, 
1998); 10) the capacity to understand the impact of the nature of the relationship, 
including its closeness and the degree and direction of power in the relationship, on the 
intensity and depth of emotional reactions, as well as on the genuineness of emotional 
displays (Saami, 1999); 11) the capacity to respond with empathy to another person’s 
distress (Denham, 1998; Kestenbaum, Farber & Sroufe, 1989; Zahn-Waxler, Radke- 
Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992) and the ability to tolerate the distress that this may 
in turn evoke (Fabes, Eisenberg, & Miller, 1990; Saami, 1999); and 12) awareness of 
emotional communication within relationships as well as relationship knowledge and 
understanding (Fonagy & Target, 2003; Fonagy et al., 1997; Saami, 1999).
How do all these different abilities relate to one another and to other intellectual 
abilities, and is there a more efficient way to categorise? Greenspan (1979) has proposed 
a hierarchical model of social intelligence consisting of social sensitivity (manifested in 
role-taking and social inference), social insight (including social comprehension, 
psychological insight and moral judgement) and social communication (including 
referential communication and social problem solving). Social intelligence and 
conceptual and practical intelligence are regarded as components of adaptive intelligence. 
The latter, together with physical competence and socio-emotional adaptation 
(temperament and character) form the basis of personal competence.
Much less is known regarding the capacity to consider affects and mental states in 
relational contexts, and its impact on emotional reactions and interactions in close 
relationships. This has remained a relatively neglected area of study and is regarded as a 
key dimension of what Fonagy, Target, and co-workers have termed “reflective
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functioning”.
Affect Understanding and Self-Understanding
Many theorists, and especially theory of mind theorists, seem to assume that we 
have an automatic understanding of and access to our emotional reactions, the assumption 
is also that we should be able to identify our basic emotional responses. However, there 
is evidence that this is not necessarily the case, and some children and adults have severe 
difficulties in identifying their own emotional reactions (Krystal, 1988; Saami, 1999). In 
its extreme form, this has been designated by some researchers as a condition called 
alexithymia. As Saami concludes, it may well be that some children who have had 
developmental experiences in which their self-states and intentionality have not been 
recognised, or who have suffered abusive or mentally ill parents, struggle to identify their 
own internal states. Self understanding also involves more a sophisticated ability, 
appearing roughly at age 4, to organise autobiographical memories as personally 
experienced, and it requires a command of emotional language to give expression to and 
communicate these personal reactions (Saami, 1999). From Fonagy*s perspective, 
children’s understanding of their own affects as mental phenomena, constructed by 
mental processes rather than being determined by events, can help them realise that 
mental states are amenable to change and are ultimately under their own control. This is 
a first step to considering mental strategies such as the redefinition of situations or the use 
of distraction to change emotional experience.
Harter (1993) regards the self as an “active cognitive construction” developing 
from what Cooley (1902) has described as self-feeling and from the experience of being a 
cause of things; a similar notion found in the theory of mind literature and referred to as a 
sense of agency. Most recent writers on the subject consider this experience of the self as 
being a cause, as having intentions and an impact as central features of the self. Dunn 
(1988) adopts a similar position in that she sees the child’s sense of agency in 
relationships as playing an important role in the development of self-awareness. In this 
context, empirical findings relating childhood depression to differences in attributional 
styles (Seligman & Patterson, 1986) underscores the importance of children’s sense of 
their own agency. Depressed children were more likely to perceive the locus of control as 
external, rather than as internal.
Dunn (1988) also theorises that children learn to be sensitive to the way others 
perceive them, that they start to engage in a process of social comparisons at a much 
earlier age than has been theorised and that this process is driven by the child’s desire to
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be accepted and effective in the social world. In her account, the development of self- 
understanding is linked to the development of understanding of others, and both develop 
in social and close relationships. Young children’s displays of shame and guilt, as well as 
the questions they ask and the jokes they make when siblings and adults comment about 
their behaviour, can be seen as evidence of the emergence of this concern about the 
approval of others. This occurs long before children are able to articulate this concern. 
Dunn raises the interesting point that while cognitivists emphasise the maturation of 
cognitive abilities as driving development in self and emotional understanding, emotion 
itself may stimulate the development of cognitions and the understanding of emotions; 
i.e., children learn to argue and think about those situations that cause the most conflict 
and the most heated emotions.
Denham (1998) argues that a combination of the child’s cognitive abilities and 
socialisation or emotional reactions to the child underlies the development of what she 
refers to as the self-conscious or social-emotions. Her choice of these descriptives is 
interesting and reflects the interplay of the child’s cognitive ability to see the self as a 
separate object that can be evaluated, the emotional reactions of significant others, and 
the internalisation of these reactions which results in generating pride or shame and 
subsequently more complex feelings and perceptions regarding the self.
The role and importance of self-representations as mediators of affect, motivation 
and behaviour is increasingly being recognised at a theoretical level (Harter, 1999). 
Harter (1999) proposed a Piagetian developmental model in which young children refer to 
behavioural and physical characteristics, preferences and group membership in their self­
descriptions, whereas primary school children use trait-like attributes (friendly, 
intelligent, kind, fun to be with) in their self-descriptions. Damon and Hart (1988) 
describe a developmental trajectory in self-representations that goes from descriptions 
centered on the self, to descriptions focusing on interpersonal characteristics such as 
social skills in adolescence, to descriptions related to belief, personal philosophy and 
morality in adulthood.
The clarity and consistency of self-beliefs has been shown to be linked with self­
esteem, and the evidence suggests that the less clear people are about their own attributes, 
the less positive they feel about themselves (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). Interestingly, 
people with higher self-esteem tended to slightly overestimate the uniqueness of their 
attributes, although they were more accurate in describing their performance in an 
interaction than were those with low self-esteem.
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Affective Understanding, Affect Regulation and Self Regulation
In spite of the remarkable progress in this area over the past two decades, affect 
regulation remains one of the most challenging areas of investigation (Thompson, 1994). 
In part, the problem is due to the inherent complexity of affect regulation in and of itself, 
and the inevitable tension in considering applying rules and regulating emotion at the 
very time when it is at its most urgent, powerful, passionate and messy. Another 
fundamental difficulty faced by researchers is defining effective affect regulation, given 
that for many of life’s difficulties, there are no optimal solutions (Saami, 1999). This 
predicament is illustrated by the observation that children are often punished for 
expressing anger, no matter how appropriately they express it to adults. Saami suggests 
that success in affect regulation ultimately depends on the individual’s appraisal abilities 
and on the extent to which his or her way of dealing with affect contributes to a sense of 
self-efficacy.
Saami (1999) defines affect-regulation as “the ability to manage one’s subjective 
experience of emotion, especially its intensity and duration, and to manage strategically 
one’s expression of emotion in communicative contexts. Optimal emotion regulation also 
contributes to a sense of well-being, a sense of self-efficacy and a sense of connectedness 
to others” (p. 220). This definition is similar to that of Thompson (1994) and Walden and 
Smith (1997). It is also remarkably similar to current understandings and definitions of 
self-regulation; indeed, the term “regulation” implies a certain control by the individual 
whether it is conscious or not (Saami, 1999).
From a developmental perspective, temperament and the parent’s ability to 
facilitate the development of regulatory capacities, for example, by helping the infant 
return to a calm state when distressed, have been identified as important factors in affect- 
regulation (Thompson, Gil, Burbach, Keith, & Kinney, 1993). Some studies have 
suggested that these two factors are not independent, and there is evidence indicating that 
mothers modulate their socialisation practices depending on their perceptions of the 
emotional vulnerability of their children (Fabes et al., 1994). There is also evidence of 
links between temperament and inhibitory control and later development of conscience 
and moral sensibilities (Kochanska, Murray, and Coy, 1997). While temperament is 
frequently regarded as a biological given, closer analysis of the way it is defined indicates 
considerable overlap with affect regulation (Walden & Smith, 1997). This, and the fact 
that it is extremely difficult to assess temperamental differences in infancy (Underwood,
1997), suggest that some caution is required when attributing differences to temperament.
In contrast to the models proposed by Eisenberg (1991) and Kochanska et al.
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(1997) in which temperament is regarded as pivotal, Denham (1998) considers the 
contribution of parental socialisation, including modelling, contingent responding and 
coaching, as equally important. She proposes a model in which affect regulation is at the 
intersection of expressiveness, understanding and socialisation. In this model, parents 
explain why emotions happen, how they are experienced and how they are expressed, 
thus communicating the expectation that children will use their understanding to deal with 
their emotional experience. In addition, the commands and instructions that parents use 
to teach their children cultural expectations and family norms regarding the expression of 
emotion may also play a contributory role (Thompson et al., 1993). The socialisation 
hypothesis remains to be empirically verified, but there is research evidence suggesting 
that accepting, sympathetic, inductive and warm parenting facilitate effective emotional 
coping in children when distressed, whereas negative and punitive parental reactions 
increase distress and negativity (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1994; Fabes et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, parental use of problem solving was found to be negatively associated with 
anger in children, and parental emotion-focused responses were associated with children 
being able to use verbal means to cope with anger.
Saami (1999) has delineated a number of different “coping” strategies which may 
be used by primary school-aged children, including problem-solving, support seeking, 
internalising and externalising; they also use more emotion-focused strategies such as 
distraction, reframing, denial, avoidance, cognitive blunting and information seeking 
strategies, as well as dissociation from the situation. A flexible range of affect regulation 
strategies is considered optimal for self-development. Furthermore, the ability to tolerate 
intense and distressing emotions (in order to have ail opportunity to make sense of them), 
problem solving and recruitment of social support are all considered to be related to better 
self-efficacy. On the other hand, avoidance, denial and dissociation come at a high cost 
in the long run, they restrict children’s options, rather than expanding them as would 
social and problem orientated strategies.
Early Developmental Issues in Affective Understanding
Theory of mind theorists such as Melzoff and Moore (1989) argue that different 
emotional states are largely pre-programmed from birth. Their model assumes, as does 
that of Izard and Malatesta (1987) and Ekman and collaborators (Ekman et al., 1972), that 
different emotional and physiological states are prewired to correspond to specific 
emotional facial muscle patterns and expressions. There is an assumption that there is an 
“innate expression-to-feeling concordance” in the young infant (Malatesta, Culver,
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Tesman, & Shepard, 1989). Based on Meltzoffs work on the ability of young infants to 
imitate certain facial expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983a), they contend that when the 
infant imitates the emotional expression of the parent, this activates the same emotion in 
the infant via prewired connections. Critics have argued that this model of emotion as 
innately specified is limited, and does not account for how children come to appreciate 
the intentional aspect of emotions in others (Fonagy et al., 2002).
At present, the dominant biosocial view of emotional development sees the mother 
and infant as forming an affective communication system in which the mother plays a 
vital role in regulating the infant’s affective state (Beebe, Lachmann, & Jaffe, 1997; 
Brazelton, Kowslowski, & Main, 1974; Stem, 1984; Trevarthen, 1979; Tronick & Cohn, 
1989). Researchers using micro-analytic methods to analyse face-to-face interactions 
have produced evidence of the bi-directional influences of behaviour and mutual 
regulation of affective communication between mothers and infants (Beebe & Lachman, 
1988; Tronick & Cohn, 1989). A number of these researchers have identified facial and 
vocal mirroring of affective behaviour as central to parental regulation of affect in infants.
Gergely and Watson (1996) have proposed a social biofeedback theory of affect- 
mirroring in which infants learn to recognise and distinguish different affects through a 
special type of interaction with their parents, namely, in which the parents mirror the 
affective expression of their infants. He suggests that parental affect mirroring usually 
involves an exaggeration of the affect of the infant, which serves the purpose of marking 
the emotional display as being different from the real feeling of the parent. As Gergely 
(2002) points out, if the affect is not differentiated in this way, it might have a very 
different impact on the infant; he or she might attribute the emotional state, e.g., of 
sadness or anger, to the parent. At the same time, a high degree of contingency between 
the affect expressed by the parent and the emotion experienced by the infant is required 
for the infant to infer that the parent’s expression relates to him or her. Gergely suggests 
that the parent’s marked mirroring of affect functions in the same way as social 
biofeedback; it sensitises the infant to different internal emotional states. It also 
facilitates the development of a secondary representation of the infant’s affective states, 
which provides him or her with cognitive means for attributing mental states to the self.
Fonagy et al. (2002) speculate that the process of internalising the marked “as i f ’ 
expressions of the parent facilitate the development of a communicative code of marked 
expressions, which then opens up the possibility of pretend play. They also propose that 
contingency of the parent’s response and marked affect mirroring are central to state 
regulation in that the contingency of the parents* affect produces a pleasant feeling of
control in the infant and soothes the infant.
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Learning Affective Understanding in the Family
A number of different parent-child and family processes have been identified as 
having an impact on the development of children’s affective understanding.
Parent-Child Talk about Emotions
Parent-child talk about emotions, also referred to as coaching (Denham, 1998) and 
emotional didactics (Harris, 2000), has been identified as playing a pivotal role in the 
development of children’s emotional understanding. Studies from at least two major 
laboratories have shown that it is a predictor of concurrent and later emotional 
understanding when measured at 24 months, 33 months, and 6 years of age (Denham, 
Cook, & Zoller, 1992; Denham, Renwick-DeBardi et al., 1994; Dunn & Brown, 1994; 
Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991). A connection has been established between parent- 
child talk about emotions and children’s recognition of emotional expressions, as well as 
their understanding of emotion situations (Denham & Grout, 1992). Shipman and Zeman 
(1999) found a similar link in a study investigating emotional understanding in 
maltreating and non-maltreating environments. They reported a significant relationship 
between discussions indicative of a mother’s emotional understanding and that of her 
child’s emotional understanding.
Results from a recent study indicate that what may be important is not simply 
conversation about what someone feels, but rather the emphasis on why the person 
experiences specific emotions (Gamer, Jones, Gaddy, & Rennie, 1997). Also of interest 
is the finding that parental disclosure of emotion in disciplinary encounters has been 
found to facilitate the development of emotional understanding (Hoffman, 1994) by 
evoking what has been referred to as “hot” cognitions, providing fertile ground for 
emotional development (Denham, 1998). Harris (2000) suggests that parental talk 
provides coherent narrative representations that may help children think through the 
implications of particular emotional episodes. Harris contends that the way in which 
parents organise and put together narratives about emotional episodes provides a type of 
scaffolding for children. This helps them to work out the psychological implications of an 
episode in the same way that children perform better on the false-belief task when 
prompted to structure events, as shown by the research of C. Lewis (1994). Harris 
speculates that parents who are high elaborators, that is, who request and provide richly 
detailed accounts of past events with adjectives and modifiers indicative of the interest 
and emotional significance of events, teach children to organise events into narrative
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structures. These children thus benefit doubly; they learn this organising skill and they 
also have more opportunities to acquire a varied and elaborate stock of narratives about 
the causes and consequences of emotional events. The association between cooperative 
interactions with older siblings and children’s more sophisticated emotional 
understanding (Brown & Dunn, 1992) have been discussed previously in Chapter 1.
Parental Reactions to Children *s A ffect
The way parents respond to their children’s expressions of emotion, referred to as 
“contingency” by Denham (1998), has also been shown to contribute to the development 
of children’s emotional understanding. Positive maternal responsiveness, i.e., reacting 
with happiness to displays of happiness, with calmness to anger and with tenderness to 
sadness has been found to predict child emotional understanding (Denham, Renwick- 
DeBardi et al., 1994). Not surprisingly, the opposite was also found to hold true; negative 
parental responses to children’s emotional displays of anger and humiliation, as well as 
discouragement of children’s expressions of emotion were found to have a negative 
impact on children’s emotional understanding (Denham, 1998; Gamer, Jones, & Miner, 
1994).
Parental Modelling o f Emotions
Parental emotional expressiveness, also referred to as modelling of emotions 
(Denham, 1998), has been found to predict children’s emotional understanding (Denham 
& Grout, 1992; Denham, Renwick-DeBardi et al., 1994; Denham, Zoller et al., 1994). 
When negative emotions are expressed, the picture is more complex. Negative emotions, 
when expressed in a modulated way, provide children with opportunities to learn about 
the appropriate expression of negative emotions and thus contribute to emotion 
understanding. Children with mothers with a secondary negative expressiveness, such as 
sadness, also performed better with regard to emotional understanding. This suggests that 
this type of exposure, as long as it was not predominant, contribute to children’s 
emotional understanding. At the same time, studies reflect the toxic effects of negative 
affect, especially where it is predominant, intense or unregulated, on the development of 
children’s emotional understanding (Denham & Grout, 1992; Parka, Cassidy, Burks, 
Carson & Baum, 1992). Convergent results from a number of studies indicate that 
maternal anger is inversely related to children’s emotional understanding (Cummings et 
al., 1985; Cummings, Zahn-Waxler, & Radke-Yarrow, 1981; Denham, 1998; Dunn & 
Brown, 1994). More specifically, children with mothers who directed considerable anger 
towards their children had a lower comprehension of anger producing situations (Gamer, 
Jones, & Miner, 1994). Sadly, maternal expressiveness of negative emotions such as
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anger and contempt have been found to be related to children’s tendency to cover up 
emotions, presumably as a self-protective measure to avoid trouble with potentially 
explosive mothers (Bowling & Jones, 1993).
Other negative emotions, such as maternal sadness and tension, also had a 
negative impact on the development of emotional understanding in children, and their 
mastery of pro-social display rules (Bowling & Jones, 1993). This may be because these 
mothers are more self-involved and are less able to model suppressing displays of dislike 
for the sake of kindness.
Fantasy Play and Emotion Understanding
A number of studies have confirmed the link between fantasy play and emotional 
understanding, and individual differences in imagination and fantasy have been found to 
be significantly related to affective perspective taking (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; 
Griffin, Carlson, Taylor, & Wilson, 1997; Slomkowski & Dunn, 1992; Youngblade & 
Dunn, 1995) and empathy (Strayer, 1989; Strayer & Schroeder, 1989). Seja and Russ
(2001) also found consistent correlations between different dimensions of fantasy play 
and emotional understanding; the ability to access fantasy was related to the ability to 
both describe emotional experiences and understand the emotions of others. 
Interestingly, the impact of fantasy play appears to be specific to understanding of others, 
and it has not been found to be related to self-understanding. Frequency of affect 
expression in the play of girls was also correlated with understanding of emotions in 
others, pointing to subtle gender differences. In line with the simulation hypothesis of 
Harris et al. (1989), Seja and Russ suggest that imaginative abilities as reflected in fantasy 
play, and possibly facilitated by fantasy play, may be important in the imaginary 
identifications which facilitate the understanding of the affects of others.
Emotional Experience, Affective Understanding and Empathy
Researchers such as Denham (1998) point out that children need to have 
experienced moderate levels of a range of emotions in order to begin to consider the 
causes and consequences of these emotions. She suggests that children build on the 
experience and understanding of their own emotions in order to understand the emotions 
of others, and she found that children who show more emotion, as long as the emotions 
were predominantly positive, were better at emotional understanding (Denham, 1986). 
The research findings of both Denham (1998) and Cummings (1995) suggest that children 
who are emotionally secure, get their emotional needs met, are generally happy, and are 
more likely to engage in speculations about emotions, with the converse being true for 
children who show considerable negative emotion. The situation is somewhat different
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when it comes to negative emotions; children who rarely experienced these emotions 
showed more difficulties understanding similar feelings, while children who experienced 
a high frequency of negative emotions showed a good understanding of these feelings, but 
not other feelings.
Patterns of parental expressiveness with regard to emotion have also been shown 
to have an impact on children’s social behaviour and empathy. A number of studies by 
Denham (1998) indicated that maternal displays of anger, as measured either in 
laboratory sessions or home observations, predicted less pro-social behaviour by pre­
schoolers during free-play with peers. Denham concluded that consistent exposure to 
negative emotions in their parents is painful to young children and generally harmful to 
the development of their capacity to react sympathetically. Also correlated with 
responsiveness to peer emotions, were maternal reports that they explained their sadness 
and expressed their anger more rationally and in a more positive manner towards their 
children. Findings from other studies suggest that children who grow up in environments 
in which they observe parents responding in sympathetic ways to the negative emotions 
of others are more likely to show sympathetic concern to the distress of others (Eisenberg 
& Fabes, 1992; Fabes et al., 1990). Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992) conclude that children who 
grow up experiencing and observing empathic responses to their own and others* distress, 
have templates to refer to in empathy eliciting situations. On the other hand, some 
exposure to negative emotions in the context of generally positive parental emotions 
contributes to the development of empathy in children.
Emotional Understanding, Maltreatment and Psychopathology
There are still considerable gaps in our understanding of the emotional 
development of both children with histories of maltreatment and children with signs and 
symptoms of psychopathology (Greenberg, Kusche, Cook, & Quamma, 1995; Smith & 
Walden, 1999). Results from studies comparing maltreated and low-risk children suggest 
that maltreatment may be associated with deficits in basic understanding of emotions, 
problems in emotional regulation and poor social competence.
With regard to understanding emotional expression, there is evidence that 
maltreated children have difficulties posing and recognising facial expressions, especially 
of pure emotions (Camras, Ribordy, Hill, & Martino, 1990). Findings from more recent 
research indicate that differences in receptive language skills underlie the differences in 
emotional competence (on both facial expression cue tests and contextual cue tests) of 
maltreated pre-school-aged children compared to both high-risk and low-risk children
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(Smith & Walden, 2001). This suggests that maltreatment affects cognitive-language 
skill development and that this, in turn, affects performance on emotional understanding 
tasks (Smith & Walden, 2001). Deficits in expressive language skills in maltreated 
children have also been reported in a number of other studies. Maltreated children have 
been found to have less developed vocabularies for describing internal states, they talk 
less about themselves and use less internal state language (Beeghly & Cicchetti, 1994; 
Coster, Gersten, Beeghly, & Cicchetti, 1989). There is also research evidence that in 
verbal interactions with their caregivers their responses are frequently not linked to the 
preceding utterance of the caregiver (Coster et al., 1989), as that they avoid verbalising 
negative affects (Cicchetti, 1991). In addition, they have more difficulties identifying 
negative emotions, especially anger, when read brief vignettes in which emotions are 
elicited in a target child (Rogosch, Cicchetti, & Aber, 1995).
Findings from a recent study of primary school-aged girls with a history of sexual 
maltreatment by their fathers or paternal figures indicated that compared with a non­
maltreated sample, these girls had both lower emotional understanding and more 
difficulties with emotional regulation (Shipman, Zeman, Penza, & Champion, 2000). 
Maltreated girls were also more inclined to expect conflict in response to displays of 
anger and less inclined to expect support in response to sadness in the case of both parents 
and friends. Physical abuse has been found to have a similar negative impact on 
emotional understanding in primary school-aged children (Shipman & Zeman, 1999). 
Results from this study indicate that abusing mothers were less likely to engage in 
discussion about the causes and consequences of emotions, and a significant relationship 
emerged between maternal behaviour in this regard and children’s emotional 
understanding.
Results from observational studies have shown that maltreated children generally 
display more inappropriate affect during free play, and they also have difficulties in 
responding appropriately to the emotional distress of peers (Haskett, 1990; Haskett & 
Kistner, 1991;). In general, maltreated children have been found to show either 
heightened levels of physical and verbal aggression with peers (George & Main, 1979; R. 
C. Heirenkohl & E. C. Herrenkohl, 1981; Hoffman-Plotkin & Twentyman, 1984), or 
avoidance and withdrawal (George & Main, 1979; Hoffman-Plotkin & Twentyman, 
1984). This suggests that social contact with peers elicits stressful reactions (Lynch & 
Cicchetti, 1991) in children with a history of maltreatment.
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Impact o f Parents with Psychiatric or Affective Disorders
Results from a number of studies underscore the highly negative impact on 
children of growing up in environments with a predominance of negative emotion, 
including environments in which they are exposed to a high level of personal distress or 
implicated in conflict due to living with parents with psychiatric or affective disorders. 
These environments have been shown to induce negative emotions, as well as 
incapacitating guilt in children (Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, Krupnick, & McKnew, 1990). 
At this stage, however, the way in which they affect emotional understanding has yet to 
be clarified.
Studies examining the impact of maternal depression on children reveal that at age 
5 children of depressed mothers show more aggression and peer-difficulties (Denham, 
Zahn-Waxler, Cummings, & Iannotti, 1991; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1988). Furthermore, the 
results suggest that these children develop particular types of problems such as over- 
regulating and suppressing negative emotions, and when they are eventually expressed, 
they have difficulty regulating them. It has also been observed that though children of 
depressed mothers tend to be exceptionally well behaved when involved in 
experimentally induced situations of escalating conflict, they actually get more upset and 
remained preoccupied with the situation. They also tend to inhibit frustration and use 
politeness, comforting and appeasement more often than other children (Cummings et al., 
1985; Denham, Zahn-Waxler et al., 1991; Zahn-Waxler, Cummings, McKnew, & Radke- 
Yarrow, 1984).
Early Development o f Emotional Understanding
There is converging evidence that already in the first year of life infants are tuned 
in to different emotional expressions of adults (Bretherton et al., 1986; Campos, 1983; 
Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1988; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 2000; 
Stenberg, Campos, & Emde, 1983). One-day-old infants seem to be able to distinguish 
between happy and sad faces (Field et al., 1990). At 5 months, they are able to 
differentiate sad, happy and angry vocalisations, and they are also able to match faces and 
affect based on congruence (Walker, 1982). They react appropriately to the emotional 
content of praise or prohibition (Femald, 1993), and they react negatively to depressed 
affect in their mothers (Tronick & Gianino, 1986). In addition, there is evidence that 
infants use the emotional expression of parents, a phenomenon is referred to as “social 
referencing” and which appears during the period from 10 to 12 months of age, to 
regulate their behaviour when they are in new or potentially threatening situations
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(Campos, 1983). More specifically, it has been shown that infants look at their parents 
and will only proceed to interact with a stranger, cross a visual cliff or touch new toys if 
the emotional expression of the parent is positive (Feinman, 1991).
A review of research findings has identified a number of striking changes in 
mother-infant interaction starting at around 9. months of age, including shared 
referencing, an increasing ability to understand maternal instructions and intentional 
communication (Bretherton et al., 1986). Studies also show that from age of two, 
children comfort victims who display distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 
1983). On the basis of this evidence, Bretherton et al. conclude that there is ample 
evidence that by the time children begin to talk about emotions, they already have an 
understanding of themselves and others as experiencing emotions. Studies by Bretherton 
and Beeghly (1982) using maternal diaries also suggest that: 1) the use of emotion words 
can start as early as 18 months of age and that by 28 months of age the majority of 
children use at least some emotion words when expressing themselves or referring to 
others; 2) some 24-month-olds talk about the causes of emotions, their consequences, or 
related mental states; 3) babies and toddlers have been observed to play “emotion games” 
in which they elicit behaviours in their mothers; and 4) between 2 and 3 years of age 
children begin to attribute emotions to others in pretend play.
In addition, data collected on language production in a small group of children 
aged between 2 and 5 years indicate that even 2-year-olds can talk systematically about 
emotions (Wellman et al., 1995). Harris (1989) points out that at least half of the emotion 
references made by 2-year-olds concern past, future and recurrent feelings, but he 
concludes that they are still largely descriptive. Others have argued that at this age 
children already use emotion talk instrumentally in order to guide, change or elicit 
behaviour in others (Bretherton et al., 1986; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991; 
Wellman et al., 1995). Results from an observational study in day-care centres (Fabes et 
al., 1991) have provided further support for this argument in that children as young as 3 
years old provided relatively accurate reports of emotions and their causes when they 
observed incidents in which peers expressed emotions of happiness, sadness, distress or 
anger.
Labelling Emotional Expression and Understanding Emotional-Eliciting Situations
The comprehension of facial expressions of emotion is considered to be the 
perceptual bedrock on which subsequent understanding of emotions is founded (Denham,
1998). A number of studies have confirmed that children’s abilities to identify emotions
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both verbally and non-verbally, whether presented in drawings (Camras & Allison, 1985; 
Denham & Couchoud, 1990), in photographs (Field & Walden, 1982) or in person 
(Felleman, Barden, Carlson, Rosenberg, & Masters, 1983), are well established by the 
end of the pre-school period. Furthermore the acquisition of these abilities is progressive; 
children are able to identify happy faces first, and then gradually leam to differentiate 
negative emotions such as anger, fear and disgust (Camras & Allison, 1985; Denham & 
Couchoud, 1990). Studies suggest that children first retain mouth expressions, such as 
smiles of happiness, followed by eye expressions and nose expressions.
An understanding of the types of situations that elicit specific emotions apparently 
develops in parallel with an understanding of emotional expressions; in addition, it has 
been shown that children have relatively more difficulty understanding negative emotions 
(Denham, 1998). Fear appears to present a challenge to pre-school children who have 
more difficulty both in identifying it and understanding the situations in which it is 
evoked. These difficulties are thought to be related to the complex eye, brow and mouth 
movements involved (Denham, 1998), but the factors underlying children’s difficulties in 
identifying the situational triggers seem more complex than this. Pre-schoolers seem 
more likely to consider imaginary creatures such as monsters and witches when asked 
about situations causing fear (Lieberman, 1993), and respond with reality based triggers 
that adults might consider as inducing fear, when asked about situations in which they 
may feel sad.
Understanding the Causes and Consequences o f Emotions
A number of studies have confirmed that although 3-year-olds give idiosyncratic 
reasons for emotions, this is not true for 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds (Denham & Zoller, 
1991; Fabes et al., 1991). In general, Dunn and Hughes (1998) found that the 
explanations that pre-school children give for their own emotions are more complete than 
when they explain the emotions of parents, siblings and peers.
Interestingly, pre-school children seem to find it easier to understand the causes 
of negative emotions than happiness and sadness in peers (Dunn & Hughes, 1998; Fabes 
et al., 1991). By the time they are 5 years old, children are more likely to consider 
personal dispositions and they provide more abstract accounts of the possible causes of a 
peer’s emotions, rather than identifying causes primarily in terms of goal states (Dunn & 
Hughes, 1998; Fabes et al., 1991; Strayer, 1986). Girls and boys appear to have 
somewhat different foci in the way that they think about the causes of emotions, with girls 
being more likely to give explanations involving interpersonal aspects (Fabes et al., 1991;
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Strayer, 1986).
With regard to understanding the causes of parents’ emotions, Denham (1998) 
found that 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds were able to identify the causes of a variety of 
parental emotions, as assessed verbalisations and actions occurring during a semi­
structured dollhouse play interview. The method of assessment seems critical here in that 
direct verbal questioning used by Dunn and Hughes (1998) produced significantly more 
“don’t know” responses than in play based interviews such as the dollhouse interview 
used by Denham. Also of interest is the finding that boys, but not girls, were more likely 
to regard themselves as the cause of their mothers’, but not fathers’, emotions. Denham
(1998) concluded that pre-schoolers generally had a fairly solid understanding of the 
consequences of emotions in themselves and in others.
Understanding Mixed Emotions
With regard to understanding ambivalence and mixed emotions, Harter (1999) has 
argued that it is only at the age of 7 that children start showing an understanding of 
others’ differing emotions, and even then they are only able to consider emotions having 
the same valence, such as anger and sadness. Furthermore, it is only at the age of 11 that 
children start to understand that someone can have emotions of opposite valence towards 
the same person, for example, being angry at their mother when she imposes a time 
restriction, while also acknowledging that they still love her. Other studies using 
methodologies that provide more scaffolding suggest that this is only partly true. Wintre 
and Valence (1994) used an abacus-like frame with different emotions such as happy, 
sad, angry, scared and loving to explore when it is that children begin to consider mixed 
emotional reactions. They found that at age 5 children were able to imagine having 
different emotions, but only of the same valence and intensity. At age 6, children were 
able to consider multiple emotions of the same valence and of different intensities as 
being possible response to a specific emotional stimulus. At age 8, which is considerably 
earlier than predicted by Harter, their responses reflected an ability to consider that 
multiple emotions of different valences and intensities could follow from a particular 
emotional stimulus.
Another method used to explore the emergence of mixed-emotion understanding 
involved telling the story of a child who was looking for a lost pet and who finds his pet, 
which is injured (Peng, Johnson, Pollock, Glasspool, & Harris, 1992). The children were 
presented with the mixed emotions in that they were told that the child was happy to find 
the pet, but sad that it was injured. Children were then asked to describe how the child
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felt. The results indicated that 6 to 7-year-olds agreed that the child in the story could feel 
emotions of different valences, but that 4 to 5-year-olds were unable to consider this 
possibility.
As to the reasons why younger children have so much difficulty with mixed 
emotions, Denham (1998) points out that younger children think quite concretely about 
emotions and tend to rely on facial expressions (“faces can’t go up and down at the same 
time”). Their limited ability to understand mental processes and the lack of sophistication 
of their theory of mind (“you can’t think two ways”) have also been identified as possible 
obstacles (Harris et al., 1989).
Self-Understanding
From a cognitive perspective, Wellman and Woolley (1990) have observed that it 
is during the primary school years that children begin to display the capacity to talk about 
their own thoughts and to increasingly to think about themselves in mental state and trait 
terms rather than principally in terms of their physical attributes, abilities and context. 
Harter’s (1999) research indicates that these shifts are apparent in children’s self­
representations and she sees the latter as linked to their growing capacities to form higher 
order generalisations based on their behaviour, performance and interpersonal relations. 
This is in line with Damon and Hart’s (1988) findings that up to the age of 7 years, the 
self tends to be perceived in terms of physical characteristics and favourite activities. 
From a Piagetian perspective, the concrete, ability-specific conceptions of the self of 
young children are explained in terms of their lack of mental sophistication and their 
inability to view themselves in global integrated terms. The evidence suggests that age 8 
marks a transition from a concrete to a more psychological self, with children becoming 
able to explicitly compare their own attributes and abilities with those of others (Harter,
1999). They also become increasingly able to see their qualities as mixed, and while this 
may protect them from all out negative self-evaluations, their growing critical abilities 
create new challenges to their self-esteem. Kovacs (1986) suggests that it is not until 
adolescence that a psychological awareness and capacity to self-reflect are developed, and 
the various dimensions of the self are integrated into a stable personality characterisation.
Emotional Understanding, Social Competence and Empathy
The relationship between emotional understanding and social competence, as well 
as between emotional understanding and prosocial reactions to the emotions of others, has 
been underscored by results from many studies (Denham, 1986; Denham & Couchoud,
62
1990; Denham, McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990; Field & Walden, 1982; Gnepp, 
1989). This is the case regardless of whether researchers focus on emotional 
understanding of situations (Gnepp, 1989), the ability to identify facial expressions of 
emotions (Field & Walden, 1982), aggregates of comprehension of emotional expression, 
or emotion expressive and receptive labels (Denham, 1998).
Interestingly, young children’s emotional responsiveness to the distress of others 
has been found to be predicted by a particular type of complex emotional understanding 
which is referred to as emotional role taking and defined as the “ability to be open to and 
recognise the unique emotional cues generated by the individual in a particular situation” 
(Gamer, Jones, & Palmer, 1994, p. 910). Results from two other studies indicated that 
both emotional situation knowledge and emotional role-taking abilities predict pre­
schoolers’ abilities to remain positive in spite of disappointing circumstances (Gamer & 
Power, 1996), as well as lower levels of aggression (Arsenio & Lover, 1997). There is 
also evidence suggesting that emotional understanding facilitates the development of 
moral sensibility, even after considering the effects of intelligence and verbal ability. 
Results from a longitudinal study by Dunn, Brown and Maguire (1995), showed that 
children’s abilities to identify emotional expressions and emotional situations at 40 
months were related to indexes of empathy and reparative story completion in 
kindergarten, and understanding of emotional ambivalence in kindergarten again 
predicted empathic reactions in grade 1.
How does understanding of one’s own emotions fit into this picture? The 
development of children’s understanding of their own affects and self-understanding has 
been surprisingly neglected. A study by Parke et al. (1992) addressed this question by 
investigating a range of domains related to children’s understanding of their own 
emotions. The results indicate that peer acceptance and prosocial behaviour are predicted 
by children’s ability to identify emotions and understand the circumstances evoking their 
emotions, as well as their understanding of the reactions of others to their own emotions. 
Moreover, this association remained robust even when the contributions of parental 
emotional expressiveness as assessed at home and in laboratory situations were taken into 
account (Cassidy, Parke, Butkovsky, & Braungart, 1992; Parke et al., 1992)
Affective Understanding and Psychopathology
Much of the developmental research reviewed focuses on normal trajectories in 
the development of emotional understanding, and much less is known about the 
development of child psychopathology. There is some evidence of an association between
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delays in affective understanding and disturbances of affect (Walker, 1981) and behaviour 
(Cook et al., 1994) in children. There is also evidence that distorted appraisal contributes 
to conduct disorder (Dodge, Murphy, & Buchsbaum, 1984); conduct disorder is thus not 
simply a matter of a lack of emotional understanding. Learning theories (Fester, 1973) in 
which lack of opportunities to acquire social skills are seen argued to contribute to 
depression and conduct disorder, could fit well with the deficit in emotional 
understanding model. Other cognitive psychological accounts of childhood depression 
(Beck, 1974) and conduct disorder (Kazdin, 2000) are expressed in terms of disturbances 
in appraisal. The question is whether difficulties in affective understanding contribute to 
distortions in appraisal processes. Beck’s theory of depression as involving distorted 
attributions involving self-blame and generalisation of negative expectations are more 
difficult to explain using a simple emotional understanding model.
Greenberg, et al. (1995) have proposed an integrated affective-behavioural- 
cognitive-dynamic (ABCD) model of development. This model is based on the 
assumptions that the majority of affective response systems have become automatic 
before children begin to use language, and that difficulties in emotional understanding 
and regulation contribute to social competence and personality development. They 
identify both accurate appraisals of situations and social-cognitive strategies for dealing 
with difficult emotional situations as being important during the primary school-age 
years. Furthermore, they have designed a curriculum, the PATHS preventative 
intervention, with the aim of teaching children these skills, and they have reported 
promising findings, although it is not clear how this curriculum influences appraisal 
processes. The intervention focuses on increasing children’s ability to discuss emotions 
and on improving their emotional vocabulary, as well as on understanding meta-cognitive 
aspects of emotions such as awareness of emotion cues and display rules, mixed emotions 
and changing emotional states.
Interpersonal cognitive problem-solving skills training (PSST) has also been 
reported to be effective with children presenting with conduct disorder (Kazdin, 2002). 
This intervention is designed at providing children with a step-by-step framework for 
responding to social difficulties. It involves teaching self-statements that direct the 
child’s attention to certain aspects of the problem and the solution, thus fostering pro­
social behaviour. Structured tasks, games, role-play and stories are used and the therapist 
models the solution with the child.
In summary, the research on the development of affective understanding reviewed 
here points to social and familial interactions as providing the context crucial to
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children’s learning about affects: 1) parental attributions of intentionality to infants and 
their capacity to both recognise infant affect of infants and mirror it with a particular 
markedness are seen as central to the development of the understanding of emotions 
within the self; 2) parent-child discussions of emotions, and the quality and elaborateness 
of these narratives are seen as playing a central role in facilitating children’s affective 
understanding as well as self-understanding; 3) parental expressiveness and the valence of 
parental affect is seen as having an important impact on the development of children’s 
affective understanding; 4) pretend play and role play are seen as contributing to the 
capacity to understand the affective reactions of others; 5) interactions with siblings, 
peers and older adults are seen as providing further opportunities for children to develop 
their understanding of affect, and the acquisition of this ability is also seen in part as 
depending on the child’s temperament as well as motivation to become effective in the 
social world; and 6) parental negative affect, psychiatric illness and abuse and neglect 
have been shown to have negative implications for the development of children’s 
affective understanding.
In the section that follows, the attachment paradigm for understanding children’s 
emotional development will be introduced. According to attachment theory, interpersonal 
processes make an important contribution to development, but emphasis is placed on the 
early mother-infant relationship. Some researchers, such as Dunn (1993), have been 
critical of what they consider to be an overemphasis on attachment relationships in 
explaining the development of affective understanding. On the other hand, the findings 
of H. Steele, M. Steele and Fonagy (1996) provide longitudinal evidence suggesting that 
parental reflective functioning and child attachment security are implicated in the 
development of children’s emotional understanding and thus merit further consideration. 
In the section that follows, the focus will first be placed on attachment theory and 
research, and then on the closely related concept of reflective functioning.
Attachment and Reflective Functioning
The question inevitably arises as to how theory of mind relates to attachment, both 
conceptually and empirically, given that these are amongst the most influential models in 
the field of the development of mentalisation in childhood. The preceding reviews of the 
literature on theory of mind and affective understanding indicated that theorists are 
divided when it comes to deciding whether it is biological maturational or social-familial 
processes that drive the development of mentalisation. Researchers in favour of the latter 
processes broadly agree that mentalisation develops in relationships. At the same time,
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there is considerable diversity with regard to the centrality attributed to early relationships 
and with regard to the emphasis placed on affective bonds and affective communication 
in the development of theory of mind. Those who adopt social-functionalist and social- 
leaming positions such as Dunn (1994) and Astington (1994), focus on the period after 
infancy and tend to consider social learning within the family and society as the 
mechanism through which children acquire theory of mind. From this perspective the 
early attachment relationship is seen as less important in the development of theory of 
mind than other factors such as emotion-focused discussions by parents. Theorists such 
as Bretherton (1991) consider the infant-caregiver interaction and the caregiver’s ability 
to attribute intentionality to the infant’s pre-intentional behaviour as at the root of the 
development of intentionality and theory of mind. This perspective overlaps and 
integrates easily with the attachment model, as will be discussed below. From this 
perspective, working models of relationships are seen as influencing interpersonal 
understanding, and meta-cognitive development is seen as closely linked to secure early 
relationships.
A number of seminal thinkers in both developmental and cognitive psychology, 
and in psychoanalysis, have made the link between the quality of the mother-infant 
relationships and the emergence of symbolic thought. Bretherton, Bates, Benigni, 
Camaioni, and Volterra (1979) consider the harmoniousness of the mother-child 
relationship as facilitating the development of symbolic thought. Considerably earlier, 
Bion (1962a, 1962b) introduced a particular conceptualisation of “containment” as 
involving mental rather than physical processes. From this perspective, the mother’s 
thinking about the unmentalised experience of the infant is seen as crucial to the 
development of the infant’s capacity to transform experience into something which can be 
thought about or known. But is there empirical evidence that the quality of the early 
mother-child relationship provides the foundation on which children build the ability to 
discover their own minds and understand that of others? In the review that follows, 
attachment theory and research will be introduced with the aim of reviewing the current 
state of knowledge with respect to this question.
Theoretical and Historical Background
Bowlby’s attachment theory caused a dramatic shift in the way we think about the 
importance of the early mother-child relationship in the formation and organisation of the 
self, and also in the development of the individual’s characteristic styles of interaction 
and perception of others (George & Solomon, 1999). The mother is seen to function as a
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psychic organiser, and if she is unable to fulfill this role during a critical period, this is 
considered to result in maladaptation of the child’s self-regulatory abilities. Bowlby 
arrived at the concept of attachment after rethinking psychoanalytic theories of mother- 
infant relationships in light of new ethnological findings suggesting that this relationship 
is evolutionarily determined, genetically driven behavioural system. His trilogy 
“Attachment and Loss” (1969, 1973, 1980) integrates concepts from ethology, systems 
theory and cognitive psychology and is based on three core constructs: behavioural 
systems, representations and defensive exclusion. Operating from an evolutionary 
perspective, he argues that the attachment behavioural system developed so as to increase 
the chances of survival of the young of the species by keeping them in close proximity to 
caregivers who would protect them.
Development o f Internal Working Models
The notion of an internal working model, first used by Craik (1943) in trying to 
conceptualise the underlying systems required for intelligent problem solving, appealed to 
Bowlby more than did terms such as representation or image because of its dynamic and 
functional connotations. In Bowlby’s model (1973), the infant gradually builds up 
patterns of expectancy based on the accessibility and responsiveness of the caregiver, 
until at some stage these become consolidated into internal working models or 
representational models involving complementary representations of the self and the 
attachment figure. These models reflect the child’s experience of the self as acceptable 
and worthy of care, as well as the caregiver’s availability, desire and ability to provide 
protection and care. They are seen as not only guiding appraisal processes and responses 
to future behaviour, but also as operating outside of conscious awareness; they are 
therefore difficult to access for reflection, evaluation, and change.
To account for certain phenomena associated with psychopathology, Bowlby 
(1973) introduced the notion of multiple models that are incompatible and contradictory, 
and that are kept segregated through defensive exclusion. Children, who feel loved and 
protected, and who see their caregivers as capable and willing to provide love and 
protection, have representational models of self and others that are compatible and well 
aligned. When children feel unloved and unwanted and when they have experienced their 
caregivers as rejecting or incapable of providing care, this may result in multiple and 
conflicting representations of self and others, because the child struggles to protect 
himself against negative appraisals of the self and other. When the child experiences 
what Bowlby refers to as “assaults on the attachment system”, i.e., when the child’s
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attachment system is chronically activated and not responded to, or is responded to with 
punishment or ridicule, defensive exclusion may become dominant and severe. In these 
cases, a potentially pathological type of exclusion takes place, resulting in what Bowlby 
refers to as “segregated systems” in which the attachment information is kept out of 
consciousness. When memories and feelings are triggered by attachment relevant cues, 
this may result in attachment behaviour that is dysregulated, irrational, unpredictable and 
out of control, or completely blocked.
Attachment Styles in Infancy and the Strange Situation
Ainsworth’s development of the “Strange Situation” (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 
1971) provided attachment theory with a laboratory based research methodology that 
enabled investigators to test attachment theory empirically; this has stimulated prolific 
research which in turn has contributed to further theory building. This method involves a 
20 minute procedure in which exploratory and attachment behaviour is assessed in the 
context of a laboratory imposed situation designed to activate the attachment system 
(Ainsworth, 1982). The reaction of the infant when reunited with his mother, his capacity 
to use her to regulate his distress and his subsequent ability to return to exploratory play 
are seen as indicative of the expectations he has developed regarding his mother’s 
physical and emotional availability.
Based on a systematic analysis of both exploratory and attachment seeking 
behaviours and the interactions which take place after the reunion episode, Ainsworth 
(1982) developed a classificatory system that identified three distinct patterns associated 
with attachment styles and behaviours observable at the end of the first year of life. 
Securely attached infants are ready to explore in the presence of the mother, less so in her 
absence, and are prompt to seek positive contact with her when she returns. They are 
quick to respond to comfort and readily resume exploration of the toys provided. 
Although there is some variation across samples,. approximately 55-65% of infants in 
low-risk non-clinical samples displayed behaviour indicative of secure attachment (van 
IJzendoom, 1992).
The second and third groups are both considered as showing insecure or anxious 
attachment, but use different strategies to organise their behaviour relative to the 
caregiver. Avoidant infants tend to maintain exploratory behaviours and appear 
unperturbed when their mothers leave, and they ignore her when she returns. Bowlby 
(1988) interpreted this avoidance as indicating that even at this early age, these children 
no longer reveal their deepest feelings to the caregiver, nor their equally deep desire for
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comfort and proximity. Fearfulness, hostility and dependency are no longer expressed, 
thus it may be assumed that psychological defenses are already present. Research with 
low risk, non-clinical samples indicates that 20-30% of infants display avoidant 
attachment styles (Main, 1995a). Ambivalent or resistant infants tend to be fearful of the 
stranger. Intensely upset by the separations they are highly focused on but also 
ambivalent towards the mother when she returns; they express first a desire for closeness 
and then anger in quick succession, and thus are difficult to soothe. They cling to their 
mothers and resist being put down, and they are also slow to return to play. In low risk, 
non-clinical samples, approximately 5-15% of infants display ambivalent attachment 
patterns.
Through naturalistic observations of parents and children at home, Ainsworth 
(1982) has linked these three groups of reactions to the quality of mothering that infants 
received during the first year of life. Infants with a secure attachment had mothers who 
were contingently responsive and accessible, and who were able to read their babies 
signals and respond to them in a sensitive and consistent way. They were accepting and 
responsive when their infants showed a need for closeness and contact. Infants with an 
avoidant attachment style had mothers with a restricted range of emotional expression and 
who showed a dislike of physical contact. They frequently ignored and failed to respond 
to their infants’ attempts to be physically close or comforted; they avoided cuddling and 
held and carried their babies less comfortably than did other mothers. Infants with 
ambivalent attachment tended to have mothers who were erratic and inconsistent in 
providing physical comfort; they tend to provide it in response to their own needs, rather 
than those of the infant. In addition, they tended to be interfering and intrusive. The 
infant’s anger towards the mother may be understood as the expression of frustration and 
dissatisfaction due to their inconsistent handling.
Main and Solomon (1986) subsequently made the landmark discovery of an other 
attachment style, that of disorganisation when they observed a group of infants who were 
difficult to classify using Ainsworth’s three category attachment classification system 
(1982). They noted that these infants behaved in a disorientated or disorganised way 
when reunited with their mother in the Strange Situation, as evidenced by contradictory 
and conflicting behaviours such as turning in circles, approaching and then avoiding their 
mothers or approaching her with the head averted. In contrast to the secure and insecure 
groups previously described, what seemed to characterise the attachment behaviour of 
these difficult to classify infants was the absence of a consistent, organised pattern of 
response to separation and reunion. Fear has been identified as playing a central role in
69
the aetiology of attachment disorganisation, and Main and Hesse (1990) suggest that the 
disorganised behaviour of these infants can be traced to frightening and frightened 
behaviour on the part of the caregiver. The rapidly growing body of research in this area 
suggests that the organised-disorganised distinction is more relevant to psychopathology 
than is the secure and insecure distinction, but a further discussion of this falls outside the 
scope of this thesis.
Caregiver Sensitivity and Other Determinants o f Security o f Attachment
Bowlby (1969) stressed the importance of determining the antecedents of different 
attachment styles and he considered maternal sensitivity in responding to the baby’s 
signals as playing a central role in this regard. Results from the classic Baltimore study 
carried out by Ainsworth and her colleagues (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) 
provided strong support for this hypothesis. They identified maternal sensitivity, 
acceptance, cooperation, and accessibility as closely linked to attachment security. 
Ainsworth defined maternal sensitivity as the capacity and willingness to 1) perceive the 
infant’s communications as reflected in his behaviour, emotional expressions, and 
vocalisations; 2) interpret them from the infant’s point of view, and; 3) respond to them 
promptly and appropriately based on the infant’s developmental and emotional needs.
Subsequent studies (Belsky, Rovine, & Taylor, 1984; K. E. Grossmann, K. 
Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985; Isabella, 1993) have yielded results 
generally supportive of the central role of maternal sensitivity in the development of 
attachment security. Researchers such as Bretherton (1985), Main (1990) and Sroufe 
(1988) have nonetheless continued to consider maternal sensitivity as being critical to the 
development of attachment security. Others have been more sceptical about the evidence 
that maternal sensitivity plays a role in attachment security (Lamb, Gaensbauer, Malkin, 
& Shultz, 1985). An initial meta-analysis of studies on attachment and sensitivity 
(Goldsmith & Alansky, 1987) concluded that the predictive effect was much weaker than 
once believed. A more recent meta-analysis (De Wolff & van Uzendoom, 1997) has 
more or less put the debate to rest; it indicated that sensitivity plays an important, but not 
exclusive, role in the development of attachment security. At the same time intervention 
studies aimed at facilitating maternal sensitivity towards infants with difficult 
temperaments reflect an impressive effect size of .48 (van IJzendoom, Juffer, & 
Duyvesteyn, 1995), suggesting that maternal sensitivity can make a cmcial difference in 
socially disadvantaged groups.
The relationship between sensitivity and attachment has been found to be weaker
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in samples of younger infants. The results suggest that the development of attachment can 
easily change course when family life circumstances, child rearing arrangements or 
maternal sensitivity change (De Wolff & van IJzendoom, 1997). The relationship 
between sensitivity and attachment was also found to be weaker in disadvantaged families 
and clinical samples, suggesting that contextual stresses can override the contribution of 
maternal sensitivity or impact on it in a number of ways. Findings from other studies 
suggest that social variables (Cummings & Davies, 1994) and the impact of social context 
and clinical conditions (Belsky & Cassidy, 1994; Sameroff & Chandler, 1975) need to be 
considered together with parental sensitivity.
Infant Factors in the Development o f Attachment Security
What role do infant factors such as genetics and temperament play in the 
development of attachment security and organisation? Results from a wide range of 
studies indicate that maternal factors such as the mother’s perception of the baby appear 
to be generally more important than any specific infant factors in the development of 
attachment security (Egeland & Farber, 1984; Pianta, Marvin, Britner, & Borowitz, 
1996). There is also evidence from primate laboratory studies that maternal factors 
outweigh the impact of infant factors (Suomi, 1995). These studies show that when 
temperamentally reactive or behaviourally inhibited infant monkeys were reared by 
highly nurturing foster mothers, they develop secure relationships, whereas they develop 
insecure attachments with punitive foster mothers. An exhaustive review of research to 
date has failed to find evidence that temperamental factors, such as emotional reactivity, 
psychomotor arousal levels, and capacity for regulation, have a direct influence on infant 
attachment security (Vaughn & Bost, 1999). Studies also indicate that genetic factors do 
not appear to play as important a role in the development of attachment security whereas 
in cognitive development they explain over 50% of the variance (De Wolff & van 
IJzendoom, 1997). The findings that infants frequently develop different attachment 
styles vis-a-vis mothers and fathers can also be interpreted as further evidence that 
attachment is a characteristic of the dyad, rather than a function of infant temperament or 
genetic factors.
Adult Attachment and the Move to the Level o f Representation
The development of the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI: George, Kaplan, & 
Main, 1985; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985) was another seminal step in attachment 
research, as it provided a method for classifying attachment at the level of representation,
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rather than at behaviour level thus allowing for the study of attachment beyond infancy. 
When Main, working with George and Kaplan, asked parents to talk about their early 
experiences with their own parents, they found that the narrative styles of the stories, 
which the parents produced in the context of this semi-structured interview, were 
correlated with the attachment security of their infants. The AAI has been widely used by 
researchers because of its unique ability to predict infant attachment classification, even 
before the birth of the infant. This remarkable finding that the AAI classification of the 
parent predicts not only the attachment style of the infant, but also the exact attachment 
style that the child manifests in the Strange Situation, has been demonstrated in at least 14 
studies (van IJzendoom et al., 1995).
The AAI interview repeatedly asks for descriptions and evaluations of early 
relationships with each parent, a technique that has been described as “surprising the 
unconscious”. The AAI essentially evaluates the impact of the individual’s “current state 
of mind with respect to attachment” (Main & Goldwyn, 1991) on his ability to search for 
early memories and to recount his early attachment experiences while, at the same time, 
providing a coherent, collaborative discourse without inconsistencies and contradictions 
(Main, 1995b). Coherence, the most important factor overall in classification, has been 
found to be the best predictor of infant attachment organisation (Main, 1995c). Main and 
Goldwyn (1991) found that the search for memories can lead to incoherence and to 
characteristic types of breakdown in discourse and thus to violations of Grice’s four 
maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975) pertaining to quality, quantity, relation and 
manner. Distinct types of violations have been found to be associated with different 
attachment classifications, with dismissing individuals violating the maxims of quantity 
and quality, and preoccupied individuals violating those of quantity and manner. As 
Siegel (1999) puts it, “...it is here that the AAI offers a unique perspective on the 
relationships among attachment, memory and narrative” (p. 79).
Main (1995b) identified analogues of infantile attachment patterns in adulthood as 
a function of the coherence of the attachment narratives; the AAI coding system thus 
yields attachment classifications that correspond to the infant attachment patterns 
observed in the Strange Situation paradigm (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Adults with a secure 
and autonomous attachment style value attachment, as reflected in their narratives which 
are relatively objective about specific events and relationships, as well as coherent and 
plausible regarding both favourable and unfavourable life experiences. Adults with a 
dismissing attachment classification which corresponds to the avoidant classification of 
infancy, generally provide accounts that are somewhat dismissive of their attachment
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experiences and relationships. They tend to normalise negative childhood experiences and 
may be somewhat idealising or devaluing. They emphasise their self-reliance and 
frequently appear emotionally restricted. Those with ambivalent-preoccupied 
classifications, corresponding to the ambivalent-resistant infant classifications, show pre­
occupation with past attachment relationships and experiences and often seem confused 
and overwhelmed. They tend to produce long, entangled histories with run-on sentences 
and pseudo-psychological explanations. They may also show preoccupation of an angry, 
passive and sometimes fearful nature with traumatic events related to attachment. Those 
with an unresolved attachment classification, matching the disorganised classification of 
infancy, show unusual lapses, as described previously, in their discussion of loss or 
abusive experiences. For example, they may speak of a dead person as if they were still 
alive, or may launch into eulogistic speech like that of a priest or orator, rather than a son 
or daughter.
A plausibility scale was added to the AAI after Main (1991) became aware of the 
presence of what appeared to be failures in meta-cognitive monitoring in the narratives of 
parents of infants with disorganised and disoriented attachment behaviour. Although the 
Gricean maxims are not violated, failures in meta-cognitive monitoring include highly 
implausible statements regarding the causes and consequences of events such as loss, e.g., 
magical causality in the case of death or statements suggesting that the dead person is still 
thought of as being alive. Both the approach used in the AAI interview and the coding 
system where attachment style is seen as revealed in the coherence of the narratives about 
attachment relationships, were influential in terms of the development of the Child 
Attachment Interview (CAI: Target et al., 2000) and the Child Reflective Functioning 
Scale (CRFS: Target et al., 2001) used in the present thesis.
Stability o f Attachment
With regard to the long-term stability of attachment patterns, the literature reflects 
a complex picture. Infant attachment security has been found to predict positive 
interactions between parents and children in the short term (Slade, 1987) and some 
studies have reported remarkable stability in attachment style over many years (Main & 
Cassidy, 1988; Wartner, Grossmann, Fremmer-Bombrik, & Suess, 1994). Results from 
other studies have not confirmed this picture of stability (K. E. Grossmann, K. 
Grossmann, & Zimmermann, 1999), and suggest that associations cease to be direct after 
6 years of age (K. E. Grossmann & K. Grossmann, 1991). This has led to the conclusion 
that while developmental history and attachment experiences are important, subsequent
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experiences can significantly affect attachment security (Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson,
1999). At this stage, relatively little is known about the factors underlying continuity and 
change in attachment patterns (Thompson, 1999).
Attachment and Psychopathology
A large body of research investigating the links between early attachment and a 
range of characteristics, such as cognitive capacities, interpersonal abilities and 
psychopathology, has accumulated, and the findings do not reflect the direct relationship 
initially suggested by Bowlby. With regard to social adaptation and personality 
development, a complex picture emerges. In the Minnesota Parent Child Project early 
attachment security was found to be associated with self-esteem, emotional health, 
agency, compliance and positive affect; this association was found to still be evident at 
age 10 (Elicker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1992; Weinfield, Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 1999). 
Infant attachment security also predicted a number of personality features, the risk for 
adolescent anxiety disorders (Warren, Huston, Egeland, & Sroufe, 1997) and adult 
psychiatric morbidity (Carlson, 1998; Weinfield et al., 1999). Other studies have not 
been able to replicate these findings and Belsky and Cassidy (1994) have concluded that 
the relationship between attachment and later behaviour is modest or weak.
A re-examination of these studies have led to the conclusion that insecure 
attachment interacts with risk factors and is more likely to be associated with 
psychopathology in high-risk than in low risk samples. Support for this conclusion comes 
from two studies involving high risk samples; these studies found that early attachment 
disorganisation or disorientation is a vulnerability factor which, when combined with 
other risk factors, and contribute to externalising problems, especially aggression (Lyons- 
Ruth, 1996; Shaw, Owens, Vondra, Keenan, & Winslow, 1996; Shaw & Vondra, 1995).
With regard to adult psychopathology, there is evidence suggesting that 
attachment security is a protective factor associated with lower anxiety (Collins & Read, 
1990, 1994), lower hostility, increased resilience (Kobak & Sceery, 1988) and the 
capacity to regulate affect through interpersonal relatedness (Simpson, Rholes, & 
Nelligan, 1992; Vaillant, 1992). Insecure attachment, on the other hand, has been found 
to be a risk factor associated with a greater degree of depression (Armsden & Greenberg,
1987), anxiety, hostility and psychosomatic illness (Hazan, 1990).
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Attachment and Social Adaptation
In the Bowlby-Ainsworth model, early attachment relationship styles are seen as 
providing the templates for subsequent social and intimate relationships, but the question 
remains as to whether or not there is empirical evidence that attachment is associated with 
interpersonal competence. Results from some studies show that secure children have 
better sibling relationships (Teti & Ablard, 1989; Volling & Belsky, 1992), and also 
better relationships with teachers and counsellors during the pre-school period and at age 
10 (Weinfield et al., 1999). However, findings from other studies are inconclusive 
(Berlin, Cassidy, & Belsky, 1995; Howes, Hamilton, & Matheson, 1994; M. Lewis & 
Feiring, 1989; Youngblade & Belsky, 1992).
In general, disorganised attachment appears to be a risk factor for maladaptive 
behaviour (Jacovitch & Hazen, 1999; Lyons-Ruth, Easterbrooks, & Cibelli, 1997). A 
meta-analysis of two longitudinal studies by van Ijzendoom, Schuengel, and Bakermans- 
Kranenberg (1999) reported an association of .55 between disorganised attachment and 
controlling attachment behaviour in middle childhood. Furthermore, observational 
studies of peer relations suggest that disorganised children were less competent in play 
and conflict resolution (Wartner et al., 1994) and did not have a consistent relational 
model with different peers (Jacovitch & Hazen, 1999). Links between disorganised 
controlling attachment and aggression have been found in both longitudinal (Goldberg, 
Muir, & Kerr, 1995; Hubbs-Tait, Osofsky, Hann, & Culp, 1994; Lyons-Ruth, 1996; 
Lyons-Ruth, Alpem, & Repacholi, 1993; Shaw et al., 1996) and cross-sectional studies 
(Geenberg, Speltz, DeKlyen, & Endriga, 1991; Moss, Parent, Gosselin, Rousseau, & St- 
Laurent, 1996; Moss & St-Laurent, 1999; Solomon, George, & Dejong, 1995).
Pathways o f Attachment from Infancy to Adulthood
As the preceding review indicates, there is sufficient evidence of continuity in 
early attachment organisation to warrant explanation. The ample evidence of the impact 
of attachment organisation on character, interpersonal relations and psychopathology also 
warrants explanation. Three possible explanations of this evidence have been proposed 
by researchers and will be summarised below.
The first explanation is that of continuity in the social environment and quality of 
care. The association between early care that is neglectful or openly hostile and later 
difficulties in functioning is argued to be more a function of the long term exposure to 
generally harmful caregivers and environments, rather than a function of early
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compromised care (Belsky, 1999; Lamb et al., 1985; Thompson, 1999). This explanation 
does not hold up under the evidence provided by adoption studies that profound early 
privation has an enduring impact, even when circumstances change radically after 
children are adopted (Chisolm, 1998; Fisher, Ames, Chisholm, & Savoie, 1997; Hodges 
& Tizard, 1989). Results from a study of UK Romanian adoptees indicated that length of 
early privation is associated with long term disturbances in attachment and peer 
relationships, and in attention regulation and cognition; this study also showed that 
attachment disturbances remained unchanged by age 6 (O'Connor, Rutter, & Kreppner,
2000). The number of securely attached children was also lower than would be expected 
based on IQ and social class, and it was higher in children who spent the shortest period 
in orphanages (Marvin & Britner, 1999). The percentage of children with attachment 
disorganisation was striking, and these children showed little evidence of recovery over 
time.
The second mechanism that has been proposed to explain continuity of early 
attachment organisation focuses on relationship representations, or internal working 
models. Fonagy and Target (2003) hypothesise that attachment security is related to the 
development of inhibitory processes that regulate dominant, but immature responses, and 
that once this ability is established, the individual has a lifelong advantage. According to 
this model, positive relational expectancies of care and intimacy are encoded as cognitive 
affective structures that continue to affect perception, cognition and motivation through 
the lifetime of the individual (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999). As Fonagy points out 
(Fonagy et al., 2002), Dodge et al’s (1984) conclusions with regard to the importance of 
attributional biases are consistent with this view.
There is some evidence (Cassidy, Scolton, Kirch, & Parke, 1996) that attachment 
experiences have an impact on neural organisation, and it has been argued that it is this 
continuity that is observed. This is in line with Hofer’s (1995) conclusion that what is 
important in attachment is not so much the immediate protective value of being close to 
the mother, but rather the opportunity for the development of internal regulatory 
structures and the modulation of affect and behaviour into a stable response system. 
There is evidence from animal studies that there are permanent changes in stress 
mechanisms following adverse attachment experiences (Plotsky & Meaney, 1993), and 
there is also evidence that stress produced a range of changes in neurobiological systems 
and structures such as the hippocampus (Bremner & Vermetten, 2001; Sapolsky, 1990). 
In humans, disturbances in reactivity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis have 
been shown to be associated with disorganised attachment (Nachmias, Gunnar,
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Mangelsdorf, Parritz, & Buss, 1996; Spangler & Grossmann, 1993) and childhood trauma 
(Brenner, Randall, Vermetten, & Staib, 1997). There is also evidence that the 
hippocampus is vulnerable to stress (Bremner et al., 1995); it appears to be shrunken in 
victims of repeated childhood abuse and in war veterans suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (LeDoux, 1996).
Link between Parental and Infant Attachment: The Transmission Gap
One of the most striking findings of attachment research has been that of the high 
correspondence between the attachment styles of parents and their infants. Across 
different studies, parental AAI classifications based on coherence, cohesiveness and 
plausibility of discourse correspond with infant attachment behaviour in 65-85% of cases 
(van Uzendoom, 1995). Reviews of research in this area also show conclusively that 
parental attachment classification, when compared with intellectual ability, socio­
economic factors and personality, remains the strongest predictor of infant attachment 
style (Sagi et al., 1994; van IJzendoom, 1992,1995).
Even more striking have been results from four pre-birth studies which found that 
maternal attachment status during pregnancy predicted infant attachment, as assessed 
using the Strange Situation (Benoit & Parker, 1994; Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991; 
Hesse, 1999; Radojevic, 1994; Ward & Carlson, 1995). This suggests that the style of 
parental interactions with their offspring is determined by parental characteristics which 
are present before the birth of the baby, and that it is not simply a reaction to particular 
characteristics of the infant such as temperament.
This intergenerational concordance in attachment styles has intrigued both 
epidemiologists (Frommer & O'Shea, 1973; Rutter & Madge, 1976; Rutter, Quinton, & 
Liddle, 1983) and psycho-analysts (Emde, 1988a, 1988b; Fraiberg, Adelson, & Shapiro, 
1975); nonetheless, researchers have been unable to account for a substantial portion of 
the variance in infant attachment behaviour that is associated with adult attachment 
representations. This is what van IJzendoom (1995) refers to as “the transmission gap”.
Both Fonagy and Slade (Fonagy et al., 2002; Slade, Belsky, Aber, & Phelps, 
1999) have proposed that the transmission gap may be explained by the link between a 
mother’s ability to represent and think coherently about her past relationships and her 
ability to form a clear and accurate representation of her infant and his needs, wishes and 
desires. This ability of the mother to mentalise and think accurately about the infant’s 
internal states is considered to be the most important factor in the development of secure 
attachment. Slade’s findings indicate that mothers who are assessed as secure according
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to the AAI were able to represent their relationship with their toddler in a more coherent 
way, and their responses also reflected greater pleasure and joy in this relationship. 
Slade’s research suggests that the mother’s clarity of representation of the child may be 
what mediates between the AAI classification and the mother’s observed behaviour or 
sensitivity.
Fonagy and Target’s (2003) thesis is that the key to generational transmission is 
the capacity of the caregiver to think of the infant as an intentional being and to adopt 
what they refer to as the “intentional stance” towards the pre-intentional infant. The 
proclivity of the caregiver to attribute feelings, thoughts and desires to the infant is seen 
as the key mediator of attachment and as the factor that also accounts for the classical 
observations concerning caregiver sensitivity (Fonagy, M. Steele, H. Steele, Moran, & et 
al., 1991). This ability is also seen as intimately related to the caregiver’s capacity to 
reflect on her own and her parents’ mental states in the context of the AAI, what these 
researchers refer to as “reflective functioning”. Ratings of parental reflective functioning 
have been found to predict infant attachment security (Fonagy, H. Steele, & M. Steele, 
1991) and are seen as closely linked to their intentional stance towards the infant and their 
capacity to foster the child’s self-development and attachment security.
Empirical Evidence ofLinks between Attachment and Theory o f Mind
The results of recent studies provide further specific empirical support for the 
hypothesis that there is a link between attachment and cognitive abilities. Attachment 
style in relation to mothers has been found to be a concurrent predictor of children’s 
metacognitive abilities as manifested by memory, comprehension, and communication 
(Moss, Parent & Gosselin, 1995; Moss, Talagala & Kirisci, 1997). There is also 
longitudinal evidence from two studies supporting the hypothesis that there is a link 
between the attachment security and theory of mind. Fonagy, Redfem and Charman 
(1997), in a prospective study of the relationship between attachment security (vis-a-vis 
the mother at 12 months and the father at 18 months) and later theory of mind abilities, 
found that 82% of those classified earlier as secure in relation to mother passed a belief- 
desire reasoning task at age 5Vi, as compared with 54% of those classified as insecure in 
relation to mother. A similar picture was observed for attachment security vis-a-vis 
fathers, with 77% of those who were securely attached passing the false-belief task, 
compared with 50% of insecurely attached children. Security of attachment was also 
related to passing a second order false-belief task, with 36% of children who were secure 
vis-a-vis both parents passing, compared with 9% of children who were insecure vis-a-vis
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both parents. These findings have been partially replicated in a small longitudinal study 
(Meins, Femyhough, Russel, & Clark-Carter, 1998); 83% of children who were securely 
attached at 12 months passed a false-belief task at age 4, compared with 33% of 
insecurely attached children.
Attachment, Theory o f Mind, Emotional Understanding: Overlapping Constructs
Two explanations for the relationship between attachment and theory of mind 
have been proposed (Fonagy et al., 2002), assuming that the relationship is non-trivial and 
not due to an unknown third factor, such as temperament.
The first explanation centers on the continuity and impact of the maternal factors 
considered mutative. Child attachment security can be regarded as an indicator of the 
quality of the maternal abilities that facilitate the development of psychological 
understanding. The same parental factors thought to facilitate child attachment security 
are argued to be associated with factors such as parental elaboration of emotional 
narratives in interactions with their children, known to facilitate the development of 
cognitive-emotional capacities (Harris, 2000). In this explanatory model, the caregiver’s 
contribution to later development of psychological understanding is emphasised, 
especially the coaching and narratives that they provide. This model has been explicitly 
adopted by social-functionalists such as Dunn (1993), based on her research into the 
development of social and affective understanding. .
Fonagy et al., (2002) have proposed another model that emphasises the 
importance of both parent and child at different developmental periods. The parental 
ability to both represent the mental world of the infant and relate to the infant as having 
intentions is seen as playing a crucial role in the early psychic organisation of the child, 
and as thus as being central to the establishment of the foundations of affect regulation, 
namely affect recognition and intentionality. This is seen as the bedrock on which theory 
of mind competence in the child is built. This will have an influence on the child’s ability 
to engage in and benefit from other activities, such as play and interaction with parents, 
siblings, peers and others. To summarise, parental factors, which facilitate attachment 
security, are thus seen as very important in infancy, but subsequently, child 
characteristics, related to security of attachment, are seen to have a more significant 
impact. Attachment organisation is seen as reflecting the presence of mental structures, 
and is associated with certain attentional and emotional processes (as discussed earlier). 
This helps children to benefit from other social processes which are known to be related 
to the development of theory of mind. In Fonagy and Target’s model, attachment security
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functions as a type of catalyst that helps children engage in and benefit from social 
processes that contribute to the development of mentalisation. This early organisation is 
thought to have a significant impact on the child’s propensity to engage in subsequent 
behaviours, such as pretend play, known to facilitate the development of mentalising 
abilities. It is also thought to have a significant impact on children’s ability to benefit 
from subsequent opportunities for learning the rules, via reasons and nuances of affective 
life and relationships via parental talk about emotions and interactions with siblings and 
peers. Fonagy et al. (2002) have proposed a mediational model that includes the 
identification of particular predictors of theory of mind, and they offer evidence that the 
prediction is enhanced by secure attachment. Three possible mediators that correlate with 
theory of mind performance will be considered, namely, pretend play, parental talk about 
emotions, and peer group interactions. The research findings related to attachment 
security, theory of mind and each of these three possible mediators will be considered in 
turn.
Pretend Play
With regard to pretend play, Dunn’s (1988) findings that children who engage 
more often in more pretend play show superior theory of mind performance have been 
discussed earlier. There is also evidence from longitudinal studies that securely attached 
infants show more engagement in fantasy play during the pre-school years than avoidant 
children (Carlsson & Sroufe, 1995; Main et al., 1985). Securely attached infants have 
been shown to engage more frequently in solo pretence, as well as more sophisticated 
pretence, during the pre-school period (Belsky, Garduque, & Hmcir, 1984; Bretherton et 
al., 1979; Matas, Arend, & Sroufe, 1978). The facilitating role of play in cognitive- 
emotional development is well recognised. Winnicot (1971) described play as providing 
a potential or transitional space in which the child comes to appreciate the distinction 
between subjective and objective reality. Play has been considered as providing a zone of 
proximal development for the child (Vygotsky, 1967; van Geert, 1999), and Lillard 
(1993) suggests that symbolic play may be a zone of proximal development for the skills 
required in understanding others. Astington (1994) has speculated that pretend play 
shared with peers and parents provides a learning situation for children. The fact that the 
adult or older participants share the pretend representations of reality provides a type of 
mental scaffolding that helps children learn about mental states. However, the hypothesis 
that shared pretend play, rather than solo play, is more important for theory of mind 
development has yet to be empirically verified. Fonagy et al. (2002) have speculated that 
securely attached children more readily enter more readily into shared pretend and are
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more likely to benefit from the scaffolding that supports theory of mind development. 
There is evidence that children who were securely attached as infants were more able to 
incorporate suggestions from an experimenter into their play at 31 months of age (Meins 
et al., 1998). Similarly, maternal involvement was found to stimulate the play of securely 
attached children (Slade, 1987), but not that of insecurely attached children.
Parents * Explanations o f Emotions
Parental talk about the feelings and mental states behind people’s actions is also 
known to be a predictor of children’s theory of mind precocity (Brown, Donelan-McCall, 
& Dunn, 1996; Dunn & Brown, 1993). There is also evidence that children of mothers 
who spontaneously provided mental state explanations for emotions when interacting 
with their 3V2-year-olds performed better on emotional understanding tasks fifteen months 
later (Denham, Renwick-DeBardi et al., 1994). In turn, early attachment classification 
has been shown to predict the discourse patterns of mothers and their 6-year-olds, with 
secure dyads being more fluent and addressing a wider range of topics (Carlsson & 
Sroufe, 1995). This would at first glance seem to support the hypothesis that mothers 
who are able to facilitate attachment security are also more likely to engage in emotional 
and mental state explanations. While accepting this hypothesis, Fonagy and Target 
(2003) also suggest that children who are securely attached facilitate, and are more 
responsive to, parental communication regarding emotions, and are also more open to 
learning and benefiting from these interactions. Evidence that secure children find it 
easier to deal with emotional issues in an open and free way (Bretherton, 1990; Cassidy,
1988), can be interpreted as providing support for this hypothesis.
Peer-Group Interactions
The third potential mediator is that of peer-group interactions. Evidence of the 
link between sibling interactions and theory of mind performance (Jenkins & Astington, 
1996; Pemer et al., 1994; Ruffman, Pemer, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998) was 
reviewed earlier in the theory of mind section. There is also evidence that the use of 
mental state terms with siblings and friends is a better predictor of false-belief 
performance than mother-child conversations (Brown et al., 1996). There is also an 
independent body of evidence showing a link between attachment in infancy and social 
competence, popularity and empathy (Elicker et al., 1992; Lieberman, 1977; Pancake, 
1985; Park & Waters, 1989; Sroufe, 1983).
While there is evidence that pretence, spontaneous parent-child mental state talks, 
and peer relationships are all related to both attachment and theory of mind, Dunn (1996) 
has drawn attention to the surprising lack of correlations across contexts. This finding
has led Dunn to conclude that the differences in mentalisation are related more to the 
interaction of specific dyads, rather than to the inherent capacities of the child. It would 
seem as likely that the variance introduced by different relationships makes it difficult to 
measure contributions specific to the child. On the other hand, Fonagy et al. (2002) have 
speculated that the lack of correlations across contexts indicate that there are a number of 
independent pathways linking attachment and socio-emotional competence.
Reflective Functioning
In the early nineties, Peter Fonagy and Mary Target, in collaboration with their 
colleagues George Moran, Miriam Steele, Howard Steele, Anna Higgit, Gyorgy Gergely, 
Effain Bleiberg and Elliot Jurist, introduced a new model for understanding and studying 
the psychological processes underlying mentalisation, which they referred to as 
“reflective functioning”. They contended that reflective functioning is a key determinant 
of self-organisation, affect regulation and the quality of interpersonal relating (Fonagy & 
Target, 2003). The term “reflective cognition” is also used by Kuhn (1992) to refer to 
the reflective aspects of metacognition, that is, an individual’s reflective awareness of the 
cognitive processes they are experiencing. This awareness is regarded by Kuhn as being 
an important aspect of the development of mentalisation.
Fonagy and Target (2003) have proposed a model of mentalisation, or reflective 
functioning, that defines its normal and abnormal development, its links to affect 
regulation and self-regulation, as well as its potential role in psychotherapeutic treatment. 
They theorise that affect regulation, the capacity to modulate emotional states is closely 
related to mentalisation. This in turn is seen as playing a fundamental role in the 
development of a sense of self and agency. In this model, affect regulation is a prelude to 
mentalisation. However, once mentalisation occurs, the nature of affect regulation is 
transformed; it not only allows adjustment of affect states, but more fundamentally, it is 
also used to regulate the self’ (p. 271). This idea of “mentalised affectivity” (Fonagy et 
al., 2002) applies not just to affect regulation; it also denotes the ability to discover the 
meanings of one’s own feelings.
Fonagy and colleagues* findings in the London Parent-Child Project indicated 
that: 1) the attachment security of each parent during pregnancy independently predicted 
the child’s attachment security (Fonagy et al., 1992), and that; 2) the parent’s ability to 
understand their attachment experience in mental state terms was a better predictor of the 
child’s attachment security than was the parent’s attachment security (Fonagy, H. Steele, 
Moran et al., 1991). These findings drew further attention to the important role of
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parental mentalisation abilities in child development, leading Fonagy and Target to 
investigate the role of reflective functioning further. The model draws on Main’s (1991) 
work on 1) the coherence of narratives as indicative of the quality of affective and 
relational representational and memory structures, and 2) meta-cognition and meta- 
cognitive monitoring as indicative of the capacity of the speaker to consider their impact 
on the listener. Fonagy et al. (1998) suggest that “the Reflective-Functioning scale can be 
conceived as providing operationalised definitions of individual difference in adult’s 
metacognitive capacities” (p. 6). In the London Parent-Child project, reflective 
functioning was found to be closely associated with performance on the coherence scale 
of the Adult Attachment Rating and Classification system (Main & Goldwyn, 1991). 
Rather than taking the categorical approach to attachment used by Mary Main, Fonagy et 
al. propose a dimensional approach to measuring reflective functioning. The link to 
attachment is also reflected in the fact that both the child and adult reflective functioning 
coding manuals were initially designed for use with both the Adult Attachment Interview 
and Child Attachment Interview.
The reflective functioning model of mentalisation also has roots in the psycho­
analytic tradition. Fonagy and Target (2003) argue that the notion of an intersubjectively 
acquired implicit awareness of mental states has always been at the core of many 
psychoanalytic formulations of development. They point to links with ideas about 
mentalisation proposed by a number of early psychoanalysts, including Freud’s (1911) 
original concept of “bindung” or “linking”. It is possible to see similarities in the way 
that reflective function is conceptualised and Klein’s description of the depressive 
position and reflective functioning as entailing an awareness of the hurt and suffering of 
the other, as well as an awareness of one’s own role in the process (Klein, 1945/1975). 
There are also similarities between the way that Fonagy and Target think about the 
development of reflective functioning and Bion’s emphasis on the importance of the 
mother-child relationship for the development of symbolic capacities (Bion, 1962). He 
proposed that the mother’s ability to respond to an infant experiencing intolerable affect, 
in a way that shows recognition altered through mentalisation, is crucial in containing the 
infant and in modulating his affective experience. He describes this process as the 
transformation of internal states, or “beta-elements”, via “alpha-function” into tolerable 
thinkable experiences. Fonagy and Target’s ideas regarding the role of the mother’s 
psychological understanding of the infant in the development of the true self are similar to 
those introduced by Winnicot (1960). He drew attention to the importance of the child 
being perceived in the mind of another as both feeling and thinking; this is critical in the
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development of the core psychological structure and a viable sense of self. In addition, 
Fonagy and Target’s emphasis on the importance of mentalisation for a sense of self- 
coherence resonates with the notions of mentalisation put forward by French 
psychoanalysts such as Marty (1968) protective buffer against progressive 
disorganisation, and thus ensuring permanence and stability.
The Concept o f Reflective Functioning
Using terminology from theory of mind discussed in the previous chapter, Fonagy 
and Target (2003) describe reflective functioning as the developmental acquisition that 
permits children to respond to their own conception of others’ beliefs, feelings, attitudes, 
desires, hopes, knowledge, imagination, pretence, deceit, intentions, plans, etc. They 
argue that reflective functioning underlies children’s mind reading capacities and that it 
helps children to give meaning to people’s behaviour make it predictable. Fonagy and 
Target (2003) theorise that children’s reflective functioning is linked to their interpersonal 
abilities, and that it helps them to consider multiple possibilities which are organised 
based on prior experience and to activate the responses most suited to particular 
interpersonal transactions. They see this ability to explore the meanings of others actions 
as crucially linked to the child’s ability to label and give meaning to his own experience. 
They speculate that this ability makes a critical contribution to affect regulation, impulse 
control, self-monitoring and the experience of self-agency.
In contrast to theory of mind which largely neglects the question of self- 
understanding, reflective functioning is considered as involving both self-reflective and 
interpersonal components. These provide the individual with a well-developed ability to 
distinguish inner from outer reality, pretend from “real” modes of functioning, as well as 
intrapersonal mental and emotional processes from interpersonal communications. In 
essence, Fonagy and Target (2003) consider reflective functioning to be the mental 
function that organises the experience of one’s own and others’ behaviour in terms of 
mental state constructs. In addition, reflective functioning is also thought to involve 
knowledge of the common scripts of causal relationships between situations, emotions, 
beliefs and behaviours, knowledge of the transactional relationships between beliefs and 
emotions, and knowledge of the feelings and beliefs characteristic of particular 
developmental phases or relationships. Furthermore, the individual’s orientation, or 
attitude, towards intentionality, referred to as the “intentional stance”, to use Dennett’s 
term (1987), is identified as important for appreciating intentional behaviour in the self 
and for creating the continuity of self experience, the latter being the underpinnings of a
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coherent self structure.
Fonagy and Target (2003) emphasise that reflective functioning should not be 
confused with introspection. Introspection is seen as involving a metaphorical stepping 
back from the heat of a situation in order to undertake a conscious cognitive analysis of 
the situation in a state of relative emotional calm. Reflective functioning, on the other 
hand, is seen as an automatic procedure invoked when attempting to make sense of 
emotional reactions and interpersonal situations as they happen in real life, in the heat of 
the moment. It is considered an “over-learned” skill, and for this reason may be 
systematically misleading in a way that makes it more difficult to detect and correct than 
would be the case in making mistakes in conscious attributions. Similarly, reflective 
functioning lends shape and coherence to self-organisation, which is largely outside 
awareness.
In contrast with the notion that theory of mind is acquired during the fourth year 
of life (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Morton & U. Frith, 1995), Fonagy and Target (2003) contend 
that reflective functioning is a developmental “achievement” which is never fully 
acquired or even maintained across situations. At the individual level, reflective 
functioning does not necessarily generalise across situations and can vary considerably 
depending on whether it involves the self, others or attachment relationships and on the 
intensity and complexity of the emotions involved. Individuals have also been observed 
to differ widely in their ability to account for their own or others’ actions in terms of 
beliefs, desires and plans. Bolton and Hill (1996) and Cassam (1994), among others, 
regard this high level cognitive ability as an important determinant of individual 
differences in self-organisation, given that it is intimately involved with many defining 
features of selfhood, such as self consciousness, autonomy, freedom and responsibility.
Importance o f Reflective Functioning
With regard to sense of self and intentionality, Fonagy and Target (2003) see 
reflective functioning and mentalised affectivity, in particular, as determining the 
experiential understanding of one’s feelings, which is seen as going well beyond 
intellectual understanding. Psychopathology is thus thought to result from distortions in 
mental representations relating to certain emotions and also, more seriously, from an 
inhibition or lack of development of certain mentalising processes. In Fonagy and 
Target’s (2003) words “We can misunderstand what we feel, thinking that we feel one 
thing while truly feeling something else. More seriously, we can deprive ourselves of the 
entire experiential world of emotional richness. For example, the inability to imagine
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psychological or psychosocial causation may be the result of the pervasive inhibition 
and/or developmental malformation of the psychological processes that underpin these 
capacities” (p. 271).
Reflective functioning is also seen as central to developing deeper experiences 
with others and ultimately, to experiencing life as more meaningful. Fonagy and Target 
(2003) see the successful integration of internal and external realities as essential for 
endowing human actions with meaning that is emotionally alive, but manageable. A 
partial failure to achieve this integration is seen as underlying neurotic states. In more 
profound and pervasive failures of integration, reality is experienced as emotionally 
meaningless, other people and the self are related to as things, and the relating itself 
occurs at a very concrete level characteristic of severe personality disorders. In the 
extreme, the individual may be unable to treat themselves or others as motivated by 
mental states, which results in a personality organisation sometimes denoted as borderline 
(Fonagy, 1989; 1991; Fonagy &Higgitt, 1989).
Reflective functioning is also seen as central to meaningful interpersonal 
communication, in that it is linked to the ability to form a clear representation of the 
other’s mental state. This is in keeping with the philosopher Grice’s (1975) observation 
that for a speaker to be effective, he needs to keep in mind the point of view of the 
listener. These notions concerning; 1) the importance of keeping the other in mind in 
communicative acts, and; 2) the way narrative style reflects a speaker’s abilities and 
stance in this regard are central to the approach used by Main and her colleagues in rating 
the AAI (Main & Goldwyn, 1991).
Until children are able to understand emotional reactions and appreciate that 
mental phenomena, unlike external reality, can be altered, they remain vulnerable to then- 
own and others’ immediate emotional reactions. Prior to the development of reflective 
functioning, children are more vulnerable to consider inconsistency or hostility on the 
part of others as indicating showing something bad about the child. In contrast, if the 
child is able to attribute a withdrawn, unhappy mother’s apparently rejecting behaviour to 
her emotional state, the child is better protected from lasting injury to his view of himself. 
Once the child is able to evaluate and use mental representations, he can modify or 
separate perceptions of, for example, the maltreating parent from perceptions of the self 
(e.g., He was unloving but I am not unlovable). These abilities may not be important in 
all cases, but in the case of maltreatment or trauma they may be important to the child’s 
psychological survival, and they may relieve the pressure to re-enact the experience in 
concrete ways.
86
Reflective Parenting, Self-Development and Mentalisation
Fonagy and Target (2003) have developed an integrated model of the early 
development of mentalisation in the context of the caregiver infant relationship. By 
linking concepts of intentionality, marked affect mirroring and representational mapping, 
it provides a unique account of mentalisation, self development and affect regulation. 
The model integrates and reformulates concepts and processes initially introduced from 
different perspectives, including theory of mind, psychoanalysis, developmental 
psychology, and attachment; it thus provides a unique reinterpretation from a cross- 
fertilised perspective.
The parental ability to attribute intentionality to the infant is considered to be of 
key importance in the development of self and agency. At the same time, the quality of 
parental affect mirroring is seen as laying crucial to the development of affect 
recognition, which in turn is seen as laying the foundation for self-understanding and 
affect regulation. Like a number of theory of mind researchers, Fonagy and Target 
(2003) adopt the view of Gergely (Gergely et al., 1995; Gergely & Watson, 1996) that by 
the second half of the first year the infant’s perception of social contingencies is 
“teleological” in that they have a basic appreciation of future goals. This is evident from 
the fact that they expect action to be goal-directed. Fonagy and Target contend that the 
transition from a teleological to mentalising models depends on the quality of the parent 
infant interaction, and that the child develops a mentalising model in order to account for 
human action in terms of desires and beliefs.
Marked Affect Mirroring
In contrast with theory of mind accounts of mentalisation as developing from 
maturational processes, Fonagy and Target (2003) see parent-child intersubjective 
processes as having a profound impact on the development of the representational 
processes underlying mentalisation (Fonagy & Target, 1997). The period between birth 
and 5 months is seen as crucial in the early development of affect regulation. They 
suggest that a process referred to as parental “marked affect mirroring” plays a central 
role in the development of the child’s representation of affect. On the basis of evidence 
from micro-observational studies of contingency and co-ordination in early caregiver 
infant affective exchanges, they conclude that there is empirical support for earlier 
psychoanalytic notions (Bion, 1962; Jacobson, 1964; Kemberg, 1984; Kohut, 1977; 
Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975; Winnicott, 1956) concerning the role of parental 
mirroring in self-organisation, containment, regulation and mentalisation. Their concept 
of the mirroring relationship (Fonagy & Target, 2003) is closer to the empirically based
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model developed by Gergely and Watson (1996) than to the traditional concepts of 
mirroring introduced by psychoanalysts, although it follows this in spirit. It is in line with 
the contention of several infant researchers that facial and vocal mirroring of affective 
behaviour is a central feature of parental affect-regulative interactions occurring during 
the first year of life (Beebe & Lachman, 1988; Stem, 1985; Trevarthan, 1979; Tronick & 
Cohn, 1989).
Fonagy and Target (2003) postulate that this process of parental affect mirroring is 
a key mechanism and that it accounts for the links between parental reflective 
functioning, infant attachment and later performance regarding theory of mind abilities 
and emotional understanding. Their theory is influenced by evidence that in early 
caregiver infant interactions, exchanges of facial expression showed sensitivity to the 
state of the other and could be systematically altered by both parties (Beebe et al., 1997; 
Tronick, 1989). Their theory is also supported by research evidence that mothers are 
more likely to imitate their infant’s categorical emotional displays than random facial 
movements (Malatesta et al., 1989; Izard & Malatesta, 1987), that they imitate their 
infant’s expressions of sadness and anger (Tronick & Cohn, 1989) and that they respond 
with mock expressions of negative affect in response to reactions of negative affect. 
Fonagy and Target build on Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977, 1983a, 1983b) well-known 
findings that infants seem to have from surprisingly early on, a natural penchant for 
imitating the facial expressions of adults. Both Meltzoff and Gopnik (1993) and Gergely 
and Watson (1996) have developed models of the development of affect recognition and 
understanding based on these findings. Gergely and Watson’s social biofeedback theory 
of affect mirroring was presented in Chapter 1 and was contrasted with Meltzoff and 
Gopnik’s imitation-based hypothesis of the attribution of mental states. Gergely and 
Watson hypothesize that the infant’s expression and the mother’s facial and vocal 
responses come to be linked in the baby’s mind through a contingency detection 
mechanism identified by Watson (1972). This they suggest has two important effects. 
The sense that the infant gets that he controls the mirroring displays of the parent, comes 
to be associated with the improvement in his emotional states that he experiences after the 
parent’s contingent reaction and this eventually gives him a sense of himself as a 
regulating agent. This process is central in establishing the second order representation of 
affect, which helps to make affects recognisable and forms the basis for affect regulation. 
If the parent fails to provide contingent affect mirroring, this may lead to difficulties in 
labelling and recognising certain internal states, which will then remain confusing, 
unsymbolised and hard to regulate.
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Fonagy and Target (2003) theorise that in order for parental affect mirroring to 
serve as the basis for the development of a representational system, the mother has to 
differentiate her affective display from that of the infant so as to mark it as not her real 
feeling. If she simply mirrors the infant’s state of distress, this is seen as likely to result 
in an escalation of distress rather than in containment. The point is that the reflection of 
the affect state should be neither too close nor too remote. A display which mixes both a 
mirroring display with an affect incompatible with the child’s affect helps the child to 
realise that his emotion is analogous to, but not identical to reality, and such a display is 
more likely to soothe the child and establish a representation which limits, rather than 
exaggerates, the intensity of the affect.
Parental Stance Towards the Infant's Intentionality
In addition to the theory of marked affect mirroring outlined above, Fonagy and 
Target (2003) emphasise the importance of the intentional stance as important in the 
development of the sense of self and self-understanding. They consider the idea of the 
intentional stance, first introduced by the philosopher of mind, Dennett (1987), as 
capturing something essential regarding an orientation towards internal intentions and 
mental life within oneself and others. While theory of mind researchers have been 
preoccupied with the question of the earliest emergence and development of intentionality 
in infants, Fonagy and Target propose a new theory which sees the parent’s stance 
towards the infant and their ability to attribute and recognise the earliest signs of 
intentionality as key to the development of intentionality, as well as to its transmission. 
They stress the critical role of importance of the parent who attributes an intentional 
stance to the baby from birth, and who is sensitive to the first manifestations of it. More 
specifically, they contend that caregivers who conceive of their infants as mentalising will 
see their child’s behaviour as intentional and will respond as if it were an intentional 
communication. For example, the mother may say to the crying infant, “Do you want 
your nappy changed?”, or “Do you want a cuddle?”. Thus caregivers, who unconsciously 
and pervasively attribute mental states to their infants, are likely respond to them as if 
their behaviour were an attempt at communication. In this model, the child develops both 
his sense of himself as an intentional being and his perception of his own mental states 
and that of others inter-subjectively, through his experience of being related to as a 
mentalising being, not only in early mother-infant interactions, but also in later shared 
pretend play, conversation and peer interaction.
Attachment Security and Reflective Functioning
From a reflective functioning perspective, the caregiver’s perception of the child
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as an intentional being and an ability to be sensitive to the moment-to-moment changes in 
the child’s mental states are at the heart of sensitive caregiving (Fonagy, 1997; Fonagy & 
Target, 2003). They are seen as having repercussions on attachment security, and once the 
toddler has established a particular attachment style, they are seen as having 
consequences for the future development of mentalisation. Fonagy and Target (2003) 
theorise that the secure child feels safe when it comes to exploring the mental states of 
others, while the avoidant child shuns and is closed to the mental states of others, and the 
resistant child is pre-occupied with their own state of distress and is not open to 
intersubjective exchanges. In children who displayed resistant or avoidant attachment 
styles as infants, self-organisation is maintained within a rigid framework that limits 
mentalisation in specific ways.
The disorganised child is seen as representing a special category; hyper-vigilant to 
the caregiver’s intentional states he may develop a hyperactive mentalisation capacity, but 
sadly, this is not paralleled by the development of a robust self-organisation, as in 
securely attached children. It is theorised that disorganised infants are not able to achieve 
a basic self-organisation or sense of themselves because either: 1) the caregiver relates to 
them too inconsistently, possibly because of shifts in her mental states and mental 
representation of the infant; or 2) the mental state of the caregiver is too threatening or 
malevolent for the child or may be one of sadness or fear, even fear of the child. Whether 
the caregiver’s ability to accurately perceive the child’s mental states is severely 
compromised because of unresolved loss or trauma, or because of mental illness or 
malevolence, the infant does succeed in getting his own states recognised by his mother. 
Not only has the infant missed out on this process that facilitates self-organisation. More 
tragically, the focus of attention then becomes shifted away from the infant’s self to 
reading the mother’s mental states.
Normal Development o f Reflective Functioning during the Toddler and Pre-School 
Years
In their two Playing with Reality papers, Fonagy and Target (Fonagy & Target, 
1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996) hypothesised that normal development of reflective 
functioning and psychic reality in the period between 2 and 5 years of age involves a 
transition from a dual mode (involving either a “psychic equivalence” mode or a 
“pretend” mode) to mentalisation. This model of psychic development builds on the 
findings of developmentalists and theory of mind researchers as reviewed earlier in 
Chapter 1, and uses developmental evidence to support a contemporary interpretation of 
Freud’s concepts regarding psychic reality. Fonagy and Target (Fonagy & Target, 1996;
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Target & Fonagy, 1996) contend that very young children function predominantly in what 
they describe as a “psychic equivalence” mode, in which ideas are not seen as 
representations, but as exact replicas of the world, and thus necessarily true. They 
theorise that the young child experiences internal psychological states as reality, and does 
not recognise mental phenomena as involving beliefs, thoughts, feelings and desires about 
things. That young children may act as if there really is a monster under the bed can be 
regarded as an example of this inability to use the protection offered by the cognitive 
perception that imagination and reality do not correspond. Further evidence in support of 
this theory is the finding that young children tend to be realists and thus fit their beliefs to 
external reality and appearances, an orientation which promotes learning and adaptation 
in normal circumstances (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
This dependency on external reality or appearances has been illustrated in a number of 
studies, which show that when 3-year-olds are given a sponge painted to look like a rock, 
they will maintain that it is a rock, even after they have felt it and realised that it was a 
sponge (J. H. Flavell, E. R. Flavell, & Green, 1983). Fonagy and Target have argued that 
this lack of boundaries between internal and external experience, whereby internal reality 
can spill over and affect external reality, and similarly whereby external reality can 
impose on internal reality, leaves the child vulnerable, as he has no mental mechanisms to 
gain mastery over the impact of external reality.
Fonagy and Target (1996) contend that a second mode, the “pretend mode”, 
emerges when the child plays or pretends. In this mode, ideas are thought to be 
representational, but unconnected to reality. Fonagy and Target attribute a central role to 
play in the development of mentalisation, citing the theoretical and empirical work 
reviewed earlier on the transformative qualities of play and mental scaffolding provided 
by play partners. The very nature of play and pretend is seen as helping to free the child 
from the grip of external reality and as creating the context in which the child can 
discover the representational nature of mental states. They theorise that in play, the child 
has a unique opportunity to “think about thoughts as thoughts, because these are clearly 
and deliberately stripped of their connection to the real world of people and even things”
(p. 220).
Fonagy and Target (Fonagy & Target, 1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996) emphasise 
that their view of the development of mentalisation is not simply maturational. The 
involvement of the caregiver and, to some extend that of older siblings, are seen as crucial 
in helping the child to integrate what they refer to as a “non-mentalising reality orientated 
mode” and a “mentalising non-reality-connected mode”. They theorise that when older
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siblings or caregivers participate in the child’s pretend play, this provides the child with 
the opportunity to see his fantasy or idea represented in the mind of another. When the 
child sees the parent or playmate adopt a playful “as i f ’ stance in response to the child’s 
intentional state, and when he sees his thoughts and experiences represented outside of 
himself, as conceived by another he has the opportunity to discover that thoughts and 
experiences are not “for real”. This type of participation by a parent or a playmate is 
considered by Fonagy and Target to be crucial in the process through which the child 
discovers the symbolic nature of thought. They argue that through the repeated 
experience of having his thoughts and fantasies reflected in a recognisable and accepting 
way, the child begins to be able to maintain a mentalising stance himself, having 
discovered through using his parent’s mind, so to speak, to “play with reality”. Through 
this process, the child develops a reflective mode of functioning in which mental states 
can be experienced as representations.
In Fonagy and Target’s model (1996), the “psychic equivalence” and “pretend 
modes” become increasingly integrated, and what they designate as a reflective, or 
mentalising, mode of psychic reality is established between the ages of 4 to 5 years. This 
is considered a major step in the development of children’s mentalisation abilities. 
Fonagy and Target thus see the advantage of acquiring a theory of mind or learning about 
pretend, primarily in terms of self-regulation abilities which it confers. Discovering the 
nature of mental states enables children to master their inner reality. This is in contrast 
with the theory of mind and social functionalist positions (see, for example, Dunn, 1993) 
in which theory of mind abilities and the ability to understand the intentions of others are 
seen as providing a competitive advantage in the pursuit of goals in the social world.
Reflective Functioning: Developmental Model o f Psychopathology
Fonagy and Target (2003) regard failures in parental affect mirroring as a causal 
factor in psychopathology and in disturbances in self development, affect regulation and 
mentalisation. They delineate different types of pathological affect mirroring that are 
thought to have differing negative consequences for the development of the experience of 
self and the capacity to appreciate psychic reality; associated with different types of 
psychopathology.
One type of pathological affect mirroring is said to occur when the infant’s affect 
triggers painful feelings or fear in the parent, who then becomes overwhelmed by their 
own distress. In this situation, the infant is then confronted with display of the parent’s 
real anxiety, fear or anger, rather than with the containing type of marked affect
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mirroring. This triggers fear and results in an escalation of the infant’s distress. This is 
seen as an impediment to the development of a secondary representation and to the 
development of a sense of the boundary between the self and the other; the infant is left 
with the perception that his internal experience has become external. This type of 
pathological mirroring is seen as leading to borderline personality organisation, described 
in the psychiatric nomenclature as a personality disorder characterised by an inability to 
tolerate and regulate emotions and by a lack of personal identity and integration.
A second type of deviant mirroring is thought to underlie the development of 
narcissistic personality disorders, rather than borderline states. In this case, the problem 
arises from the fact that the infant’s emotion is consistently misunderstood by the parent, 
i.e., although she responds with marked affect mirroring, it is not in tune with that of the 
infant’s emotion. This results in secondary representations that misrepresent the primary 
emotional state, thus providing no basis for a representation of self. Fonagy and Target 
(2003) also mention another group involving dismissing mothers who avoid recognising 
the infant’s affect and who fail altogether with regard to mirroring, although they do not 
elaborate on whether the developmental consequences are similar to or different from 
those described in the development of narcissistic pathologies.
Fonagy and Target (2003) have used the concept of the alien self to describe an 
essential aspect of the impact of the deviant parental affect mirroring. They contend that 
when parental affect mirroring is highly insensitive or misrepresents the infant’s affect, 
this results in the failure of the development of a sense of the psychological self. Instead, 
the infant is left with a single option, that of internalising the parent’s affect and state of 
mind; this becomes a core part of the self, hence the notion of the alien self. Winnicott 
(1967), they suggest that the infant, “failing to find himself in the mother’s mind, finds 
the mother instead” (p. 279). At the same time, the alien self is thought to remain 
unconnected with the structures of the constitutional self and is dealt with through 
extemalisation and projection, which provides temporary relief in that the infant 
experiences the alien self as being inside someone else. This process is seen as being 
driven by the need to get rid of the alien self in order to experience the self as coherent.
Fonagy and Target (2003) also suggest that experiencing the alien self is more or 
less a part of growing up, in that transient neglect is part of ordinary caregiving. In the 
course of the normal development of mentalising, these gaps and inconsistencies are 
smoothed out by self-narratives that are well within the capabilities of reasonably 
functioning mentalising minds. Fonagy and Target theorise that it is in the context of later 
experiences of trauma in the family or within the peer group that there is a risk that the
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child may, in order to avoid pain, use this alien self to identify with the aggressor. In 
these cases, the child may come to experience himself as destructive and even monstrous. 
In summary, what is suggested is that early failings in parenting creates vulnerabilities; 
these may either be destructive for the development of the self and mentalising or may be 
used for defensive purposes. The continued defensive use of the alien part of the self is 
seen as deeply pathogenic and as connected to a future repudiation of mentalisation, to a 
disruption of the psychological self (as a result of the development of the torturing other 
within the self), and to a constant need for the presence of another onto whom the alien 
part can be projected. These characteristics are considered common to borderline 
disorder.
Reflective Functioning in the Context o f Abuse
In situations of abuse, the mentalising capacity of the child and his ability to 
interpret the perpetrator’s behaviour as reflecting something about the perpetrator, rather 
than about him, are theorised by Fonagy and Target (2003) as being vital to psychological 
survival. At the same time, the intense shame that is frequently elicited in attachment 
relationships, and when coupled with impairments in mentalisation, is seen as a likely 
trigger for violent acts against the self and others. It is also argued that where an 
individual or child is unable to conceive of the mental states that might explain the 
actions of the abuser, or when threatens the attachment relationship this contributes to a 
defensive and voluntary sacrifice of thinking about mental states on the part of the child. 
This abandonment of mentalisation leaves him functioning predominantly at a psychic 
equivalence mode at the level of internal reality; feelings and thoughts are perceived as 
real. At the same time, the child does not have the mental resources that could have 
helped him to fill in the gaps in self-structure through mentalisation.
Empirical Evidence fo r the Reflective Functioning Model
The findings of the London Parent-Child project were presented and discussed in 
detail earlier in this chapter. The results of studies from a number of other researchers 
provide support for the conclusion that maternal reflective functioning makes an 
important contribution to children’s emotional development and symbolic abilities. The 
findings of Slade et al. 1999 showed a strong association between the reflective 
functioning of parents concerning their toddlers and their reflective functioning about 
their own attachment relationships with their parents (Slade et al., 1999). Maternal 
reflective functioning was also found to be inversely related to negative, coercive and 
aggressive interactions with their toddlers. The findings reported by Meins et al. (1997)
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also showed that maternal mind-mindedness, as revealed in the descriptions of their 
toddlers, was linked to infant attachment security. In addition, Meins (1998) reported that 
mothers of the secure group attributed meaning to the early utterances of their children.
With regard to the link between reflective functioning and psychopathology, there 
is research evidence that patients with diagnoses of Borderline Personality Disorder and 
Eating Disorders, have significantly lower reflective functioning than patients with other 
diagnoses (Fonagy et al., 1998). Further analysis revealed a more complicated picture 
and showed that patients with a history of abuse were more likely to present with 
Borderline Personality Disorder when they also had low reflective functioning, while in 
the group without histories of trauma there was no relationship between reflective 
functioning and borderline disorder. Results from a small exploratory study comparing 
prisoners on remand with an inpatient psychiatric group with Borderline Personality 
Disorder and a control group matched for diagnosis, socio-economic status, age and IQ, 
also showed that the prisoners had significantly lower reflective functioning than the 
inpatient group (Fonagy et al., 1998). Within the prison group there was also a significant 
difference in reflective functioning between the reflective functioning of prisoners who 
had committed violent crimes, and other prisoners.
These findings suggest that reflective functioning, or rather, the lack there of, may 
be an important risk factor for the development of borderline psychopathology when 
associated with other risk factors and trauma, and that many individuals who transgress 
the social codes protecting person and property, frequently have severe inhibitions of 
reflective functioning. These provocative findings, call for further research to clarify the 
associations and mechanisms involved and to explore whether and how reflective 
functioning can be a target for intervention.
Critical Consideration o f Reflective Functioning
At this stage there is developmental data showing links between maternal 
reflective functioning, or mind-mindedness, and children’s attachment security, as well as 
between attachment security and the emergence of symbolic abilities, theory of mind and 
understanding of mixed emotion in children. While the latter abilities can be interpreted 
as evidence of children’s reflective functioning, direct evidence is lacking. To date, there 
are no measures available for assessing children’s reflective functioning. It has yet to be 
determined whether or not these capacities can be measured with sufficient reliability and 
validity, and whether or not they can be shown to be distinct from children’s intellectual 
abilities or related to other developmental processes and psychopathology. At both a
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conceptual and methodological level, the question also arises as to whether or not 
reflective functioning, as operationalised for the purposes of measurement in the 
reflective functioning scale, focuses on an ability that is both too specific and too 
intellectual. It may be that reflective functioning is specifically involved in some of the 
memory systems, like autobiographical memory, but it may be well be a less important 
aspect of procedural knowledge, given that additional processes are thought by others to 
be involved in classifying and making sense of social interactions (Anderson, 1976; 
Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Winograd, 1975, Tulving, 1983). It is possible that reflective 
functioning is more like one aspect of personality, rather than directly underlying the 
quality of interpersonal and intrapersonal appraisal and emotional experience per se. Thus 
reflective functioning may constitute several pieces of the social intelligence puzzle, but 
other social emotional abilities, such as temperament and empathy, may be equally 
important and may make an independent contribution to the quality of interpersonal and 
intrapersonal experience.
Conclusion
The above reviews presented three different, although related, views of the 
development of children’s mentalisation capacities. In the first paradigm, that of affective 
understanding, children learn to mentalise in their interactions with their parents, older 
adults and siblings. The emphasis is on coaching and on learning through narratives that 
adults provide regarding affects. In addition, pretend play, especially role-play, is 
considered as providing important opportunities to develop the capacity to imagine what 
others are feeling. In the second paradigm, that of attachment, attachment style predicts 
children’s mentalisation capacities. It is argued that this is because secure children will 
seek out, engage with, and benefit more from those processes identified as important in 
the development of affective understanding, and theory of mind. In addition, securely 
attached children are more likely, at each subsequent developmental stage to continue to 
reap the benefits of being with parents who are orientated towards the mental aspects of 
relationships and experience. Parents who have the qualities that foster attachment 
security can also be expected to engage in emotion rich discussions and narratives when 
interacting with their children. In the third paradigm, that of reflective functioning, both 
this orientation of the parent towards intentionality, and their capacity to consider 
thoughts, feelings and desires of others in relationships, are central to the development of 
mentalisation abilities in children. This comes about through an interaction with 
attachment, as well as the other processes identified above.
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CHAPTER 3
ASSESSING THE MENTALISATION ABILITIES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL-AGE 
CHILDREN: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND THE ANNA FREUD CENTRE
STUDY
There are major gaps in our understanding of whether and how children’s theory 
of mind and emotional understanding are linked to adaptive functioning and to 
psychopathology. At the same time, there is sufficient evidence to postulate, based on the 
preceding review of theoretical developments and empirical research, that children’s 
ability to use mental states to think about their relationships is linked to social adaptation, 
and also to behaviour difficulties and disturbances of affect. The lack of reliable age 
appropriate measures of mentalising abilities in primary school-aged children remains one 
of the principal problems besetting researchers wanting to address these questions. In 
part, this problem is related to the challenges involved in developing reliable and valid 
assessments of complex mentalisation. The phenomena of interest can be defined as the 
mental ability to take into account affects and internal states within oneself and others, 
and as the ability to have a sense of the context and intentions that might give rise to these 
reactions, especially in interpersonal processes. This mental ability is used in everyday 
life, to make sense of our own reactions and those of others; thus it is especially used in 
interpersonal contexts. But the question remains: can it be operationalised and studied in a 
reliable and valid way? The challenge is to conceive of and develop appropriate and 
reliable methods for assessing this ability, or more likely, abilities, as different abilities 
are hypothesised to be involved in understanding self and others. In terms of assessing 
mentalisation in primary school-aged children, theory of mind, affective understanding, 
and reflective functioning present promising approaches. The rationale is as follows: the 
identification of a method in which the ability of interest is elicited and its full range 
tested, combined with an objective, manualised method for assessing and coding the 
child’s performance can be expected to produce the most reliable estimate of children’s 
mentalisation abilities.
The goal of this thesis is to identify and develop measures of mentalisation that are 
appropriate for use with primary school-aged children and that can be used to obtain an
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objective, valid and reliable assessment of mentalisation. In this chapter, three candidate 
measures will be introduced. The focus will be on key measurement issues and on the 
methodological approach that will be used to examine the reliability and validity of these 
measures.
Candidate Measures of Children’s Mentalisation Abilities
Theory o f M ind
The Happe’s Strange Stories (HSS: Happe, 1994) measure was selected because it 
goes beyond other theory of mind measures and assesses the ability to consider the 
intentions of the speaker when interpreting everyday expressions that involve figures of 
speech not literally true. This procedure was developed by Happe within the theory of 
mind tradition and uses short stories to recount everyday situations involving 
communicative interactions between two people involving joking, sarcasm, figures of 
speech and lying, amongst others. The measure is pitched at an 8-year-old level, although 
the HSS has never, in fact, been used with this age group. It is one of the only theory of 
mind tests designed for children older than 6 years of age and was chosen in part for this 
reason.
The coding system allows the rater to obtain an objective assessment of the child’s 
ability to consider the intentions of others in everyday speech in which what is said is not 
literally true. The construct measured by the HSS can be described as children’s theory 
of mind abilities, and more specifically, their ability to consider the intentions of the 
speaker in understanding everyday speech in which what is said is not literally true. The 
HSS will be presented and described in detail in Chapter 4.
Reflective Functioning
A child version of the Reflective Functioning Scale (CRFS: Target et al., 2001) 
has recently been adapted from the Adult Reflective Functioning Scale (ARFS: Fonagy et 
al., 1998), and was designed for use with the Child Attachment Interview (CAI: Target et 
al., 2000). Further development of the CRFS coding system and manual was undertaken 
as part of the work for this thesis. The CRFS coding system is designed so that raters can 
make an objective assessment of children’s ability to provide mentalising accounts of 
themselves, their key attachment relationships and their context. The raters assess 
descriptions children provide of specific memories or events to illustrate key qualities of 
themselves and their relationships.
The construct that is measured has been defined as children’s reflective
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functioning, and more specifically, as children’s propensity to give accounts of 
themselves and their close relationships in mental state terms. The CRFS will be 
presented and described in detail in Chapter 6.
Affective Understanding
The Affect Task (AT: Fonagy et al., 2000) was designed to obtain an objective 
measure of children’s affective understanding, as assessed in the context of a semi- 
structured interview. The test explores various dimensions of children’s affective 
understanding from a reflective functioning perspective. It builds on empirical work on 
the development of affective and social understanding, and it integrates this work with a 
reflective functioning approach. The AT uses simple pictures depicting common 
situations in which there is a protagonist, victim and observers in order to evaluate: 1) the 
accuracy of children’s emotional attribution; 2) children’s understanding of the links 
between the affects evoked and the interpersonal events; 3) their understanding of 
emotional dissemblance; 4) their understanding of how affects change over time; as well 
as 5) their ability to be reflexive when challenged to consider why someone else may 
have a quite different emotional reaction.
The AT has similarities to the Kusche Affective Interview (Kusche, Greenberg, 
Beilke; 1988) in terms of the domains that are assessed. The procedure used in the 
Kusche Affective Interview was not considered an optimal measure for the assessment of 
children’s mentalisation abilities, as it uses a self-report format and appears to principally 
assess social knowledge involving social rules and etiquette. The Affect Task, when used 
with the coding manual, makes possible an objective assessment of children’s emotional 
understanding based on the way they respond in the interview. The ability assessed by 
the AT can be defined as children’s affective understanding vis-a-vis five different areas: 
the affects evoked in social contexts, the interpersonal causes of these affects, the 
phenomenon and reasons for emotional dissemblance, how feelings change, and affective 
reflexivity. The AT will be presented in more detail in Chapter 5.
Model and Conceptual Issues: Relationship between Mentalisation, Intelligence,
Psychopathology and Attachment
Are Socio-Cognitive Abilities Different from  Intelligence?
All three models of children’s mentalisation abilities presented thus far are based 
on the implicit assumption that these abilities are distinct from general intelligence. 
Baron-Cohen (1995) has claimed that the core deficit in autism is one of social
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intelligence and this is regulated by a distinct, biologically based theory of mind module. 
Fonagy et al. (2002) see reflective functioning as being associated with an interpersonal 
interpretative mechanism developed in the context of early parent-infant interactions. At 
the same time, reflective functioning is differentiated from the constitutional 
characteristics and intelligence of the child. Similarly, in the developmental models of 
emotional understanding, it is parent-child processes, rather than constitutional factors 
such as intelligence, that are seen as determining children’s affective understanding. The 
question is whether or not this assumption of the relative independence of children’s 
socio-cognitive abilities and intelligence is well founded and, assuming that these are 
distinct abilities, whether or not valid assessment methods can be devised that do not 
simply assess social knowledge or intelligence.
Reviews of studies of social intelligence indicate that there are still major 
questions about: 1) whether or not sociocognitive abilities involve a faculty distinct from 
non-social cognition and 2) whether or not social intelligence is more than just general 
intelligence applied to the social domain (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). It has proved 
remarkably hard to develop self-report measures that can produce results indicating that 
social intelligence is a capacity that can be distinguishes from general intelligence. Ford 
and Tisak (1983) produced promising results using a multi-trait, multi-method study. 
Using reports obtained from multiple informants, they found that a composite of social 
competence and performance on Hogan’s (1969) scale of empathy was a better predictor 
of interview-based expert evaluations of social competence than were academic 
measures. This would suggest that when verbal self-report measures of social 
intelligence are used, correlations with IQ are very likely, but this is not the case when 
using performance based assessments of social intelligence. Even more promising was 
that the interview-based evaluations, especially when done by experts, seemed to provide 
a valid assessment of social abilities and empathy. A number of other investigators 
(Brown & Anthony, 1990; Marlowe, 1986) reported similar findings, although there is 
concern that different methods used to assess general intelligence and social intelligence 
might account for the apparent differences (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). An additional 
important contribution comes from a factor analytic study conducted by Wong, Day, 
Maxwell, and Meara (1995) showing that social perception (accuracy in decoding verbal 
and nonverbal behaviour) and social insight (accuracy in interpreting social behaviour) 
were closely related and were distinct from social knowledge (awareness of the rules of 
etiquette). All three of these abilities were distinct from traditional academic ability. The 
findings from subsequent factor analytic studies testing various models of the relationship
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between social and academic intelligence suggest that crystallised social intelligence or 
knowledge was not discriminable from academic intelligence, but that fluid social 
intelligence is discriminable from both (Jones & Day; 1997). Similar findings were 
obtained in a recent sophisticated factor analytic study conducted by Lee, Wong, Day, 
Maxwell and Thorpe (2000), leading one to the conclusion that social and academic 
intelligence are distinct domains and that crystalised and fluid abilities can be identified 
in each domain.
Lee et al. (2000) have drawn attention to the important implications of the choice 
of assessment methods and to the fact that when abilities are assessed using self-reports 
and other-reports, method based variance exceeded the variance shared between objective 
assessments of the same abilities and either self-report or other-report assessments. This 
was true for the assessment of abilities in both the academic and social domains. In the 
light of these findings, it can be concluded that objective assessments of socio-cognitive 
and academic abilities are more likely to produce valid results. This added to the impetus 
for identifying and developing objective methods for assessing children’s socio-cognitive 
abilities; these methods will be presented in this study. In terms of the choice of 
assessment methods, the present study relies on objective assessment methods and is thus 
well suited to assessing the relationship between children’s socio-cognitive and academic 
intelligence.
Empirical Evidence o f the Link between Attachment and Mentalisation Abilities
Based on the evidence presented in Chapter 2 that children’s theory of mind and 
mixed emotional understanding are predicted by their attachment security, the association 
between attachment and mentalisation abilities appears robust. The development of child 
measures of reflective functioning now makes it possible to investigate empirically 
whether or not this association between attachment security and children’s mentalisation 
abilities can be demonstrated to be present across three different assessment methods.
Model o f Mentalisation and Psychopathology
Given the previous findings that Fonagy et al. (1998) reported from studies with 
adult psychiatric patients, it is unlikely that there are direct links between children’s 
mentalisation abilities, and their reports of feelings of depression and unhappiness, and 
behavioural difficulties. Negative life events and difficult family circumstances are 
known to play a central role in children’s depression and unhappiness (Wing, Mann, Leff 
& Nixon; 1978). Unless these can be taken into consideration, it might not be possible to
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conclude whether children’s mentalisation abilities make a contribution to finding 
adaptive solutions in the face of overwhelming odds. Ideally longitudinal studies are 
needed to determine whether children’s mentalisation abilities do indeed contribute to 
resilience and recovery in the contexts associated with increased risk of adult 
psychopathology such as of childhood trauma, neglect and deprivation (Cicchetti & 
Rogosch, 1999). The observation of Rutter el al. (1970), in the context of the Isle of 
Wight study, that many apparently normal children reported depressed feelings or looked 
depressed, leads to the further question of whether or not children’s mentalisation abilities 
can help them maintain their adaptive functioning in spite of a depressed mood and 
depressive disorder. The additional question arises as to whether or not theory of mind, or 
reflective functioning, can increase children’s awareness of how unsatisfactory their 
circumstances are and contribute to the development of the type of distortions in 
attributions that depressed children have been observed to make.
Finally, given the possibility that conduct disordered children have a theory of bad 
minds, it is worth investigating whether or not children develop a theory of disturbed 
minds when disturbed parent-child emotion-focused discussions is the norm. Dodge 
(1991) has concluded that children, who grow up in contexts where aggression is 
valorised or who have aggressive role models, are more likely to use pro-active 
aggression in their relationships with others. In addition, Dodge, Pettit and Bates (1997) 
have found that children, who have been exposed to political or family violence and 
trauma, are more likely to react to aggression with fear and counter aggression. There is 
also evidence suggesting that in certain cultural contexts there may be more deviant 
pathways to peer popularity (Richters & Cicchetti, 1993). Luthar and McMahon’s (1996) 
findings suggest that in certain crime and violence-laden disenfranchised communities, 
aggressive behaviour that is regarded as anti-social from a mainstream perspective, results 
in peer popularity.
From a conceptual point of view, there is a more fundamental problem that may 
reduce the chances of finding links between child factors such as children’s mentalisation 
abilities, and child psychopathology, i.e., there are still many serious concerns regarding 
the definition of the latter construct (Achenbach, 1992). As Achenbach (1992) and 
Ciccheti & Rogosch (1999) point out, child psychopathology has been defined partly 
through clinical observation and experience, and partly through factor analytic studies, 
and work is just beginning on the integration of a developmental approach.
Measurement Issues
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Research with Children
A number of factors are known to influence the reliability of assessments of the 
abilities of young children. Children are known to present particular problems regarding 
rapport and motivation; they may have difficulty understanding the task maintaining 
attention and coping with distraction and fatigue (Messick, 1983). At age 6, children are 
just beginning to acquire the ability to realise when they do not understand a question and 
to communicate that fact, and may thus be more likely to not respond or to say that they 
do not know the answer in response to a question.
It is also considered inevitable that test-retest reliability will be lower when the 
same measure and test-retest interval used with older children is used with younger 
children (Hartmann, 1992). There are also concerns as to whether or not children prior to 
age 8 can be reliable informants, Shaffer (1985) has suggested that children may not 
understand questions about symptomatology; thus, interpretation of these responses can 
be difficult. At the same time, children are considered to be more reliable informants 
than their parents when it comes to internalising problems (Edelbrock, Costello, Dulcan, 
Conover, & Kalas, 1986). For these reasons, objective assessments of children’s abilities 
or difficulties, based on interview data, are considered to provide the most reliable results.
Hartmann (1992) also points out that because of developmental changes, scores on 
a particular measure may be a valid indicator of ability at a given age, but may primarily 
reflect motivation at another age. This is particularly relevant when using tests that are 
too easy, and there are some questions regarding whether this will be the case for the 
HSS. Newly emerging abilities are known to be difficult to catch, as they are emerging, 
and to have transient performance levels. This is known to lead to lower reliability when 
newly emerging abilities are assessed (Hofstaetter, 1954), and may be a factor when 
assessing reflective function in very young children.
Reliability and Validity in the Context o f Assessing Mentalisation Abilities
The procedure for assessing reliability, including interrater reliability, internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability is relatively standard, regardless of the type of 
construct, and there is general agreement regarding the criteria that determine whether or 
not interrater reliability and internal consistency is good. There is, however, a question 
regarding test-retest reliability criteria, and for a number of reasons. Kline (2000) has 
commented that respondent factors, such as respondents having mental health problems
103
can be expected to lower test-retest reliability of otherwise reliable instruments.
In addition, complex rating systems that rely on the skills of the interpreter are 
also likely to lower reliability. As Western, Feit.and Zittel (1999) point out, when 
interrater reliability is a factor in the test-retest scores, test-retest reliability is bound to be 
lower. Lower test-retest scores are also inevitable when using projective tests, story 
completion tasks and narrative methods that inevitably introduce variance. Western et al. 
(1999) have concluded that it is not realistic to expect these measures to have the same 
test-retest reliability as, for example, intelligence tests, and that what is important is that 
these tests measure certain abilities more reliably than self-report methods. Generally, 
reliability estimates of lower than .60 are considered unacceptably low (Murphy & 
Davidshofer, 2001). The same criteria was used in a review of the reliability of self­
esteem measures by Bosson, Swann and Pennebaker (2000). At the same time, reliability 
of projective tests are generally in the .5 to .65 range (Murphy & Davidshofer, 2001). 
Kline (2000), who generally contends that anything less than .8 suggests that a test is not 
reliable, comments in a discussion of projective tests that a test-retest correlation of .5 for 
a projective test over a 10 months was “quite high”, suggesting that the test may be 
useful. This raises questions as to how far the reliability “envelope” can be stretched. As 
Kline points out, however valid the justifications may be for why a particular test of 
construct shows lower stability, this does not change the fact that reliability coefficients 
below .5 could reflect chance. For the purposes of this study, test-retest correlations of .6 
and above will be considered as moderate, and correlations of .5 and above will be 
considered as low.
There is also the issue of how to interpret the magnitude of the correlation 
between the test and the criterion. Based partly on the results of a review of a number of 
studies on personnel selection with a N  of over 140 000 (Schmidt, Hunter, & Pearlman, 
1981) Murphy and Davidshofer (2001) have pointed out that correlations higher than .3 
are not very common. Even a good, carefully chosen test is unlikely to show a correlation 
with a criterion of higher than .5. In addition to method variance, informant variance is 
also a factor that has to be considered. In the context of child psychopathology, meta­
analyses have reflected correlations of .6 between informants who have similar roles in 
relation to the child (e.g. mother versus father), .28 between informants playing different 
roles (parents versus teachers), and .22 between children and parents or mental health 
workers (Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell, 1987).
The impact of method variance is becoming increasingly recognised. A review of 
research by Buckley, Cote and Comstock (1990) on measures of personality showed that
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in addition to measurement error, approximately 22% of score variance can be attributed 
to measurement method, leaving only 42% of the variance attributable to the traits the 
scale was designed to measure. This calls into question the desirability of the multi­
method studies that were highly touted not too long ago. In this respect, the design of the 
present study may not be optimal, in that because of limitations in resources, self and 
parent-reports were used to obtain information regarding children’s symptoms of anxiety, 
depression and behavioural difficulties.
Finally, there is the question of the particular methods that have been chosen to 
assess mentalisation abilities. The method for assessing theory of mind is predominantly 
performance based. The coding system is relatively straightforward and can be expected 
to be applied reliably by psychology undergraduates after a brief training period. The 
method used to assess affective understanding and reflective functioning is comparatively 
more complex, and it requires more ability and skill at the level of interpretation. Here, as 
is true for the AAI, the CAI, projective tests and story completion methods, test validity 
reflects not just the test, but also the interpretation and coding of the test data (Karon, 
1991). It would seem that in the history of cognitive assessment, the tide turned against 
interview based methods after Vernon and Parry (1949) showed that interviews, except 
when conducted by individuals with exceptional abilities, made selection worse, rather 
than better. At the same time, the success of attachment research in which interviews are 
rated by highly trained expert raters using a carefully elaborated coding system attests to 
the usefulness of these complex rating methods in obtaining objective and reliable 
assessments of personal attributes that are otherwise difficult to measure. In this context, 
there is a growing recognition that objective expert assessments of interviews or 
performance data is likely to be the most reliable method in the assessment of socio 
cognitive abilities (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1999).
Aims and Objectives
The aims of this study are to present the HSS, AT and CRFS and to examine their 
psychometric properties, including reliability and validity.
In order to establish the reliability of the three measures, the objectives are: 1) to 
present the adapted coding system and evaluate the interrater reliability results obtained 
using the coding systems; 2) to evaluate the internal consistency reliability of each scale, 
after investigating the dimensionality and factor structure of the scales; and 3) to establish 
whether the HSS, AT and CRFS have adequate stability over a 3-month test-retest period, 
as well as after 1 year. Following the guidelines of Endicott and Spitzer (1978) for
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interpreting ICCs, values above .75 will be considered as indicative of good reliability; 
between .50 and .75 as fair; and values below .50 as reflecting poor reliability1. To 
establish the stability of the HSS over time, Pearson product-moment correlations (r) 
between time 1 and time 2 scores over a 3-month test-retest interval, as well as after a 1- 
year period, are calculated. Following Murphy and Davidshofer (2001), moderate test- 
retest correlations of .6 and above will be considered as acceptable, test-retest correlations 
of .5 and above will be regarded as low, and below .5 as poor.
The validity of the HSS, AT and CRFS will be evaluated in the context of the 
relationships and associations between performance on the measures and key 
demographic variables, IQ and expressive language abilities, psychopathology, social 
adaptation and attachment. These relationships and associations will be examined with 
the following objective in mind: 1) to investigate the performance of the scales with 
regard to gender and family composition; 2) to evaluate the construct validity of HSS, AT 
and CRFS in the context of their relationships with age, IQ, expressive language abilities, 
psychopathology and social-adaptation; 3) to evaluate the predictive validity of the HSS, 
AT and CRFS in relation to psychopathology, by examining whether or not factors other 
than age and intelligence enhance the prediction of children’s socio-cognitive abilities as 
measured on the HSS, AT and CRFS; 4) to evaluate whether or not there are differences 
in socio-cognitive abilities of children as measured by the HSS, AT and CRFS as a 
function of attachment security and clinical psychopathology while adjusting for factors 
such as age and IQ; 5) to examine the convergent validity of the assessments of 
children’s mentalisation abilities by comparing the correlations between children’s 
performance on the HSS, AT and CRFS.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses corresponding to all the objectives will be outlined below.
Gender and Family Composition
No gender effects are expected, given the divergent findings with regard to gender 
and socio-cognitive abilities, and also considering that the measures do not assess abilities 
in which females have been shown to have advantages, such as interpreting mental states 
via the eyes and facial expressions (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997).
In the light of previous findings that only children showed delays in theory of
1 Jones, Reid and Patterson (1973) suggested .70 agreement as an acceptable level when complex coding 
schemes are used, while Gelfand and Hartmann (1975) recommend .60.
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mind abilities compared with children with siblings (Pemer et al., 1994; Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996), family composition is expected to have a small impact on the 
mentalisation abilities of only children when compared to that of children with siblings.
Mentalisation and Age, IQ, Expressive Language, Psychopathology and Social- 
Adaptation
A positive correlation between age and children’s mentalisation abilities is 
expected and will be regarded as providing confirmation that the measure is sensitive to 
the effects of age on the development of children’s theory of mind. Given previous 
findings regarding the relationship between theory of mind and language abilities 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1995; J. G. De Villiers and P. A. De Villiers; Happe, 1995; Tager- 
Flusberg, 1996), positive relationships of weak to moderate strength between 
mentalisation abilities, expressive language abilities and verbal IQ, are expected. The 
relationship is expected to be weaker than during the pre-school years when language 
abilities are more closely associated with fluid intelligence than with crystallised 
intelligence. Theory of mind abilities, as measured on the HSS, and affective 
understanding, as measured on the AT, are expected to show comparatively stronger 
correlations with intelligence than with reflective functioning, as the HSS and the AT 
could be argued to measure abilities which involve intelligence, whereas the CRFS is 
expected to be more closely linked to attachment and expressive language abilities. The 
CRFS is expected to show a moderate correlation with reflective functioning if narrative 
accounts, such as that of Harris (2000) are accepted: he contends that the development of 
both abilities are rooted in interpersonal narrative construction processes.
From a theoretical perspective, mentalisation abilities, as measured by the HSS, 
AT and CRFS, are expected to be associated with better social functioning, and to be 
inversely related to behavioural difficulties. Weak inverse relationships are expected 
between performance on the HSS and behaviour problems as measured on the CBCL 
Externalising Scale, as well as between the HSS and social adaptation, measured on the 
CAFAS (here higher scores reflect increased adaptive difficulties). In addition, 
mentalisation abilities are expected to be inversely related to depression, as measured on 
the CDI, and anxiety as measured on the STAIC, although the theoretical and empirical 
evidence suggest that the relationship may be indirect.
Predictors o f Children’s Mentalisation Abilities
It is expected that taking into account social adaptation and psychopathology will 
contribute to the prediction of children’s mentalisation abilities for the reasons outlined 
previously.
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Differences in Mentalisation as a Function o f Attachment and Psychopathology
Differences in the mentalising abilities of secure and insecure children (as 
measured on the CAI) are expected to remain significant after adjustment for other 
contributors. This hypothesis is based on the findings that attachment predicts theory of 
mind performance and affective understanding (Fonagy, Redfem et al., 1997), and on the 
argument that from a theoretical perspective, they can be seen as overlapping constructs 
(Fonagy, 1997). The mentalisation abilities of children with behaviour problems in the 
clinical range of the CBCL are expected to be significantly lower than those of the non- 
clinical group, after adjustment for other contributors. Similar differences are expected 
with regard to depression, with children who report symptoms of depression in the 
clinical range on the CDI expected to have lower intentional understanding on the HSS.
Convergent Validity
Children’s mentalisation abilities as measured on the HSS, AT and CRFS are 
expected to converge, and their performance on the different measures is expected to 
show moderate correlations.
Method 
Participants and Recruitment
The samples that will be used to investigate the psychometric properties of the 
HSS, AT and CRFS are sub samples of a larger sample of children recruited for a project 
of child measure development conducted at the Anna Freud Centre under the direction of 
Peter Fonagy and Mary Target from University College London. The aim of the Anna 
Freud Centre study was to identify, develop and standardise measures of the 
mentalisation abilities of primary school-aged children that could then be used to measure 
the impact and outcome of child psychotherapeutic treatment.
Ethical approval for the Anna Freud Centre study was obtained from the Ethics 
Committees of University College London and the Camden and Islington Health 
Authority (see Appendixes Al, A2, A3 and A4). A sample of 200 children aged 5-11 
were recruited; 100 were referred by schools and 100 by Child Mental Health Clinics in 
the greater London area. To recruit the school sample, head-teachers of 20 schools in the 
greater London area, as well as a school in Reading, were contacted via letter. This letter 
introduced the aims and procedures of the project and requested study participation. The 
Reading school was recruited specifically with the objective of increasing the range of 
social backgrounds of the children in the sample. Three schools in London, as well as the 
school in Reading, agreed to participate. The head-teachers from the participating
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schools distributed a package containing study information sheets and consent forms 
(parallel versions for children and parents) to all potential participants and their 
parents/caregivers.
The clinic sample was recruited from two National Health Service Child and 
Family Consultation Services (Hornsey Rise Child and Family Unit and Canonbury Child 
and Family Unit), as well as from charitably funded child-psychotherapy clinic, the Anna 
Freud Centre (which also served as the home base for this research project). All three 
clinics were situated in the North-London area. The recruitment procedure firstly 
involved the identification of all referrals within the relevant age range. The following 
exclusion criteria were then applied: 1) family not fluent in English; 2) diagnosed or 
suspected pervasive developmental delays or psychotic disorder; 3) serious medical or 
neurological condition; 4) child without guardian, or very recently placed with foster 
family; and 5) acute family stress or other circumstances which makes study participation 
inappropriate (e.g., family in shelter or referral under court order). Study information 
sheets describing the aims of the study, as well as an outline of what study participation 
would involve, were mailed to all families who met the criteria for study participation. 
Families were then contacted by telephone or by letter to confirm their willingness to 
participate in the study, and to arrange meetings for the study interviews. In total, 
approximately 25% of families who initially met the inclusion criteria agreed to 
participate in the study.
Thirty children agreed to participate in the test-retest study and repeated the HSS, 
AT and CRFS after 3 months. In addition, approximately 50% of families who 
participated at time 1 agreed to return for interviews after 1 year.
The descriptive statistics of the samples used in the three studies to investigate the 
psychometric properties of the HSS, AT and CRFS, will be presented separately in the 
chapters focusing on each measure. The sample sizes with valid data for the HSS, AT 
and CRFS differ because: 1) some of the measures, such as the HSS, were introduced 
later in the Standardisation Study; and 2) the format for interviews such as the AT, as 
well as the child attachment interview which is coded with the CRFS, was being 
developed in the initial stages of the Standardisation Study and changed substantially, 
such that only data collected using the final form of the interviews is valid.
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Measures
Thirteen parent-report and child-report measures were selected to assess IQ and 
expressive language abilities, child psychopathology, child adaptation, self-esteem, 
attachment and mentalisation abilities. All the measures used in this study are 
summarised in Table 3.
Table 3
Child and Parent-Report Measures Used in the Study
Dimension Assessment Type Measure
Intelligence Test Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children
Expressive Language Test Clinical Evaluation of Language 
Fundamentals -  Revised
Child Psychopathology Child-report Child Depression Inventory
Child-report State and Trait Anxiety Inventory
Parent-report Child Behaviour Checklist
Child Adaptation Parent-report Child Adaptation and Functioning 
Scale
Self-Esteem Child-report Harter’s Self Perception Profile
Attachment Interview & Child Attachment Interview
Classification
System
Mentalisation Interview & Happe’s Strange Stories
Rating Scale Affect Task
Child Reflective Functioning Scale
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Measures o f IQ and Expressive Language Abilities
Wechsler Intelligence Scale fo r Children - Third UK edition. (WISC-III1^ : 
Wechsler, 1991). This is the UK edition of the most widely used intelligence scale for 
children aged 6-16, and its psychometric properties are well established. The WISC 
consists of 13 sub-tests measuring different aspects of intelligence that are used to 
calculate Verbal and Performance subscale scores, as well as a Full-scale IQ score. In the 
present study, a shortened form of the WISC-III was used. Two sub-tests were used to 
estimate verbal subscale scores: 1) similarities, which requires the child to identify how 
two words are alike; and 2) vocabulary, which requires the child to explain the meaning 
of words presented. To estimate Performance subscale scores, the following two sub­
tests were used: 1) picture arrangement, which requires the child to order a series of 
picture cards so that they tell a story and 2) block design, which requires the child to 
arrange blocks to replicate two-dimensional designs. These subtests were chosen because 
they have been shown to correlate well with the subscale scores and are considered to 
provide good estimates of verbal and performance abilities. The short form takes 
approximately 30 minutes to administer. Verbal IQ, Performance IQ and Full-Scale IQ 
scores were subsequently pro-rated based on the four subscale scores.
In this study, the relationship between intelligence and children’s mentalisation 
abilities will be examined in order to evaluate whether or not the latter is sufficiently 
distinct from intelligence such that it may be considered a separate construct.
Clinical Evaluation o f Language Fundamentals-Revised. The CELF-R (Semel, 
Wigg, & Secord, 1987) is a widely used standardised language measure designed to 
assess receptive and expressive language skills in children aged 5-16. In the current 
study, the following three expressive language sub-tests of the CELF-R (UK version) 
were used: 1) formulated sentences, which assesses the ability to form simple, compound 
and complex sentences and 2) recalling sentences, which assesses recall and reproduction 
of surface structure as a function of syntactic complexity, and 3) sentence assembly which 
assesses the ability to assemble syntactic structures into grammatically acceptable and 
semantically meaningful sentences. Raw scores derived from each of the CELF-R sub­
tests were converted into norm-referenced standard scores.
In this study, CELF-R standard scores will be used as an indicator of children’s 
expressive language abilities, and the relationship between these abilities and children’s 
mentalisation abilities will be examined.
I l l
Measures o f Child Psychopathology
Children’s Depression Inventory. The CDI was developed by Kovacs and Beck
(1977) and is a widely used and well-researched measure of depression in children 
(Kovacs, 1992). It is designed for use with children aged 6-17 and consists of 27 items 
assessing cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of depression. It is presented as a 
self-report scale and takes approximately 15 minutes to complete, with the option of 
reading the items to the child or having the child read them by himself. For each item, the 
child is asked to select one of three descriptors that best describes them during the past 
two weeks. On the underlying 3-point Likert scale, 0 indicates an absence of the 
depressive symptom and 2 indicates the clear presence of the symptom. Item scores are 
summed and this raw score converted to standardised T-scores. Interpreting the T-score, 
the following categories are used: 1) 45-55 (average); 2) 56-60 (slightly above average); 
2) 61-65 (above average); 3) 66-70 (much above average); and 4) above 70 (very much 
above average). Normative data is available to compare the level of dysfunction of 
children with that of peers of the same sex. The CDI has also been used with a fairly 
large normal sample in the UK (Charman, 1994).
Kovacs (1992) reports test-retest reliability data from a number of studies for the 
CDI. Moderate test-retest correlations have been reported over a 2-week period, with the 
majority of correlations falling between .62 and .87, but performance is less stable over 
longer periods. The internal consistency of the measure has been demonstrated to be 
good.
In this study, CDI total scores will be used to investigate the relationship between 
child-reports of depressive symptoms and child mentalisation abilities as assessed by the 
three measures under investigation in this study.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory fo r Children. The STAIC is an empirically derived 
standardised research tool developed by Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene (1970). The 
inventory is designed for self-completion, either individually or in group settings, by 
children aged 9-12, but it can also be used with younger children of at least average 
reading ability. It consists of two scales, the state and trait scales, each containing 20 
items, and takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. The state scale is designed to 
measure fluctuations in subjectively perceived levels of anxiety over time. For each item, 
children are asked to choose one of three responses that best indicates how they feel at a 
particular moment in time. The trait scale is designed to measure the inter-individual 
differences in anxiety proneness that are relatively stable over time, and children have to
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chose the response that best reflects how they feel in general.
STAIC items are rated on a 3-point Likert scale, and possible total scale scores 
range from a minimum of 20 to a maximum of 60. Total scores can be converted and 
presented as T scores, with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 1. Normative data 
based on a total of 737 children attending schools in Florida, U.S., is available. The test- 
retest reliability of the trait scale of the STAIC has been reported to be in the moderate 
range, with r = .65 for boys and r = .71 for girls (Spielberger, 1973). Given that 
variability in state anxiety was expected, test-retest reliability for state anxiety was much 
lower, r = .31 for boys and r = .47 for girls. Spielberger has demonstrated that both 
scales have good internal consistency.
In this study STAIC trait and state scores will be used to investigate the 
relationship between child-reports of anxiety symptoms and child mentalisation abilities 
as assessed by the three measures under investigation in this study.
Child Behaviour Checklist. The CBCL is a widely used and well-standardised 
parent-report measure of the behavioural problems and social competencies of children 
aged 4-18. It was developed by Achenbach and Edelbrock, (1983), and subsequently 
revised by Achenbach (1991). The checklist consists of 113 behaviour descriptions that 
are rated on a 3-point scale (not at all, sometimes, or very often). It takes approximately 
10 minutes to complete and can either be self-administered, as in this study, or 
administered as part of an interview. A computer-based program is used to score the 
CBCL and generates a Total Problem score, as well as subscale scores for Internalising 
problems (e.g., social withdrawal, somatic complaints, depression) and Externalising 
problems (e.g., aggression, inattentiveness, delinquency). The scores are reported as 
standardised scores, with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 1. Total scores of 
above 70 are considered to be in the clinical range (Achenbach, 1991). Achenbach
(1978) reported 8-day test-retest correlations averaging r = .89 across subscales.
In this study, the CBCL total scores, as well as subscale scores of internalisation 
and extemalisation, will be used to investigate the relationship between parent-reports of 
child emotional and behavioural difficulties and performance on each of the three 
measures of mentalisation that are presented in this study.
Child and Adolescent Functioning Scale. The CAFAS was developed by 
Hodges (1995) to assess the degree of impairment in child and adolescent functioning, 
with the last 3 months as the period of reference. It is designed for use with children aged 
5-17. The CAFAS consists of eight scales covering role performance at school, work, 
home or community; appropriateness of behaviour towards others/self; regulation of
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moods/emotions; self-harm; inability to think rationally; and substance use. A score for 
each scale as well as a total score is generated. The rater considers the child’s lowest 
level of functioning (rather than optimal functioning) to determine the severity level 
which applies and assigns scores as follows: 30 for severe disruption or incapacitation, 20 
for moderate disruption (persistent or major occasional disruption of functioning) 10 for 
mild disruption (significant problems or distress) and 0 for minimal disruption or no 
impairment. A detailed scoring manual with explicit behavioural anchors is available, 
and there is a training manual that includes rated vignettes. Fair to good interrater 
reliability has been demonstrated, with ICCs > .8 for the total scores, even when using lay 
raters. The CAFAS has previously been used to assess rehabilitation treatment effects 
(Quist & Matshazi, 2000), clinical outcomes in the Fort Bragg Evaluation Project and 
service utilisation and costs (Hodges, Wong, & Latessa, 1998). These studies have 
demonstrated that the scale is sensitive enough to detect changes resulting from clinical 
interventions.
In the present study, the CAFAS was coded by two raters with post-graduate 
training in psychology and experience in working with children in clinical settings; they 
were thus familiar with evaluating child emotional and behavioural functioning. The 
vignettes provided by Hodges (1995) were used for training. Good interrater reliability 
was established, based on ratings of 30 cases (ICC’s > .9 for the total scores). The 
CAFAS Manual is designed so that it can be used to rate data obtained from clinical or 
semi-structured interviews and case records. In this study, audiotaped semi-structured 
interviews with parents and caretakers regarding their children were transcribed and 
coded to obtain CAFAS scores.
In this study the CAFAS total score will be used to investigate the relationship 
between child adaptation and functioning based on parent-reports, and performance on 
the three measures of child mentalisation that are focused on in this study.
Measure o f Self-Esteem
Harter *s Self-Perception Profile. Harter developed the Self-Perception Profile in 
order to assess children’s domain-specific perceptions about their cognitive, social and 
athletic competence, their physical appearance and behavioural conduct. Global self- 
worth is assessed separately. There are six questions corresponding to each domain as 
well as to global self-worth, and means are derived for each. It is possible to use the 
global score alone for statistical analysis. The scale uses a structured alternative format 
which is designed to mitigate against the problem of social desirability, and The child 
first chooses which of two descriptions best describes them, and then decides whether the
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description bears a close (very true) or not so close (sort of true) resemblance to them. In 
effect, each item is rated on a scale of 1 - 4.
Psychometric properties of the Self-Perception Profile have been investigated in 
two large UK samples of non-referred older children and adolescents (aged 8 and older) 
(Granleese & Joseph, 1994; Hoare, Elton, Greer, & Kerley, 1993). The results indicate 
that global self-worth showed moderate stability (r = .61) over a 3-year period for 
children aged 8-11 (Granleese & Joseph, 1994). Hoare et al. (1993) adapted the language 
of the questionnaire for use with a Scottish population, making minor changes to the 
wording and replacing Americanisms with expression clearly understood in most UK 
contexts. This adaptation was used in the present study. The results of the UK studies 
replicated the factor structure found in US samples, but the norms were slightly lower in 
the UK sample. The items are scored on a 4-point scale and a mean score is calculated 
for each subscale. Based on the findings in the Scottish study, children are categorised as 
falling outside the normal range when they have scores of one or below on the scales.
In this study, Global self-worth scores, as measured by the Harter Self-Perception 
Profile, will be used to investigate the relationship between self-esteem and child 
mentalisation.
Measures o f Attachment
Child Attachment Interview. The CAI, Version III (Target et al., 2000), is a 15 
question semi structured interview adapted from the Adult Attachment Interview (Main & 
Goldwyn, 1991); it is designed to access children’s mental representations of themselves, 
their attachment figures and relationship episodes. It has been demonstrated to be 
appropriate for use with primary school-aged children aged 8-12, but Shmueli-Goetz 
(2001) has concluded that ratings based on narrative coherence are not be reliable when 
used with younger children.
More specifically, the interview aims to access narratives of specific relationship 
episodes (REs) involving attachment figures, with REs constituting “a relatively discrete 
episode of explicit narration about relationships with others or with the self’ (Luborsky & 
Crits-Christoph, 1990). Following the AAI, the CAI aims to assess the child’s overall 
current state of mind with respect to attachment, but it focuses on current experience of 
relationships, rather than on early experiences, as in the AAI. The interview style is less 
neutral than that of the AAI, and interviewers use probes when necessary to obtain full 
(and codable) attachment narratives and to elicit characteristics of emotional processing. 
The child is asked: 1) to think of three words that describe what they are like as a person, 
and then to describe a time or a memory that illustrates why they chose a specific
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adjective; 2) to think of three words that describe their relationship with their mother or 
what it is like to be with her, and then again to give a description; 3) to describe a time 
when their mother was angry with them or when they argued; 4) to think of three 
adjectives for relationship with father followed by the same requests for examples; 5) to 
describe a time when their father was angry with them or when they argued; and 6) to 
describe a time when their mother and father argued. In addition, the CAI also asks the 
child to give accounts of times of crisis (e.g., personal injury, bullying), losses, and 
separations from parents. The interview generally takes 25-50 minutes to complete, and 
it is videotaped for coding purposes.
A detailed coding manual, the Child Attachment Interview Coding and 
Classification Manual, Version III, is available (Target et al., 2000) and is appended (see 
Appendix Dl). The scoring system involves the identification and coding of REs on 10 
scales. Idealisation, Dismissal and Preoccupied Anger are rated separately for each 
caregiver, but Emotional Openness, Balance of Positive and Negative References to 
attachment figures. Use of Examples, Self-Organisation, Resolution of Conflict, and 
Overall Coherence are rated for the narrative as a whole. The Emotional Openness scale 
was designed to measure the extent to which the child is able to both label emotions and 
provide affect-laden descriptions that reflected an understanding of the interplay between 
affect, mental states and behaviour. The Coherence scale assesses the child’s ability to 
present an integrated and consistent account of his/her attachment relationship when 
under the pressure of trying to access memories and provide specific examples.
Attachment status with respect to both the mother and father is determined based 
on performance on these scales. The coding manual can be used to obtain either a two- 
way classification of (secure or insecure), or a three-way classification in which 
insecurity is classified additionally as avoidant/restricted or ambivalent/entangled. The 
interviews are coded directly from video, with full transcriptions of the interview. 
Shmueli-Goetz (2001) has reported good interrater reliability for the main classifications 
( k  = .80 for mother, and k  = .79 for father). Good internal consistency has also been 
demonstrated as has been satisfactory test-retest reliability over an 8 week period was 
shown for attachment with respect to mother (k  = .68; p < .001) and father (fc= .68; p  < 
.001).
In the present study, the CAI was coded by two raters with post-graduate 
qualifications in psychology and who were trained by one of the developers of the CAI. 
In this study, the CAI main classifications (secure and insecure) will be used rather than 
the sub-classifications, given the relatively small sample with CAI data. The CAI
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interview material will also be coded for reflective functioning, using the Child Reflective 
Functioning Scale as outlined in Chapter 6.
Measures o f Child Mentalisation
In the next three chapters, the Happe’s Strange Stories (HSS), the Affect Task 
(AT) and the Child Reflective Functioning Scale (CRFS) will be presented. Part of the 
work undertaken for this thesis involved the adaptation and development of their 
respective coding systems and manuals.
Procedure .
Depending on the preference of parents or caretakers, interviews were conducted 
at the Anna Freud Centre, at school (in the case of the school sample) or at the family 
home. Families who came to the Anna Freud Centre to complete the research interviews 
were reimbursed for travel and parking expenses. Children and their parents completed 
the lengthy research battery in the course of two to three visits that each lasted 2-3 hours. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants and involved explaining the study 
aims and procedures, as well as the rights of participants to withdraw from the study at 
any stage and to refuse to answer questions. The child information and consent forms 
were worded in such a way as to be intelligible to children aged 5-11 and were read and 
explained, when necessary, to them. Children and their parents completed the interviews 
at the same time, but with two different interviewers, when possible. For rating purposes, 
all the child interviews were videotaped, and parent interviews were audiotaped.
Interviewers were selected on the basis of demonstrated ability and sensitivity to 
work with children and parents of a wide range of backgrounds, including families with 
considerable psychosocial problems. All interviewers had a minimum of 3 years of 
undergraduate training in psychology. They received a 2-week orientation and training in 
the use of the battery of interviews and assessments. The training involved role-play 
interviews with an experienced interviewer (the author of this thesis), as well as 
videotaped practice interviews with children who were not study participants.
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CHAPTER 4
PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE HAPPE’S STRANGE STORIES
This chapter will focus on the psychometric properties of Happe’s Strange Stories 
(HSS) and will examine the performance of primaiy school-aged children on this theory 
of mind measure designed to test comprehension of everyday speech in which what is 
said is not literally true. As such, it requires the ability to consider the intentions of the 
speaker in interpreting communication.
The goals of this chapter are to examine the reliability of the HSS, and to explore 
its validity. The contributions of age and IQ to performance on this measure will be 
examined, as will be the contributions of social functioning, psychopathology, attachment 
and self-esteem. In summary, the aim is to determine whether or not the HSS is 
psychometrically robust including whether or not it is sensitive to the subtle distortions in 
mentalisation considered to be associated with emotional, social, behavioural and 
attachment difficulties in a sample of primary school children aged 5-11.
Introduction
Theory of mind researchers of have provided startling evidence of the precocious 
abilities of infants and pre-school children to relate to others as intentional beings (Baron- 
Cohen, 1995; Gergely et al., 1995; D. Premack & A. J. Premack, 1995; Wellman & 
Lagattuta, 2000) and to mentalise about their beliefs and desires. Much less is known 
about the development of theory of mind during the primary school years, during 
adolescence and adulthood. Little is also known about how the ability to interpret the 
intentions of others relates to affective and behavioural difficulties, and self-esteem, if at 
all. Conceptual and methodological problems related to the use of second order theory of 
mind tests with older children (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997) and a general lack of 
age appropriate alternative assessment methods have contributed to this state of affairs. 
Children with a mental age of 6 generally pass second order theory of mind tests (Baron- 
Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997), and it is misleading to refer to them as tests of complex 
theory of mind and inappropriate to use them with older populations where they are 
bound to produce ceiling effects. Happe (1994) and, more recently, Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe 
et al. (1997) addressed this problem by developing measures of more advanced theory of
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mind skills appropriate for use with older populations. The HSS task, developed by 
Happe (1994), was designed as a test of more advanced theory of mind and is pitched 
roughly at the level of 8 to 9-year-olds. Baron-Cohen’s (2001) “Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes” task was designed to test a related ability, that of “Mindreading” or interpreting 
mental states as reflected in the eyes and surrounding areas. However, both authors have 
primarily used these tasks to investigate the nature of theory of mind deficits in young 
adults with autism and Asperger syndrome. There is still currently no data on how 
children aged 8-9 actually perform on the HSS, or with which age range it can be reliably 
used. Furthermore, it has not yet been demonstrated that this task may be sensitive 
measure of the theory of mind deficits associated with difficulties in adaptation and with 
behavioural problems.
The aim of the present study is to examine the psychometric properties of the HSS 
when used with primary school-aged children aged 5-12.
Theory o f Mind at Age Six and Beyond
Theory of mind research has largely focused on the abilities of pre-schoolers to 
understand the beliefs and desires of others, and impressive though the theory of mind 
abilities are given how young these children are, these abilities are only a fraction of the 
abilities used by adults in everyday communication, work, love, play and art. In spite of 
their basic theory of mind abilities to predict someone else’s actions by considering what 
they may know, think and desire, pre-school children still frequently struggle to know 
what others feel and think (J. H. Flavell et al., 1995). It is only during the primary school 
years that children develop the more general ability to know when others are thinking and 
to imagine what they may be thinking. By the end of the primary school years, children 
display a more nuanced understanding of the behaviour and thoughts of others. They 
come to understand that these are individual and are based on personal characteristics 
which are likely to be stable over time will depend on their knowledge, experience and 
preferences (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). Nonetheless, little is known about the 
developmental changes that occur during the primary school years. This is surprising 
given that entry into school presents opportunities for increasingly complex relationships 
with peers and teachers which can be expected to stimulate another period of rapid theory 
of mind development. In addition, children’s increasing cognitive skills can also be 
expected to contribute to significant development in their ability to explore and consider 
the mental states of others, as well as their own.
Indeed, it is during the primary school years that children show an increasing
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ability to talk about their own thoughts (Wellman, 1990) and increasingly to think about 
themselves in mental state and trait terms rather than principally in terms of their physical 
attributes, abilities and context (Harter, 1999; Wellman, 1990). In contrast to younger 
children who describe themselves in absolute terms, for example, as always being nice, 
older children describe their characteristics as more mixed, depending on the situation 
(Harter, 1999). While this may help to protect them from all out negative self- 
evaluations, their growing critical abilities also present new challenges to their self­
esteem. If Harter’s model of self-esteem as involving the ability to reconcile aspirations 
with actual abilities or qualities, is accepted, the question arises as to whether or not this 
ability is, broadly speaking, associated with theory of mind. In the context of Harter’s 
findings that global self-worth is much more inextricably linked to satisfaction with 
physical attractiveness rather than to satisfaction with academic and athletic abilities, the 
question arises as to whether or not theory of mind helps children to effect reconciliations 
in the areas which matter most.
Theory o f Mind and Language Development
Research findings indicate that at the end of the pre-school period, language 
abilities make a significant contribution to theory of mind performance on false-belief 
tasks (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; HappS, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 1996). Language 
abilities, especially complement syntax, have also been shown to predict variance in later 
performance on false-belief tests (J. G. De Villiers & P. A. De Villiers, 1999). As Pemer 
(1991b) has suggested, one possible explanation for this relationship is that language 
based representational systems are advantageous in that they provide both a syntax which 
facilitates thinking about human behaviour, and symbolic representations elaborate 
enough to overcome experiential evidence which would otherwise be compelling. 
Language skills also facilitate the discussions and interactions through which children get 
to know more about the minds of others (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991). Recent 
research evidence reveals an interesting picture of links between language acquisition and 
intentionality. There is evidence suggesting that early manifestations of awareness of 
others as intentional agents (Baron-Cohen, 2000), such as joint attention in 1-year-olds, 
predict later language acquisition (Sigman & Ruskin, 1999). Tager-Flusberg (2000) 
suggests that this is because early learning of words depends on the interpretation of 
words and communicative gestures as intentional acts.
Performance on theory of mind tests has been found to be generally correlated 
with verbal intelligence (Happe, 1995). Research findings have indicated that the
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relationship between verbal IQ, theory of mind test performance and actual social abilities 
is complex, especially when psychopathology enters into the equation. Klin et al. (2000) 
and Tager-Flusberg (2000) suggest that language can be used as a kind of scaffolding by 
high functioning autistics to “hack out” solutions to theory of mind tests even though they 
do not have the ability to use these capacities spontaneously in the way that those who 
pass this test normally do. It has been argued that this accounts for the gap that has been 
noted between performance on theory of mind tests and real life social abilities (U. Frith 
et al., 1994). Indeed Klin et al. call attention to the need for a theory of mind in action, 
which they contend involves a series of additional skills, including the ability to react 
intuitively to inflections and tone of voice as well as to fast-changing emotional 
expressions, such as those measured by Baron-Cohen’s (2001) Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test.
With regard to performance on the HSS specifically, no direct correlation with IQ 
and task performance has been reported when it is used with adults with autism and 
Asperger syndrome (Happe, 1995; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). The picture is likely 
to be different when the HSS is used with children. Given the previous findings 
regarding the link between verbal IQ and theory of mind performance in younger 
children, verbal IQ can be expected to explain a significant proportion of the HSS 
performance of primary school-aged children.
Individual Differences in Theory o f Mind:
Attachment, Gender, Parental and Sibling Factors
A number of factors have been identified as possible contributors to individual 
differences in children’s theory of mind abilities. First of all, children’s theory of mind 
abilities have been shown to be associated with their attachment security (Fonagy, 
Redfem et al., 1997; Moss et al., 1995). In addition, there is evidence from longitudinal 
studies that the quality of the early attachment relationship with the caregiver has a 
significant impact on theory of mind development, symbolic capacities and affective 
understanding (Meins et al., 1998; H. Steele, M. Steele & Fonagy, 1996).
There is also evidence of considerable individual differences in the rate of theory 
of mind development, depending on factors such as family composition and emotional 
climate, as well as on parenting practices and competencies with regard to talking about 
emotions and their causes. Parent-child discussions involving feelings and their causes 
have been shown to be predictive of 3 year old children’s abilities in this regard, and also 
of affective perspective taking in 7 year old children (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991).
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Growing up in a family in which the emotional climate is generally positive and tolerant 
and in which feelings are talked about, thought about, and elaborated on is generally 
conducive to the development of children’s emotional (Denham, Renwick-DeBardi et al., 
1994; Dunn & Brown, 1994). In stark contrast, the research evidence indicates that there 
is a significant disadvantage in terms of understanding emotions when children have 
histories of sexual or physical abuse (Shipman & Zeman, 1999; Shipman et al., 2000).
Children who have siblings also seem to have an advantage when it comes to 
acquiring theory of mind abilities and there is evidence that 3-5 year olds with siblings 
pass “false-belief’ tasks earlier than only children of the same age (Pemer et al., 1994; 
Ruffman et al., 1998; Jenkins & Astington, 1996). At this stage, it is not clear whether 
these advantages are temporary or enduring, and whether the gap closes or opens up 
during the primary school years. Opportunities to engage in pretend play with older 
siblings (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) and interactions with older people have been 
identified as generally contributing to children’s early understanding of beliefs and 
mental states (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991; C. Lewis et al., 1996). 
Participation in role-play has also been shown to predict false-belief understanding 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1995), and is thought to contribute to the development of theory of 
mind because it provides an excellent opportunity to imagine and explore what other 
people might feel in different circumstances and roles.
The findings regarding gender differences are not conclusive (Dunn & Brown,
1993), although some studies show female advantages in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Halpem, 1992). There is evidence 
that already by age 2, girls already talk more extensively about emotions (Dunn et al., 
1987). This may be due, in part, to the fact that girls show precocious language 
development; thus, it is possible for parents to talk to them at an earlier age about the 
causes and consequences of feelings (Haden et al., 1997; Reese et al., 1993).
As this review of research studies indicates, attachment, parental factors, the 
presence of siblings, and gender are expected to have an impact on theory of mind 
performance on the HSS. The present study did not include assessments of the parental 
qualities that the literature has identified as being important to theory of mind 
development.
Theory o f Mind, Social Adaptive Functioning and Psychopathology
At a theoretical level, it is reasonable to expect that affective disorders, especially 
behaviour disorders, will be associated with difficulties in mentalisation. However, with
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the exception of studies involving schizophrenics during acute episodes, theory of mind 
research has failed to show a relationship between theory of mind and psychopathology 
when using second order theory of mind tests (Corcoran, 2000). In retrospect, it would 
hardly seem surprising that depressed adult patients had no difficulty with these very 
basic tasks; as it is unlikely that any non-psychotic adult of normal IQ would find these 
tasks difficult. Happe and U. Frith (1996) also did not find evidence of deficits on second 
order tests in conduct disordered children aged 6-12, although as they themselves 
observed, a more challenging theory of mind test, such as the HSS, might have been more 
appropriate. Happe and U. Frith concluded that children with conduct disorder may not 
have a theory of mind deficit, but rather a distorted theory of mind or a theory of “nasty 
minds”, which they develop based on their experience of growing up in environments in 
which negative reactions predominate. Problems with executive control, rather than with 
theory of mind, were also considered as an alternative explanation. Blair and colleagues 
(Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1996; Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997) also found no theory 
of mind deficits using the HSS with psychopaths who had committed first degree murder, 
leading them to the conclusion that psychopaths have deficits in empathy, rather than in 
theory of mind. It is difficult to see why this would not also manifest in measurable 
deficits in mentalisation about others, and findings by Fonagy, Target et al. (1997) 
suggest that this is indeed the case. Using measures of attachment and reflective 
functioning, this group of researchers found evidence of significant deficits in 
mentalisation in borderline patients (Fonagy et al., 1995), as well as in psychopathic and 
non-psychopathic prisoners who had committed first degree murder (Fonagy, Target, et 
al., 1997). These findings suggest that there are significant mentalisation deficits in 
certain non-autistic clinical groups with social difficulties, when compared with normal 
controls, but that measures are required which assess this at a level of difficulty 
appropriate to the age-group being studied and the degree of interpersonal disturbance.
Evidence from neuro-imaging studies point to considerable overlap in the areas 
involved in affective processing and theory of mind, and there appears to be a neuro­
functional loop integrating these abilities in the context of social responses (Damasio, 
1994; Klin et al., 2000). Seen from this perspective, a number of different scenarios 
could account for social and interpersonal difficulties, and it is here that research in this 
area is advancing rapidly. In this respect, the aims of the present study are modest; to 
explore whether or not performance on a theory of mind test with a strong language 
component is related to affective and behavioural difficulties as reported by primary 
school-aged children.
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Aims and Objectives of this Study
The aims of this study are to present the HSS and examine its psychometric 
properties, including reliability and validity.
In order to establish the reliability of the HSS, the objectives are: 1) to present the 
adapted HSS coding system, and to evaluate the interrater reliability results obtained 
using this coding system; 2) to evaluate the internal consistency reliability of the HSS 
scale, after investigating the dimensionality and factor structure of the HSS; and 3) to 
establish whether or not the HSS has adequate stability over a 3-month test-retest period, 
as well as over a 1-year period. These indexes of reliability will be evaluated to 
determine whether or not they meet the criteria set forth by Kline (2000) for interrater 
reliability and internal consistency, as well as the criteria outlined by Murphy and 
Davidshofer (2000) in evaluating test-retest reliability. (These criteria will be detailed in 
the section addressing the analyses that will be used.)
The validity of the HSS will be evaluated in the context of the relationships and 
associations between performance on the HSS and key demographic variables, IQ and 
expressive language abilities, psychopathology, social adaptation and attachment. These 
relationships and associations will be examined with the following objectives in mind: 1) 
to investigate the performance of the scale with regard to gender and family composition; 
2) to evaluate the construct validity of HSS in the context of the relationships between 
children’s intentional understanding as measured by the HSS and age, IQ, expressive 
language abilities, psychopathology and social-adaptation; 3) to evaluate the predictive 
validity of the HSS by examining whether factors other than age and intelligence 
contribute to the prediction of children’s intentional understanding; 4) to evaluate the 
discriminant validity of the HSS by examining whether or not there are differences in 
intentional understanding as a function of attachment security and clinical 
psychopathology while adjusting for factors such as age and IQ.
The hypotheses corresponding to each of these objectives will be outlined below.
Hypotheses
Gender and Family Composition
A number of hypotheses will be examined with regard to gender and family 
composition. No gender effects are expected, given the divergent findings with regard to 
gender and theory of mind, and also given the fact that considering that theory of mind, as 
measured by the HSS, tests the capacity to understand the intentions of others as revealed 
through speech, rather than through visual cues. Females have been shown to have an
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advantage in interpreting mental states revealed in the eyes and facial expressions.
In the light of previous findings that only children showed delays in theory of 
mind abilities when compared with children with siblings (Pemer et al., 1994; Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996), it is expected that the intentional understanding of only children will be 
significantly lower than that of children with siblings, when measured on the HSS. The 
performance of the HSS of children living in single-parent families and children living in 
two-parent families will also be compared. In light of previous findings that link single­
parent families to adversity and risk (Luthar, 1999) the hypothesis is that living in single­
parent families will have a negative impact on theory of mind performance on the HSS.
Theory o f M ind and Age, IQ, Expressive language, Psychopathology and Social- 
Adaptation
The hypotheses relating to the construct of theory of mind as measured by the 
HSS will be examined next. The ability to consider the intentions of others when 
interpreting what someone says is expected to develop with age during the primary school 
years. A positive correlation is expected between age and children’s performance on the 
HSS is expected and will be regarded as providing confirmation that the measure is 
sensitive to the development of children’s theory of mind abilities. In the light of 
previous findings of relationships between theory of mind and language abilities 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1995; J. G. De Villiers and P. A. De Villiers; Happe, 1995; Tager- 
Flusberg, 1996), positive relationships of weak to moderate strength between 
performance on the HSS, expressive language abilities and verbal IQ, are expected. 
Relationships of weak or moderate strength between performance on the HSS and both 
intelligence and verbal expressive abilities are also expected given that the HSS tests the 
capacity to interpret intentionality behind speech and as such is expected to involve a 
cognitive linguistic component.
From a theoretical perspective, theory of mind, as reflected in the ability to 
understand the intentions of others, is expected to be associated with better social and 
psychological functioning, and to be inversely related to behavioural difficulties. The 
lack of evidence supporting these expectations is considered to be due in part to the use of 
inappropriate assessments methods that used theory of mind tasks that were to easy given 
the age of the children so that differences could not be detected. Weak inverse 
relationships are expected between performance on the HSS and behaviour problems (as 
measured on the CBCL Externalising Scale), social adaptation (as measured on the 
CAFAS; here higher scores reflect increased adaptive difficulties), depression (as 
measured on the CDI) and anxiety (as measured on the STAIC).
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Predictors o f Children's Theory ofM ind
The hypothesis is that behavioural difficulties and social adaptation will add to the 
prediction of children’s theory of mind, once the contributions of other variables such as 
age and intelligence have been taken into account. In addition, it is expected that 
psychopathology will enhance the prediction for the reasons outlined previously.
Differences in Theory o f M ind as a Function o f Attachment and Psychopathology
The hypothesis is that there will be significant differences in the theoiy of mind 
abilities as measured by the HSS, as a function of attachment style as measured on the 
CAI. This expectation is based on the findings that attachment style predicts theory of 
mind performance (Fonagy, Redfem et al., 1997), and on the fact that, theoretically, they 
can be seen as overlapping constructs (Fonagy, 1997).
In addition, the hypothesis is that children with behaviour problems in the clinical 
range of the CBCL are is expected to have significantly lower theoiy of mind abilities as 
measured by the HSS, compared with the non-clinical group, after adjustment for other 
contributing factors. Similar differences are expected to be found with regard to 
depression, with children who report symptoms of depression in the clinical range on the 
CDI expected to have lower intentional understanding as measured on the HSS.
Method
Participants and Recruitment
The HSS was administered to a sample of 109 children aged 5-11, recruited from 
referrals to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services in London2. This study forms 
part of a larger project of measure development and standardisation conducted at the 
Anna Freud Centre, London, UK (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the 
recruitment procedure).
The sample comprised 68 boys (62.4%) and 41 girls (37.6%). The age difference 
between boys (M  age = 9.87, SD = 4.18) and girls (M  age = 8.82, SD = 4.61) was not 
significant (/(l07) = -1.20,/? = .23 (one-tailed)).
The vast majority of the children lived with their natural mothers (95%); 
approximately half lived in two-parent families (51%) with both biological parents 
present (44%). The majority of children were Caucasian (72,5%) and for nearly all of
2 Two children were removed from the analyses because English was not their mother language and they 
had extremely low scores on the HSS.
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them (98%) English was the language spoken at home. Many were only children (38%) 
or had only one sibling (37%), and those with two or more siblings (25%) were in a 
minority. In terms of maternal educational level, the sample was fairly equally 
distributed between mothers who had attended secondary school (30%), those who had 
attended college (32%) and those who had university qualifications (38%). Exactly half 
of the mothers were not employed at the time , of the interview, and a significant 
percentage (26%) of fathers were unemployed. With regard to the nine standard 
employment categories used in the census, 50% of families fell into the highest sector 
which denotes technical, professional and managerial occupations, and 30% into the 
middle sector, which includes personal services, skilled trade and administrative and 
secretarial occupations. The remainder of the families fell into two other categories: 
manual workers (6%) and retired persons, homemakers and unemployed people (14%).
Measures
Happens Strange Stories (HSS)
The HSS was originally designed by Happe (1994) as a more complex test of 
theory of mind when compared with original false-belief tasks. It was originally used to 
compare the abilities of autistic children and adults with that of mentally handicapped 
children and adults (age 6 and older). The HSS tests the ability to understand that 
communication is about the expression and communication of intended, rather than 
literal, meaning, i.e., the ability to infer the “mind behind the speech” (Mitchell & Isaacs,
1994). In other words, it measures the ability to explain a communication in which 
another person says something that is not literally true; an ability which requires an 
understanding that communication depends on the intention of the speaker. The stories 
used in the HSS involve ordinary, everyday interactions between two people, but in 
stories one character says something which is not literally true. The HSS tests the ability 
to understand the intentions behind the utterance; this can be inferred from both the 
context leading up to the utterance, and the description of the relationship between the 
characters. The task has an inductive component in that the child is required to infer the 
general mentalising rule from the particular story in order to score at the highest level.
The full original version of the HSS test consists of 24 short vignettes 
accompanied by drawings clearly depicting engaging scenarios which school-aged 
children are likely to be familiar with. There were 12 types of stories and two vignettes 
per story type. In line with Happe’s (1994) suggestion, only half of the original battery 
was used, one of each type of story. This study reports on ten stories from the original
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battery, namely: Lie, White Lie, Joke, Pretend, Misunderstanding, Persuade, 
Appearance/Reality, Figure of Speech, Sarcasm, and Contrary Emotions. Double Bluff 
and Forgot stories were excluded from the analysis because of inconsistencies in the way 
these stories were presented and in which the questions were asked. The stories and the 
accompanying pictures that were used in this study are appended (see Appendix Bl). The 
final battery contained an equal number of stories with girl characters and boy characters.
The original coding system developed by Happe (1994) distinguished between 
incorrect responses containing factual errors, those offering physical justifications, and 
those offering mentalistic justifications. Happe used a co-validation method in which all 
the scores were double rated by a second rater, and she reports the degree of concordance 
for stories as ranging from 92- 100%. Shand (1996), working under the direction of Mary 
Target and Peter Fonagy, adapted and elaborated this coding system with the aim of 
differentiating between increasing levels of response sophistication. The rating system 
distinguished between four levels of mentalisation, and scores were allocated as follows: 
a level one score was given when no reference to mentalisation was present, and in the 
case of physical explanations and bizarre responses; a level two score required a mental 
state answer even if incorrect or incomplete; a level three score required the identification 
of the correct general principle; and a level four score required the correct general 
principle, as well as a reference to the “relationship between the two minds in the story”, 
for example, “She is pretending and playing with her friend”.
The Revised HSS Coding System. Shand’s (1996) coding system was replaced 
with a re-conceptualised Revised HSS Coding System. The reasons for this revision were 
two-fold: 1) an acceptable level of interrater reliability using Shand’s coding manual 
could not be reached after several trials; and 2) at a conceptual level, the raters, as well as 
the author, questioned the rationale of allocating higher scores to children simply because 
they provide a reference to the relationship between the two minds in the story. The main 
criticism was that these interpersonal references frequently seemed somewhat redundant 
and immature. It was suspected that more socially mature children may consider it 
inappropriate to provide information that is obvious to their conversation partner, unless 
explicitly asked to do so. There is also a theoretically motivated reason for not 
considering these explicit responses to be superior, simply because they refer to the 
interpersonal context. One of the Gricean maxims of conversation requires us to be 
informative (Grice, 1975) but to refrain from telling people what they already know. 
Given the way in which the HSS questions are phrased, it did not seem appropriate to 
consider explicit interpersonal references as evidence of a higher level of theoiy of mind,
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and the coding system was thus adapted accordingly.
A brief summary of the revised coding system is provided below and illustrated 
with examples of children’s responses to the story in which Emma pretends that a banana 
is a telephone (see Table 4). Responses were rated in terms of accuracy and according to 
whether explanations involved references to mental states, or focused on concrete 
explanations. A manual containing examples of the different levels of responses for each 
story was developed in order to limit the problems experienced by both Happe (1994) and 
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) regarding the subjectivity of ratings. For a detailed 
description of the coding manual and coding sheet of the HSS, see Appendixes B2 and
B3.
Table 4
HSS: Examples o f the Revised HSS Coding System
Score Category of Responses Illustration
2 Correct mental response She is pretending the banana is a telephone.
1 Correct physical response Because the banana is shaped like a telephone.
0 Incorrect response Because it is a banana, not a telephone.
-1 Bizarre response The banana rang.
A small number of children provided replies that were frankly bizarre and not just 
incorrect because they failed to understand the story. For example, in response to a 
picture of a little girl pretending a banana is a teiephone, a child replied “The banana 
rang”. These responses were rated at the lowest level, -1. The next level included 
children who provided incorrect physical and mental responses to the justification 
question. Children who were unable to hazard an answer, or who insisted that they did 
not know the answer, were also rated at this level. Correct responses that simply stated 
the physical truth, rather than displaying an understanding of the mental state of the 
protagonist or the motivation for their action, were rated 1. The highest level included 
responses that explain the correct motivation and reasoning behind the behaviour. These 
responses were rated level 2. Even if the child failed to use the word which best 
described the intention behind the utterance, for example, that the little girl is pretending 
that the banana is a telephone, they were given credit if their answers reflected more than
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a physical explanation, e.g., “Because she was playing that the banana was a telephone”.
Evidence of the sensitivity of the HSS comes mainly from research with adults 
suffering from autism and Asperger syndrome. Happe (1994) found that the HSS 
successfully discriminated amongst groups of autistic subjects who failed both first and 
second order tasks, those who failed only second order tasks, and those who passed both 
tasks. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., (1997) found a similar pattern of theory of mind 
deficits using a test that measures the ability to recognise mental states as expressed by 
the eyes and the surrounding facial area. A more recent study by Jolliffe and Baron- 
Cohen (1999) also showed that performance on the HSS discriminates between normal 
controls, autistic adults with normal IQ and adults with Asperger syndrome who passed 
second order tasks. In the current study, the sensitivity and discriminant capacity of the 
HSS when used with primary school-aged children will be tested in relation to emotional 
and social difficulties
Other Measures
Other measures for which results will be reported here include two parent-report 
measures, namely the Child Behaviour Checklist (CBCL: Achenbach & Edelbrock. 1983) 
and the Child Adaptation and Functioning Scale (CAFAS: Hodges, 1998). Six child- 
report measures will also be used, including two measures of depression and anxiety, the 
Child Depression Inventory (CDI: Kovacs, 1992) and the State and Trait Anxiety Scale 
for Children (STAIC: Spielberger, 1970), as well as Harter’s Self-Perception Profile 
(Harter: Harter, 1985) and the Child Attachment Interview (CAI: Target et al., 2000). In 
addition, a short form of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third UK edition 
(WISC-IH1*) will be administered to obtain an estimate of IQ, and the Clinical 
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-Revised (CELF-R: Semel et al., 1987) will be 
administered to assess expressive language abilities. These measures have been presented 
in detail in Chapter 3.
Procedure
Both the HSS interview procedure and the Anna Freud Centre Standardisation 
Study of which this study forms a part were presented in Chapter 3. Interviews were 
conducted in a quiet room either at school, at home, or at the Anna Freud Centre, over the 
course two to three sessions. All the interviews were videotaped. On the average, the 
HSS took 15 minutes to complete. Thirty children who agreed to participate in the test- 
retest study repeated the HSS interview after a 3-month interval. Approximately 50% of 
the families, who participated in the study at time 1, returned 1 year later and then again
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after 2 years, to complete the same battery of tests.
The HSS is introduced by saying to the child: “Here are some stories and some 
questions. I am going to read out loud the stories, and I would like you to listen carefully 
and then help me with the questions at the end of each story”. Each story is then read out 
to the child. The sheet with the story and drawing remain in front of the child to serve as a 
memory aid and thus reduce any memory effects. Each story is followed by two test 
questions; firstly a comprehension question: “Was it true what X said?” and secondly, a 
justification question: “Why did X say that?”. In order to answer the justification 
question, the child needs to understand that what , is said by the story character is not 
meant literally. The administrator repeats the comprehension question until the child 
correctly answers it. In the rare cases where it is necessary, the administrator may 
indicate that what is said is not literally true by saying something simple such as “Well 
no, what X said is not really true”. The justification question which follows tests whether 
or not the child understands the mentalisation leading to the statement which is not 
literally true. Only the response to this question is scored.
Raters and Coding Procedure
Five raters were trained to use the original HSS coding system developed by 
Shand (1996). Three raters had completed 3 years of undergraduate psychology training 
and two had post-graduate qualifications in psychology. Four were female and one male.
A revision of the original coding manual was necessary because the raters could 
not reach agreement after several trials. Close examination of the children’s responses in 
relation to specifications in the manual pointed to conceptual problems within the original 
coding system. The process of revision involved discussion, clarification and re- 
conceptualisation of the approach used in the original coding manual. This process took 
several months.
Approximately 8 hours of training comprising ten interviews were required for 
raters to become familiar with the new version of the coding manual. Once raters were 
able to reach 80% agreement among themselves on the training interviews, they received 
30 new transcripts of videotaped HSS for the interrater reliability study. This sample was 
selected to include a roughly even number of boys and girls of all age groups, as well as a 
range of types and levels of psychopathology. Rating time was approximately 15 minutes 
per interview.
Planned Data Analyses
To determine the interrater reliability, the intraclass correlations (ICC) using 
Bartko’s two-way random effect model are computed; these provide an estimate of
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agreement between raters for the scores on the individual stories, as well as for the total 
scores (Bartko, 1976; W. T. Carpenter, Bartko, C. L. Carpenter, & Strauss, 1976). Using 
the guidelines set down by Endicott and Spitzer (1978) for interpreting ICC’s, values 
above .75 will be considered as indicative of good reliability; between .50 and .75, as 
fair; and values below .50, as reflecting poor reliability3. To establish the stability of the 
HSS over time, Pearson product-moment correlations (r) between time 1 and time 2 
scores over a 3-month test-retest interval, as well as over a 1-year period, are calculated. 
Following Murphy and Davidshofer (2001), moderate test-retest correlations of .6 and 
above will be considered as acceptable; test-retest correlations of .5-.6 will be regarded as 
low, and below .5 as poor.
To examine the factorial structure of the HSS, stories with good interrater 
reliability using the revised HSS coding manual are selected, and a factor analysis is 
performed to investigate the dimensionality of the HSS. Next, the internal consistency 
reliability of the stories is evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha. Following Kline’s (2000) 
recommendations, scale alphas of .7 and above are considered as indicative of good 
internal consistency.
The relationships between HSS and age, IQ, expressive language, as well as 
demographic variables, gender and family composition are examined using Pearson 
product-moment correlations (r) and t tests. With regard to the construct validity, it is 
expected that theory of mind performance on the HSS will show correlations of moderate 
strength, i.e., no higher than .5, with expressive language abilities and intelligence. 
Subsequently, significant relationships are taken into account in further analyses. In order 
to determine if psychopathology and social adaptation constitute good predictive factors 
of theory of mind as measured by the HSS, a stepwise multiple regression analysis is 
employed. The data set is then optimised with Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) estimates that are computed using the AMOS software (Arbuckle, 1994), with 
estimates computed in cases where at least 60% of data is available. The regression 
analysis is then repeated 1) determine whether or not the increase of power through the 
replacement of missing data reveals any additional relationships and 2) investigate 
whether or not self-esteem (as measured on the Harter) and anxiety (as measured on the 
STAIC) contribute to the prediction of theory of mind (as measured by the HSS).
3 Jones, Reid and Patterson (1973) suggested .70 agreement as an acceptable level when complex coding 
schemes are used, while Gelfand and Hartmann (1975) recommend .60.
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To evaluate the discriminatory ability of the HSS, differences in HSS performance 
as a function of attachment security are investigated using a one-way analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA), after taking into account the effects of age and IQ. Finally, HSS 
performance as a function of clinical levels of behavioural and emotional difficulties on 
the (CDI and CBCL) is investigated using t-tests.
Results
Performance o f the HSS Scale
Results indicate that primary school-aged children have scores distributed across 
the full range of the 4-point scale, on all the stories of the HSS. Mean scores on stories 
ranged from .85 to 1.83, showing that scores tended to be are towards the centre of the 
rating system. The SDs of the stories ranged from .61 to 1.06, and the SD of the HSS 
scale was 4.47, confirming that children in this sample showed a range of theory of mind 
abilities, (see Table 5).
Reliability o f the Revised HSS Rating System
The reliability of the HSS was evaluated using the standard indexes of reliability, 
including interrater reliability, internal consistency and test-retest reliability.
Interrater Reliability
Interrater reliability was investigated using intraclass correlations (ICC’s: Bartko, 
1976) which, unlike less stringent statistic such as Pearson correlations, take into account 
not only the order (or direction) of possible differences between raters but also the 
magnitude of such differences.
The resulting reliabilities range from .57 (idiom) to .74 (pretend) with a median of 
.70 (see Table 5). The ICCs of the two remaining stories, namely the Lie story and the 
Appearance/Reality story, are poor, and for this reason, they are excluded from 
subsequent analyses. Once raters had separately rated the stories, they compared their 
scores and rendered consensus ratings arrived at through discussion. On the rare 
occasioms when raters were unable to reach consensus, the author served as mediator. 
Consemsus ratings were factored into subsequent analyses.
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Table 5
HSS: Means, Standard Deviation and Interrater Reliability
Stories M SD Min Max ICC
Pretend 1.22 .83 -1.0 2.0 .74
Lie 1.83 .61 -1.0 2.0 .48
Joke .94 .83 -1.0 2.0 .71
White Lie 1.58 .81 -1.0 2.0 .67
Idiom 1.21 .81 - 1.0 2.0 .57
Misunderstanding .96 1.05 -1.0 2.0 .69
Politeness/Sarcasm .85 .85 -1.0 2.0 .70
Persuade .94 1.06 -1.0 2.0 .65
Contrary Emotion 1.50 .77 -1.0 2.0 .69
Appearance Reality 1.50 .80 -1.0 2.0 .36
Scale 9.22 4.47 -8.0 16.0 .79
Note. N = 109 for descriptive statistics, and n = 30 for the ICC’s
Factor Analysis o f the HSS
Before doing the factor analysis, a correlation matrix was used to examine the 
underlying structure of the correlations among the different stories. Pearson product- 
moment correlations (r) were used and results are presented in Table 6 .
The results show that there were statistically significant positive correlations 
between all the stories; Pearson’s r ranged from .21 to .43, which indicates that the 
performance on each story generally correlates well with performance on other stories. 
This suggests that the stories generally measure a related ability, and at a comparable 
level of difficulty.
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Table 6
HSS: Correlation Matrix Used in the Factor Analysis
Stories 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Pretend .40** .30** 24* * * .23* .23* 34*** 39***
2. Joke 40*** 28** .34*** .20* 35*** 26***
3. White Lie - .35*** 37*** .26** 42*** ' 41* * *
4. Idiom - .32** 37*** .32** 35***
5. Misunderstanding - .21* 35*** .27**
6 . Politeness/Sarcasm - .26** .32**
7. Persuade 43***
8. Contrary Emotion
N = 109, *p < .05 **/?<. 01 ***/?<.001
The dimensionality of the eight stories with good interrater reliability was 
evaluated using principal component factor analysis. The results, presented in Table 7, 
indicate that all the stories loaded on one component, with factor loadings ranging from 
.54 to .69, explaining 38.4% of the variance. The solution could not be rotated.
Table 7
HSS: Item Loadings and Percentage o f Variance Explained by Principal Component
Stories Component 1
Pretend .59
Joke .61
White Lie .69
Idiom .64
Misunderstanding .60
Politeness/Sarcasm .55
Persuade .65
Contrary Emotion .69
% of Variance Explained 38.4
N=  109
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Internal Consistency o f the HSS
Item-total correlations were calculated for the eight stories with good interrater 
reliability; they ranged from .39 to .56. Internal consistency for the eight items was good, 
with Cronbach’s alpha = .794(see Table 8).
The finding that the internal consistency of the scale was good supports the 
conclusion from the factor analysis that the HSS assess a single ability when used with 
this age group. Consequently all individual scores were aggregated to reflect one 
composite total score.
Table 8
HSS: Item-Total Correlations and Alpha Coefficient
Stories Item-Total Correlation
Pretend .48
Joke .49
White Lie .55
Idiom .51
Misunderstanding .46
Politeness/Sarcasm .39
Persuade .55
Contrary Emotion .54
Alpha (a) .79
N=  109
Test-Retest Reliability
Pearson product-moment correlation (r) was used to test the temporal stability of 
children’s performance on the HSS over 3 months, and after 1 year. As shown in Table 9, 
the test-retest reliability of HSS scores after a 3-month interval was significant, but low (r 
= .40, p  = .017). The stability over 1 year was higher, with the correlations between HSS
4 Cronbach alpha coefficient of. 70 is considered acceptable for reliability (Kline, 2000).
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scores at time 1 and HSS scores after a 1-year interval significant and moderate 
(r = .59, p  = .001).
Table 9
HSS: Three-Month and One-Year Temporal Stability
Time 1 Time 2
Interval
n M SD M  SD r
Three month 30 14.7 3.3 15.3 3.4 .40*
One year 53 14.5 3.5 15.2 3.3
* p  < .05 ** p< .01 *** p <.001
Validity o f the Happe's Strange Stories
Three types of validity are assessed; construct, predictive, and discriminant 
validity. These are assessed in relation to different hypotheses which will be presented 
below.
Relationship between Performance on the HSS and Age, IQ and Expressive Language
In order to assess the validity of the HSS, Pearson product-moment correlations 
were computed to examine whether or not a relationship existed between HSS 
performance score and age, IQ and expressive language scores. As can be seen from 
Table 10, all the correlations were statistically significant; they ranged from .38 to .47. 
These results suggest that there are definite age, IQ. and expressive language effects with 
regard to performance on the HSS, with children who are older and who have higher IQ’s 
and better expressive language abilities performing better on the HSS. These 
relationships will be considered in future analyses, with the exception of expressive 
language scores (because of the small sample for which data was available).
To determine whether or not verbal IQ and expressive language measure different 
abilities, the relationship between expressive language abilities and intelligence was 
examined. The relationships between expressive language abilities and Full Scale IQ 
(r = .28) and Verbal IQ (r = .19) were weak and non-significant.
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Table 10
HSS: Correlations with Age, IQ and Expressive Language
Variable N M SD Min Max r
Age 109 8.7 1.7 5.2 11.9 .38**
WISC Full IQ 98 97.9 21.1 52 146 47**
WISC Verbal 98 101.8 21.4 52 155 .42**
WISC Performance 98 93.1 22.4 46 143 41**
CELF-R
Expressive Language
43 88.5 14.8 64 137 40**
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p < .001
Relationship between Performance on the HSS and Demographics, Gender and Family 
Composition
Student /-tests were used to investigate whether or not performance on the HSS 
was associated with socio-economic status (SES), gender and family composition.
The results show that with respect to family composition, children living in single- 
parent families, with mum only, had significantly higher HSS scores (M  = 
10.27, SD = 4.88) than did those living in two-parent families (M  = 8.20, 
SD = 4.89), / (98) = -2.41,^ < .05. No gender effect was present, / (107) = -1.05, p  = .23.
There were no other significant results. The HSS performance of children with 
siblings (n = 42) and that only children (n = 40) were not found to differ significantly (/ 
(80) = 1.71, p -  .09), although the mean scores of children with siblings were generally 
higher (M  = 10.10, SD = 3.99) compared with those of only children (M = 8.35, SD = 
5.18). Using the highest states occupation in the family as a proxy for socio-economic 
status, the difference between the HSS performance of children from working class 
households (n = 40), (M  = 9.49, SD = 4.62) and middle class households (n = 53), (M=
8.88, SD = 4.16) was non-significant, / (91) = .66, p  = .51, ns. Only in two cases did 
respondents indicate that they spoke another home language in addition to English, and 
they were excluded from further analyses because they had extremely low mean scores 
{M -  -2.00, SD = 8.49) when compared with those who spoke only English at home (M= 
1.04, SD= 3.99).
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Relationship between Performance on the HSS and Self-Esteem
Pearson product-moment correlations were used to examine the relationship 
between children’s theory of mind performance on the HSS and their self-esteem ratings 
using Harter’s Global Self-Esteem Scale. No evidence of a relationship between theory 
of mind and self-esteem was evident; the correlation was low and non-significant (r = 
.16).
Contributions o f IQ, Age, Psychopathology and Social Adaptation to HSS
The factors hypothesised to be predictors were first examined using a correlation 
matrix (see Table 11). Expressive language was not taken as a potential predictor 
because of the small sample for which data was available. Stepwise multiple regression 
was employed to determine if addition of scores on measures of psychopathology and 
adaptation improved the prediction of performance on the HSS beyond that of IQ and 
age. With performance on the HSS as the dependent variable, predictors were entered in 
three blocks. Verbal IQ was entered in block one, age in block two, and psychopathology 
CBCL (internalising, externalising and total scores), CDI, and CAFAS total scores in 
block three. The Harter and STAIC scores were not included in this regression, as this 
would have reduced the number of cases with data for all measures to 50.
Table 11
HSS: Correlations with Potential Predictors o f Theory o f Mind
Stories 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. HSS 38*** 42*** .05 .24* .19 .09 .31**
2. Age .08 .23* .08 .09 .07 .07
3. Verbal IQ .13 .22* .23* .24* .14
4. CBCL (Int) - 62*** £9*** 4g*** .20
5. CBCL (Ext) - 88*** 53*** .31*
6 . CBCL (Total) - .58*** .30*
7. CAFAS (Total) - .35**
8. CDI (T score) -
*p < .05 **;?<.01 ***/?< .001
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Table 12 displays the unstandardised regression coefficients (B), the standard error 
and the standardised regression coefficients (P), intercept R2 and AR2 after entry of all the 
independent variables. After step 1, with age in the equation, R2 = .18, 
F (l, 63) = 13.55,/? < .001. This indicates that age makes a significant contribution to the 
prediction of children’s performance on the HSS and accounts for 18% of explained 
variance in theory of mind on the HSS. After step 2, with verbal IQ added to age in the 
prediction of HSS performance, R2 = .30, F(l, 62) = 10.90, p  < .002. Addition of verbal 
IQ to age resulted in a significant increment in R2, explaining an additional 12% of 
variance in HSS performance. At step 3, with the CDI score entered, R2 = .35, F (l, 61) =
4.88, p  < .03. The CDI was the only variable entered in block three that resulted in a 
significant increment in HSS variance after controlling for the effects of age and verbal 
IQ, explaining an additional 5% of variance in theory of mind on the HSS. After step 3, 
the model consisting of age, verbal IQ and CDI, explained 35% of the variance. The 
partial correlations of the excluded variables and HSS performance were all non­
significant: CBCL-intemalising (-.04), CBCL-extemalising (-.08), CBC-total score (-.09) 
and CAFAS (.08). The same pattern of results was found after two children with IQs 
below 70 were excluded.
Exploratory Regression Analysis using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates,
Another exploratory regression analysis was conducted using the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates (Arbuckle, 1994) to optimise our database through 
estimation of missing measure scores. The principal reasons for missing data were the 
late introduction of certain measures to the standardisation study, and the fact that 
families frequently cancelled appointments especially within the clinical sample and did 
not return self-report forms, consequently, complete data for the full battery was not 
available. There was no evidence that data was missing in a systematic way that would 
contribute to bias in the estimation of missing values from existing data. The maximum 
number of estimations was calculated for the Harter; values were estimated for 38 cases 
in order to produce full data for 98 subjects in total.
Exactly the same procedure was used as for the first regression analysis, but at 
step 3, STAIC trait and state anxiety, and Harter’s Global Self-Esteem were added as 
potential predictors. The results largely reflect that of the first analysis, with the 
exception that trait anxiety as measured on the STAIC now also entered as a predictor of 
HSS performance and explained an additional 5% of the variance. As with depression, 
increases in trait anxiety in children were associated with lower scores on the HSS.
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Table 12
HSS: Stepwise Regression Analysis for Predictors o f Theory o f Mind Performance
Predictor B SE P R2/AR2
Step 1
Age 8.79 .03 .42
Jg***
Step 2
Age 8.21 .03 .39
Verbal IQ .91 .31 .35
12***
Step 3
Age 7.57 .20 .36
Verbal IQ .88 .27 .34
CDI 
Full Model
-8.35 .04 -.23
.05*
.35**
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***/?<.001
Clinical Levels o f Psychopathology and Performance on the HSS
One-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine whether or 
not children with CBCL and CDI scores in the clinical range differed significantly from 
others with respect to their theory of mind abilities .as measured on the HSS, after taking 
into account the effects of age and IQ. ANCOVA was used to investigate differences 
between clinical and non-clinical groups based on: 1) CBCL Total Scores; 2) CBCL 
Internalisation Scale; 3) CBCL Extemalisation Scale; and 4) CDI standardised scores. 
For the respective analyses, the independent variables were clinical status on the CBCL 
(where clinical was defined as T scores of 70 and above, and non-clinical as T scores 
below 70) and clinical status on the CDI (where clinical was defined as T scores of 70 
and above, and non-clinical as T scores below 55). For each of the four independent
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variables, a set of analyses was conducted with performance on the four AT Scales 
(Accuracy, Justification, Impact and Challenge) as the dependent variables. The 
covariates were age and verbal IQ. The assumptions of normality of sampling 
distributions, linearity, homogeneity of variance, homogeneity of regression and 
reliability of covariates were evaluated as satisfactory. In the subsequent analyses, cells 
were weighted by sample size to adjust for unequal n’s.
The results revealed no significant differences in theory of mind performance on 
the HSS when comparing children with CBCL and CDI scores in the clinical range with 
others, after adjusting for the effects of age and IQ (see Tables 13,14,15 and 16).
Table 13
HSS: Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CBCL Scores
Non-Clinical Clinical
Scale
n Observed
M
SD Adjusted SE n Observed SD 
M  M
Adjusted
M
SE
HSS 52 9.63 4.10
CBCL Internalising Scale 
9.73 .51 40 9.60 4.68 9.48 .58
HSS 63 9.56 4.80
CBCL Externalising Scale 
9.25 .46 29 9.76 3.18 10.41 .69
CBCL Total Score
HSS 56 9.73 4.58 9.58 .49 36 9.44 4.00 9.68 .62
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Table 14
HSS: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical andNon-Clinical CBCL Scores
Source of Variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P 2 Adjusted
R2
HSS .28
CBCL Internalising 1.34 1 1.34 .10 ns .001
Covariates
Age 186.24 1 186.24 13.74 *** .135
Verbal IQ 288.77 1 288.77 21.30 *** .195
Error 1193.25 88 13.56
HSS .29
CBCL Externalising 25.47 1 25.47 1.91 ns .021
Covariates
Age 185.55 1 185.55 13.97 *** .137
Verbal IQ 314.26 1 314.26 23.65 .212
Error 1169.13 88 13.29
HSS .28
CBCL Total .20 1 .20 .02 ns .000
Covariates
Age 183.89 1 183.89 13.55 *** .133
Verbal IQ 286.82 1 286.82 21.13 *** .194
Error 1194.39 88 13.57
*p< .05 **p<. 01 ***/?<.001.
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Table 15
HSS: Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CDI Scores
CDI
Non-Clinical
CDI
Clinical
Scales n Observed SD Adjusted 
M  M
SE n Observed SD Adjusted 
M  M
SE
HSS 6 i 10.72 3.48 10.19 .50 31 7.45 5.05 8.51 .76
Table 16
HSS: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical andNon-Clinical CDI Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P Adjusted
R2
HSS
CDI 37.78 1 37.78 2.87 ns .032
.30
Covariates
Age 55.58 1 55.58 4.23 * .046
Verbal IQ 273.51 1 273.51 20.81 *** .191
Error 1156.82 88 13.15
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Attachment Security and Performance on the HSS
The impact of child attachment security on HSS performance was investigated 
next using a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to compare the performance of 
children classified as secure or insecure in terms of attachment (according to the CAI), 
again taking into account the effects of age and IQ. The dependent variable was HSS
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performance, and the independent variable was security of attachment (secure or 
insecure). The covariates were age and verbal IQ. The ANCOVA was significant, F (l, 
60) = 4.07, p  < .05. The means of HSS scores of insecure and secure children, adjusted 
for age and IQ, were ordered as expected, with insecurely attached children generally 
having lower HSS scores (M = 9.12) than securely attached children (M = 11.42) (see 
Table 17). Results summarised in Table 18 show that the relationship between attachment 
and the adjusted HSS score was significant but low, with r\2 = .071, indicating that 
attachment classification explained 7% of the variance of this scale.
Table 17
HSS: Performance o f Children with Secure and Insecure Attachment Classifications
Secure Insecure
Scale n Observed SD Adjusted SE n Observed SD Adjusted SE
M  M M  M
HSS 15 11.73 3.39 11.42 .94 44 9.07 4.68 9.12 .55
Table 18
HSS: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Secure and Insecure Attachment 
Classifications
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P 2*1 Adjusted
R2
HSS
Secure/Insecure 55.85 1 55.85 4.20 * .071
.35
Covariates
Age 145.88 1 145.88 10.98 ** .166
Verbal IQ 208.34 1 208.34 15.68 *♦* .222
Error 730.60 55 13.28
*p < .05 **/?<-01 ***/><-001
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Discussion
The aims of this study were two-fold: 1) to investigate the psychometric properties 
of the HSS when used with the adapted coding system and manual, including its interrater 
reliability and its qualities as a scale, and then 2) to examine the relationship between 
HSS performance and key demographic variables (including age and IQ), as well as 
measures of psychopathology, adaptation and attachment. In the following section, the 
principal findings are briefly summarised and then discussed in turn.
Reliability o f the HSS
The findings indicate that the psychometric properties of the HSS are solid. 
Interrater reliability was found to be good using the newly adapted coding system and 
coding manual. The HSS, after exclusion of one item, had good internal consistency, and 
the results from a factor analysis, as well as the good scale alpha, indicate that the HSS 
measures a single construct. With regard to stability over time, the correlations over 1 
year show moderate stability, although stability over a shorter period was less 
satisfactory. This pattern of findings suggests that theory of mind (as measured by the 
HSS) is a relatively stable capacity of children, but that children, perhaps especially 
children recruited from referrals to child and adolescent mental health services, and who 
may be experiencing significant personal difficulties, are less motivated to re-engage with 
these tasks after a 3-month period.
Taken together, these findings regarding reliability confirm that the HSS is a 
reliable measure of primary school-aged children’s theory of mind abilities.
Association with Demographic Variables, Age and IQ
As predicted, children’s theory of mind abilities as measured by the HSS showed 
significant correlations with intelligence and expressive language abilities. This finding 
is not unexpected, given the ample evidence that language abilities and theory of mind are 
generally linked, and given that the HSS is essentially a language based test. These 
observations gave rise to the concern that the HSS might be more a test of verbal ability 
than of test theory of mind, but the results indicate that the correlation is not unduly high 
and confirm that the HSS measures an ability that goes beyond language ability and 
verbal IQ.
From a methodological perspective the English HSS cannot be considered an 
appropriate test of theory of mind abilities for children who have a different home 
language, and caution must be exercised when deciding whether or not to use this test
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with children who have a working knowledge of English, but whose mother tongue is 
another language. This conclusion is based on the impact of language on theory of mind 
performance (as measured by this test), as well as on the extremely low HSS scores 
observed for the two children in the sample who spoke English as a second language at 
home. The impact of bilingualism, or multilingualism on theory of mind development, 
and the related question concerning which tests would be are appropriate for these 
children, are of considerable interest, especially when working with immigrant children 
and children adopted from other countries.
As hypothesised, there were significant age effects, and the study results indicate 
that intentional understanding increases significantly from age 5-11. With regard to 
family composition, the results were somewhat unexpected.
Contrary to expectation, children from single-parent families performed 
significantly better on the HSS than did children from two-parent families. This finding 
requires further investigation and replication, but it is possible that children who grow up 
in single-parent families spend more time interacting with parents and have more 
opportunities to observe and learn how to interpret speech that is non-literal, and perhaps 
more opportunities to develop theory of mind in a general sense. Another, not unrelated, 
explanation could be that single parents demand more understanding from their children 
and that this contributes to a more rapid development in understanding of intentionality in 
communication or to the development of theory of mind in general. In the present study, 
the difference between the theory of mind performance of children with siblings and that 
of only children was not statistically significant. This suggests that the advantages of 
having siblings with regard to theory of mind development are not as marked during the 
primary school years as during the pre-school years.
Psychopathology as Predictor o f Performance on the HSS
As hypothesised, this study shows that depressive symptomatology and trait 
anxiety based on self-reports by children aged 5-11, made a significant addition to the 
prediction of performance on the HSS. This finding that depression and anxiety make a 
significant contribution to predicting theory of mind performance as measured by the 
HSS, is new and exciting for a number of reasons. Previous research, such as that 
reported by Corcoran (2000), failed to identify theory of mind problems associated with 
affective disorders. From a methodological perspective this findings is of importance 
because it demonstrates that HSS when used to measure theory of mind abilities of 
children aged 5-11 exhibits the variance and sensitivity necessary to identify associations
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between theory of mind capacities and affective difficulties. More generally, it suggests 
that when theory of mind tests are appropriately pitched for the age group under study, it 
is possible to observe sufficient variability in children’s theoiy of mind abilities and thus 
to identify links with psychopathology.
From a theoretical perspective, the association between self-reports of affective 
symptomatology and theory of mind performance is not entirely surprising, especially in 
the light of the new evidence from neuroimaging studies suggesting that mentalisation 
and affect are inextricably linked. The findings of the present study point to a definite 
association both between level of depression and anxiety, and the capacity of children to 
make basic discriminations and attributions regarding the intentions of others when 
interpreting speech. At this point, we have to be content with speculating about causality 
and pathways, given that symptomatology and theory of mind were concurrently 
assessed. There are a number of possible explanations. It could be that deficits and 
delays in the development of the capacity to interpret the intentions of others make 
children particularly vulnerable to depression and anxiety, or it could be that more general 
deficits in theory of mind abilities play a role here. Alternatively, it may be that 
depression and anxiety impairs children’s motivation or ability to think about 
intentionality. Or, finally, it may be that the same factors underlying depression and 
anxiety, also impact on the ability to understand the intentions of others.
The lack of significant findings with respect to behavioural difficulties is 
somewhat surprising at first glance, given that it seems reasonable to expect that 
difficulties in discerning the intentions of others will be associated with interpersonal 
difficulties. The study findings are, nonetheless, in line with findings of previous studies 
such as those of Happe and U. Frith (1996), which failed to find significant relationships 
between theory of mind and behavioural difficulties. This leads to the conclusion that 
children with behavioural difficulties do not differ significantly from their normal peers in 
their ability to identify the intentions of others when in emotionally neutral situations, 
such as test situations. It may be, as suggested by Happe and U. Frith (1996), that these 
children have a theory of bad minds or to use Blair’s (1995) terms, it may be that they 
lack empathy, or as Dodge et al. (1984) assert, it may be that they have negative 
attribution biases and make distorted appraisals of the intentions of others as overly 
negative. Alternatively, it may be that problems with executive control make it difficult 
for these children to use their theory of mind abilities when emotionally aroused, for 
example, when threatened by hurt, rejection or humiliation. Finally, there is the 
possibility that methodological factors such as the reliance on parent-reports of
148
behavioural difficulties, rather than on direct observation or on peer or teacher reports, 
may have contributed to the lack of significant findings here.
Clinical Levels o f Psychopathology and Performance on the HSS
In this sample of primary school-aged children referred to mental health services, 
theory of mind (as measured by the HSS) was not found to differ significantly as a 
function of whether children had clinical levels of depression (as measured on the CDI) or 
clinical levels of behavioural and emotional difficulties (as measured on the CBCL), after 
considering the effects of age and verbal IQ.
Attachment Security and Theory o f Mind
As hypothesised, there were significant differences in the theory of mind abilities 
of children as a function of their attachment security. Securely attached children, when 
compared with insecurely attached children of the same age and IQ, performed 
significantly better on the HSS, indicating that secure attachment is associated with a 
greater ability to understand the intentions of others and to understand what people really 
mean when they speak. While there is evidence that attachment security ( as measured at 
1 year of age) predicts theory of mind performance at the end of the pre-school years 
(Fonagy, Redfem et al., 1997; Main, 1991), the results of this study indicate that securely 
attached children still has this advantage with respect to theory of mind performance into 
the primary school years. As was theorised by Fonagy, Redfem, et al. (1997) it is 
possible that securely attached children develop superior theory of mind abilities because 
they feel at liberty to explore the minds of other. It may also be, as suggested by Harris 
(2000), that the parenting qualities that facilitate attachment security, that are in turn 
associated with parent-child emotion narratives, facilitate affective understanding and 
theory of mind development. Fonagy and Target (2003) argue that the development of 
the ability to understand the minds of others is inextricably linked to attachment. The 
results of this study provide support for theories postulating that of the development of 
theory of mind, as well as the development of the understanding of the intentions of 
others are determined by relationships that the child develops with caregivers (Fonagy, 
Redfem et al., 1997; Harris, 2000), and these do not develop a biologically predetermined 
course.
Future Considerations
This study provides provocative evidence of the link between mentalisation about 
the intentions of others cmcial to understanding everyday communication, and affective
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symptomatology, including depression and anxiety. Significant differences in intentional 
understanding were also found between securely and insecurely attached children. 
However, causality was not addressed by this study, given that theory of mind and 
symptomatology and attachment were assessed concurrently. A longitudinal study will 
be required to explore causality.
The lack of significant findings with regard to behavioural difficulties and 
adaptation also requires further investigation. It is possible that the use of parent-reports 
which may reflect parental psychopathology and distortions in parental representations of 
their children may have contributed to the lack of significant results. Independent reports 
by teachers, or observations undertaken by researchers at home and at school, may 
provide a more reliable indicator of behavioural and adaptation difficulties. Another 
factor that has to be considered is that HSS data was only available for children referred 
to child mental health services; we would expect difficulties in identifying the intentions 
of others to result in interpersonal difficulties and to contribute to behavioural difficulties. 
This warrants further investigation in a study designed to include both children who meet 
conduct disorder criteria and a normal control group.
The findings from the current study suggest that there is a link between both 
depressive symptomatology and trait anxiety and the ability to consider the intentions of 
others, an ability considered to be indicative of theory of mind ability. However, the 
question as to whether or not affective symptomatology is also linked more generally to 
children’s own ability to see themselves in intentional terms and to take an intentional 
stance, which needs further investigation. Also warranting further study is the 
clarification of the direction of the relationship between theory of mind and affective 
difficulties, so as to determine whether the latter difficulties would respond better to 
treatments that focus on the development of mentalising capacities.
A further question that needs to be addressed is the link between performance on a 
language orientated theory of mind task, such as the HSS, and the ability to identify 
mental states which are expressed non-verbally, as assessed, for example, by the Eyes 
Task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997). Further research using measures of both theory 
of mind and mindreading, could help to clarify their developmental relationship, and 
determine whether or not they are associated with psychopathology.
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Conclusion
After confirming that the psychometric properties of the HSS, including interrater 
reliability and internal consistency, were robust, the study results indicated that the HSS 
is an appropriate test of theory of mind abilities for children age 5-12. Performance on 
this theory of mind measure which assessed the ability to consider intentionality in 
interpreting communication was demonstrated to be related not only to verbal ability and 
age, but also to affective symptomatology and attachment. These findings are highly 
interesting, as previous studies assessing theory of mind were not able to confirm the link 
with affect, despite the fact that this link is strongly suggested both theoretically and by 
current evidence from neuroimaging studies.
Results from this study confirm that when theory of mind tests are selected 
carefully and are appropriate for the age group being investigated, it is possible to 
demonstrate that a relationship exists between theory of mind abilities and affective 
symptomatology. The study results indicate that children who report higher rates of 
depressive and anxiety symptomatology have lower theory of mind scores on this test 
measuring the ability to interpret communication in terms of the intentions of the 
speakers, rather than in terms of what is said literally. As such, this study provides 
evidence in support of the notion that affect and mentalisation are inextricably linked.
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CHAPTER 5 
PSYCHOMETRIC AFFECT TASK
This chapter will focus on the psychometric properties of the Affect Task (AT), a 
new measure designed to assess affective understanding in primary school-aged children; 
it evaluates, in particular, the dimensions that have been identified by research as salient 
dimensions of affective understanding namely: 1) knowing which affects will be evoked; 
2) knowledge of the causal connections between feelings and contexts; 3) understanding 
how feelings change; 4) understanding emotional dissemblance; and 5) understanding 
why someone else may have a very different, unexpected reaction vis-^-vis our own 
reaction.
The goals of this chapter are to examine the reliability of the AT and to explore 
whether affective understanding (as measured by the AT) is primarily determined by age 
and intelligence, and to investigate whether or not the AT is sensitive to problems in 
social functioning, psychopathology, self-esteem and attachment. In sum, the aim is to 
establish whether or not the AT is robust psychometrically, and to examine the construct 
validity of the AT when used in a sample of primary school children aged 5-12.
Introduction
As Shields and Cicchetti (1997) have pointed out, our understanding of children’s 
emotional development is still at a stage such that measure development can make an 
important contribution to research. Despite the last decade of rapid growth in knowledge 
of children’s emotional development, there are still major gaps in our understanding of 
this process. Consequently we are still unable to identify the salient signs of risk, and thus 
to identify children who are at the highest risk. At this stage, the relationship between 
emotional understanding, i.e., the way children understand and interpret emotional cues, 
and emotional regulation is still inadequately understood, although there is research 
linking both to relational and behavioural difficulties. It remains unclear to what extent, 
as Harris (2000) has put it “Children’s developing understanding of emotion is simply an 
epiphenomenon of the underlying process of emotion. Understanding may operate at a 
‘meta’ level, sealed off from the underlying emotional process that is its subject matter.
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To take a concrete example, it is possible to assert that a child functions at two separate 
levels: On one level there is the child’s display of sadness; at a separate level, there is the 
child’s capacity for reporting on and ruminating about that experience. Increasing 
sophistication at the latter level may have few or no repercussions for processing at the 
former level” (p. 290).
Determining the relationship between the understanding of affect and feelings and 
affect regulation is of considerable importance, especially in considering whether or not 
talking therapies, which also construct new narratives and increase affective 
understanding, can be expected to impact on severe difficulties in affect regulation. 
Research progress with regard to our understanding of causal pathways, risk, and 
intervention is hampered by the lack of developmentally appropriate and validated 
assessment tools. In this context the Affect Task, a new instrument developed to assess 
the emotional understanding of children aged 6-11, presents considerable promise.
The aim of this study is to present the development of the AT and its coding 
system and to examine whether or not its psychometric properties indicate that it is a 
reliable and valid measure of primary school-aged children’s affective understanding.
Different Aspects and Sophistication o f Affective Understanding
Developmentalists such as Saami (1999) have differentiated an astonishing range 
of affective understanding abilities. The AT focuses on five skills that are thought to 
develop during the primary school years. Two skills involve what can be regarded as 
essential affect knowledge, including the ability to know which affects are likely to be 
evoked in a given situations and the ability to understand and think clearly about the 
causal links between affects and situations. The other three skills involve more complex, 
or sophisticated, understanding of affects. In Fonagy and Target’s (2003) theoretical 
model, this growing sophistication in understanding the qualities of mental states is 
developmentally significant, in that it makes possible the increased mastery of children’s 
emotional reactions and emotional worlds this makes possible. The five skills assessed 
by the AT will be briefly discussed in the following section.
Understanding Affects Evoked by Particular Situations
Research suggests that ability to identify more complex social and what is referred 
to as the self-conscious emotions such as pride, guilt, shame, embarrassment, and 
empathy, emerges at the age of 6 (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Denham, 1998). With regard 
to understanding ambivalence and mixed emotions, Harter (1999) has argued that only 
from the age of 7 do children start to understand that others can experience differing
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emotions of the same valence, such as anger and sadness; Harter also contends that at age 
11 are children able to consider the possibility of having emotions of opposite valences 
towards the same person. Studies in which scaffolding is provided have shown that, in 
fact, these abilities emerge earlier (Wintre & Valence, 1994); the responses of 8-year-olds 
indicated that they were able to consider the possibility that multiple emotions of different 
valences and intensities could result from a given emotional stimulus. Peng et al. (1992), 
using a story involving a child who finds his lost pet, only to realise that it is injured, 
found that when children were told of the mixed emotional reaction of the story character, 
6-7 year old children, but not 4-5 year old children were able to consider the possibility 
of mixed emotional reactions having opposite valences. Denham (1998) explains the 
difficulties of 4-5 year old children by citing evidence that younger children think 
concretely about emotions and rely principally on facial expressions (i.e., “Faces can’t go 
up and down at the same time”). Their limited ability to understand mental processes and 
their unsophisticated theory of mind (“You can’t think two ways at the same time”) have 
also been identified as possible obstacles (Harris et al., 1989).
The coding system of the AT Accuracy scale is based on these findings, and 
scores are given based on children’s ability to consider the possibility that the story 
characters might have mixed emotional reactions and that the valences of these emotions 
might be diametrically opposed.
Knowledge o f the Causal Connections between Feelings and Contexts
Narratives about emotionally loaded events are seen as providing the mental 
scaffolding that helps the child interpret similar events when they subsequently encounter 
them. Harris (2000) has argued that a child’s knowledge of common emotional scripts, 
i.e., narratives about emotions and their causes, acts as an organiser of both affect and 
affective memories. The research evidence indicates that during the pre-school period 
children see the causes of emotions in terms of goals, and that age 5 marks a shift in 
perception; at this age, children begin to show the ability to consider personal dispositions 
and to provide more abstract accounts of the possible causes of a peer’s emotions (Dunn 
& Hughes, 1998; Fabes et al., 1991; Strayer, 1986).
These findings have informed the approach used in the coding system of the AT 
Justification scale; thus, scores are based on the extent to which the child shows an 
understanding of interpersonal determinants when explaining the affective reactions of 
the story characters. The stories and drawings have all been developed to depict affect 
provoking events in interpersonal contexts, in order to specifically elicit children’s ability 
to consider the impact of interpersonal processes on affective reactions.
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Understanding Change in Feelings
Studies of children’s ability to understand the impact of time on both happiness 
and sadness show that this ability emerges during the primary school period, with 
younger children only understanding shifts from one emotion to another, but not shifts 
over time of a single emotion (Brown et al., 1991). Children aged 4-16 generally resort 
behavioural rather than cognitive strategies to change emotions and generally have to be 
reminded of cognitive strategies before they are able to consider using them (Brown, 
Covell, & Abromovitch, 1991).
In light of these findings, the coding system of the AT Impact scale evaluates 
children’s capacity to recognise that feelings become less intense over time, and it 
assessed their knowledge of more sophisticated behavioural and cognitive strategies.
Understanding Emotional Dissemblance
The ability to understand cultural display rules and to understand the motivations 
for hiding one’s true feelings and for pretending to feel something quite different is 
essential for interpreting the reactions of others; in addition, these skills have important 
social and personal advantages. Six-year-olds are generally able to understand why 
children might wish to hide their true feelings. Results with regard to the emergence of 
this ability in younger children are divergent. Some studies suggest that pre-schoolers 
have not acquired the understanding that feelings can be masked or minimised for social 
or self-protective reasons (Denham, 1989). On the other hand, studies of the 
appearance/reality distinction from a theory of mind perspective found that pre-school 
children were, in fact, able to identify how the protagonist was really feeling, despite 
appearances (Gross & Harris, 1988).
In the context of this study, the coding system of the Internal/External scale is 
designed to measure children’s developing knowledge of emotional dissemblance, as well 
as their understanding of social rules and personal motivations underlying its use.
Understanding a Surprising Affective Reaction
Mental reflexivity, i.e., the ability to apply affective understanding creatively 
when challenged by circumstances which cannot be explained by common scripts, is 
considered by Fonagy et al. (2000) as an important aspect of sophisticated affective 
understanding. Mental reflexivity is crucial because social and interpersonal processes 
require individuals to understand a wide range of reactions to which their existing 
repertoire of narratives and explanations (or attempts at understanding through 
identification) do not apply.
With regard to the early development of this ability, Denham and Couchoud’s
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studies (1990) have shown that pre-schoolers struggle to imagine that others might have 
feelings different from theirs. The evidence suggests that this ability appears during the 
early school years; Denham (1998) found that children aged 5 or 6 were able to 
understand that some children, for example, might be scared of dogs, whereas others 
might like dogs. Certain children when pressed to explain different reactions to dogs, 
insisted on reconstructing the situation (“The dog does not have big teeth, so she likes 
him”)(Denham, 1998). This suggests that these Children are still unable to consider 
affective reactions as mental phenomena determined by personal characteristics and 
preferences, rather than by external reality.
The scoring system of the AT Challenge scale is designed to measure different 
levels of sophistication in children’s ability to use their affective understanding skills 
reflexively in considering a reaction that falls outside the range of reactions that they are 
normally confronted with.
Affective Understanding, Social Adaptive Functioning and Psychopathology
From a theoretical point of view, affective understanding has been explicitly 
linked to social understanding (Dunn, 1988) and social competence (Denham, 1998). In 
addition, affective understanding is seen as an essential component of emotional 
competence (Saami, 1999) and is linked to self-efficacy and the capacity to regulate, 
express and communicate emotions. This, in turn, is considered to be central to 
interpersonal connectedness. The ability to know and understand what one feels and then 
to express it, together with the ability to imagine and understand someone else’s affective 
reactions and the ability to feel empathy and express it interpersonally, are considered as 
underlying the quality and depth of interpersonal interactions. This is also the central 
tenet of the reflective functioning thesis (Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy & Target, 2003) 
which states that: 1) a person’s ability to mentalise and to know what they feel and why is 
intimately connected with their affect regulation and sense of their own agency, and that 
this is in turn affects; 2) to what extent they are likely to consider the mental states, 
intentions and feelings of others, and that; 3) this orientation with regard to mental states, 
intentions and affect determines the depth and quality of interpersonal interactions.
The relationship between emotional understanding and social competence, as well 
as between emotional understanding and prosocial reactions to the emotions of others, has 
been underscored by results from many different studies (Denham, 1986; Denham & 
Couchoud, 1990; Denham, McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990; Field & Walden, 1982; 
Gnepp, 1989). At an empirical level, there are still considerable gaps in our understanding
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of the relationships between emotional understanding, temperament, the regulation of 
negative affects, inhibitory control and empathy. In particular, little is known regarding 
the contributions of these factors to the development of child psychopathology, 
especially in contexts known to be psychopathogenic such as child maltreatment 
(Greenberg et al., 1995; Smith & Walden, 1999). Parental, family and socio-economic 
risk factors associated with psychopathology have been relatively well documented, but 
the question now arises as to which factors are associated with, or mitigate (in certain 
cases) the risk of psychopathology.
There is a paucity of research investigating emotional understanding in depressed 
children, but more is known about the association between emotional understanding and 
disruptive behavioural disorders. A review by Miller and Eisenberg (1988) points to an 
inverse relationship between antisocial behaviour and emotional understanding. Children 
with conduct disorders have been shown to have significant deficits in emotional 
understanding, as assessed by the Kusche Affective Interview (Kusche et al., 1988). 
However, aggressive children with ADHD do not appear to manifest the same socio- 
cognitive delay, suggesting that problems with executive control might contribute to the 
behavioural and social difficulties of this group (Hughes, White, Sharpen, & Dunn, 2000; 
Barkley, 1997). There is also evidence that children with behaviour problems have 
fundamental problems in appraisal, show negative attributional biases and tend to 
misinterpret the pro-social intentions and cues of others as being hostile (Dodge et al., 
1984). Research findings indicate that these attributional biases are resistant to 
correction, as rejected children continue to mistakenly attribute hostile intentions to others 
even when they are informed of the affect of the protagonists (Keane & Parrish, 1992). 
As suggested in the previous chapter, these negative expectations may reflect relationship 
representations based on hostile and conflictual family relationships and on a theory of 
“nasty minds” (Happe & U. Frith, 1996). At a deeper level, they may also be associated 
with disorganised attachment, given the converging evidence of links between attachment 
disorganisation and aggression (Goldberg, Muir, & Kerr, 1995; Hubbs-Tait, Osofsky, 
Hann, & Culp, 1994; Lyons-Ruth, 1996). Delays in developing false-belief understanding 
and affective perspective taking, as well as deficits in executive control, have been 
identified as important contributors to the problems associated with hard-to-manage pre­
schoolers (Hughes, 1998) and as likely predictors of anti-social behaviour (Hughes et al., 
2000).
One of the aims of the present study is to examine whether or not child affective 
and behavioural disorders, as well as social adaptive functioning, contribute to predicting
various dimensions of children’s affective understanding.
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Affective Understanding, Intelligence and Expressive Language Abilities
In contrast to the wealth of research addressing the relationships between 
children’s theory of mind abilities, intelligence and language abilities, there is 
surprisingly little data on the relationship between affective understanding and children’s 
cognitive and language abilities. The findings showing links between these latter abilities 
and theory of mind abilities can also be expected to apply to affective understanding, 
given that affective understanding is thought to overlap with theory of mind, and that 
similar abilities are being assessed from the different theoretical perspectives.
The lack of data with regard to the possible relationships between expressive 
language abilities and affective understanding is surprising, given the central role 
accorded to language in the development of children’s affective understanding; i.e., 
parental narratives (Harris, 2000) and parent-child emotion-focused discussion (Dunn, 
1988). Emotional expressiveness is considered in its own right as a key element of 
emotional and social competence alongside affective understanding and affect regulation 
abilities (Denham, 1998). Nonetheless, the relationships between language abilities, 
emotional expressiveness and affective understanding appear relatively neglected.
When it comes to emotional processes in general, some have argued that IQ is not 
particularly relevant (Goleman, 1995). Results from a recent study involving young adult 
students suggest that the picture is more complex (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000). 
Factors such as self-esteem and empathy, but not intelligence, predicted an aggregate 
emotional intelligence score based on emotional perception, affective understanding and 
emotional management (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). However, IQ was found to make an 
independent contribution to the ability to manage laboratory-induced moods, and it also 
prevented biased social judgements, whereas emotional intelligence was found to be 
related only to the ability to manage moods. Verbal IQ has been found to be related to 
understanding of complex emotions (Cook et al., 1994) in primary school-aged children 
with behavioural problems. At the same time, after IQ was controlled for significant 
differences in the ability to provide personal examples of basic emotions remained. This 
suggests that IQ has more of an impact when assessing sophisticated rather than basic 
levels of emotional understanding for any given age group. As far as behaviour problems 
are concerned, a number of researchers have reported an inverse relationship with IQ 
(Cook et al., 1994; Paget, 1982; Schonfeld, Shaffer, O'Connor, & Portnoy, 1988; White, 
Moffit, & Silva, 1989) and with verbal ability, in particular (Hinshaw, 1992).
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In summary, the research to date suggests that intelligence is related to certain 
types of emotional understanding and that it contributes to management of moods, 
thereby preventing the latter from affecting social judgement. One of the aims of the 
present study is to clarify the relationships between expressive language abilities, 
intelligence and affective understanding in primary school-aged children.
Individual Differences in Affective Understanding:
Attachment, Gender, Parental and Sibling Factors
A number of factors which have been identified as contributing to the 
development of affective understanding will be presented briefly.
Gender
In line with cultural expectations, there is evidence that females are better able to 
decode emotional expressions (Casey, 1993), but the literature does not reflect consistent 
significant gender differences in performance on other measures of emotional 
understanding (Gross & Ballif, 1991; Strayer, 1989; Thompson, 1989). There is also 
evidence suggesting that boys and girls differ in the way they think about the causes of 
affective experiences, with girls focusing more on interpersonal aspects of situations 
(Fabes et al., 1991; Strayer, 1986).
Attachment Security
The findings that attachment security predicted performance on a task of mixed 
emotional understanding were discussed in preceding chapters (H. Steele, M. Steele & 
Fonagy, 1996), and attachment is expected to impact in a similar way on affective 
understanding (as measured on the AT).
Parent-Child Talks about Emotions
Parent-child talk about emotions, also referred to as “coaching” (Denham, 1998) 
and “emotional didactics” (Harris, 2000), has been identified as playing a pivotal role in 
the development of children’s emotional understanding. Studies from at least two major 
laboratories have shown that it is a predictor of concurrent and later emotional 
understanding whether measured at 24 months, 33 months, or 6 years of age (Denham, 
Cook, & Zoller, 1992; Denham, Renwick-DeBardi et al., 1994; Dunn & Brown, 1994; 
Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991). Results from a recent study indicate that parental 
emphasis on why people experience specific emotions, is especially important (Gamer, 
Jones, Gaddy, & Rennie, 1997). Harris (2000) has argued that rich and complex parental 
accounts of the emotional significance of events help children to organise events into
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narrative structures and at the same time teach children this skill. He suggests that the 
quality of parental elaborations and the emphasis on emotions are important in the 
development of similar abilities in children. This proposal is similar to that of Fonagy et 
al. (2002), and that of Fonagy and Target (2003), in parental reflective functioning is seen 
as central to the development of children’s ability to consider mental states, affects and 
interpersonal reactions in the course of everyday life.
In addition, positive maternal responsiveness (i.e., parents show happiness when 
children are happy, calmness when they are angry, and tenderness when they are sad) has 
been found to predict child emotional understanding (Denham, Renwick-DeBardi et al.,
1994). There is also evidence that maternal anger, sadness and tensions are inversely 
related to children’s emotional understanding (Cummings et al., 1985; Cummings, Zahn- 
Waxler, & Radke-Yarrow, 1981; Denham, 1998; Dunn & Brown, 1994).
Fantasy Play and Emotional Understanding
The link between fantasy play and emotional understanding has been confirmed 
by a number of studies showing that individual differences in imagination were 
significantly related to affective perspective taking (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Griffin, 
Carlson, Taylor, & Wilson, 1997; Slomkowski & Dunn, 1992; Youngblade & Dunn,
1995).
In this study, the primary concerns are the reliability and validity of the AT when 
used to assess children’s affective understanding. The focus is on child factors, rather 
than on parent and family factors. Based on assessments of children’s functioning and 
abilities across a number of domains, various dimensions of the validity of the AT will be 
evaluated.
Aims and Objectives of this Study
The aims of the present study are to present the AT and to examine its 
psychometric properties, including reliability and validity.
The reliability of the AT will be established by addressing the following 
objectives: 1) to present the development of an AT coding manual, and to present the 
interrater reliability results obtained using this manual; 2) to evaluate the internal 
consistency reliability of the AT scales, and the dimensionality and factor structure of the 
AT; and 3) to establish whether the AT has adequate stability over a 3-month test-retest 
period, as well as after 1 year. These indexes of reliability will be evaluated to determine 
whether or not they meet the criteria set out by Kline (2000) for interrater reliability and 
internal consistency, and as well as the criteria established by Murphy and Davidshofer
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(2001) for evaluating test-retest reliability. (The criteria will be detailed in the section that 
addresses the analyses used.)
The validity of the AT will be evaluated in the context of the relationships 
between performance on the AT and key demographic variables, IQ, expressive language 
abilities, self-esteem, psychopathology, social adaptation and attachment. These 
relationships and associations will be examined with the following objectives in mind: 1) 
to investigate children’s affective understanding as measured by the AT in relation to 
gender and family composition; 2) to evaluate the construct validity of the AT in the 
context of the relationships between children’s performance on the AT and age, IQ, 
expressive language abilities, psychopathology and social adaptation; 3) to evaluate 
whether factors other than age and IQ play a role in the prediction of children’s affective 
understanding; 4) to evaluate whether or not there are significant differences in children’s 
affective understanding as a function of attachment security and psychopathology; 5) to 
examine the convergent validity of measurements of children’s mentalisation abilities 
from the perspectives of theory of mind and affective understanding, thus to examine the 
correlations between children’s HSS scores and their performance on the AT Scales.
The hypotheses corresponding to each of these objectives will be outlined below.
Hypotheses
Gender and Family Composition
Given the divergent findings with regard to gender and affective understanding 
and the fact that the AT measures a dimension of emotional understanding that is 
cognitively mediated, no gender effects are predicted. With regard to family composition, 
only children are expected to show lower affective understanding when compared to 
children with siblings, on some, but not all, dimensions of affective understanding, in 
light of previous findings in this regard (Pemer et al., 1994; Jenkins & Astington, 1996). 
At a more exploratory level, children living in single-parent and two-parent families will 
be compared to determine whether or not children from single-parent families had lower 
affective understanding than children from two-parent families given that growing up in 
single-parent families has adverse impact on children’s affective understanding (Luthar, 
1999).
Affective Understanding and Age, IQ, Expressive language, Psychopathology and 
Social Adaptation
A positive correlation between age and affective understanding is expected, and 
will be regarded as evidence that the measure is sensitive to developmental changes in
161
children’s affective understanding during the primary school years. Based on previous 
findings of relationships between theory of mind and language abilities (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1995; J. G. De Villiers and P. A. De Villiers; Happ6, 1995; Tager-Flusberg,
1996), affective understanding is expected to show a positive relationship of moderate 
strength with verbal IQ. Affective understanding is not expected to be directly related to 
expressive language abilities. A significant negative correlation between affective 
understanding and behaviour problems (as measured on the CBCL Externalising Scale) is 
expected, based on previous findings (Kusche et al., 1994). A negative correlation is also 
expected between affective understand and social adaptation (as measured on the 
CAFAS; where higher scores reflect increased adaptive difficulties) on the basis of 
previous findings (Denham et al. 1990; Field & Walden, 1982; Gnepp, 1989). There is 
currently no data regarding the relationship between affective understanding and 
depression, anxiety and self-esteem, but an inverse relationship between affective 
understanding and symptoms of depression and anxiety is expected. This expectation is 
based on the rationale that children who are not able to understand why people react the 
way the do will be more vulnerable to depression or anxiety symptoms.
Predictors o f Childrens Affective Understanding
It is predicted that social adaptation and possibly, psychopathology, will make a 
contribution to predicting children’s affective understanding on the AT, for reasons 
outlined above.
Differences in Affective Understanding as a Function o f Attachment and 
Psychopathology
Based on the findings that attachment predicts affective understanding (H. Steele 
et al., 1996), affective understanding of children (as measured by the AT) is expected to 
discriminate between secure and insecure children, after adjustments are made for other 
contributors. The affective understanding of children with clinical levels of 
psychopathology is expected to be significantly lower than that of the non-clinical group.
Convergent Validity o f Measures o f Mentalisation
With regard to convergent validity, the relationship between children’s 
mentalisation abilities, as measured from the perspective of affective understanding using 
the AT, and their theory of mind abilities, as measured by the HSS, is expected to be 
strong because theory of mind and affective understanding are considered to be 
overlapping constructs.
Method
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Participants and Recruitment
The AT was administered to a sample of 175 children aged 5-11, 65 of whom 
were recruited from schools and 110 from referrals to Child and Adolescent Mental 
Health Services in London, UK. This study was part of a larger project of measure 
development conducted at the Anna Freud Centre, London, UK (see Chapter 3 for a 
detailed discussion of the recruitment procedure).
The sample comprised 108 boys (62%) and 67 girls (38%). With respect to age, 
there were no significant differences between boys (Mage = 8.9, SD = 1.79) and girls 
((Mage = 8.9, SD = 1.67), *(173) = -.13, ns).
The vast majority of the children lived with their biological mothers (95%). 
Approximately half lived in two-parent families (58%) and with both biological parents 
(53%). The majority of the children were Caucasian (73%) and the vast majority (97%) 
spoke English at home. Many were only children (44%) or had only one sibling (31%), 
and those with two or more siblings (25%) were in a minority. In terms of maternal 
educational levels, the mothers with a university degree (44%) or with college education 
(29%) were over represented, and mothers with only secondary school education (25%) 
were in the minority. The majority of mothers were employed at the time of the interview 
(72%), as were the majority of the fathers (98%). In terms of the ten standard 
employment categories used in the UK census, 53% of families had specialised technical, 
professional and managerial occupations, 34% were employed in occupations involving 
sales, personal services, skilled trades, administration or secretarial work. The remainder 
consisted of manual workers (4%) and those who were retired, homemakers and 
unemployed (9%).
In terms of attachment status, attachment data was available for 62 children only: 
15 were classified as securely attached to their mothers and 47 as insecurely attached 
(including disorganised).
Instruments
Development o f the Affect Task (AT)
The AT (Fonagy et al., 2000) was developed by Peter Fonagy, Mary Target and 
the author of this thesis (Fonagy et al., 2000) to assess affective understanding in 
children aged 5-11. The author of this thesis was responsible for developing the AT 
coding manual that introduces the AT and which contains descriptions and illustrations of
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the different levels for each of the abilities that are assessed.
One of the AT’s strengths is that it can be used to assess five dimensions of 
affective understanding that have been identified by the empirical literature as critical. It 
was designed from a reflective functioning perspective and allows for the systematic 
differentiation between different levels of sophistication in affective understanding in 
interpersonal contexts. The dimensions that are assessed include: 1) Accuracy: the ability 
to identify which affects are likely to result given emotion evoking situations; 2) 
Justification: the ability to provide justifications and narratives which show understanding 
of the causal links between contexts and feelings; 3) Impact: the understanding of how 
feelings change; 4) Internal/External: the ability understand that feelings might be 
dissembled and that there are a variety of reasons explaining why the feelings shown on 
the outside might be different from those on the inside; and 5) Challenge; the ability to 
imagine and understand that someone else may have a reaction very different from one’s 
own reaction, or a reaction that is not common.
The AT for primary school children was adapted from an earlier version of the AT 
that was developed for pre-school children by Howard Steele, Miriam Steele and Peter 
Fonagy (H. Steele et al., 1999). The AT for pre-school children focuses specifically on 
the ability to consider mixed and multiple emotions; this contrasts with the wider focus 
and more complex coding system of the AT developed for primary school children, as 
reported.
The AT uses line drawings of children portrayed in six emotionally charged 
everyday situations that were selected because they are familiar to school going children 
and because these situations commonly elicit a range of emotions. The AT has an 
introductory component which is not scored and which introduces the child to line 
drawings of faces depicting nine different emotional expressions ranging from happy to 
shocked; these were derived from Ekman et al. (1972). The child is asked to identify the 
different emotions in order to familiarise him with the different faces and with the idea 
that each face is meant to represent a different mental state. The same nine faces are then 
used in acetate form for the next part of the task. In the second and central component of 
the AT, the child is shown the six cartoon drawings, in which the facial expressions of the 
characters are not drawn in. The interviewer then reads and animates a short script that 
accompanies each picture. Parallel versions of the six scenarios and accompanying 
cartoons with boy and girl protagonists are used depending on the gender of the child 
being interviewed.
The drawings reflect situations familiar to school going children; in these
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situations, there is a central affective theme: bullying, being selected to be captain, being 
left out, being naughty at the expense of another child, being punished or being in an 
embarrassing situation. Story 1 is about a bully who pushes over a younger child in front 
of his/her friends in the school playground. Story 2 describes an athletic child who is 
selected by his/her teacher from amongst a group of other children to be the swimming 
team captain. Story 3 is a continuation of the previous story: A child, who is not very 
good at swimming, is the last person to get picked to be on a team. Story 4 is about a 
bored child who flicks a piece of paper at and stings the neck of the child sitting in front 
of him/her during a math lesson. Story 5 follows from Story 4; the protagonist in this 
story is caught by the teacher and has to stay in class to do extra work during playtime. 
The victim of the flicking incident and another child observe him through the window. 
Story 6 is about a child who mistakenly wears very formal clothes to an outdoor 
children’s party. His or her arrival is observed by a group of casually dressed children.
After each narrative, the child is invited to choose the appropriate acetate faces to 
show how all the children in the story might be feeling, using as many faces, or feelings, 
for each of the characters as he/she may want to use. Following this, the child is asked: 1) 
to name all the feelings (used to rate accuracy of the identification of affects); 2) why they 
may be feeling that way (used to rate the capacity to justify and provide a plausible, well 
motivated explanation or narrative which explains the different emotional reactions); 3) 
what happens to the feeling (used to rate the child’s knowledge of the fact that the impact 
of emotions changes over time and his knowledge of the fact that people use specific 
strategies to reduce the impact of negative feelings; 4) whether the character could be 
feeling something different on the inside than he is showing on the outside and then to 
explain why (used to rate the child’s understanding that feelings may be hidden for 
different reasons and that appearances may not reflect internal emotional experience); and 
5) a “challenge” question in which the child is asked to imagine and explain why another 
“very different sort of child” might have a quite different response to the one they had 
originally attributed to the character (used to rate the child’s capacity to shift perspectives 
and consider why someone else might have a quite different emotional reaction). This last 
question was added to determine the child’s ability to be recursive and flexible in thinking 
about and consider the emotions of other children, i.e., is the child able to consider the 
feelings that he/she would have had in the same situation. Is the child able to shift mental 
frames when challenged to consider why someone might have a quite different emotional 
response. A complete version of the AT, including its administration procedure and 
coding manual, has been appended (see Appendixes Cl, C2 and C3).
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The coding system provides a systematic approach to scoring children’s responses 
concerning the identification and discussion of emotional states, from a reflective 
functioning perspective. A hierarchical approach is used that differentiates between five 
levels of mentalisation on the basis of elaboration and complexity. The approach used to 
rate responses to the Accuracy and Justifications questions is outlined in Table 19.
At this stage, the only data available regarding the psychometric properties and 
performance of the AT is exploratory, based on a small sample, and on an earlier version 
of the coding system, as reported by Leeuwerik (1999) in a Master’s thesis. Her results 
demonstrated that it was possible to achieve good interrater reliability using the AT 
coding manual.
Other Measures
Other measures used in this study include two parent-report measures, namely the Child 
Behaviour Checklist (CBCL: Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983) and the Child Adaptation 
and Functioning Scale (CAFAS: Hodges, 1998). Six child-report measures will also be 
used, including two measures of depression and anxiety, the Child Depression Inventory 
(CDI: Kovacs, 1992) and the State and Trait Anxiety Scale for Children (STAIC: 
Spielberger, 1970), a measure of child self-esteem, Harter’s Self-Perception Profile 
(Harter: Harter, 1985), and the Child Attachment Interview (CAI: Target et al., 2000). In 
addition, a short form of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third UK Edition 
(WISC-HI1^ )  will be administered to obtain an estimate of IQ and the Clinical Evaluation 
of Language Fundamentals-Revised (CELF-R: Semel et al., 1987) will be administered to 
assess expressive language abilities. These measures and their psychometric properties 
presented in detail in Chapter 3.
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Table 19
AT: Examples o f Coding System and Responses for Accuracy and Justification
Level Accuracy Coding System Examples
1. Unable to attribute any reaction. “Don’t know” “What do you think?” 
“Nothing”.
2 . Does not include an emotional 
component.
“He wants to go back inside”.
3. Able to provide an emotional label, but “The bully is ‘happy’, the victim is
these responses are at the level of the 
most obvious.
“sad”.
4. Describes differentiated affects that “Sad and cross”.
indicate a mixture of feelings.
5. Sophisticated responses describing “He feels sad that he was pushed
differentiated affect states and which over, and he’s angry with the bully
address apparent contradictions for making him cry and spoiling his
between affect states. game”.
Level Justification Coding System Examples
1. Unjustified and parroting. “Because he was pushed”.
2 . Limited explanation in terms of the “Because he did nothing and got
context. hurt”.
3. Reference to affects and mental states. “Shocked because they like him”.
4. Reference to mental states and implicit “Feels sad because he thinks the
Interpersonal orientation. bully probably has no friends, and 
feels sorry for him”.
5. Reference to mental states and explicit “The boy who wasn’t picked feels
interpersonal orientation. sad because he thinks the others did 
not want him on the team”.
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Procedure
The procedure of the Anna Freud Centre Standardisation Study was presented in 
Chapter 3. All interviews were conducted in a quiet room either at school, home or at the 
Anna Freud Centre, and the interviews and assessments were completed over 2-3 
sessions. All child interviews were videotaped and the parent interviews were 
audiotaped. On the average, the AT interview took approximately 45 minutes to 
complete. Thirty children agreed to participate in the test-retest study and repeated the 
AT interview after a 3-month interval. Approximately 30% of the families who 
participated in the study at time 1 returned after a. 1-year interval to complete the same 
battery of tests.
Raters and Coding Procedure
Five raters were trained to use the AT coding system. Three had completed 3 
years of undergraduate psychology training and two had post-graduate qualifications in 
psychology. Three were female and two were male.
Approximately 16 hours of training and ten interviews were required for raters to 
becoming familiar with the coding manual. Once raters were able to reach 80% 
agreement amongst them on the training interviews, they received 30 new transcripts of 
videotaped AT’s for the interrater reliability study. This sample was selected to include 
an approximately even number of boys and girls of all age groups, as well as a range of 
types and levels of psychopathology. Once raters were familiar with the coding manual, 
it took them approximately 30 minutes to rate interviews.
Planned Data Analyses
To establish the interrater reliability, the intraclass correlations (ICC) using 
Bartko’s two-way random effect model are computed to provide an estimate of agreement 
between raters for the scores on the individual stories, as well as the total scores (Bartko, 
1976; Carpenter et al., 1976). Following the guidelines of Endicott and Spitzer (1978) for 
interpreting ICC’s, values above .75 will be considered as indicative of good reliability; 
between .50 and .75, as fair; and values below .50, as reflecting poor reliability. To 
establish the stability of the AT over time, Pearson product-moment correlations (r) 
between time 1 and time 2 scores over a 3-month test-retest interval, as well as after a 1- 
year period, are calculated. Following Murphy and Davidshofer’s (2001) guidelines, 
moderate test-retest correlations of .6 and above will be considered as acceptable; test- 
retest correlations of .5 and above will be regarded as low; and below .5, as poor. This
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more tolerant approach to assessing test-retest stability was used in view of the fact that 
children recruited from referrals to mental health services constituted a large part of the 
sample; stability in measure scores over time tend to be much lower in these types of 
samples (Kline, 2000). It may be that motivation and ability to focus on tasks fluctuates 
in children with mental health problems or who are experiencing problems or acute life 
stressors.
To examine the factorial structure of the AT, stories with good interrater reliability 
(using the revised AT coding manual) are selected and an exploratory factor analysis is 
performed to investigate the dimensionality of the AT. This is primarily for exploratory 
purposes as the scales will be used in the analyses. Next, the internal consistency of each 
scale is evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha. Following Kline’s guidelines (2000), scale 
alphas of .7 will be are considered as indicative of good internal consistency.
The relationships between the AT and gender, family composition, IQ, expressive 
language abilities and self-esteem, are examined using Pearson product-moment 
correlations and /-tests. Subsequently, significant relationships are taken into account. In 
order to determine if psychopathology and social adaptation constitute predictive factors 
of children’s affective understanding as measured by the AT, a stepwise multiple 
regression analysis is employed.
One-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is then used to investigate whether 
children’s affective understanding (as measured on the AT) differs as a function of 
psychopathology as reassured on the CDI and CBCL), after taking into account the 
effects of age and IQ. ANCOVA is also used to examine whether or not AT performance 
differs as a function of attachment security (as measured on the CAI), after taking into 
account the effects of age and IQ.
Results
Performance o f the Affect Task
Means and standard deviations for the AT Scales are summarised in Table 20. 
The Accuracy and Justification scales included 14 items, and the Impact, Challenge and 
Justification scale included 6 items. An examination of the item scores confirmed that 
primary school-aged children have scores across the full range (from 1 to 5) on the 
majority of items. The items means decreased across the scales, with item means of 4 for 
the Accuracy questions, 3 for the Justification and Impact questions, and 2 for the Impact
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and Internal/External questions. This suggests that children find the questions 
increasingly difficult.
Table 20
AT: Scale Means and Standard Deviations
Scales N M SD Min Max
Accuracy 174 53.48 5.69 34 62
Justification 170 29.48 .6.32 14 46
Impact 101 17.80 4.60 6 25
Challenge 105 13.38 3.26 6 20
Internal/External 103 10.34 4.05 6 27
Reliability o f the A T
Three standard indexes of reliability are assessed, namely, interrater reliability, 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the AT.
Interrater Reliability o f the A T Rating System
Table 21 shows the intraclass correlations (ICC: Bartko, 1976) for AT item scores 
with five raters. The results indicate that the agreement between the raters were all in the 
fair to good range. Consensus ratings were entered into subsequent analysis with the 
author serving as mediator where necessary.
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Table 21
AT: Interrater Reliability o f the Scales
Intraclass Correlations (ICC)
Stories Accuracy Justification Impact Challenge External/Internal
Bully story
Victim .79 .77 .89 .78 .80
Bully .80 .75
Observers .72 .77
Captain story
Hero .75 .85 .65 .85 .77
Observers .67 .88
Left out story
Victim .69 .82 .71 .68 .75
Observers .82 .80
Flicking story
Victim .72 .75 .92 .82 .76
Bully .73 .66
Detention story
Bully .79 .84 .91 .66 .85
Observer .77 .68
Party story
Victim .78 .73 .77 .80 .77
Mother .88 .79
Observers .78 .75
Range .67-.88 .66-.88 .65-.92 .66-.85 .75-.85
Item-Total Correlations fo r the A T
Item-total correlations and alpha coefficients were calculated for all the scales, and 
the internal consistency results are presented in Table 22. The alpha coefficients reflected 
good internal consistency for the Accuracy scale (a = .79), the Justification scale 
(a  = .81), the Impact scale (a  = .7), External/Internal scales (a  = .73) and Challenge scale
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(a = .69).
The item-total correlations for the Justification scale were recalculated for 13 
items after the Justification score for the observers in the Bully Story was excluded, as it 
was found to be unacceptably low (1.6). Where scale alphas were above .70, items with 
item-total correlations of above .20 were kept in the interest of maintaining potential 
sources of variance, though the majority of items had item-total correlations above .30.
Table 22
AT: Item-Total Correlations and Alpha Coefficients o f the AT
Corrected Item-Total Correlations
Stories Accuracy 
(n = 144)
Justification 
(n = 79)
Impact Challenge 
(n = 71) (n = 89)
Ext/Int 
(n =88)
Bully Story
Victim .48 .35 .26 .49 .35
Bully .30 .36
Observers .26
Captain Story
Hero .34 .43 .42 .35 .39
Observers .51 .55
Left out Story
Victim .50 .49 .33 .45 .55
Observers .49 .38
Flicking Story
Victim .38 .51 .61 .43 .44
Bully .26 .56
Detention Story
Bully .52 .42 .62 .39 .56
Observer .45 .61
Party Story
Victim .49 .60 .37 .33 .55
Mother .21 .36
Observers .41 .39
Scale Alpha .79 .82 . .70 .69 .73
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Pearson product-moment correlations were used to examine the relationships 
between performance on the different scales, and (r) ranged from .35 to .49 (see Table 
23), showing relationships of moderate strength between performance across the AT 
scales.
Table 23
AT: Correlation Matrix Used in the Factor Analysis
Scales 2 3 4 5
1. Accuracy 4 9 * * * 3 7 * * * . .36*** 4 9 * * *
(;n = 170) (n = 101) (« =105)
/“Nm 
©
 
1—
HII>5
2. Justification .35*** 4g*** 43***
&©II (n = 100) (n = 102)
3. Impact
-
.34***
(n = 98)
.38***
(;n = 98)
4. Challenge
-
.40***
(« = 101)
5. Internal/External
-
*p < .05 **/? < .01 ***/? < .001
Dimensionality and Factor Structure o f the A T
In order to further explore the dimensionality of the AT, the factor structure of the 
AT was investigated using principal-component analysis with varimax rotation.
Given the results of the scree test, it was concluded that two factors should be 
rotated. The rotated factor solution yielded two interpretable factors: affect attribution and 
complex affect. The affect attribution factor accounted for 75% of the item variance, and 
the complex factor accounted for 12% of the item variance (see Table 24). The affect 
attribution factor included all the items of the Accuracy and Justification scales, and the 
complex affect factor included all the items of the Impact, Challenge and 
Internal/External scales.
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Table 24
AT: Item Loadings and Percentage o f Variance Explained by Principal Components
Affect Task Items Affect Attribution Complex Affective
& Explanation Understanding
Factor 1 Factor 2
Left out accuracy: observers .905 .403
Left out accuracy: victim .905 .403
Captain accuracy: hero .905 .403
Captain accuracy: observers .905 .403
Bully accuracy: victim .905 .403
Bully accuracy: observers .905 .403
Detention accuracy: bully .905 .403
Bully accuracy: bully .905 .403
Detention accuracy: observers .905 .403
Flicking accuracy: bully .905 .403
Flicking accuracy: victim .894 .394
Party accuracy: observers .884 .372
Party accuracy: victim .884 .373
Bully justification: victim .866 .357
Flicking justification: victim .866 .358
Captain justification: hero .857 .408
Party accuracy: mother .856 .294
Flicking justification: bully .852 .303
Captain justification: observers .851 .356
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Table 24 (continued)
AT: Item Loadings and Percentage o f Variance Explained by Principal Components
Left out justification: victim 
Left out justification: observers 
Bully justification: bully 
Detention justification: bully 
Bully justification: observers 
Party justification: observers 
Party justification: victim 
Party justification: bully/mother 
Detention justification: observers 
Bully internal/external 
Flicking internal/external 
Detention challenge: victim 
Left out internal/external 
Flicking challenge 
Captain internal/external 
Bully impact 
Bully challenge 
Captain challenge 
Party internal/external: victim 
Left out challenge 
Detention impact:
Left out impact
.843 .410
.841 .364
.839 .228
.838 .306
.836 .284
.825 .340
.822 .312
.807 .183
.793 .358
.361 .904
.343 .900
.344 .889
.333 .878
.332 .872
.366 .862
.344 .858
.366 .857
.342 .845
.344 .843
.350 .837
.320 .836
.344 .828
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Table 24 (continued)
AT: Item Loadings and Percentage o f Variance Explained by Principal Components
Captain impact .311 .825
Party challenge .322 .819
Detention internal/external .329 .812
Party impact: victim .332 .810
Flicking impact .334 .797
% Variance Explained 75% 12%
Based on these results there are two potential ways to use the AT data: either 
using the AT Scales or using the two factors of Affect Attribution/Explanation and 
Complex Affective Understanding. For the purposes of this study, subsequent analyses 
will be conducted using the AT Scales rather than the two factors, as this approach will 
allow for a more detailed evaluation and comparison of the performance of specific AT 
scales.
Test-Retest Reliability
Pearson product-moment correlations (r) were used to investigate the test-retest 
reliability of the AT after a 3-month test-retest interval, and also to investigate stability 
over a 1-year period. The 3-month test-retest correlations (see Table 25) of the AT 
Accuracy and AT Justification scales were significant, and they showed moderate and 
low stability of .61 and .50. The test-retest results of the remaining three AT scales 
(Impact, Challenge and Internal/External) ranged from .04 to .21, indicating that 
performance on these scales was not stable over a 3-month period.
With regard to stability over a 1-year period, the results reflected significant 
correlations of .52 and .44 for the AT Accuracy and AT Justification scales, there was 
slightly lower stability over the 3-month test-retest period. The correlations between 
scores over a 1-year period on the AT Impact and AT Challenge scales were also 
significant, but the correlations were well below the criteria for stability.
Based on these reliability results, it was decided to conduct further analyses using 
only Accuracy and Justification.
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Table 25
AT: Three-Month and One-Year Temporal Stability
Interval n
Time 1 Time 2
M SD M SD r
Three Months
Accuracy 30 53.24 5.85 53.67 6.02 .50*
Justification 30 33.17 5.44 33.06 6.02 .61**
Impact 30 19.36 4.12 21.13 2.67 .04
Challenge 30 14.37 2.74 14.91 2.72 .19
Internal/External 30 1.78 3.64 12.01 4.54 .21
One Year
Accuracy 71 51.42 5.50 52.15 5.77 .52***
Justification 35 32.17 5.68 32.62 5.98 .44**
Impact 35 18.92 4.12 19.32 4.47 .37*
Challenge 35 14.22 2.68 14.28 2.81 .36*
Internal/External 35 1.99 3.85 11.65 4.14 .15
* p < .  05 **/?<. 01 ***/?<.001.
Validity o f the Affect Task
Construct, predictive, and discriminant validity are assessed in relation to a 
number of different hypotheses; this will be presented in the sections which follow.
Relationship between Performance on the A T  and Demographics, Gender and Family 
Composition
Student /-tests were used to investigate the effects on AT performance of gender, 
living in two-parent families rather than in single-parent families, employment status of 
the parents, maternal education and the presence of siblings.
With regard to gender, there were no significant differences in the affective 
understanding of boys and girls on the AT scales (see Table 26).
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Table 26
AT: Gender Comparisons
Girls Boys
Scales n M SD n M SD t
Accuracy 66 5.14 5.14 108 5.69 6.02 .63
Justification 65 30.49 6.31 105 28.86 6.27 -1.65
*p < .05 **p<.01 ***p< .001.
Next, the impact of family composition on children’s affective understanding as 
measured on the AT was investigated. The impact of living in single-parent families or 
two-parent families was examined, as well as the impact of having siblings compared to 
being an only child. The results revealed no significant differences in AT performance 
between children living in single-parent or two-parent families (see Table 27).
Table 27
AT: Comparing Children in Two-Parent and Single-Parent Families
Scales
Two-Parent
Families
Single- Parent 
Families
n M SD n M SD t
Accuracy 104 51.07 5.54 . 59 49.81 5.69 1.38
Justification 102 29.03 6.71 57 30.46 5.86 -1.34
*p < .05 **p<.01 * * * p <  .001
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Results from group comparisons between only children and children with siblings 
showed that children with siblings performed significantly higher on the Justification 
scale of the AT. However, no differences were found on the Accuracy scale (see Table 
28).
Table 28
AT: Comparing Only Children and Children with Siblings
Only Child Child with Siblings
Scales n M SD n M SD t
Accuracy 76 51.22 5.45 98 49.91 5.84 1.52
Justification 74 28.51 6.41 96 30.74 6.01 2.31*
*p<  .05 **p<  .01 ***p < .001
Next, /-tests were used to examine whether or not children of working caregivers 
differed from children with caregivers who stayed at home in terms of their affective 
understanding as measured by the AT scales. The results revealed no differences between 
the two groups (see Table 29)
Table 29
AT: Comparing Children o f Working Caregivers and At-Home Caregivers
Scales
Working
Caregivers
At Home 
Caregivers
n M SD n M SD t
Accuracy 113 5.90 5.75 43 5.23 5.17 .61
Justification 110 29.70 6.01 42 30.14 7.12 -.39
* p < . 05 **/?<.01 ***/?<.001
Relationship between Performance on the A T  and Age, IQ and Expressive Language 
Abilities
In order to explore the validity of the AT, correlations between the two AT scales 
and age, IQ and expressive language were examined. As can be seen from Table 30,
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there were significant age effects on both AT scales. The results show significant 
correlations between intelligence and children’s performance on the AT Accuracy and 
Justification scales. The correlations between performance on the AT scales and 
expressive language abilities as measured by the CELF-R (see Table 30) were not 
significant, and the strength of the relationships was weak.
Table 30
AT: Correlations with Age, IQ and Expressive Language
Variable Accuracy Justification
Age ' 45* * * 53***
(n =174) (n = 170)
WISC Full IQ 35*** .26**
(w=150) (n =147)
WISC Verbal IQ 40*** 29***
(n = 149) (n =147)
WISC Performance IQ .27** .20*
(n = 130) (n = 146)
CELF-R Exp. Language .19 .12
(» = 45) (n = 45)
*p < .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
Contributions o f Age, Verbal IQ, Psychopathology, Social Adaptation and Self-Esteem 
to the Prediction o f A T  Performance
Regression analysis was conducted to determine if performance on the AT was 
predicted primarily by age and IQ, and to determine the contribution, if any, of 
psychopathology and social adaptation. The first step was to examine the potential 
predictors by looking at their correlations with AT Scale performance (see Table 31).
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Table 31
AT: Pearson Correlations with Potential Predictors
Predictor Accuracy
(n)
Justification
(n)
Age 4^*** .53***
(n= 174) (w= 170)
Verbal IQ 40*** 29***
(n=  149) (w= 147)
CBCL Global -.26** -.05
(n= 152) («= 148)
CBCL Internal -.14 -.09
(»= 152) («= 148)
CBCL External -.27** -.12
(«= 152)
/"SOOIIS'w'
CAFAS -.32***' -.15
(n=  162) (w= 158)
CDI -.35** -.23
in = 73) in = 72)
STAIC State -.23 -.29*
{n = 63) in=  63)
STAIC Trait -.15 -.08
{n= 62) in = 62)
Harter .19* .15
(n= 118) («= 115)
*p < .05 **p<. 01 ***/?<.001
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Age, Verbal IQ, psychopathology (CBCL, CDI and STAIC), social adaptation 
(CAFAS) and self-esteem (Harter) were selected as the independent variables, and the 
four AT scales, as the dependent variables. Two sets of regression analyses were 
conducted, because the number of cases with complete child-report data (on the CDI, 
STAIC and Harter) was considerably smaller than the number of cases with complete 
parent-report data (on the CBCL and CAFAS). The first set used age, verbal IQ, parent- 
reports of psychopathology (CBCL) and social adaptation (CAFAS) as independent 
variables. The second set used verbal IQ, child-reports of psychopathology (CDI and 
STAIC) and self-esteem (Harter) as independent variables.
First Regression Analysis with Age, Verbal IQ and Parent-report Measures o f  
Psychopathology and Social Adaptation
Stepwise multiple regression was employed to determine if the addition of scores 
on parent-report measures of psychopathology and adaptation would improve the 
prediction of performance on the AT scales, after considering the contributions of age and 
IQ. The predictors were entered in three blocks. Age was entered in block one, Verbal 
IQ in block two, and CBCL (internalising, externalising and total scores) and CAFAS 
(total scores) in block three. The regression analysis was repeated for both AT scales.
Table 32 displays the unstandardised regression coefficients (B), the standard error 
and the standardised regression coefficients (P), intercept R2 and AR2, after entry of all the 
independent variables.
Accuracy. The regression using performance on the Accuracy scale as the 
dependent variable was conducted first. After step 1, with age entered into the equation, 
R2 = .20, F (l, 134) = 33.95, p  < .001. This indicates that age accounts for 20% of 
explained variance on the Accuracy scale. After step 2, with verbal IQ entered, R2 = .32, 
F (l, 133) = 31.20, p  < .001. Addition of verbal IQ to the equation resulted in a 
significant increment in R2, indicating that verbal IQ accounted for an additional 12% of 
variance on the Accuracy scale. At step 3, with parent-reports of social adaptation as 
measured by the CAFAS entered, R2 = .38, F(l, 132) = 26.82,/? < .001, indicating that 
social adaptation explained an additional 6% of the variance in performance on the AT 
Accuracy scale. The model consisting of age, verbal IQ and social adaptation explained 
38% of the variance. The partial correlations of the excluded variables and performance 
on the Accuracy scale were all non-significant: CBCL Internalising score (-.08), CBCL 
Externalising score (-.12), CBCL (Total) score (-.14).
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Table 32
AT: Stepwise Regression Analysis with Age, Verbal IQ andParent-Report Measures
Predictor B SE P R2/AR2
Accuracy
Step 1 .20***
Age 1.47 .25 .45
Step 2 12***
Age 1.34 .24 .41
Verbal IQ .09 .02 .35
Step 3 .06**
Age 1.32 .23 .40
Verbal IQ .08 .02 .30
CAFAS -.07 .02 -.23
Full Model 38***
Justification
Step 1 28***
Age 1.92 .27 .53
Step 2 .05**
Age 1.82 .26 .50
Verbal IQ .07 .02 .50
Full Model 33***
*p < .05 **p < .01 * * * p <  .001
Justification. The second regression analysis using performance on
Justification scale indicated that age and IQ were the only predictors, together accounting 
for 33% of explained variance on this scale. After step 1, with age entered in the 
equation, R2 = .28, F(l, 134) = 51.79, p  < .001, indicating that age accounted for 28% of 
explained variance on the Justification scale. When verbal IQ was added to the prediction 
equation at step 2, R2 = .33, F(l, 134) = 51.79, p  < .001, indicating that verbal IQ 
accounted for an additional 5% of explained variance. No other variables entered the 
model at step 3 , and the partial correlations of the excluded variables and performance on 
the accuracy scale were all non-significant: CBCL Internalising score (-.04), CBCL 
Externalising score (-.10), CBCL Total score (-.06) and CAFAS (-.10).
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Second Regression Analysis with Age, Verbal IQ and Child-Report measures o f  
Psychopathology and Self-Esteem
Next, a set of regression analyses were undertaken which examined the 
contributions of performance on Child-Report measures of psychopathology (CDI, 
STAIC) and self-esteem (Harter) to performance on the AT scales, after considering the 
contributions of age and verbal IQ. Exactly the same procedure was used as for the first 
set of analyses, with age entered at step 1, and verbal IQ added at step 2, but this time the 
Child-Report measures (CDI, STAIC and Harter) were added at step 3.
Table 33 displays data for the Accuracy and Justification scales: the 
unstandardised regression coefficients (B), the standard error and the standardised 
regression coefficients (P), and intercept R2 and AR2 after entry of all the independent 
variables.
Table 33
AT: Stepwise Regression Analysis for Age, Verbal IQ and Child-Report Measures
Predictor B SE P t f /A R 2
Accuracy
Step 1 .20**
Age 1.47 .42 .45
Step 2 12**
Age 1.34 .40 .41
Verbal IQ .09 .32 .35
Step 3 .08*
Age 1.29 .38 .39
Verbal IQ .88 .03 .31
CDI .08 .05 -.29
Full Model 4Q***
Justification
Step 1 .28***
Age 1.9 .44 .53
Full Model 28***
*p < .05 **/?<.01 ***;?< .001
Accuracy. The regression analysis conducted with performance on the Accuracy 
Scale as the dependent variable will be presented first. After step 1 with age in the
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equation, R2 = .20, F (l, 48) = 12.16, p  < .01. This indicates that age accounted for 20% 
of explained variance. After step 2, with both verbal IQ and age in predicting 
performance on the AT Accuracy Scale, R2 = .32, F (l, 47) = 11.03, p  < .01. This 
indicates that the addition of verbal IQ to the equation resulted in a significant increment 
in R2, with age thus explaining an additional 12% of variance in performance on the 
Accuracy scale. At step 3, the CDI score entered, R2 = .40, F(l, 46) = 1.26, p  < .001, 
accounting for an additional 8% of explained variance in performance on the Accuracy 
scale. After step 3, the model consisting of age, verbal IQ, and CDI taken together 
explained 40% of the variance. No other variables entered the model, and the partial 
correlations of the excluded variables and performance on the Accuracy scale were all 
non-significant; STAIC State score (-.03), Harter (.02). The interpretation of these 
results must take into account the fact that they were obtained using a small sample.
Justification, The regression analysis with performance on the Justification scale 
indicated that age was the only predictor, accounting for 28% of explained variance on 
this scale. After step 1, with age in the equation, R2 = .28, F (l, 48) = 18.55, p  < .001. 
No other variables entered the model at steps 2 and 3, and the partial correlations of the 
excluded variables and performance on the Accuracy scale were all non-significant: 
Verbal IQ (.27), STAIC (State) score (-.25), CDI (-.23), Harter (.12).
Clinical Levels ofPsychopathology and Performance on the A T
One-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine whether or 
not children with CBCL and CDI scores iu the clinical range differed significantly from 
others with respect to their affective understanding as measured on the AT scales, after 
taking into account the effects of age and IQ. Group comparisons were based on: 1) 
CBCL Total scores, 2) CBCL Internalising scale 3) CBCL Externalising scale, and 4) 
CDI standardised scores. For the respective analyses, the independent variables were 
clinical status on the CBCL (where clinical was defined as T scores of 70 and above) and 
clinical status on the CDI (where clinical was defined as T scores of 70 and above and 
non-clinical as T scores of below 55). For each of the four independent variables, a set of 
analyses was conducted with performance on the AT Scales (Accuracy and Justification) 
as the dependent variables. The covariates were age and verbal IQ.
The assumptions of normality of sampling distributions, linearity, homogeneity of 
variance, homogeneity of regression and reliability of covariates were evaluated and 
shown to be satisfactory. Cells were weighted by sample size to adjust for unequal 
sample sizes.
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ANCOVA Using CBCL Scores. An initial comparison of observed means 
indicated that children with behaviour problems in the clinical range on the CBCL 
Externalising scale, generally had lower affective understanding on the AT Accuracy and 
Justification scales (see Table 34), but after adjustment for age and verbal IQ, these 
differences were no longer significant. The results revealed no further group differences 
in the affective understanding of children as a function of psychopathology on the CBCL 
Internalising scale or using the CBCL Total scores. The strength of the relationships 
between psychopathology and the adjusted scores on the AT scales (Accuracy, 
Justification) were very weak, with T]2 varying from .003 to .015 (see Tables 35, 36, 37).
Table 34
AT: Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CBCL Scores
Scale
Non-Clinical Clinical
N Observed
M
SD Adjusted SE n 
M
Observed
M
SD Adjusted
M
SE
CBCL Internalising
Acc. 105 50.84 5.61 50.77 .47 44 50.09 5.66 50.25 .72
Just. 103 29.83 6.02 29.82 .52 44 29.02 7.01 29.03 .80
CBCL Externalising
Acc. 117 51.00 5.69 50.47 .44 32 49.22 5.19 49.75 .86
Just. 115 30.03 6.42 29.85 .49 32 28.00 5.75 28.64 .95
CBCL Total
Acc. 111 51.01 5.76 50.84 .45 38 49.47 5.05 49.97 .78
Just. 109 30.08 6.28 29.97 .50 38 28.16 6.30 28.48 .86
Note: Acc. = Accuracy; Just. = Justification
186
Table 35
AT: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CBCL Internalising 
Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P n Adjusted
R2
Accuracy .28
CBCL Internalising 
Covariates
8.46 1 8.46 .37 ns .003
Age 64.55 1 64.55 28.18 *** .16
Verbal IQ 
Error 
Justification
516.58
3296.14
1
145
516.58
22.73
22.73 *** .14
.31
CBCL Internalising 
Covariates
19.04 1 19.04 .70 ns .005
Age 1418.41 1 1418.41 51.76 *** .266
Verbal IQ 
Error
266.00
3919.00
1
143
266.00
27.41
9.71 *♦ .064
*p < .05 **/?<.01 ***p< .001
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Table 36
AT: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CBCL Externalising 
Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P 2*1 Adjusted
R2
Accuracy .28
CBCL Externalising 12.50 1 12.50 .55 ns .004
Covariates
Age 637.17 1 637.17 28.06 *** .162
Verbal IQ 478.60 1 478.60 21.08 *** .127
Error 3292.10 145 22.70
Justification .32
CBCL Externalising 34.35 1 34.35 1.26 ns .009
Covariates
Age 141.51 1 141.51 51.67 *** .265
Verbal IQ 231.23 1 231.23 8.47 ** .056
Error 3903.69 143 27.30
*p < .05 **/?<01 ***p< .001
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Table 38
AT: Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CDI Scores
CDI CDI
Other Depressed
Scales n Observed SD Adjusted SE n Observed SD Adjusted SE
M M M M
Acc. 47 52.72 4.81 51.69 .68 86 50.10 5.76 50.67 .49
Just. 47 32.36 5.62 31.07 .76 84 28.13 6.22 28.85 .56
Note: Acc. = Accuracy; Just. = Justification
Table 39
AT: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical Score CDI Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P 2 Adjusted
R2
Accuracy .35
CDI 28.27 1 28.27 1.41 ns .011
Covariates
Age 64.10 1 64.10 31.92 *** .198
Verbal IQ 441.69 1 441.69 22.02 *** .146
Error 2587.08 129 2.06
Justification .37
CDI 132.56 1 132.56 5.24 ★ .040
Covariates
Age 1069.32 1 1069.32 42.24 *** .250
Verbal IQ 197.41 1 197.41 7.80 ** .058
Error 3215.46 127 25.32
*p < .05 **/?<.01 ***p<. 001
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Table 37
AT: ANCOVA Comparing AT Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical 
Levels o f Psychopathology Based on CBCL Total Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
d f M S . F P 2n Adjusted
R2
Accuracy .28
CBCL Total 2.80 1 2.80. .92 ns .006
Covariates
Age 642.51 1 642.51 28.37 .164
Verbal 486.28 1 486.28 21.47 *** .129
Error 3283.80 145 22.65
Justification .32
CBCL Total 59.99 1 59.99 2.21 ns .015
Covariates
Age 1424.17 1 1424.17 52.52 *** .269
Verbal IQ 232.71 1 232.71 8.58 *♦ .057
Error 3878.05 143 27.12
*p<.  05 **/?<.01 ***p < .001
ANCOVA Using CDI Scores. An initial comparison of unadjusted means (see 
Table 38) indicated that depressed children had lower affective understanding on all the 
AT scales. After adjustment for the covariates, differences in affective understanding of 
depressed children (as assessed on the AT Justification scale) remained significantly 
lower than that of their non-depressed peers. Differences on the AT Accuracy scale were 
no longer significant after adjustment for age and IQ. The strength of the relationship 
between depression and the adjusted AT Justification score was weak, with rj2 = .04 (see 
Tables 39). This indicates that depression explained 4% of the variance on the 
Justification scale.
190
Child Attachment Security, and Performance on the A T
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine whether children’s 
affective understanding (as measured by the AT Scales) differed as a function of 
attachment security, after adjustment for the contributions of age and IQ. The data set 
used for this analysis comprised a smaller sub-sample of 62 children (15 secure and 47 
insecure) for whom CAI attachment classifications were available. CAI attachment 
classification (secure, insecure) was the independent variable, and a set of analyses was 
conducted with performance on the AT Scales (Accuracy, Justification) as the dependent 
variables. The covariates were age and verbal IQ. The assumptions of normality of 
sampling distributions, linearity, homogeneity of variance, homogeneity of regression and 
reliability of covariates were examined and found to be satisfactory. Cells were weighted 
to adjust for unequal sample sizes. The descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 40. 
Initial comparisons based on unadjusted means indicated that securely attached children 
performed significantly better on the Justification scale than insecurely attached children 
t{6\) = 2.19,/? < .05. These findings remained significant after considering the effects of 
age and IQ, F( 1,59) = 4.51, p  < .05. The results are summarised in Table 41; they show 
that the relationship between attachment and the adjusted AT Justification score was low 
but significant, with r\2 = .074, indicating that attachment classification explained 
approximately 7% of the variance of this scale.. No other significant differences in 
affective understanding as a function of children’s attachment security were present.
Table 40
AT: Performance o f Children with Secure and Insecure Attachment Classifications
Secure Insecure
Scale n Observed SD Adjusted SE n Observed SD Adjusted SE
_______________ M ________________M ____________________M ______________ M _________
Acc. 15 50.93 4.01 48.96 .42 47 49.15 6.18 48.94 .74
Just. 15 33.67 6.28 31.13 .51 47 29.53 6.71 29.97 .81
Note: Acc. = Accuracy, Just. = Justification.
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Table 41
AT: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Secure and Insecure Attachment Classifications
Source of variance Adjusted SS d f MS F P 2 Adjusted
R2
Accuracy .20
Secure/Insecure 20.48 1 20.48 .77 ns .013
Covariates
Age 344.63 1 344.63 12.89 *** .187
Verbal IQ 77.03 1 77.03 2.88 ns .049
Error 1497.71 56 26.75
Justification .28
Secure/Insecure 145.78 1 145.78 4.51 * .074
Covariates
Age 478.79 1 478.79 14.80 .209
Verbal IQ 149.95 1 149.95 4.64 * .076
Error 1811.22 56 32.34
*p < .05 **/?<.01 ***/?<.001
Theory o f M ind and Affective Underst inding
The concurrent relationships between children’s theory of mind abilities (as 
measured by the HSS) and affective understanding (as measured by the AT scales) were 
investigated using Pearson product-moment correlations. As shown in Table 42, the 
correlations between children’s theory of mind abilities and their affective understanding 
were significant, and ranged from .41-.54. This reflects generally moderate correlations 
between mentalisation abilities as assessed on the HSS and AT.
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Table 42
AT: Correlations with Theory o f Mind Abilities on the HSS
Accuracy Justification
(n) (n)
Happe’s Strange Stories 47*** 54***
(102) (101)
*p < .05 **p<.  01 ***/?<.001
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the psychometric properties of the AT, 
including reliability and validity. Three indexes of reliability were evaluated, including 
interrater reliability, the scale qualities and test-retest reliability. Next, the validity of the 
AT was evaluated in the context the relationships between AT performance and age, IQ, 
expressive language abilities, self-esteem, psychopathology, adaptation and attachment.
In the following section, the main findings are briefly summarised and then 
discussed in turn.
Reliability o f the A T
The findings confirm that the coding scale and system are appropriate for 
measuring affective understanding of children aged 5-11; item scores were distributed 
across the full range of the 5-point rating scale, as delineated in the AT manual.
The interrater reliability of all the scales was found to be in the fair to good range 
when evaluated using Kline’s (2000) criteria. This confirms that the AT coding manual 
can be used to train graduate level coders to rate the affective understanding of primary 
school-aged children at an acceptable level of reliability, after a reasonable training 
period.
Scale analysis confirmed that the AT scales have good internal consistency. 
Further exploration of the dimensionality of the Affect Task revealed that the measure 
was composed of essentially two factors; affect attribution and complex affect. The affect 
attribution factor included all the items of the Accuracy and Justification scales, and the 
complex affect factor included all the items of the Impact, Challenge and 
Internal/External scales.
These results indicate that analyses can be conducted using either AT factor scores
193
or AT scale scores. In this study, the decision was made to use the AT scales rather than 
AT factors in subsequent analyses, given that there was no prior data available on the 
performance of these scales in relation to other aspects of children’s functioning. 
Analyses undertaken using the individual scales also make it possible to examine whether 
or not specific dimensions of affective understanding are related to show particular 
relationships with factors such as intelligence, age and psychopathology.
Moderate stability over 3-month 1-year intervals was demonstrated for the 
Accuracy and Justification scales. The results concerning stability of children’s complex 
affective understanding (as measured by the Impact and Challenge scales), were more 
complex. Significant correlations, reflecting marginal stability, were found between scale 
scores over a 1-year period, but not over a shorter 3-month test-retest period. One 
explanation of this pattern showing greater stability over a 1-year period is that children 
might not be willing or might be unable to entirely engage in a test of this nature, unless it 
is fresh, in the same way that it is difficult to laugh at a joke if it is retold too soon. One 
AT scale, the Internal/External scale, used to assess children’s capacity to understand 
emotional dissemblance, was not included in further analyses, because the results did not 
show acceptable stability over time when using this scale.
Suggestions fo r Future Scale Improvement
One possible explanation for the low stability of children’s understanding of 
complex affect, as assessed by the AT Challenge, Impact and Internal/External scales, is 
that these abilities are newly emerging; they are thus more likely to be sensitive to state 
and context and to show unevenness across assessments. A child’s performance may thus 
vary depending on whether or not he had a bad day at school, is worried about an exam or 
is tired. It may thus not be possible to obtain reliable assessments of complex and 
emerging mentalisation abilities of children, given that their ability to regulate affective 
and internal states, which in turn impacts on mentalisation, is still relatively immature and 
fluctuates more than does that of adults.
An alternative explanation is that the way in which complex affective 
understanding is assessed by the AT contributes to variation in children’s performance 
over time. More specifically, it is possible that assessing complex affective understanding 
in the context of children’s responses to the Accuracy questions contributes to variability 
in children’s performance on this task over time. Questions regarding how affects change 
over time, questions regarding the character’s internal feelings versus appearances, and 
the challenge question were asked in relation to different emotions, depending on the 
emotions children identified in response to the accuracy questions. The stability of the
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Impact scale could possibly be improved by introducing an additional scenario focusing 
on a particular emotion, given that previous research that the ability to consider the 
resolution of negative emotions develops later (Steiner & Levine, 1990). This also applies 
to the Challenge scale. Previous research has indicates that children find some affects 
more difficult to consider than others. Similar factors are considered to have contributed 
to the lack of stability for the Internal/External scale which assessed children’s ability to 
understand emotional dissemblance. The use of a particular scenario which tests the 
understanding of emotional dissemblance and social display rules could also be expected 
to contribute to a significant improvement in assessment reliability.
Association with Gender and Family Composition
As predicted, the findings reflect no gender differences in affective understanding 
as measured by the AT scales; this suggests that cognitive-emotional abilities do not 
display the pattern of female advantage that was observed in studies of “mindreading” 
abilities (Baron-Cohen, 2000).
With respect to family composition, the findings indicate that children with 
siblings have an advantage in terms of their ability to provide narrative explanations of 
why certain feelings are experienced in specific contexts; this ability was measured by the 
AT Justification scale. The findings suggest that the presence of siblings is associated 
with an advantage that is specific rather than general, as no differences were evident with 
regard to complex affective understanding and knowing which affects will be evoked by 
specific contexts. This pattern of mixed findings fits well with the divergent results 
reported in the literature with respect to the influence of siblings on the development of 
affective understanding (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Children with siblings, when 
compared with only children, thus showed a better understanding of the emotional 
reactions of others; this finding is interesting and consistent with the conclusions of 
Pemer et al. (1994) and Jenkins & Astington (1996). They contend that having siblings 
provide additional opportunities to engage in role play, which facilitates the development 
of children’s understanding of the emotional reactions of others. At the same time, thanks 
to their siblings, these children benefit from additional opportunities to learn about the 
emotional reactions of others, and to learn from parental discussions of emotions.
No additional associations between affective understanding and family 
composition, or between affective understanding and the mother’s employment status 
were detected.
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Association with Age, IQ and Expressive Language Abilities
Children’s scores on all AT scales showed significant correlations with age and 
indicate that affective understanding increases significantly during the primary school 
years between the ages of 5 and 11. The findings of the regression analysis (based on the 
larger sample) indicate that, in addition to age, intelligence also made a significant 
contribution to the prediction of performance on the AT (Accuracy and Justification 
scales). Verbal intelligence explained an additional 12% of the variance on the Accuracy 
Scale, and 5% of the variance on the Justification Scale. Given these findings it can be 
concluded that verbal intelligence is a stronger predictor of children’s ability to 
understand which emotions are likely to be evoked in particular interpersonal contexts, 
than it is of children’s ability to provide explanations of emotions or to use their 
understanding reflexively when challenged to do so.
The finding that intelligence contributes to the prediction of affective 
understanding is in line with earlier findings that intelligence added to the prediction of 
complex affective understanding (Cook et al., 1994) and social judgement when under 
emotional pressure (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). In the current study verbal intelligence was a 
stronger predictor of children’s ability to understand what others are likely to feel, than of 
complex affective understanding.
The lack of significant results with regard to expressive language abilities was 
initially surprising, given the findings reported in Chapter 4 showing moderate 
correlations between language skills and theory of mind performance as measured by the 
HSS. The small sample size used for this analysis may have partly contributed to the lack 
of significant relationships, but even so, the strength of the relationships was weaker than 
expected. Given the small sample size, and the fact that only results based on correlation 
analysis are available, these results need to be considered as somewhat tentative. They 
suggest that the relationship between children’s affective understanding and verbal 
intelligence is stronger than that between affective understanding and expressive language 
abilities. When these findings are considered in the context of previous findings linking 
language abilities and theory of mind (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; J.G. De Villiers and 
P.A. De Villiers; Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 1996), it is reasonable to speculate that 
the cognitive aspects of language abilities, rather than expressive language abilities per se, 
are linked with theory of mind and affective understanding. Expressive language abilities 
may be more closely related to other aspects of children’s interpersonal functioning and 
to their ability to express their emotions, considered a distinct emotional skill by Denham
(1998) and Saami (1999).
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The moderate strength of the relationships with intelligence suggests that the 
abilities measured by the AT are sufficiently distinct from intelligence. On the basis of 
these findings it can be concluded that affective understanding as measured by the AT is a 
valid construct and involves a distinct ability. The moderate strength of the relationship 
between affective understanding and intelligence is consistent with expectations, given 
that the AT assesses cognitive-emotional abilities.
Psychopathology as Predictor o f Affective Understanding as Measured by the A T
Regression analyses were used to determine whether or not psychopathology, 
social adaptation and self-esteem would improve the prediction of affective understanding 
on any of the AT scales, over ad above age and IQ. The findings indicate that parent- 
reports of social adaptation and child-reports of depressive symptomatology add 
significantly to the prediction of performance on the AT Accuracy scale.
The finding that children’s depressive symptoms accounted for an additional 8% 
of the variance in children’s ability to think about the affective reactions of others (as 
measured by the AT Accuracy scale) is new and interesting. This finding is in line with 
theoretical expectations based on theory of mind and reflective functioning models 
(Fonagy & Target, 2003), which suggest that the ability to interpret the reactions of others 
will be associated with better self- and affect regulation and social adaptation. Another 
possible explanation is that children who have difficulty understanding others* feelings 
are at an interpersonal disadvantage; they are less likely to be successful in achieving 
goals in a social context and this adds to the risk of depression. The possibility that 
depression lowered children’s concentration and motivation on this task, was rejected, 
given that a similar pattern of results were not found for the other scales.
Children’s social adaptation as assessed by the CAFAS accounted for an 
additional 6% of the variance in performance on the AT Accuracy Scale. This finding that 
social adaptation made a small addition to the prediction children’s affective 
understanding is in line with previous findings showing a positive relationship between 
emotional understanding and social competence, as well as prosocial reactions to the 
emotions of others (Denham, 1986; Denham & Couchoud, 1990; Denham, McKinley, 
Couchoud, & Holt, 1990; Field & Walden, 1982; Gnepp, 1989). One possible explanation 
which has been suggested by Denham (1998) and Saami (1999) is that affective 
understanding is one of a range of emotional abilities which contributes to better social 
and interpersonal functioning, and which increases the chances of achieving goals in 
social contexts. Another, not incompatible, explanation from an attachment and reflective
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functioning perspective (Fonagy & Target, 2003) is that children who have had 
developmental experiences which facilitate affective understanding, are also likely to 
have better self-regulation, feel more positive and be more interpersonally oriented..
Clinical Levels o f Psychopathology and Affective Understanding 
as Measured by the A T
The findings show that children who reported significant levels of depression had 
lower affective understanding scores than their peers on the AT scales and that these 
differences (on the AT Justification scale and AT Challenge scale) remained significant 
after adjusting for age and IQ. Depression explained 4% of the variance on the AT 
Justification scale. This indicates that depressed children had greater difficulty in 
understanding affective reactions in interpersonal terms, as assessed by the AT 
Justification scale. The strength of the relationships between depression, social adaptation 
and the adjusted Justification scores was weak.
This finding that depressive symptoms predicted performance on the AT 
Justification scale provides some support for the thesis put forward by Fonagy and Target 
(2003), namely, that the ability to mentalise and to understand people’s emotional states 
in interpersonal terms is linked to self-regulation as well as affect regulation.
Children with behavioural difficulties in the clinical range on the CBCL 
Externalising Scale had lower affective understanding on the AT Accuracy and 
Justification scales when compared with other children, but these differences were no 
longer significant once the means were adjusted to account for age and IQ. The finding 
that behaviour difficulties were associated with lower affective understanding as 
measured by the Accuracy and Justification scales is consistent with the findings of a 
study using the Kusche Affective Interview (Kusche et al., 1994) to assess children with 
conduct disorder. It is in line with Miller and Eisenberg’s (1988) conclusion that research 
evidence points to an inverse relationship between antisocial behaviour and emotional 
understanding.
In retrospect, it was probably overly conservative to control for the impact of 
intelligence in these analyses. It is possible that children with lower intelligence are, in 
part, more likely to develop psychopathology because they have poorer affective 
understanding abilities. If prior analyses only adjusted for age and if a significant 
association between psychopathology and affective understanding was found, this may 
have led to the conclusion that interventions should be focused on increasing affective 
understanding should be considered, without considering the role of intelligence. The
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findings of the present study draw attention to the contribution of intelligence, and could 
thus help to inform the choice and development of intervention strategies which may be 
more appropriate for use with children who do riot have particularly strong language 
skills. For example, it is possible that children who have lower cognitive linguistic 
abilities are better visual learners; thus, visually based learning strategies, and visually 
presented scenarios may be more effective than language-based learning and 
interventions. Considering the widely reported findings that behaviour problems show a 
negative association with IQ (Cook et al., 1994; Paget, 1982, Schonfeld, Shaffer, 
O’Connor, & Portnoy, 1988; White, Moffit and Silva, 1989), the choice of effective 
intervention strategy for this group of children is particularly crucial. These results are 
thus pertinent to discussion about the types of interventions most likely to facilitate 
change.
Child Attachment Security and Affective Understanding as Measured by the A T
As predicted, the findings show that children classified as securely attached had 
better affective understanding scores than their peers on all the AT scales. The differences 
between securely and insecurely attached children on the AT Justification scale remained 
significant after adjusting for age and IQ. Attachment classification explained 7% of the 
variance on the AT Justification scale, and the strength of the relationship between 
attachment and the adjusted AT Justification scores was weak.
These findings suggest that the ability to consider the causes of people’s affective 
reactions in interpersonal and mental state terms is associated with attachment security, 
although only a small percentage of variance is shared. The findings indicate that primary 
school-aged children who provide coherent and emotionally balanced narratives 
regarding their attachment relationships also show more complex understanding of the 
affective reactions of others in interpersonal contexts. The concurrent association found 
between attachment security and affective understanding, is consistent with the earlier 
finding that infant attachment security predicted children’s understanding of mixed 
emotions as assessed 3 years later (H. Steele et al., 1999). That attachment security 
explained 7% of the variance in children’s ability to consider the causes of other’s 
emotions in interpersonal terms provides support for Fonagy and Target’s (2003) 
hypothesis that attachment is linked to the ability to understand the emotional reactions of 
others as being interpersonally influenced. Another possible explanation of the findings is 
that similar abilities are assessed by the CAI and the AT, and that performance on both 
measures reflects children’s proficiency in using emotional narratives (Harris, 2000). This
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explanation is not incompatible with Fonagy and Target’s (2003) model, although Fonagy 
and Target (2003) emphasise the importance of parent-infant interactions and attachment, 
as well as parent-child discussions, parental narratives about emotions and co­
construction processes.
The findings presented here provide strong support for the construct validity of the 
AT as well as for its predictive and discriminant validity. The relationship between 
children’s affective understanding as measured by the AT and IQ was of moderate 
strength. This was in line with expectations and confirms that the AT measures an ability 
that is sufficiently distinct from intelligence. Predictive validity was demonstrated in 
relation to depressive symptoms and social adaptive functioning. Discriminant validity 
was demonstrated by the finding that differences in children’s affective understanding (as 
measured by the AT) were associated with attachment and psychopathology, after 
considering the effects of age and IQ.
Theory ofM ind and Affective Understanding as Measured on the A T
As hypothesised, the findings confirm that there are significant moderate 
relationships between children’s theory of mind abilities as measured by the HSS and the 
two dimensions of affective understanding measured by the AT. This indicates that 
children’s ability to understand the intentions of others in interpreting what others say is 
related to their ability to understand the feelings of others in social contexts.
These significant relationships of moderate strength between mentalisation 
abilities assessed from the perspective of theory of mind or affective understanding, 
provide strong support for the convergent validity of the AT and HS. They are in line 
with what would be expected from a theoretical perspective, given that theory of mind 
and affective understanding have been hypothesised to be overlapping abilities (Fonagy et 
al., 2003). These abilities are also seen as being fostered by the same developmental 
processes, whether the latter are conceived of as being innately and maturationally driven 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995), or as involving early social learning in the family context (Dunn, 
1988), or as being related to attachment and reflective functioning (Fonagy et al., 2003; 
Fonagy and Target, 2003).
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Future Considerations
The results of this study suggest that the psychometric properties of the two scales 
are robust and that the interrater reliability based on the AT coding manual is excellent, 
but replication is required. There are also questions regarding stability of results over time 
that remain to be answered. A number of suggestions for improving the Impact, 
Challenge and Internal/External scales have been proposed.
The present study focused largely on children’s mentalisation abilities and 
included no assessments of the parental factors which were identified in previous studies 
as making significant positive or negative contributions to the development of children’s 
affective understanding. Additional studies designed to assess parental factors and the 
way they impact on children’s affective understanding, affect regulation and empathy 
(through attachment, narrative and emotional processes) could help to clarify the 
contribution of parental and parent-child factors to the development of children’s 
mentalisation abilities.
The results of this study indicate that affective understanding as assessed by the 
AT plays a role in depression and psychopathology. Given these findings, further studies 
are called for so as to clarify the relationships between factors such as affective 
understanding, attachment, temperament, executive control and other emotional skills, as 
well as their interactions with, and contributions to, psychopathology.
Finally, the question arises as to the subsequent development of affective 
understanding as measured by the AT scales, during adolescence and to the relationship 
between affective understanding and reflective functioning in early adulthood. The next 
chapter will focus on the CRFS, and the relationship between performance on the AT 
scales and the CRFS, will be examined.
Conclusion
In sum, the study results confirm that: 1) the interrater reliability of the AT is 
excellent; 2) all four AT scales (Accuracy, Justification, Impact and Challenge), have 
good internal consistency; 3) the AT Accuracy and Justification scales were moderately 
stable over time; 4) performance on the scales showed significant correlations of 
moderate strength with intelligence; 5) that child-reports of depressive symptoms and 
parent-reports of social adaptation made a significant, although relatively small, 
contribution to the prediction of performance on the AT Accuracy scale; 5) affective 
understanding was associated with depression and extemalisation disorder; 6) the ability 
to understand the causes of emotions in interpersonal terms was associated with
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attachment security; and 7) affective understanding as assessed on the AT showed 
significant correlations of moderate strength with children’s theory of mind abilities as 
measured by the HSS. These findings confirm that the AT provides a reliable and valid 
method for assessing affective understanding in primary school-aged children.
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CHAPTER 6 
PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE 
CHILD REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING SCALE
In this chapter, a new measure, the Child Reflective Functioning Rating Scale 
(CRFS: Target et al., 2001), will be introduced. This measure was designed to assess the 
complexity of children’s thinking about the interpersonal causes and consequences of 
feelings, as displayed in the examples they give to illustrate their descriptions of 
themselves and their close relationships.
The goal of this chapter is to determine whether or not the CRFS has good 
psychometric properties. The reliability of the scale will be evaluated by examining its 
interrater reliability, internal consistency and test-retest reliability. The validity of the 
CRFS will be assessed in the context of the relationships and associations between 
children’s performance on this scale and key demographic variables, IQ, expressive 
language abilities, social adaptation, psychopathology and attachment.
Introduction
A number of studies draw attention to the important role of the caregiver’s 
orientation towards the intentionality of their infants in the development of the child’s 
attachment security. These parental abilities have been termed “reflective functioning” 
(Fonagy, H. Steele, & Moran., 1991) and “mind-mindedness” (Meins et al., 1998) 
evident in the context of speaking about their own attachment relationships, and parental 
representations of their infants and children (Slade et al., 1999). At the same time, 
attachment security has been found to predict children’s development of theory of mind 
abilities and understanding of mixed emotions (Fonagy, Redfem et al., 1997; Meins et al., 
1998; Moss et al., 1995), leading Fonagy to conclude that attachment and theory of mind 
are overlapping constructs. These findings were obtained using measures of children’s 
theory of mind, emotional understanding and cognitive capacities because, up to now, no 
measure of child reflective functioning was available. The present study addresses this 
problem by presenting a newly developed child reflective functioning coding system,
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designed for use with children aged 8-11, and using transcribed CAI interviews. This will 
focus on the psychometric properties of the CRFS in order to evaluate whether or not it 
provides a reliable and valid assessment of children’s reflective functioning.
Reflective functioning refers to the ability and propensity to consider both 
internal states (such as motivations, feelings, thoughts, beliefs and desires) and 
interpersonal processes in thinking about oneself and close relationships. Fonagy and 
Target (2003) have argued that reflective functioning, or the ability to consider personal 
and interpersonal processes in mental state terms, is intimately linked to self-organisation, 
and that it is a key factor in determining the depth and quality of relationships. This 
ability is considered to be especially important in the context of challenging life and 
interpersonal circumstances as it is argued to serve as a protective factor. In the context 
of abuse, the child’s ability to see abusive experiences as related to the abuser or parent, 
rather than as reflecting something about themselves, helps to protect the child from the 
worst impact of these experiences (Fonagy et al., 2002). At the same time, Fonagy and 
Target associate gross deficits in reflective functioning, including the inability to regard 
affects and mental phenomena as amenable to change, with borderline psychopathology 
(Fonagy, 1991).
Developmental Processes which Facilitate the Development o f Reflective Functioning
Fonagy and Target (2003) consider reflective functioning to be acquired 
interpersonally through the attachment and parent-child relationship, and they identify a 
number of specific processes in this relationship which contribute to the development of 
reflective functioning. In early infancy, the parent’s ability to think about the infant as 
mentalising and to attribute intentionality to the infant is considered to be a good 
predictor of both attachment security and the subsequent development of reflective 
functioning. Following Gergely and Watson (1996), Fonagy and Target emphasise the 
importance of the parent’s ability to mirror the infant’s affect in a way which marks it as 
an affect not belonging to the parent; this helps the infant to recognise it as their own 
(Fonagy et al., 2002). This process is considered to be important in nurturing the child’s 
ability to recognise his or her own affects.
During the toddler and pre-school periods, pretend play with the parent is 
considered by Fonagy and Target (1996) as an important avenue for discovering that 
thoughts, feelings and other mental states are not real or immutable in the same way as 
external reality; the child thus begins to comprehend an important aspect of mental states. 
Fonagy and Target describe this process as involving a change from a psychic
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equivalence mode, where ideas and affects are felt to be immutable, to a mentalising 
mode of experience, and they see the development of children’s cognitive abilities (as 
defined by theory of mind researchers) as enabling this shift. In line with the 
overwhelming evidence presented in this regard, parent-child discussions about emotions 
and narrative processes are considered as other key factors.
As for the relative importance assigned to these different processes in the 
development of mentalisation, Fonagy and Target (2003) propose that early parent-infant 
interactions lay the foundation for affect regulation, self regulation, sense of self, agency, 
and intentionality. In their account, this foundation, closely linked to attachment, 
establishes the early interpretative mechanisms and psychic structures which will 
influence how children benefit from subsequent experiences, such as pretend play and 
mental state talk with parents, in the development of reflective functioning. This view is 
supported by evidence that, at age 6, children who were securely attached to their mothers 
in infancy had dyadic communication patterns that were fluent and rich in terms of the 
breadth of topics and emotions expressed (H. Steele et al. 1999). There is considerable 
evidence from developmental research supporting the role of these processes, attachment, 
role play, and parent-child emotion-focused discussion, which have been identified by 
Fonagy and Target (2003) as important for the development of reflective functioning. 
However, their emphasis on the quality of early parental affect mirroring and attachment 
remains to be tested through further research.
S e lf and Other Reflective Functioning
From a reflective functioning perspective, a sense of agency and a sense of 
knowing what one feels, is as important as understanding of others (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
From Fonagy and Target’s (2003) perspective, this sense of knowing what one feels and 
who one is, is seen as closely linked to a sense of agency, which in turn is linked to 
attachment. These abilities are seen as developing through experiences with a caregiver 
who attributes mentalisation to the infant, and the early coaching of affect recognition 
through marked affect mirroring is thought to create a sense of control and to additionally 
help the child acquire the ability to regulate his affect (Fonagy et al., 2002). More 
recently, Fonagy and Target (2003) outlined a model of pathologies of the self based on 
the types of failures in affect mirroring. Using Fonagy and Target’s model, deficits in the 
ability to identify and talk about one’s own emotions could be traced to deficits and 
distortions in the type of parental affect mirroring (Fonagy et al., 2002). Fonagy and 
Target (1995) also consider physical, sexual and emotional abuse with deficits in
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children’s ability to think coherently about what they are feeling. These children may 
indeed be quite focused on what others are feeling and may indeed seem remarkably 
perceptive, but Fonagy and Target suggest that they arrive at this understanding through 
intellectual learning, rather than through being able to intuit what others feel through an 
automatic type of identification.
With regard to the ability to understand others, Fonagy et al. (2000) have proposed 
the existence of an interpersonal interpretative mechanism which develops in the context 
of the early attachment relationship. This notion of a very early process and ability 
underlying the ability to understand others is remarkably similar to Baron-Cohen’s 
maturationally driven theory of mind module; however, Fonagy* s notion is inherently 
interpersonal, whereas Baron-Cohen’s (2000) is fundamentally biological.
Given that the CRFS distinguishes between self reflective functioning and other 
reflective functioning, this measure will make it possible to investigate these latter 
notions empirically. First, the psychometric properties of the scales and measures need to 
be demonstrated.
Reflective Functioning, Language Development and IQ
If one proceeds from the definition of reflective functioning, it is logical to 
wonder if it is largely an indicator of cognitive ability rather than, as argued by Fonagy 
(1977), being closely linked to attachment. The same applies with regard to expressive 
language abilities, but the question here is more complex, as the development of 
expressive language abilities skills can be argued to be facilitated by attachment security 
and, subsequently, by parent-child emotion-focused discussions.
Oandasan (1999) showed that reflective functioning in primary school children 
was independent of IQ, and Fonagy et al. (1998) reported a weak relationship between IQ 
and adult reflective functioning. These findings suggests that intelligence does not play a 
dominant role in reflective functioning which is in line with Fonagy and Target’s (2003) 
model that links the development of reflective functioning to attachment security. More 
data is available with regard to the relationship between attachment and verbal 
intelligence, and between the former and expressive language abilities, but the findings 
are divergent. No associations between security of attachment and either intelligence or 
expressive language abilities were reported by Shmueli-Goetz (2001) in a study focusing 
on 8 to 11-year-olds using the CAI. However, associations between verbal intelligence 
and attachment status in primary school-aged children have been reported in a number of 
other studies (Easterbrooks & Abeles, 2000; Verscheuren & Marcoen, 1999; Jacobsen &
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Hoffman, 1997). A meta-analytic study by van Uzendoom et al. (1995) revealed 
associations between security of attachment and expressive language abilities, but not 
between attachment security and intelligence.
It has been argued that attachment security predicts cognitive abilities, and Moss 
et al. (1995) reported that attachment security in the pre-school period was a good 
concurrent predictor of meta-cognitive ability as manifested in memory, comprehension 
and communication skills.
It can thus be argued that reflective functioning will show a weak relationship 
with intelligence and a moderate relationship with expressive language abilities, as the 
development of expressive language abilities may, in part, reflect the influence of 
attachment on the child.
In this study, the relationships between primary school-aged children’s reflective 
functioning as measured by the CRFS and their verbal intelligence and expressive 
language abilities will be examined. Given Fonagy’s findings regarding the ARFS, a 
weak relationship is expected between CRFS performance and verbal intelligence. Based 
on the fact that, in addition to attachment, parent-child emotion-focused dialogues and 
narrative elaboration are thought to facilitate the development of reflective functioning, a 
relationship of moderate strength is expected between child reflective functioning and 
expressive language abilities.
Individual Differences in Reflective Functioning: Gender, Age, and Family Factors
At this stage, very little is kno aoi about, the relationship between reflective 
functioning and gender, age and family composition. Oandasan’s (1999) findings with 
respect to child reflective functioning, age and gender were inconclusive. There is reason 
to suspect that, as is true for theory of mind, children’s reflective functioning develops 
with age, as a result of learning, experience and cognitive development. At the same 
time, it is possible that theory of mind measures such as the HSS and affective 
understanding measures such as the Affect Task, are more sensitive than measures of 
reflective functioning to developmental changes occurring during the period from primary 
school to early adulthood. Given the relative complexity of the ability being assessed, it 
is also possible that differences in reflective functioning emerge in a way that is only 
amenable to reliable assessment and evaluation in late adolescence.
No differences in the theory of mind abilities or affective understanding of 
primary school-aged boys and girls were found in the HSS and AT studies reported in 
Chapter 4 and 5. Given these findings, significant gender differences in reflective
207
functioning are not expected. The evidence that pre-school children with access to 
interactions with adults and siblings, develop faster in terms of theory of mind and 
affective understanding abilities (Pemer et al., 1994; Jenkins & Astington, 1996) 
reviewed earlier in Chapters 1 and 2. It is argued that siblings provide more opportunities 
for pretend play, especially role-play, and that this explains why their presence stimulated 
the development of understanding of others. Pretend play is also considered from a 
theoretical perspective as being important in the development of reflective functioning; 
however, Fonagy and Target (1996) also see pretend play with parents as contributing to 
the process in which children come to discover the difference between psychic reality and 
external reality.
Associations between security of attachment and intact, two-parent households 
have also been reported in normal and clinical populations (Greenberg et al., 1991; 
Solomon & George, 1999; Shmeuli-Goetz, 2001)..
Reflective Functioning, Social Adaptive Functioning and Psychopathology
Fonagy and Target (2003) have proposed both that affect regulation is a precursor 
to mentalisation, and that once mentalisation occurs, this in turn allows for adjustment of 
affect states and gives the child the ability to discover the subjective meanings of his own 
feelings.
At present, only preliminary data on child reflective functioning and child 
psychopathology is available (Oandasan, 1999), and it suggests that the relationship 
between child psychopathology and reflective functioning may not be linear. Oandasan
(1999) observed that children referred to outpatient mental health services displayed a 
wider range of reflective functioning (including both negative and exceptionally high 
reflective functioning) than non-referred children. She speculates that children develop 
above average reflectiveness in the context of challenging circumstances; however, this is 
not necessarily associated with better adaptation. Overactive reflectiveness could also be 
speculated to resemble depressive ruminations. It remains to be seen whether children 
who have higher reflective functioning as a result of trying circumstances have an 
increased or decreased risk of psychopathology over the long term.
Data regarding the reflective functioning of adult psychiatric patients suggests that 
there is not a direct relationship between low reflective functioning and psychopathology, 
but that low reflective functioning is a risk factor for developing borderline 
psychopathology and eating disorders in the context of sexual abuse, for example 
(Fonagy et al., 1998). At the extreme end of the spectrum, psychopathic and non-
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psychopathic prisoners who had committed first-degree murders were found to have 
significantly lower reflective functioning, when compared with other prisoners and 
psychiatric inpatients (Fonagy et al.). Less is known about the role of reflective 
functioning in depression and behavioural disorders.
Up to now, it has not been possible to identify theory of mind deficits associated 
with depression and behaviour difficulties. Working from an attachment perspective, 
Shmueli-Goetz (2001) reported that primary school-aged children judged to be insecure 
on the Child Attachment Interview had significantly more internalising and overall 
symptoms on the Child Behaviour Checklist. These findings are in line with the 
relationships between attachment security, clinical status (in terms of the presence of 
psychiatric signs and symptoms), and behaviour problems in pre-schoolers that 
Greenberg, et al. (1991) found. It is also consistent with DeKlyen’s (1996) findings that 
the majority (80%) of clinic-referred children were insecure with respect to attachment. 
Research also suggests that insecure infants are more likely to develop behaviour 
problems during the primary school years (Erickson, Sroufe, & Egeland, 1985; M. Lewis, 
Feiring, McGuffog, & Jaskir, 1984; Renken, Egeland, Marvinney, Mangelsdorf, & 
Sroufe, 1989). Furthermore, Lyons-Ruth et al. (1993) found that infant attachment 
disorganisation was the best predictor of teacher ratings of hostile behaviour in 5-year- 
olds.
Given these findings, it would not be surprising to find a link between child 
reflective functioning and psychopathology, but it seems much more likely that, as is the 
case for adults, this will only be revealed in the context of risk factors such as abuse.
Aims and Objectives of This Study
The aims of this study are to present the CRFS and to examine its psychometric 
properties, including reliability and validity.
The reliability of the CRFS will be established as follows: 1) the revised CRFS 
coding system and manual will be presented and the interrater reliability results obtained 
using this manual will be evaluated; 2) the internal consistency reliability of the CRFS 
scale will be evaluated, after investigating the dimensionality and factor structure of the 
CRFS; and 3) to establish whether the CRFS has adequate stability over a 3-month test- 
retest period, as well as after 1 year. These indexes of reliability will be evaluated to 
determine whether they meet Kline’s (2000) criteria for interrater reliability and internal 
consistency, and the criteria used by Bosson, et al. (2000) for evaluating test-retest 
reliability. (These criteria will be detailed in the section that addresses the analyses to be
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used.)
The validity of the CRFS will be evaluated in the context of the relationships 
between performance on the CRFS and key demographic variables, IQ and expressive 
language abilities (as measured on the CELF-R), psychopathology (as measured on the 
CBCL and CDI), social adaptation (as measured on the CAFAS), self-esteem (as 
measured on the Harter) and attachment (as measured on the CAI). These relationships 
will be examined with the following objectives in mind: 1) to establish the performance 
of the scale with regard to gender and family composition; 2) to evaluate the construct 
validity of the CRFS in the context of its relationships age, IQ, expressive language 
abilities, psychopathology and social-adaptation; 3) to evaluate the predictive validity of 
the CRFS by examining whether or not factors other than age and intelligence predict 
children’s affective understanding; 4) to evaluate the discriminant validity of the CRFS 
by examining whether or not there are differences in the affective understanding as a 
function of attachment security and clinical psychopathology, while adjusting for age and 
IQ; 5) to evaluate the concurrent and convergent validity of the CRFS by examining the 
relationships between performance on the CRFS and two other measures of socio- 
cognitive mentalisation abilities, the HSS and AT.
The hypotheses corresponding to each of these objectives will be outlined below.
Hypotheses
Gender and Family Composition
No gender differences in reflective functioning are expected, given the divergent 
findings with regard to gender and constructs closely related to reflective functioning, 
such as theory of mind and affective understanding.
In light of the emphasis on the quality of the parent-child relationship in the model 
of the development of reflective functioning, the hypothesis is that there will be no 
significant differences between the reflective functioning of only children and that of 
children with siblings. Instead, the hypothesis is that children of caregivers who do not 
have formal employment, i.e., “stay-at-home” caregivers, will have higher reflective 
functioning than children of working mothers. Given previous findings that primary 
school-aged children in single-parent families are more likely to have insecure attachment 
classifications (Greenberg et al., 1991; Shmeuli-Goetz, 1999; Solomon & George, 1999), 
the hypothesis is that the reflective functioning of children of single-parents will be lower 
than that of children living in two parent families.
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Reflective Functioning and Age, IQ, Expressive language, Psychopathology and Social 
Adaptation
A weak relationship between age and children’s reflective functioning is expected, 
given that the CRFS is used with a relatively narrow age range. On the basis of previous 
research showing a weak relationship between intelligence and adult reflective 
functioning (Fonagy et al., 1998), a weak to moderate relationship between intelligence 
and child reflective functioning is expected. A relationship of moderate strength is 
expected between children’s expressive language abilities and their reflective functioning, 
given the important role that parent-child discussions are considered to play in the 
development of children’s reflective functioning (Fonagy & Target; 2003).
Considering previous findings that reflective functioning and psychopathology do 
not have a simple linear relationship (Fonagy et al., 1998), a significant relationship 
between reflective functioning and psychopathology is not expected, but a relationship 
between reflective functioning and social adaptation (as measured on the CAFAS) is 
expected, given that the ability to make sense of the reactions of others, and of one’s own 
reactions is thought to facilitate social adaptive functioning.
Predictors o f Children’s Reflective Functioning
It is expected that attachment security will predict children’s reflective functioning 
as measured on the CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other, in addition to age and IQ, as mentioned 
earlier. This is based on Fonagy and Target’s (1997) thesis that attachment predicts, and 
is closely related to, reflective functioning.
Differences in Reflective Functioning as a Function o f Attachment and 
Psychopathology
Children’s mentalisation abilities, as measured by the CRFS, are expected to differ 
as a function of attachment security. In light of the fact that attachment is considered to be 
a related construct and the findings that attachment predicts affective understanding (H. 
Steele et al., 1996), differences in reflective functioning of secure and insecure children 
are expected to remain significant after adjustments for other contributors. On the basis 
of the findings that lower reflective functioning is not necessarily related to 
psychopathology and that it interacts with risk factors (Fonagy et al., 1998), the 
hypothesis is that no significant differences will be found as a function of 
psychopathology (as assessed on the CBCL and CDI), once the contribution of other 
factors such as age and IQ are taken into account.
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Convergent Validity o f Measures o f Mentalisation
The hypothesis is that children’s performance on the three measures of children’s 
mentalisation abilities will converge, and moderate to strong relationships are expected 
between their performance on the HSS, AT and CRFS as these are related constructs. It 
can be contended that theory of mind and affective understanding are developmental 
precursors of reflective functioning, as argued by Fonagy and Target (2003).
Method
Participants and Recruitment
The CRFS was used to code the CAI data of a sample of 61 children aged 8-11, all 
recruited from referrals to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services in London. This 
study forms part of a larger project of measure development and standardisation 
conducted at the Anna Freud Centre, London, UK (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion 
of the recruitment procedure).
The sample comprised 40 boys (63.5%) and 23 girls (36,5%); with respect to age, 
there were no differences between boys (Magc=  9.2, SD = 1.7) and girls (Mage = 9.0, SD 
=1.3),/( 61 ) = .46, ns.
The vast majority of the children lived with their biological mothers (93%). 
Approximately half lived in two-parent families (49.1%) and with both biological parents 
(45.6%). The majority of the children were Caucasian (66%) and the vast majority 
(95.5%) spoke English at home. Many were only children (41%) or had only one sibling 
(37.7%), and those with two or more siblings (21.3%) were in a minority. In terms of 
maternal educational levels, the sample was roughly equally distributed between mothers 
with secondary school education (32.4%), those with college education (35.1%) and those 
with university education (32.4%). More than half the mothers were not employed at the 
time of the interview (58.8%), but the majority of the fathers were employed (66.7%). 
Using the ten standard employment categories included in the UK census, 46.4% of 
families had specialised technical, professional and managerial occupations, and 37.4% 
were employed in occupations involving sales, personal services, skilled trades, 
administrative or secretarial work. The remainder consisted of manual workers (3.6%) 
and those who were retired, homemakers or unemployed (1.7%).
In terms of attachment status, 23.8% of the children were classified as securely 
attached to their mothers, and 76.2% as insecurely attached (including disorganised). 
With regard to the attachment status of the mothers, Adult Attachment Interview data was
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available for 43 cases, and on the basis of this data 27,9% of the mothers were classified 
as securely attached and 72,1% as insecurely attached.
Instruments
Development o f the Child Reflective Functioning Scale
The Child Reflective Functioning Scale was adapted from the Adult Reflective 
Functioning Scale (ARFS: Fonagy et al., 1998) by Oandasan (1999), a child psychiatrist, 
who undertook the work as part of her Master’s thesis, under the direction of Mary 
Target. The CRFS was developed to assess the extent to which primary school-aged 
children consider themselves and their significant relationships in mental state terms, and 
it was designed for use with children aged 8-11. The CRFS was designed in light of the 
findings of Shmeuli-Goetz (2001) using the Child Attachment Interview; the latter had 
raised concerns regarding the reliable assessment of these abilities in younger children. 
Her work confirmed that, in fact, primary school children aged can respond in a 
meaningful manner to direct questions about themselves, their attachment relationships 
and situations of conflict.
The CRFS was originally designed for use with the Child Attachment Interview 
(CAI: Target et al., 2000; see Appendix Dl); this approach is thus parallel to that in 
which the ARFS is used to rate AAA data. Like the ARFS, the CRFS can be applied to 
data obtained using other interviews, e.g., Oandasan (1999) has used it with interview 
data regarding relationships with peers and close friends. The important caveat is that 
reflective functioning, like attachment, is revealed in the context of speaking about 
oneself and one’s close relationships (Fonagy & Target, 2003), and it is expected that it 
will be most evident in the context of being asked to describe specific incidents which 
reveal something about the self, interpersonal interactions and affective reactions. These 
descriptions require a process of retrieval of specific events and narratives, and these 
episodic or autobiographical memories are expected to provide a good indicator of the 
child’s “working knowledge” of mental states and of both intrapersonal and interpersonal 
thinking. These memories are expected to reflect an ability quite different from that 
demonstrated when the child describes relationships in general terms; in the latter case, 
intellectual ability is expected to play a greater role. It is argued that children’s general 
use of mental state constructs when thinking about themselves and their close 
relationships is an over learned skill, like riding a bicycle. It is very likely that failures 
and strengths in reflective functioning are revealed more in the context of accessing, 
recalling and presenting episodic memories than in providing a description of
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relationships in more general terms (Fonagy & Target, 2003). In this respect, the 
structure of the adult and child attachment interviews, which ask specifically for 
examples illustrating why a particular adjective was chosen to describe the self or a close 
relationship, is ideal for assessing reflective functioning.
Oandasan (1999) drafted a coding system based on 20 attachment interviews 
involving 12 children referred to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services and 8 
children recruited from schools. The coding system uses a hierarchical approach and 
distinguishes between 10 levels of reflective functioning going from negative reflective 
functioning to exceptional reflective functioning. An overall score was obtained on the 
basis of the judgement of the coder and by taking into account the highest scores as well 
as the presence of negative or absent reflective functioning. Based on a pilot study using 
the CRFS, Oandasan reported a distribution of scores over the full range of the scale, 
although children mostly used physical or behavioural descriptions.
Based on a small pilot study of 11 cases, Oandasan (1999) reported good interrater 
reliability between two raters. In spite of these promising results, she also reported 
significant problems with missing data; as a result, data of 50% of the cases was not 
analysable. “I don’t know” responses were also identified as a major problem, and these 
were coded as missing data. As part of the work undertaken for this thesis, the problem of 
missing data was investigated and addressed.
Revised CRFS Manual and Analysis o f Missing Data
The earlier draft of the CRFS coding system was amended and a new manual was 
written by the author in consultation with Mary Target. The manual was thus elaborated 
and examples of different levels of reflective functioning were added (see Table 43 and 
Appendix D2). A detailed investigation of the pattern of missing data was first 
undertaken. It revealed a second problem in addition to that of coding “I don’t know” 
answers as missing data, i.e., all CAI demand questions were coded for reflective 
functioning, despite the fact that children may not have experienced the life event in 
question. These two contributors to the missing data problem and the related solutions 
that were implemented will be discussed in turn.
The lack of provision for “I don’t know” answers in the rating scale and their 
subsequent treatment as missing values contributed in large part to the missing data 
problem. An initial concern was that children gave these answers in response to 
inappropriate questions; thus, there was concern that these answers were indicative of 
shortcomings in the interview procedure, rather than the child’s mentalisation ability. 
However, the pattern of these answers suggested that, in fact, they were given in response
to appropriate questions and were thus valid data.
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Table 43
Outline o f the Revised Child Reflective Functioning Rating Scale
Level Description of level of reflective functioning (RF)
-1 Response marked by active evasion of mentalising shown through hostile
criticism of the interview or interviewer, or reactions such as freezing and 
becoming completely silent. Bizarre and inappropriate explanations also fall 
under this category and are considered a type of active evasion of RF.
0 No evidence of active evasion, but child unable to respond, says “I don’t 
know” to some questions in the context of an interview with other responses at 
higher levels.
1 Absent but not repudiated reflective functioning: explanations are given in 
physical or behavioural terms and there is no evidence of thinking in terms of 
mental states.
3 Low RF: Response includes references to mental states but with limited
elaboration of the response, alternatively, an elaboration of the response only 
approximates a clear RF type and the rater must “fill in the gaps” in the child’s 
response in order to clearly define the response as an RF response type.
5 Definite RF: The response may be fairly simple and unsophisticated, but must
be described clearly and briefly reflected upon. Explicit reference is made to 
how mental states are related to contexts, relationships, behaviour, or mental 
states in relation to the interviewer.
7 Marked RF: The response is more elaborated, sophisticated It may reflect an
original view of a mental state which is not bizarre, or include an account of 
complex multilayered mental states, or an account where mental states are 
placed within a causal sequence
9 Full and exceptional RF: The response clearly rates a “7”, but is more
sophisticated in description and elaboration either in the degree of complexity 
presented, the completeness of the causal account, the account of mental states 
of all the protagonists within an interaction, the degree of surprise the rater 
experiences at the subject’s understanding, or the intricacy of the interaction 
between mental states presented.
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For example, children often gave “I don’t know” answers in response to questions about 
themselves; such answers may thus reflect the child’s ability or inability to think about 
himself. The observation that “I don’t know” answers were also common in response to 
questions concerning fathers raised concerns that the questions were asked by 
interviewers when it was inappropriate, i.e., that they were being asked of children who 
had little contact with their fathers. To address this concern, a detailed examination of 
children’s response patterns and their actual home circumstances was completed. This 
revealed that, contrary to expectations, children who lived with both parents gave “I don’t 
know” responses as frequently as others, indicating that lack of contact with fathers was 
not the main reason for these answers. In cases in which the child’s father is deceased or 
there is no contact at all, the interviewer is aware of this, given that the interview starts 
with a description of the family situation so as to frame the questions appropriately. In 
the revised manual, “I don’t know” answers are treated as data rather than as missing 
values, and they are rated as indicating an absence of mentalisation. They are rated lower 
than answers which are given in physical and behavioural terms, but higher than bizarre 
or negative responses. This method of rating “I don’t know” answers as Level 0 
responses is also used by Kusche et al. (1988), it follows the guidelines of Caroll and 
Steward (1984) for coding answers regarding reasoning about feelings.
Also identified as contributing to missing data was the fact that Oandasan’s rated 
all CAI responses (Oandasan, 1999). This meant that when children had not yet 
experienced a particular life event, such as a death or a loss in the family, and could not 
therefore answer, their provide answer to questions regarding these events, their “I don’t 
know” responses were coded as missing data. The examination of this aspect of the 
missing data problem drew attention to the wide range and level of experiences and 
traumas children were exposed to, which made it extremely complex, if not impossible, to 
code certain questions in a reliable manner. Accordingly, the new manual, only selected 
questions from the CAI were selected for RF rating: 1) the three self description 
questions; 2) the self upset question; 3) the three relationship with mother questions; 4) 
the mother cross/upset question; 5) the relationship with father question; 6) the father 
upset question; and 7) the parents argue question. The rationale for proposing this 
particular set of questions is that it is applicable to all children, and includes questions 
about the self, relationships, and affectively charged situations.
A further aim of the present study is to identify the most efficient and reliable way 
to aggregate CRFS item scores, this will be determined by analysing the dimensionality 
and scale properties of the CRFS.
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Other Measures
Results for two parent-report measures will also be reported here namely the Child 
Behaviour Checklist (CBCL: (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983) and the Child Adaptation 
and Functioning Scale (CAFAS: Hodges et al., 1998). Six child-report measures will also 
be used, including two measures of depression and anxiety, namely the Child Depression 
Inventory (CDI: Kovacs, 1992) and the State and Trait Anxiety Scale for Children 
(STAIC: Spielberger et al., 1970), a measure of child self-esteem, Harter’s Self- 
Perception Profile (Harter: Harter, 1985,1999), and the Child Attachment Interview (CAI: 
Target et al, 2000). In addition, a short form of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children - Third UK Edition (WISC-III1^ : (Wechsler, 1991) will be administered to 
estimate IQ, and the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-Revised (CELF-R: 
Semel et al., 1987) will be administered to assess expressive language abilities. These 
measures were presented in detail in Chapter 3.
Procedure
The procedure of the Anna Freud Centre Standardisation Study was presented in 
Chapter 3. All interviews were conducted in a quiet room at school, at home or at the 
Anna Freud Centre, and the interviews and assessments were completed over 2 to 3 
sessions. The CRFS is used to rate videotaped CAI data. On average, the CAI interview 
takes 60 minutes to complete. Test-retest data is available for 18 children, and 53 
families returned after a 1-year period to complete the same battery of tests.
Raters and Coding Procedure
Four raters were trained to use the CRFS coding system. Two raters had 
completed 3 years of undergraduate psychology training and two had post-graduate 
qualifications in psychology. Three were female and one was male. Approximately 40 
hours of training were required for raters to become familiar with the coding manual. 
Once raters were able to reach 80% agreement on 10 transcribed training interviews, they 
received 30 new transcripts of videotaped CRFSs for the interrater reliability study. The 
sub-sample that was used for the interrater reliability study was selected to include a 
roughly even number of boys and girls of all age groups, as well as a range of types and 
levels of psychopathology. Once familiar with the coding manual, took approximately 45 
minutes to rate a single interview.
Planned Data Analyses
To establish the interrater reliability, the intraclass correlations (ICC) using 
Bartko’s two-way random effect model computed to provide an estimate of agreement
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between raters for the scores on individual stories, as well as total scores (Bartko, 1976; 
W. T. Carpenter, 1976). Following the guidelines of Endicott and Spitzer (1978) for 
interpreting ICC’s, values above .75 will be considered as indicative of good reliability; 
between .50 and .75, as fair; and values below .50, as reflecting poor reliability. To 
establish the stability of the CRFS over time, Pearson product-moment correlations (r) 
between the scores at time 1 and after a 3-month interval are calculated. Following 
Murphy and Davidshofer (2001), moderate test-retest correlations of .6 and above will be 
considered as acceptable; test-retest correlations of .5 and above will be regarded as low; 
and below .5, as poor. This more tolerant approach to assessing test-retest reliability was 
used in view of the fact that children recruited from referrals to mental health services 
constituted a large part of the sample; as a result stability in measure scores over time is 
expected to be much lower (Kline, 2000). This may be because children with mental 
health problems or who are experiencing other problems or acute life stressors show 
fluctuations in motivation and ability to focus on these tasks.
To examine the factorial structure of the CRFS, stories with good interrater 
reliability are selected and a factor analysis is performed to investigate the dimensionality 
of the CRFS (as administered using the revised coding manual). Next, the internal 
consistency reliability of the stories is evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha, with alpha 
coefficients of .7 regarded as indicating of good internal consistency (Kline, 2000).
The relationships between CRFS and age, IQ, expressive language, demographic 
variables, gender and family composition are examined using Pearson product-moment 
correlations (r) and t- tests. Significant relationships are then taken into account in 
subsequent analyses. In order to determine if intelligence is the main predictor of child 
reflective functioning, if psychopathology, social adaptation and attachment make a 
significant contribution to the prediction of child reflective functioning (as measured by 
the CRFS), a stepwise multiple regression analysis is employed. This regression is 
performed with the data set optimised using Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) estimates computed using the AMOS software (Arbuckle, 1994) with estimates 
being made in cases for which at least 60% of data is available. Analyses based on FIML 
estimates have been shown to be more reliable than those in which cases with incomplete 
are deleted (Arbuckle, 1994).
Differences in CRFS as a function of clinical levels of behavioural and emotional 
difficulties (as measured on the CDI and CBCL) are investigated using a one-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). Subsequently, differences in CRFS performance as a 
function of attachment security are investigated using ANCOVA.
Results
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Performance o f the CRFS
Means and standard deviations for the CRFS are provided in Table 44. Results 
indicate that primary school-aged children have scores across the full range of the CRFS 
scale. Mean scores for the CRFS items ranged from .83 (3rd Self-description) to 3.51 
(Mother upset); SDs ranged from 1.53 to 2.7.
Reliability o f the Revised Child Reflective Functioning Rating Scale (CRFS)
Three standard indexes of reliability are then assessed namely interrater reliability, 
internal consistency and test-retest of the CRFS.
Table 44
CRFS: Means, Standard Deviations and Interrater Reliability
Items M  SD Min Max ICC
Self 1 1.62 1.72 -1 5 .61
Self 2 1.16 1.82 -1 7 .64
Self 3 .80 1.74 -1 7 .64
Self Upset 1.90 2.02 -1 7 1.0
Mum 1 1.84 1.53 -1 7 .71
Mum 2 1.33 1.59 -1 6 .93
Mum 3 .62 1.55 -1 6 .96
Mum Upset 3.51 2.09 -1 8 .70
Dad 1 1.24 1.59 -1 9 1.00
Dad 2 .78 1.90 -1 6 .90
Dad 3 .20 1.80 -1 5 .99
Dad Upset 2.38 2.70 -1 8 1.00
Parents Argue 1.54 2.57 -1 8 .94
Note. N = 6 3 for sample descriptives, and n = 30 for ICC’s
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Interrater Reliability o f the Revised CRFS
The first step in examining the psychometric properties of the revised CRFS rating 
system was to examine the interrater reliability for each of the items. Interrater reliability 
was evaluated using intraclass correlations (ICCs: Bartko, 1976)
The resulting intraclass correlations ranged from .61 (Self 1) to 1.00 (Self Upset, 
Dad 1, and Dad Cross) with a median of .93 (see Table 44). Once raters had separately 
rated the items, they compared their scores and rendered consensus ratings reached 
through discussion. On the rare occasions when raters were unable to reach consensus, 
the author served as mediator. Consensus ratings were used in subsequent analyses.
Factor Analysis o f the CRFS
After it was confirmed that the interrater reliability of all the items were in the fair 
to good range, the correlations among the different items were examined. The Pearson 
product-moment correlations (r) were calculated and ranged from .11 to .68 (see Table 
45), suggesting that more than one factor may be involved. The factor structure of the 
CRFS was investigated using principal components analysis with a varimax rotation. On 
the basis of theoretical expectations and the scree test, two factors were rotated. The 
results of the rotated solution identified two factors, a self and another factor. The self 
factor showed high loadings on all the self description items as well as on the first 
description of relationship with mother. The other factor showed high loadings on the 
parents argue, relationship with dad, and dad upset items (see Table 46). The two factors 
explained 55.9% of the variance. Only one item, the second description of the 
relationship with mum, loaded on both factors.
The factors identified by the analysis were in line with theoretically and 
empirically based expectations, namely, that reflective abilities regarding the self and 
others are related but distinct, and are linked to slightly different developmental and 
cognitive factors, as suggested by Fonagy and Target (2003). The ability to identify and 
understand one’s own affects and to mentalise about these and other characteristics of the 
self is considered to be closely linked to the quality of the attachment relationship, 
whereas a number of other factors, including intellectual capacity, are considered to be 
related to the ability to mentalise about others and relationships. The item composition of 
two factors is in line with this developmental model. These two factors were used to 
form two CRFS scales, a CRFS-Self scale and a CRFS-Other scale.
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Table 45
CRFS: Correlation Matrix Used for Factor Analysis
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Self 1 59***.49*** .28* .53** .31* .23 .34** .22 .34” .21 .30* .19
2. Self 2 .59*** .24 L/i 00 • * • .44*** .28* .29* .28’ .46*” .28’ .21 .26*
3. Self 3 - .18 .43** .31* .19 .27* .19 .41” .27’ .19 .11
4. Self Upset - .42** .19 00 • • • .45*** .34” .49*” .48*” .51***
••»oin
5. Mum 1 - .48*’* .27* .24 .53*** .56*** .39” .31* .43”
6 . Mum 2 - .43** .42** .40” .50*** .42” .40” .39”
7. Mum 3 - .46*** .33* .54*** .49*** .38” .40”
8 . Mum Upset - .44” .48*** .32* .63*** .45***
9. Dad 1 - .39” .33* .49*** .38”
10. Dad 2 - .57*** .59*** .68*”
11. Dad 3 - .32* .56***
12.Dad Upset - .46***
13. Par Argue -
N =  63; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 46
CRFS: Factor Pattern Matrix from Factor Analysis
Child Reflective Functioning Factors
Items Other Self
Parents Argue .78
Relationship with Dad 2 .75
Dad Upset .74
Self Upset .70
Relationship with Dad 3 .68
Relationship with Mum 3 .67
Mum Upset .65
Relationship with Dad 1 .58
Relationship with Mum 2 .50 .45
Self Description 2 .86
Self Description 3 .80
Self Description 1 .76
Relationship with Mum 1 .65
% of Variance Explained 43.13 12.76
Eigenvalue .83 .56
N=  63
Item-Total Statistics
Item-total correlations and alpha coefficients were calculated separately for the 
CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other scales (see Table 47). Item-total correlations of CRFS-Self 
ranged from .48 to .74, and the internal consistency of CRFS-Self was good, with 
a  = .825. Item-total correlations for the nine items of CRFS-Other ranged from .53 to 
.75, and the internal consistency was good, with a  = .88. The high a  coefficients of
5 C oefficient alpha o f  .70 is regarded as m inim um  to ensure good reliability (Kline, 2000).
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CRFS-Other and CRFS-Self indicated that they were reliable scales; consequently, the 
CRFS-Other and CRFS-Self will be used in subsequent analyses.
Table 47
CRFS: Item-total Correlations and Alpha-coefficients for the CRFS-Other and CRFS-Self
Child Reflective Functioning Scales
Items CRFS-Other CRFS-Self
Parents Argue .67
Relationship with Dad 2 .75
Dad upset .68
Self Upset .62
Relationship with Dad 3 .59
Relationship with Mum 3 .58
Mum Upset .68
Relationship with Dad 1 .53
Relationship with Mum 2 .75
Self Description 2 .59
Self Description 3 .74
Self Description 1 .60
Relationship with Mum 1 .63
Scale Alpha .88 .82
N = 6  3
Test-Retest Reliability
Pearson product-moment correlations were used to investigate the test-retest 
reliability of the CRFS after a 3-month period as well as to explore the temporal stability 
of the CRFS over a 1-year period.
The 3-month test-retest correlations of the CRFS show that children’s 
performance on the CRFS-Other remains highly stable, and their performance on the 
CRFS-Self shows moderate stability. With regard to stability after a 1-year interval, the 
correlations for both CRFS-S and CRFS-0 show moderate stability (see Table 48).
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Table 48
CRFS: Three-Month and One-Year Temporal Stability
Time 1 Time 2
Interval n M SD M SD r
Three Month
CRFS-Self 18 14.7 8.0 12.6 4.5 .67"
CRFS-Other 18 26.0 12.7 28.5 1.7 00 ON • • »
One year
CRFS-Self 53 14.5 6.3 15.9 5.6 5 9 * * *
CRFS-Other 53 25.5 15.1 26.9 1.8 .63***
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***/? < .001
Validity o f the Revised Child Reflective Functioning Scale (CRFS)
Three types of validity are assessed, namely, construct, predictive, and 
discriminant validity, in relation to a number of different hypotheses.
Relationship between Performance on the CRFS, Gender and Family Composition
Student f-tests were used to investigate the effects on CRFS performance of 
gender, living in two-parent families rather than single parent families, the employment 
status of caretakers, and the presence of siblings.
No gender effect was found for either CRFS-Self, /(61) = -.42, p  = .68 , ns, or 
CRFS-Other, /(61) = -.22, p  = .83, ns. Children living in one parent families, that is, with 
mother only, had significantly higher mean CRFS-Self scores (M = 13.73, SD = 6.62) 
than those living in two-parent families (M =  1.15, SD = 5.68), t(51) = -2.23, p  < .05. 
However, there were no significant differences between the two groups with regard to 
CRFS-Other, t{51) = -1.10,/? =.28, ns. Similarly, children whose primary caregiver were 
at home had significantly higher mean CRFS-Self scores (M = 13.03, SD = 6.53) than did 
children whose mothers were employed (M = 9.00, SD = 5.38), /(57) = -2.37, p  < .05. 
However, there were no significant differences in CRFS-Other scores , /(57) = -1.43,/? = 
.16, ns. Further investigation of these findings confirmed that other factors, such as
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differences in maternal educational level or socio-economic status, did not account for 
these results.
The difference between the CRFS performance of children with siblings (n = 26) 
and that of only children (n = 37) was non-significant with regard to both CRFS-Self,
/(61) = .29, p  -  .77, ns, and CRFS-Other, /(61) = 1.00,/? = .32 ns.
Relationship between Performance on the CRFS and Age, IQ and Expressive 
Language
In order to explore the validity of the CRFS, correlations were examined between 
the two CRFS scales, age, IQ and expressive language. As can be seen from Table 49, 
significant positive correlations were only found between CRFS-Self scores and 
expressive language (as measured on the CELF-R), and between CRFS-Other scores and 
Full Scale IQ. These ranged from .26 to .37, indicating relationships of moderate 
strength.
Table 49
CRFS: Correlations with Age, IQ and Expressive Language
Variable n M SD Min Max CRFS-Other CRFS-Self 
r r
Age 63 9.0 1.57 6 12 .18 .21
Wise Full IQ 61 95.2 19.8 52 146 .26* .24
WISC Verbal IQ 61 101.4 19.5 65 155 .24 .18
WISC Performance IQ 61 89.4 2.4 46 143 .18 .21
CELF-R Exp. Language 43 87.5 15.9 50 137 .28 .37*
*p < .05 **/? < .01 ***/? < .001
Contributions o f IQ, Psychopathology and Social Adaptation to Predicting CRFS 
Performance
Regression analysis was conducted using the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood estimates (Arbuckle, 1994) to optimise our database through estimation of 
missing measure scores. The principal causes of missing data were the late introduction 
of certain measures in the standardisation study and the fact that families frequently 
cancelled appointments or did not return self-report forms, so that complete data for the 
full battery was not available. There was no evidence that data was missing in any
225
systematic way that could contribute to bias in the estimation of missing values from the 
existing data. Missing data was estimated when more than 60% of data was available.
Regression analysis was conducted to determine if the addition of scores on 
measures of psychopathology and adaptation improved the prediction of performance on 
the CRFS over and above age and IQ. The potential predictors were first examined by 
looking at their correlations with reflective functioning (see Table 50). Age, IQ, 
depression (CDI) and social adaptation (CAFAS) were selected as the independent 
variables, and two regression analyses were then conducted, the first with the CRFS-Self 
as the dependent variable and the second with CRFS-Other as the dependent variable.
Table 50
CRFS: Correlations with Potential Predictors
n M SD CRFS-Other CRFS-Self
Predictor r r
Age 63 9.13 1.57 .11 .21
WISC Full-Scale IQ 61 95.15 19.78 .26* .24
CBCL (Int) 60 65.17 11.07 .10 .20
CBCL (Ext) 60 59.73 12.05 -.10 .08
CBCL (Total) 60 64.25 1.83 -.08 .09
CAFAS (Total) 63 3.95 2.30 -.27* -.25*
STAIC -  State 43 46.98 11.16 -.20 -.17
STAIC-Trait 43 52.23 12.03 -.06 -.03
CDI (/-score) 50 65.17 11.07 -.20 -.25
Harter Self-Perception 42 1.9 .70 .03 .04
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***/> < .001.
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The results of the two AMOS regression analyses are reported in Table 51. The 
standardised regression coefficients or betas (fi) reflect the impact on the outcome 
variable when the predictor variables increase one standard deviation. The latter also 
allows for an assessment of the relative importance of predictor variables. The critical 
ratio is used to evaluate whether or not the standardised regression coefficients are 
significant, with critical ratios of above 1.96 indicating that the predictor variables make a 
significant contribution to child reflective functioning when the significance level is set to 
p  < .05. As can be seen in Table 51, age (fi = .23) and attachment security (fi — -.26) 
make significant contributions to the prediction of Self reflective functioning when the 
significance level is set to p < .05. The second regression analysis with Other reflective 
functioning as the dependent variable also identifies age (fl = .21) and attachment security 
(P = -.23) as the independent variables which make significant contributions to the 
prediction of Other reflective functioning in children.
Table 51
CRFS Factors: AMOS Regression Analysis with Potential Predictors
Predictor B SE P CR
CRFS-Self
Age .88 .75 .23 2.18*
Full IQ .04 .03 .15 1.53
CDI -.07 .05 -.14 -1.36
CAFAS -.03 .03 -.12 -1.20
CAI -3.29 1.28 -.26 -2.56*
Model .18
CRFS-Other
Age 1.65 .75 .21 2.19*
Full IQ .10 .06 .17 1.71
CDI -.12 .10 -.12 -1.36
CAFAS -.10 .06 -.17 -1.73
CAI -5.80 2.57 -.23 -2.26*
Model .17
*p < .05 **p< .01 ***/?<.001
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Clinical Levels o f Psychopathology and Performance on the CRFS
One-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to investigate differences 
between the CRFS performance of children with CBCL scores in the clinical range and 
that of non-clinical groups, after taking into account the effects of age and IQ. The 
dependent variable was CRFS performance, and the independent variable was clinical 
status as determined by the CBCL (clinical and non-clinical). Two analyses were 
conducted, the first with CRFS-Self as the dependent variable, and the second with 
CRFS-Other as the dependent variable. The covariates were age and IQ. The analyses 
were performed for CBCL Total score, CBCL Internalising subscale, and CBCL 
Externalising subscale.
With respect to CRFS-Self, initial comparisons of the observed means of clinical 
and non-clinical groups (based on the CBCL scales) showed an unexpected pattern: 
children with internalising difficulties in the clinical range showed higher CRFS-Self 
scores than other children (see Table 52). The pattern of scores for children with 
externalising difficulties was as expected; it showed that children with scores in the 
clinical range had lower reflective functioning. However, after adjustment for verbal IQ, 
none of the differences remained significant (see Table 53).
Table 52
CRFS: Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CBCL Scores
Scale
Non-Clinical Clinical
•
n Observed
M
SD Adjusted SE n 
M
Observed
M
SD Adjusted
M
SE
CBCL Internalising
CRFS-S 52 11.83 4.55 11.88 .79 33 12.03 7.14 11.94 .99
CRFS-0 52 23.84 6.19 23.61 1.22 33 21.08 11.67 21.31 1.51
CBCL Externalising
CRFS-S 64 12.17 5.60 12.08 .71 21 11.10 5.91 11.37 1.25
CRFS-0 64 22.58 8.60 22.32 1.08 21 18.00 10.21 18.81 1.91
CBCL Total
CRFS-S 57 12.60 5.63 12.52 .74 28 10.50 5.55 10.66 1.06
CRFS-O 57 22.89 8.18 22.64 1.14 28 18.50 10.57 19.00 1.63
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Table 53
CRFS-Self: Comparing Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CBCL Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
df MS F P Adjusted
R2
CRFS-Self .01
CBCL Internalising .06 1 .06 .00 ns .000
Covariates
Age 37.74 1 37.74 1.19 ns .015
Verbal IQ 82.00 1 82.00 2.60 ns .031
Error 2559.45 81 31.60
CRFS-Self .02
CBCL Externalising 7.59 1 7.59 .24 ns .003
Covariates
Age 41.29 1 41.29 1.31 ns .016
Verbal IQ 68.68 1 68.68 2.18 ns .026
Error 2551.93 81 31.51
CRFS-Self .04
CBCL Total 63.50 1 63.50 2.06 ns .025
Covariates
Age 41.21 1 41.21 1.34 ns .016
Verbal IQ 61.79 1 61.79 2.01 ns .024
Error 2496.01 81 30.82
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***/? < .001.
With respect to CRFS-Other, initial comparisons revealed differences between the 
observed means of clinical and non-clinical groups (based on the three CBCL scales) with 
children scoring in the clinical range showing lower reflective functioning in relationships
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with others (see Table 52). However, after adjustment for verbal IQ, none of the 
differences remained significant (see Table 54).
Table 54
CRFS— Other: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical andNon-Clinical CBCL
Scores
Source of variance Adjusted
SS
df MS F P if Adjusted
R2
CRFS-Other .06
CBCL Internalising 7.38 1 7.38. .04 ns .000
Covariates
Age 345.64 1 345.38 1.86 ns .022
Verbal IQ 1199.43 1 1199.43 6.21 * .071
Error 14143.12 81 169.61
CRFS-Other .08
CBCL Externalising 268.53 1 268.53 1.33 ns .016
Covariates
Age 409.76 1 409.76 2.22 ns .027
Verbal IQ 924.86 1 924.86 4.90 * .057
Error 13888.89 81 171.46
CRFS-Other .09
CBCL Total 493.98 1 493.98 2.80 ns .033
Covariates
Age 390.33 1 390.33 2.16 ns .026
Verbal IQ 966.85 1 966.85 5.16 * .060
Error 13656.46 81 168.59
*p < .05 **/?< -01 * * * p < . 001
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ANCOVA was also used to investigate differences between the CRFS 
performance of children with CDI scores in the clinical range, and that of others, after 
taking age and verbal IQ into account. The dependent variable was CRFS performance, 
and the independent variable was clinical status (as determined by their CDI scores), with 
clinical defined as scores of 70 and above and non-clinical as scores below 55. Two 
analyses were conducted, the first with CRFS-Self as the dependent variable and the 
second with CRFS-Other as the dependent variable. The covariates were age and IQ. 
Only five children reported symptoms of depression in the clinical range, making the 
results tentative. As can be seen in Table 55, depressed children had lower mean CRFS- 
Self and CRFS-Other scores than their non-depressed peers, but none of these differences 
remained significant after adjustment for age and verbal IQ. The ANCOVA with CRFS- 
Self and CRFS-Other were both non-significant (see Tables 56).
Table 55
CRFS: Performance o f Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CDI Scores
CDI
Non-Clinical
CDI
Clinical
Scale n Observed SD Adjusted 
M  M
SE n Observed
M
SD Adjusted 
M
SE
CRFS-S 75 12.36 5.56 12.37 .65 5 8.40 6.54 8.19 2.50
CRFS-0 75 21.77 9.10 21.82 .99 5 18.80 10.24 18.21 3.94
*p < .05 **/?<.01 ***/?<-Ml
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Table 56
CRFS: ANCOVA Comparing Children with Clinical and Non-Clinical CDI scores
Source o f variance Adjusted
SS
d f MS F P rf Adjusted
R2
CRFS-Self .03
CDI 81.74 1 81.74 2.62 ns .033
Covariates
Age 30.30 1 30.30 .97 ns .013
Verbal IQ 49.10 1 49.10 1.57 ns .020
Error 2370.29 76 31.19
CRFS-Other .06
CDI 202.10 1 202.10 1.37 ns .018
Covariates
Age 381.70 1 381.70 1.99 ns .026
Verbal IQ 751.39 1 751.39 3.87 * .048
Error 13355.28 76 175.73
*p<  .05 **p<  .01 ***/?< .001
Descriptive Investigation o f Cases with High and Low CRFS
To examine whether or not there were children with both high reflective 
functioning and high levels of psychopathology, a further exploratory investigation was 
undertaken focusing on the 7 children with the highest CRFS scores, namely, scores on 
the extreme upper end of the normal distribution. Six of these 7 children had internalising 
difficulties in the clinical range on the CBCL, and 4 had externalising difficulties in the 
clinical range on the CBCL. None reported depressive symptoms in the clinical range on 
the CDI. Next, the seven children with reflective functioning scores at the extreme lower 
end of the distribution were selected and their CDI and CBCL scores were examined; 
three reported CDI symptoms in the clinical range, five had CBCL Internalising scores in 
the clinical range and four had CBCL Externalising scores in the clinical range. This 
pattern suggests that children reflective functioning scores at the extreme upper and
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extreme lower ends of the distribution are more likely to display affective and 
behavioural difficulties.
Attachment Security and Performance on the CRFS
Finally, the impact of child attachment security on CRFS performance was 
investigated using ANCOVA to compare the performance of children classified as secure 
and insecure in terms of attachment on the CAI, after taking into account the effects of 
age and IQ. The dependent variable was CRFS performance, and the independent 
variable was security of attachment (secure or insecure). Two analyses were conducted, 
the first with CRFS-Self reflective functioning as the dependent variable and the second 
with CRFS-Other reflective functioning as the dependent variable. The covariates were 
age and IQ.
With respect to the CRFS-Self, the ANCOVA was significant, F (l, 72) = 12.89, p  
< .001. As reflected in table 57, the means of CRFS-Self scores of insecure and secure 
children, adjusted for age and IQ, were ordered as expected, with insecurely attached 
children generally having lower Self reflective functioning scores (M  = 15,23) than 
securely attached children (M =  10,38). The strength of the relationship between CRFS- 
Self and attachment was moderate, with attachment security accounting for 15.2% of the 
variance in children’s Self reflective capacities (see Table 58).
With respect to the Other reflective functioning the ANCOVA was also 
significant, F (l, 72) = 11.82,/? < .001 with insecurely attached children generally having 
lower scores (M = 18.82) than securely attached children (M  = 26.01), after adjustment 
for age and verbal IQ (see Table 57). The strength of the relationship between CRFS- 
Other and attachment was moderate, with attachment security accounting for 14.1% of 
the variance in children’s reflective functioning regarding relationships (see Table 58).
Table 57
CRFS: Performance o f Children with Secure or Insecure Attachment Classifications
Secure Insecure
Scales n Observed SD Adjusted SE n Observed SD Adjusted SE
M M M M
CRFS-S 24 15.46 6.11 15.23 1.11 52 10.27 5.00 10.38 .75
CRFS-0 24 26.83 9.85 26.01 1.75 52 18.54 7.68 18.82 1.18
*p < .05 **/?<.01 ***p< .001
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Table 58
CRFS: ANCOVA Comparing Securely Attached and Insecurely Attached Children
Source o f variance Adjusted
SS
df MS F P rf Adjusted
R2
CRFS-Self .16
Secure/Insecure 373.25 1 373.25 12.89 *** .152
Covariates
Age 15.39 1 15.39 .53 ns .007
Verbal IQ 34.15 1 34.15 1.18 ns .016
Error 2084.16 72 28.95
CRFS-Other .19
Secure/Insecure 1887.13 1 1887.13 11.82 *** .141
Covariates
Age 236.84 1 236.84. 1.32 ns .018
Verbal IQ 747.87 1 747.87 4.09 ns .054
Error 11689.22 72 162.35
*p < .05 **/?c .01 ***/?<.001
In order to further explore the nature of the relationship with attachment, the 
correlations between child reflective functioning and performance on the Emotional 
Openness and Emotional Coherence subscales of the CAI were investigated using 
Pearson correlations. Both Self reflective functioning and Other reflective functioning 
were found to correlate significantly with emotional coherence and emotional openness 
(see Table 59).
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Table 59
CRFS: Correlations with Child Attachment Subscales
CAI Variable n M SD Min Max CRFS-S CRFS-O
r r
Emotion Openness 63 4.81 1.70 1.5 8.5 53*** £j***
Coherence 63 3.94 1.69 1.0 7.5 56*** 49***
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***/? < .001
Relationship between Performance on the CRFS, the HSS and the A T
In order to determine whether or not the construct of reflective functioning was 
related to the other constructs of socio-cognitive mentalisation that have been developed 
and investigated in this thesis, the relationships between performance on the CRFS scales, 
the HSS and AT were examined using Pearson correlations. The results, summarised in 
Table 60, indicate that, with the exception of the AT Impact scale, the correlations 
between these measures and the CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other were significant, showing 
relationships of moderate strength.
Table 60
Relationship between Child Reflective Functioning (CRFS), Theory o f Mind (HSS) and 
Affective Understanding (AT)
Scales 1 2 3 4 5
1. HSS - .36** .33** 4 7*** 54***
2. CRF-Self - .59*** .30* 4Q**
3. CRF-Other
4. AT Accuracy
5. AT Justification
.36** 41* *
49***
*p < .05 **/><.01 ***/?<.001
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of the CRFS, 
including its reliability and validity when used with the new manual and revised coding 
system. Interrater reliability, the internal consistency of the scales that were used, and the 
test-retest reliability of the CRFS were assessed. Validity was evaluated in the context of 
the relationships between performance on the CRFS and key demographic variables, 
intelligence, expressive language abilities, self-esteem, psychopathology, adaptation and 
attachment.
In the following section, the main findings are briefly summarised and then 
discussed.
Reliability o f the CRFS
Overall, the findings indicate that the psychometric properties of the adapted 
CRFS coding system and manual are robust, and that the CRFS is an appropriate measure 
for assessing the ability of children aged 8 -  11 to consider themselves and significant 
relationships in mental state and interpersonal terms.
With regard to the appropriateness of the rating scale, children’s reflective 
functioning, as evidenced by their responses to the questions that were coded, covered the 
full range of the scale ranging from -1 to 9; this confirms that this scale is appropriate for 
assessing the mentalisation abilities of children aged 8 - 1 1 .  At the same time, the item 
means were towards the bottom of the scale indicating that the majority of children in this 
age group still struggle to understand mental states and their interpersonal causes and 
impact (as evidenced in the examples they used to describe their own qualities and close 
relationships). Children tended to use physical, behavioural and categorical terms, or 
simple mental states, in portraying themselves and in describing particular events that 
illustrate their choice of self-descriptors. This was also the case in their descriptions of 
their close relationships and in their illustrations of particular interactions occurring 
between them and their parents. In general, they showed their highest reflective 
functioning when giving specific examples of what happens when their parents get upset 
or cross with them. This suggests that questions regarding what happens in conflict 
situations reflect children’s potential or highest reflective functioning.
The findings confirm that the interrater reliability using the revised CRFS manual 
is good and that the manual can be used to train graduate level coders to rate child 
reflective functioning reliably and within an acceptable training period. In terms of test-
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retest reliability, the findings reflect very good reliability over a 3-months test-retest 
interval and good stability over a 1-year period. These findings suggest that children’s 
reflective functioning regarding themselves and their relationships with their parents is a 
relatively stable characteristic and that it is reliably assessed by the CRFS, even in a 
sample of children referred to mental health services because of emotional or behavioural 
difficulties. In line with theoretical expectations and the analysis of the dimensionality of 
the CRFS, two factors were identified, a self and other factor. Two scales were formed 
based on these results, CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other. Subsequent scale analyses confirmed 
that the CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other had good scale properties.
The distinction between self reflective functioning and reflective functioning 
regarding others and relationships is consistent with Fonagy and Target’s (2003) 
argument that self reflective functioning develops in the context of attachment 
relationships, while reflective functioning regarding others is learned in a more cognitive 
way. The distinction between self and other reflective functioning is also consistent with 
the widely made distinction between self and other representations in attachment theory 
(Beebe et al., 1997).
Relationships with Demographic Variables, IQ and Expressive Language Abilities
Demographic Variables, In line with expectations, no gender effects were evident 
with respect to the reflective functioning of boys and girls aged 8-11. This provides 
further evidence for the conclusion that the gender differences observed in abilities such 
as Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen, 2000a) are less likely to be apparent in 
the assessment of cognitive-emotional abilities.
As expected, age was found to be a significant predictor of CRFS-Self and CRFS- 
Other scores, based on the findings of the regression analysis. It is worth noting that 
when a correlation analysis was used, no significant correlations between age and 
reflective functioning were found. The different methodology of the regression analysis 
contributed to slightly different results in that the contribution of age was considered in 
the context of other variables; the CAI and CAFAS inter-correlated with IQ, with age 
then predicting the residual of the variance in CRFS.
With regard to the relationship between CRFS scores and family composition, 
children living in single-parent families were found to have significantly higher self- 
reflective functioning scores than children in two-parent families. This was contrary to 
expectations, given previous findings showing that children were more likely to be 
insecurely attached if they lived in one-parent families (Greenberg et al., 1991; Shmeuli- 
Goetz, 2001). In addition, the findings indicated that children with “at-home” care-givers
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had higher CRFS-Self scores than children with working caregivers. One possible 
explanation for these findings is that children with at-home caregivers, and children living 
in single-parent families, have more opportunities, or are under more pressure, to learn 
and develop the ability to consider themselves and their relationships with their mothers 
in mental state terms. This would be in line with other findings showing that 
opportunities to spend time with older siblings and especially adults are related to the 
development of children’s emotional understanding and theory of mind abilities (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski et al., 1991). In addition, it may be that single-parents, in the 
absence of another adult, demand more understanding from their children, and that this 
challenges and stimulates children to acquire reflective-functioning.
IQ and Expressive Language Abilities. The findings showed significant positive 
correlations, and relationships of moderate strength, between expressive language 
abilities and CRFS-Self scores, as well as between IQ and CRFS-Other scores. The 
strength of the relationship between intelligence and reflective functioning is in line with 
the findings of a weak relationship between adult reflective functioning and IQ Fonagy et 
al. (1998). The findings are partially in line with expectations, given that relationships 
between child reflective functioning and both IQ and expressive language abilities were 
expected. On closer examination, it is evident that there are relationships of moderate 
strength between expressive language abilities and both scales, as well as between IQ and 
both scales, but as a result of the small sample size, the analysis lacked sufficient power 
for establishing the significance of these relationships. This suggests that caution is 
needed when drawing conclusion based on the particular patterns of significance reported 
with respect to IQ, expressive language abilities and CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other scores.
In terms of the construct validity of CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other, these findings of 
relationhips of moderate strength confirm that reflective functioning as measured by the 
two scales, is a distinct ability and does not primarily reflect either verbal intelligence or 
expressive language abilities.
The findings of a relationship between reflective functioning and expressive 
language abilities is consistent with evidence showing that the quality of attachment and 
mother-child mental state talk are linked to the development of expressive language 
abilities (Trevarthen, 1980); these same factors are also thought to contribute to the 
development of reflective functioning (Fonagy & Target, 2003). It is also consistent with 
the theoretical emphasis on narrative processes and parental discussions, referred to as 
coaching (Denham, 1998) and emotional didactics (Harris, 2000), as playing a pivotal 
role in the development of children’s emotional understanding. These parent-child
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emotion-focused narratives have been found to be a predictor of emotional understanding 
whether at 24 months, 33 months, or 6 years (Denham, Cook, & Zoller, 1992; Denham, 
Renwick-DeBardi et al., 1994; Dunn & Brown, 1994; Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991). 
Given the findings of J. G. De Villiers and J.A. De Villiers (1990) that language abilities 
were linked to the emergence of theory of mind during the pre-school period, it would 
seem likely that expressive language abilities may play a similarly important role in the 
development of and elaboration about the self. This is in line with the model proposed by 
Harris (2000) whereby rich and complex parental accounts of the emotional significance 
of events help children to organise events into narrative structures and, concomitantly, 
teach them this narrative skill. Harris suggests that the quality of parental elaborations and 
parental emphasis on emotions are important in the development of similar abilities in 
their children. This also fits with the emphasis Fonagy et al. (2002) and Fonagy and 
Target (2003) place on the parent’s orientation towards the intentionality and internal 
processes of the child, an orientation which would conceivably be reflected in parent- 
child elaborations providing explanatory models of the reactions of the child and others. 
In this model, expressive language abilities may be an outcome and an indicator of the 
quality of parent-child discourse. Furthermore, with respect to reflective functioning, it 
can be argued that expressive language abilities are important building blocks of 
reflective functioning, and that they provide the scaffolding that facilitates its 
development.
As for the relationship between CRFS-Self scores and expressive language 
abilities, it can be seen as partial evidence of the role of expressive language and parent- 
child narrative processes in the construction, or perhaps more accurately, the co­
construction of the self (Harris, 2000). As Harter (1983; 1999) has proposed, this process 
of construction can be seen as based on self-feeling (Cooley, 1902; Damasio, 1994), on 
what has been referred to in the theory of mind literature as a sense of agency or 
intentionality. It may well be that this sense of agency is supported by parental contingent 
processes, including parent-child discussions and elaborations, and that this facilitates the 
development of expressive language abilities, and that the latter abilities together with 
cognitive skills contribute to the development of children’s reflective functioning.
Attachment as Predictor o f Performance on the CRFS
The findings of the regression analysis were consistent with the hypothesis that 
attachment security would predict children’s reflective functioning regarding themselves 
and their significant relationships. In addition to age, only attachment security made a
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significant addition to the prediction of CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other scores.
As predicted, children’s CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other scores showed significant 
associations with security of attachment, after adjusting for age and IQ (Fonagy et al.,
2002). This provides support for the discriminant validity of the CRFS. It is also 
consistent with the argument that reflective functioning is closely linked to attachment 
(Fonagy, 1997), that attachment security in children fosters the development of 
mentalisation abilities, and that attachment security tends to be associated with the 
presence of parental factors likely to stimulate the development of mentalisation. The 
findings are also in line with the conclusions of Fonagy (1997), Meins et al. (1998) and 
H. Steele et al. (1999) that the development of children’s ability to think in terms of their 
own or others’ mental states is inextricably linked to attachment. Another possible 
explanation for this study finding is Fonagy’s (1997) hypothesis that securely attached 
children develop superior theory of mind abilities because they benefit more from pretend 
play and parent-child discussions involving mental states, and because they feel at liberty 
to explore another person’s mind. At the same time, it is likely that, as suggested by 
Fonagy, M. Steele, H. Steele, Higgit and Target (1994), that mothers who relate to their 
children in ways which foster secure attachments, are good at the types of interactions, 
such as engaging in pretend play with their toddlers and engaging in conversations rich in 
mental state talk, which have been identified by Dunn’s research as important predictors 
of the development of children’s mentalisation abilities. It has been hypothesised that the 
mother’s “mind-mindedness” (Meins, 1997), or reflective functioning (Fonagy & Target,
2003), predicts both children’s attachment security and mentalisation abilities (Fonagy, 
H. Steele, Moran et al., 1991; Slade et al., 1999). The mother’s perception of the child as 
mentalising, whereby she attributes intentionality to the infant, and the mother’s ability to 
mentalise and think accurately about the infant’s internal states are considered to be the 
most important factors in the development of secure attachment. These qualities are 
similar to the maternal qualities Dunn has identified as facilitating mental state 
understanding. Considered together with the earlier findings, of the present study 
showing of a relationship between attachment security and children’s mentalisation 
abilities, fit well with the theoretical models and empirical evidence of a close 
developmental relationship between attachment and mentalisation.
Psychopathology and social adaptation did not make a significant contribution to 
the prediction of children’s reflective functioning on other the CRFS-Other or CRFS-Self 
scale.
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Clinical Levels o f Psychopathology and Performance on the CRFS
After considering the effects of age and IQ, no significant correlations were found 
between psychopathology and child reflective functioning, neither when using regression 
analyses nor when comparing children with clinical and non-clinical levels of 
psychopathology ( as measured on the CBCL or CDI).
Initial comparisons indicated that with regard to psychopathology, children who 
reported a level of depressive symptomatology on the CDI above the 70th percentile, 
which is considered as indicative of warranting clinical referral and treatment, in general 
had lower CRFS-Other scores when compared with peers with less severe problems. 
Similarly, children who had behavioural and emotional difficulties in the clinical range 
based on CBCL scales, also had lower CRFS-Other scores when compared with peers 
with less severe problems. However, these differences appeared to be mainly associated 
to verbal intelligence and did not remain significant once this was adjusted for. Rather 
than interpreting these results as suggesting that verbal abilities are more important than 
reflective functioning in the context of psychopathology, it can be argued that verbal 
abilities are principally important because they enable children to be reflective about their 
circumstances and emotional reactions. No differences in CRFS-Self scores were 
observed when clinical and non-clinical groups were compared.
Another factor which may have contributed to the lack of significant findings with 
regard to psychopathology and reflective functioning is the fact that a small group of 
approximately 10% of cases had high reflective functioning scores at the upper end of the 
normal distribution, and 6 of these 7 children had internalising or externalising problems 
in the clinical range based on parent-reports on the CBCL. This group of children present 
an interesting challenge to the present theory of reflective functioning, given that one of 
the assumptions is that high reflective functioning is a protective factor with regard to 
psychopathology. One possible explanation for the findings from the present study is that 
it is possible to have a theory of agonised or twisted minds. This explanation is in line 
with the cognitive models of depression and conduct disorder where negative or distorted 
attributional systems are emphasised (Dodge et al., 1997). It may be that children develop 
a type of distorted hyper reflectiveness in the context of challenging family 
circumstances, or in the context of relating to disturbed parents. These contextual factors 
would need to be taken into account in examining whether reflective functioning 
provides some protection with regard to psychopathology either concurrently, or 
longitudinally.
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Convergent and Concurrent Validity o f the CRFS
As hypothesised, significant correlations showing relationships of moderate 
strength were found between child reflective functioning (as measured on the CRFS) and 
theory of mind (as measured by the HSS), as well as with affective understanding (as 
measured on the AT Accuracy and Justification scale). In the absence of a “gold 
standard” against which tests of children’s mentalisation abilities can be measured to 
verify their validity, this evaluation of children’s performance on the CRFS in relation to 
their performance on the HSS and the CRFS, provides a good indication of the concurrent 
validity of the CRFS scales. The findings indicate that the convergent validity of the 
construct of socio-cognitive mentalisation as measured by the HSS, AT and CRFS was 
moderate, as would be expected of related constructs of this nature.
In addition, the significant correlations showing relationhips of moderate strength 
between children’s reflective functioning and their performance on the Emotional 
Openness and Coherence subscales of the CAI provide further support for the concurrent, 
convergent validity of the CRFS scales in relation to these closely related constructs from 
an attachment perspective.
Future Considerations
The present study has demonstrated that child reflective functioning can be 
assessed reliably in children aged 8 to 11, and that it is a construct distinct from 
intelligence. Now that the psychometric properties of the CRFS have been established, it 
is possible to examine empirically: 1) Fonagy and Target’s thesis regarding the impact of 
abuse on the development of self reflective capacity; 2) the relationship between 
reflective functioning and psychopathology with a sample selected especially for this 
purpose; 3) the development of reflective functioning over time; 4) the question as to why 
some children have high reflective functioning but also show definite signs and 
symptoms of behaviour and emotional difficulties.
Conclusion
In sum, the study results confirm that 1) the psychometric properties of the CRFS, 
including the interrater reliability and the test-retest reliability of the scale, are robust; 
2) the CRFS is comprised of two factors, self reflective functioning and other reflective 
functioning; 3) used as subscales, both CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other, had good internal 
consistency; 4) the CRFS is appropriate for measuring reflective functioning of children 
aged 8 -11; 4) children’s reflective functioning as measured by the CRFS was predicted
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by age and attachment, and not by intelligence; 6) there were significant differences in 
children’s reflective functioning depending on their security of attachment; 7) children 
with unusually high reflective functioning also appear to be more likely to have affective 
and behavioural difficulties; and 8) child reflective functioning showed a significant 
moderate correlation with performance on other scales of socio-cognitive abilities such as 
the HSS and the AT.
These findings confirm both that it is possible to assess reflective functioning 
reliably in relatively young children and that reflective functioning is an ability closely 
linked to attachment.
243
CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In order to address the problem of the paucity of measures with established 
psychometric properties for assessing the mentalisation abilities of primary school-aged 
children, this thesis presented three such measures and their coding manuals and 
investigated whether or not they provide reliable and valid assessments of children’s 
theory of mind, affective understanding and reflective functioning.
The aims of the study were two-fold. The first aim was to determine the 
psychometric properties of three instruments, the HSS, AT and CRFS, developed to 
assess mentalisation in primary school-aged children from the related perspectives of 
theory of mind, affective understanding and reflective functioning, and to investigate the 
interrater reliability, test-retest reliability, scale properties and internal consistency of 
these instruments. The second aim was to examine the relationship between performance 
on each of the three measures and key demographic variables, intelligence, 
psychopathology, adaptation and attachment. The question here was whether or not 
children’s mentalisation abilities could be shown to be sufficiently distinct from 
intelligence, and whether or not these abilities could be shown to be related to other 
pertinent developmental issues, such as psychopathology and attachment security.
Reviews of the relevant literature and empirical research pertaining to children’s 
theory of mind, affective understanding, attachment and reflective functioning were 
presented, providing a background to the three empirical studies which focused on the 
HSS, AT and CRFS respectively. In this final chapter, the principal findings related to the 
HSS, AT and CRFS will be summarised. The discussion will address the following 
questions: Do these results show conclusively that the HSS, AT and CRFS provide 
reliable and valid methods for the evaluation of children’s mentalisation abilities? The 
overall pattern of results will also be considered with respect to the relationship between 
children’s mentalisation abilities (from the perspective as theory of mind, affective 
understanding and reflective functioning) and intelligence, child psychopathology, 
adaptation and attachment. At the same time, new findings and their theoretical 
implications will be considered. Finally, the limitations of the present research will be 
discussed, and directions for future research will be presented.
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Summary of Findings
For the sake of convenience, the main results are summarised in Appendix El.
Reliability o f the HSS, A T  and CRFS
The first step in the process of evaluating the psychometric properties of the HSS, 
the AT and the CRFS involved demonstrating that their performance with respect to 
reliability was satisfactory. The three standard indexes of reliability were thus evaluated, 
namely, interrater reliability, internal consistency and test-retest reliability.
Interrater Reliability
The interrater reliability of the HSS and CRFS was demonstrated to be good, and 
that of the AF scales, fair to good. This confirms that the coding systems and three 
coding manuals developed as part of the work undertaken for this thesis can be used to 
train undergraduate and graduate coders to rate primary school-aged children’s theory of 
mind, affective understanding, and reflective functioning at an acceptable level of 
reliability, after a reasonable training period.
Scale Analysis and Internal Consistency
Analyses of the scale properties indicated that all three measures had good internal 
consistency. In line with theoretical expectations, the findings showed that the CRFS is 
composed of two factors, namely, self- and other reflective functioning. Two scales were 
thus computed, a CRFS-Self scale and a CRFS-Other scales, and their internal 
consistency reliability has been demonstrated to be good. The findings also indicated that 
the AT was composed of an affect attribution and explanation factor and a complex 
affective understanding factor. This indicates that AT data can be analysed using either 
the factors or the individual scales. The latter approach was used in this thesis, given that 
there was no previous data available regarding the relationships between the dimensions 
of affective understanding measured by the different scales and children’s intelligence, 
psychopathology, adaptation and attachment.
Test-Retest Reliability
The stability of children’s mentalisation abilities as measured by the HSS, AT and 
CRFS were examined over a 3-month test-retest interval, as well as over a 1-year period. 
Children’s theory of mind abilities as measured by the HSS showed moderate stability 
over a 1-year period, but the findings did not reflect adequate stability over a shorter 
period, probably because children are reluctant to re-engage in a task of this nature after a 
relatively short interval. Children’s affective understanding as measured by the AT
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Accuracy and Justification scales showed low, moderate stability over a 3-month test- 
retest interval. Based on the poor test-retest results of the other AT scales 
(Internal/External, Impact and Challenge), these scales were excluded from further 
analyses.
Children’s reflective functioning with regard to themselves and their close 
relationships (as measured on both CRFS-Self and for CRFS-Other scales) showed 
moderate to good reliability over a 3-month period, as well as over a 1 -year period. This 
indicates that reflective functioning is a relatively stable characteristic of children. This 
evidence of the stability of children’s reflective functioning (as measured on the CRFS) is 
even more impressive considering the inevitable contribution of interrater error and the 
fact that the findings were obtained in a sample of children recruited from referrals to 
child and adolescent mental health clinics.
In summary, the study results confirmed that the interrater reliability, as well as 
the internal consistency of the three measures, was promising. The test-retest reliability 
of the CRFS was good, and the findings showed tolerable test-retest reliability for the 
HSS and the AT. When the assessments with respect to the different dimensions of 
reliability are taken together, they confirm that the HSS, the AT and the CRFS are 
reliable measures of children’s theory of mind abilities, affective understanding and 
reflective functioning.
Validity o f the HSS, A T  and CRFS
Next, the validity of the different measures of children’s mentalisation was 
considered. The first question asked concerned the validity of the construct of 
mentalisation as operationalised by the HSS, AT and CRFS, i.e., can children’s 
performance on these measures be shown to be sufficiently distinct from intelligence and 
expressive language abilities? The second question concerned the role of 
psychopathology, adaptation and attachment added to the prediction of children’s 
mentalisation abilities (over and above age and IQ). The third question concerned 
whether or not children’s mentalisation abilities, as measured by the HSS, AT and CRFS, 
discriminated between securely and insecurely attached children and also between 
children with symptoms of psychopathology in the clinical ranges on the CBCL and CDI 
and other children. The fourth question concerned the convergent validity of the different 
measures of primary school-aged children’s mentalisation abilities, as assessed by the 
HSS, AT and CRFS.
246
Age and Gender Effects
Primary school aged boys and girls were not found to differ with regard to their 
mentalisation abilities as evaluated in this study, and this was consistently the case 
regardless of the assessment measure used.
With respect to age, the study results indicated that theory of mind abilities (as 
measured by the HSS) and affective understanding (as measured on the AT scales) 
increased significantly between aged 5 and 11. Age effects with respect to reflective 
functioning on the CRFS-Self and CRFS-Other scale were also revealed in the regression 
analyses using a larger sample.
Family Composition and Mentalisation Abilities
In summary, the findings with respect to family factors and primary school-aged 
children’s mentalisation abilities reveal an interesting picture. They suggest that the 
presence of siblings, growing up in single-parent households, and having stay-at-home 
mothers all stimulate the development of different mentalisation abilities. The presence 
of siblings appears to stimulate the development of the ability to provide explanations of 
affective reactions in particular interpersonal contexts, while living in single parent- 
families is associated with a more advanced ability to interpret non-literal 
communication. Furthermore, children living in single-parent families and children with 
stay-at-home mothers who were not formally employed seemed to have at a relative 
advantage in terms of their ability to provide descriptions of themselves in mental state 
terms. This would seem to support the conclusions that there are different routes to 
different aspects of emotional understanding (Dunn, 1988; Denham, 1998; Saami, 1999); 
in other words, there may be different factors which stimulate the development of specific 
dimensions of affective understanding.
Intelligence and Expressive Language Abilities
The question of construct validity was addressed next, following Kline’s 
guidelines (2000). The aim was to determine if children’s theory of mind, affective 
understanding and reflective functioning can be considered as abilities that are 
sufficiently distinct from intelligence and expressive language so as to be considered 
constructs in their own right. In this respect, performance on the three measures was 
expected to be related to intelligence and verbal expressive abilities, with moderate 
strength correlations of not higher than r = .5. The results confirm that the constructs of 
theory of mind, affective understanding and reflective functioning as measured by the 
HSS, AT and CRFS are distinct from, although related to, verbal intelligence and 
expressive language abilities.
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The findings also show significant correlations between children’s expressive 
language abilities and performance on the HSS and the CRFS-Self scale.
Psychopathology as Predictor o f Performance on the HSS, A T  and CRFS
Child-reports of depressive symptoms and trait anxiety added to the prediction of 
their theory of mind (as measured by the HSS), in addition to age and IQ. Child-reports 
of depressive symptoms also added to the prediction of children’s abilities to provide 
narrative justifications of why certain affect were evoked by particular situations (as 
measured by the AT Justification scale). Parent-reports of children’s social adaptation 
predicted children’s knowledge of affects evoked in particular context (as measured by 
the AT Accuracy Scale), in addition to age and IQ. No significant relationships were 
found between psychopathology and child reflective functioning, but it should be noted 
that the small sample reduced the capacity to detect weak relationships.
Psychopathology and Performance on the HSS, A T  and CRFS
The findings of both correlation analyses and regression analyses are relevant 
here. In retrospect, the strategy used in the regression analyses, of considering what 
contributions psychopathology makes in addition to intelligence to the prediction of 
children’s mentalisation abilities, can be argued to have been overly conservative. For 
this reason the results of the correlation analyses will first be considered.
The findings based on the correlation analyses indicate that child-reports of 
depressive symptoms on the CDI account for 10% of the variance in children’s ability to 
understand the intentions of others as reflected in everyday speech (as measured by the 
HSS), and 12% of the variance in their understanding of which affects were likely to 
follow particular interpersonal situations. Children’s reports of depressive symptoms also 
accounted for 6% of the variance in self-reflective-functioning (measured on the CRFS- 
Self scale), 4% of the variance in reflective functioning regarding others (measured on the 
CRFS-Other scale) and 5% of the variance in their understanding of the causes linking 
affect to situations (measured on the AT Justification scale). Regression analyses 
indicated that, in addition to age and intelligence, child-reports of symptoms of both 
depression and anxiety made significant contributions to the prediction of their ability to 
understand the intentions of others as reflected in everyday speech (measured by the 
HSS), individually accounting for 5% of the variance in performance on the HSS. 
Similarly, in addition to age and IQ, child-reports of symptoms of depression accounts for 
8% of the variance on the AT Accuracy scale, which measures children’s understanding 
of the affects likely to result from particular interpersonal situations. In addition, the 
findings showed that after adjusting for age and IQ, depressed children were less able to
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provide justifications of affects evoked elicited by particular interpersonal situations 
(measured on the AT Justification scale).
Compared to the relationships between children’s reports affective symptoms and 
their mentalisation abilities, the relationships between children’s behavioural difficulties 
(based on parent-reports on the CBCL Externalising scale) and their mentalisation 
abilities were comparatively weaker. Behavioural difficulties accounted for 6% to 7% of 
the variance in children’s theory of mind abilities (measured on the HSS) and their 
understanding of which affects are likely to be evoked by particular situations (measured 
on the AT Accuracy scale).
The relationship between children’s reflective functioning and psychopathology 
was examined further to determine whether or not there was evidence supporting the 
theoretical postulate that high reflective functioning is associated with better psycho­
social adjustment. The seven children with reflective functioning scores at the extreme 
upper end of the distribution were selected and their CDI and CBCL scores were 
examined. Six of these seven children had CBCL Internalising scores in the clinical 
range and three had CBCL Externalising scores in the clinical range. Next, the seven 
children with reflective functioning scores at the extreme lower end of the distribution 
were selected and their CDI and CBCL scores were examined; three reported CDI 
symptoms in the clinical range, five had CBCL Internalising scores in the clinical range 
and four had CBCL Externalising scores in the clinical range. This pattern suggests that 
children reflective functioning scores at the extreme upper and extreme lower ends of the 
distribution are more likely to display affective and behavioural difficulties.
Parental reports of children’s adaptive functioning (measured on the CAFAS) 
accounted for 10% of the variance in children’s performance on the AT Accuracy scale, 
6% of the variance in self-reflective-functioning (measured on the CRFS-Self scale) and 
7% of the variance in other-reflective-functioning (measured on the CRFS-Other scale). 
Furthermore, the findings of the regression analysis indicate that over and above age and 
intelligence, children’s adapative functioning explained an additional 6% of the variance 
in their understanding of which affects are likely to follow on particular situations 
(measured on the AT Accuracy scale).
Attachment Security and Theory o f Mind
As predicted, the findings of the three studies reflect a consistent pattern of 
associations between attachment security and primary school-aged children’s 
mentalisation abilities as measured on the HSS, AT and CRFS. This provides empirical 
support for the postulate that children’s mentalisation abilities are linked to attachment.
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Securely attached children, when compared with insecurely attached children of the same 
age and IQ, performed significantly better on the HSS. This suggests that security of 
attachment is associated with a greater ability to interpret the intentions of others and use 
this to understand what people really mean when they say something. Significant 
differences were also found in performance on the AT Justification scale, indicating that 
securely attached children were significantly more able to provide plausible explanations 
linking affective reactions and contexts, compared with insecure children of the same age 
and IQ. In addition, the self-reflective-fuhctiohing and other-reflective-functioning of 
securely attached children were found to be significantly higher than those of insecurely 
attached children.
Relationship between Performance on the HSS, A T  and CRFS
Significant positive correlations of medium strength were found between 
children’s theory of mind abilities (measured on the HSS), affective understanding 
(measured on the AT), and reflective functioning (measured on the CRFS). These 
findings confirmed the convergent validity of the HSS, AT and CRFS as measures of the 
construct of mentalisation.
New Findings and Theoretical Implications
When the findings of this study are considered together, they suggest that the 
propensity and ability of primary school-aged children to mentalise and think about the 
feelings and thoughts of others contribute to psychopathology and adaptive functioning.
Assessing the Theory o f Mind, Affective Understanding and Reflective Functioning o f  
Primary School-Aged Children
The psychometric properties of the HSS, AT and CRFS presented in this thesis 
provide strong and convincing evidence that it is possible to obtain reliable and valid 
assessments of children’s mentalisation abilities using the coding systems and manuals 
presented here.
Age, Gender and Family Factors
The lack of gender differences in the mentalisation abilities of the primary school- 
aged children identified in this study are in line with Saami’s (1999) conclusions. This 
finding is corroborated by other evidence that girls and boys do not differ when it comes 
to the ability to understand affect per se (Gross & Baliff, 1991; Strayer, 1989; Thompson 
1989). The findings of this study can be seen as providing additional evidence that there 
are no differences in the socio-cognitive abilities of boys and girls to understand affects,
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intentional communication and relationships. In this context, the common 
characterisations of girls as folk-psychologists and boys as folk-physicists (Baron-Cohen 
& Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen 2000a) can thus be seen as reflecting differences in 
motivation and specific areas of emotional competence, such as what Baron-Cohen 
(1997, 2001) has referred to as mindreading abilities, rather than differences in affective 
understanding perse.
With regard to age, the study findings confirm that the HSS is age-sensitive when 
used with primary school-aged children and indicate that theory of mind continues to 
increase in complexity during the period from age 5 to 11. This demonstrates that when 
theory of mind tests are at the appropriate level of difficulty for the age group under 
study, there is no evidence that theory of mind abilities reach a sudden plateau at the end 
of the pre-school years. In light of these findings, it seems clear that, as Baron-Cohen 
(2000b) argues, it was incorrect to conclude that theory of mind abilities are established 
by the end of the pre-school period due to the inappropriate use of first and second order 
theory of mind tests that were not sufficiently complex for use with older children. Part of 
the problem has been that it is much more challenging to construct appropriate tests of 
more complex socio-cognitive abilities. The findings of the present study confirm that 
Happe’s (1994) solution (testing theory of mind by assessing the ability to interpret 
examples of everyday speech and to understand the intentions of the speaker) presents an 
appropriate and ingenious response to this problem. It is remarkable that this test, 
theorised to reflect the theory of mind abilities of children aged 8 to 9 (Happe, 1994; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), was never, in fact, used with primary school-aged children. 
The results of this study confirm that theory of mind abilities continue to develop during 
the primary school years in a way that can be measured reliably, they suggest that it is 
possible to use the construct of theory of mind productively in further research with 
primary school-aged children. Given these findings and Baron-Cohen’s (2001) recent 
work on children’s ability to read the mind or mental states of others in their eyes and 
surrounding areas, it would seem that the time is right to accept the challenge and 
continue mapping the developmental path of children’s theory of mind abilities, this time 
with the focus on the primary school and adolescent years.
The present study has also provided evidence that during the primary school 
years, children’s understanding of the affective reactions of others in interpersonal 
contexts, becomes increasingly complex and interpersonal. These findings elaborate upon 
earlier findings showing that these abilities emerge at around age 8 (Harter & Whitesell, 
1989; Strayer, 1986; Wintre & Vallance, 1994). This study provides the first evidence of
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children’s reflective functioning and indicates that reflective functioning, in contrast with 
theory of mind and affective understanding, is an ability which begins to emerge only 
during the primary school years, it can thus be regarded a relatively late developmental 
acquisition. This is in line with theoretical supposition that reflective functioning is a 
complex ability and is never fully established, even after arriving at adulthood (Fonagy & 
Target, 2003). From a reflective functioning perspective, theory of mind abilities and 
affective understanding could well be viewed as developmental precursors of reflective 
functioning abilities, with the latter involving relatively more complex abilities. These 
abilities are required to comprehend the emotional significance of interpersonal processes 
and also the impact of emotions, expectations and beliefs on interpersonal processes.
The study findings also provide new and interesting evidence showing that the 
development of children’s mentalisation is associated with particular family factors, and 
can be seen as support for the model postulating that this ability develops in the context of 
processes within the family, rather than being primarily biologically and maturationally 
driven. The findings suggest that during the primary school years, the presence of 
siblings, with some exceptions, no longer impacts in a general way on the development of 
mentalisation abilities as measured by the HSS, AT and CRFS. This is not entirely 
surprising, given that the presence of schoolmates and peers provides opportunities for 
play and social-emotional learning and may help only children to catch up with children 
with siblings who had more such opportunities during the pre-school years. At the same 
time, the finding that primary school children with siblings were significantly better than 
only children at providing narrative explanations of why certain emotions will be evoked 
in particular interpersonal contexts, as measured by the AT Justification scale, provides 
evidence of how sensitive these abilities are to family factors and to opportunities to learn 
and practice. The findings indicate that children with siblings have a better command of 
the narratives explaining the links between interpersonal contexts and the emotional 
reactions evoked in these contexts. Harris (2000) has hypothesised that children learn 
these narratives through hearing parents and others repeat and elaborate their discussions 
of events that evoked emotional reactions. When this line of reasoning is applied to the 
current findings, it suggests that children with siblings have more opportunities to learn 
these narratives not only directly via interactions with their siblings, but also indirectly 
via observation of their parents interacting with their siblings. The fact that the presence 
of siblings does not have the same impact on theory of mind and reflective functioning 
abilities as on the ability to identify affects accurately suggests that there are different 
developmental pathways to the different dimensions of mentalisation.
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In addition, the findings showed an unexpected association between family 
composition and the mentalisation abilities of the primary school-aged children in this 
sample. Contrary to expectation, children living in single-parent families, compared with 
children from two-parent families showed significantly better theory of mind 
understanding on the HSS, and better self reflective functioning on the CRFS-Self scale. 
These results were unexpected, as living in single-parent families has frequently been 
found to be associated with increased risk and negative impact on child development, 
especially when associated with poverty (Luthar, 1999). In addition, children with 
caregivers who were not formally employed also had significantly higher self reflective 
functioning than children with working caregivers. These findings require replication and 
further investigation in order to elucidate the mediators accounting for this association. A 
possible explanation is that in the absence of a co-parent or adult partner, single mothers 
demand more from children in terms of their understanding of adult communication that 
is non-literal, and that this stimulates the development of children’s ability to understand 
this type of communication.
The finding that children with mothers who were not formally employed, and who 
were described as homemakers, had significantly higher self reflective functioning on the 
CRFS-Self scale is also challenging to account for as there is no existing data specifically 
related to the impact of interactions with parents on the development of children’s self- 
awareness during the primary school years. A possible explanation is that children have 
more opportunities for interaction and conversations with stay-at-home mothers. It may 
be that these interactions in close relationships provide children with more personal 
feedback and thus facilitate the elaboration of their self representation. Given Youngblade 
and Dunn’s (1995) conclusion that access to older people and older siblings contributes to 
the development of affective understanding, there is reason to believe that not only the 
quality, but also the quantity, of interactions are important. As Harris (2000) has 
theorised, opportunities to express and converse with parents, especially about emotional 
reactions, help children to work out the psychological significance of situations, and to 
encode the material in a coherent way, and to develop coherent narratives. The same 
argument can be expected to apply to the development of self reflective functioning and 
to the development of a concept of self. One explanation of the findings is that mothers 
who do not have formal employment may spend more time interacting with their children, 
and this may in turn contribute, via the processes described above, to the development 
and elaboration of self representations and narratives regarding the self. An alternative 
explanation is that mothers who do not have formal employment have made a particular
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choice to be “home-makers” and that this reflects an orientation towards family and 
children which can be expected to be associated with the maternal characteristics and 
child-focused behaviours that facilitate children’s self development and self-awareness.
Psychopathology and Childrens Mentalisation Abilities
The findings of the present study reflect an interesting relationship between 
children’s mentalisation abilities and psychopathology; they suggest that when theory of 
mind tests are used which are appropriately pitched to the age group under study, it is 
possible to observe sufficient variability in children’s mentalisation abilities so as to 
identify links with psychopathology. At the same time, the findings from this study 
suggest that intelligence accounts for much of the variance shared by psychopathology 
and children’s mentalisation abilities, a fact that has been largely overlooked in previous 
studies of psychopathology and children’s mentalisation abilities. It may be argued that 
intelligence is important primarily because it facilitates socio-cognitive abilities, and that 
we should simply focus on the relationship between the latter and psychopathology. At 
the same time, approaches that ignore the role of intelligence may contribute to an 
overestimation of the role of socio-cognitive abilities. Even more seriously, this may lead 
to the simplistic conclusion that programs to facilitate affective understanding are likely 
to ameliorate behavioural and other difficulties, without considering the role of factors 
such as intelligence, and the implications this may have for intervention strategies. More 
specifically, the question arises as to how children with lower verbal intelligence learn, 
which raises the related question concerning the effectiveness of using language based 
interventions.
The findings reflect relationships of medium and low strength between children’s 
mentalisation abilities (as assessed on the measures used in this study) and child-reports 
of depressive symptoms. In addition to age and IQ, child-reports of symptoms of both 
depression and anxiety predicted children’s theory of mind abilities (their capacity to 
understand the intentions of others as reflected in everyday speech) as well their affective 
understanding (understanding which affects are likely to follow on particular 
interpersonal situations). At this point, we have to be content with speculating about 
causality and pathways, given that symptomatology and theory of mind were concurrently 
assessed, and that data was not collected regarding other risk factors for childhood 
depression and anxiety.
There are a number of possible explanations that are not mutually exclusive. It is 
quite conceivable that when children have difficulties understanding the intentions of 
others in everyday exchanges, they are less popular and effective in the social world and
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that this in turn contributes to feelings of rejection, depression and anxiety. Deficits in 
theory of mind may also make it more difficult for children to recover from adverse 
family circumstances or abusive parental relationships, as Fonagy and Target (2003) 
suggest. Another, not incompatible, explanation is that developmental factors known or 
hypothesised to be implicated in the development of theory of mind overlap with risk 
factors for childhood depression and anxiety. This is illustrated by previous findings that 
mothers with anxiety disorder, known to be a risk factor for childhood depression, are less 
able to recognise and respond to the intentional acts of their children (Feldman & 
Reznick, 1996). Explanations focused on intentionality alone are inevitably simplistic, 
given that multiple risk factors involving the level of the child, parent and context are 
known to be implicated in childhood depression. It also seems inadequate to explain the 
impact of, for example, profound parental hostility or parental depression on children’s 
emotional development, in these terms.
The findings also indicate that depressed children are less able to provide narrative 
justifications of specific affects are elicited by different situations. There is relatively little 
research explicitly addressing the relationship between depression and affective 
understanding. One possible explanation of the association between affective 
understanding and depression is that the same adverse family factors, child and parent 
factors contribute to both low affective understanding and depression, but that, 
subsequently, lowered affective understanding contributes to maintaining depression. 
Another possibility is that the lower scores reflect decreased motivation and anhedonia, or 
impaired thinking due to anxiety. It may be that the lower performance on these scales is 
a temporary phenomenon associated with a depressive episode, rather than a 
characteristic of the child. This hypothesis would need to be excluded by testing the same 
children after the depression has resolved.
With regard to adaptive functioning, the findings indicate that there was a weak to 
moderate relationship between parental reports of children’s adaptive functioning and:
1) children’s understanding of the affects likely to be evoked in particular contexts, and;
2) their reflective functioning. These findings provide further evidence in support of the 
theoretical conclusions that children’s mentalisation abilities are associated with adaptive 
functioning. The ability to identify affects following upon common emotion evoking 
circumstances was found to be related to adult reports of behavioural difficulties. This 
suggests that children who have not mastered the basic tools for thinking about affective 
and interpersonal situations are at increased risk of difficulties in the key domains of 
adaptation. The finding with regard to the link between social adaptation and affective
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understanding are in line with the growing body of evidence that affective understanding 
contributes to social competence and predicts peer status (Denham, 1998; Walden, et al.,
1992). Affective understanding is also thought to be associated with the more frequent 
use of emotion state language (Denham, 1989), and this can be seen as helping children to 
regulate and influence interpersonal relationships and the emotional states of others 
through teasing, negotiation, requesting and joking (Dunn, Brown & Beardsall, 1991). It 
may also be that the same family, parental and child factors which facilitate affective 
understanding are associated with other skills that facilitate adaptive functioning and 
emotional adaptation, such as affect regulation, emotional expressiveness, executive and 
impulse control, lack of negative affectivity, empathy and a general pro-social attitude.
After considering the effects of children’s age and attachment security, 
psychopathology and social adaptation did not add significantly to the prediction of 
performance on the CRFS. Further exploration of these findings revealed that in this 
sample of children referred to mental health clinics, some children with high reflective 
functioning also had high levels of affective and behavioural difficulties, suggesting that 
what can be referred to as hyper reflectiveness is not a sign of mental health in children. 
These findings suggest that it is possible to have a highly elaborated type of reflective 
functioning which is morbid or twisted. It remains to be determined whether this high, but 
disturbed, reflective functioning is the result of trying to deal intellectually with very 
difficult life situations or the result of internalised distorted narratives or disturbed mind- 
mindedness on the part of parents, as for example in the case of children who grow up 
with mothers with borderline personality disorder. At the same time, this finding that 
children with high reflective functioning also had behavioural difficulties, is more 
difficult to integrate into the theoretical model that sees the quality of affective 
understanding as the product of the same developmental processes considered to establish 
affect regulation. The identification of children with high reflective functioning and high 
levels of interpersonal aggression would be even more challenging to integrate into the 
theoretical model of reflective functioning. The results of this study suggest that children 
with exceptionally high reflective functioning may also have behaviour problems. This 
requires further exploration investigation in order to assess the context and the type of 
behaviour difficulties, as oppositional behaviour towards parents is much easier to 
accommodate at a theoretical level than violence towards others.
Behavioural Difficulties, The findings of this study indicate that there were weak 
inverse relationships between children’s behavioural difficulties and: 1) their theory of 
mind abilities as measured by the Happ£, and 2) their understanding of the affects likely
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to be evoked by particular situations as measured on the AT Accuracy scale. However, 
behavioural difficulties did not make significant contribution to the prediction of 
children’s mentalisation abilities, in addition to age and IQ.
The findings are in line with previous research showing an inverse relationship 
between antisocial behaviour and emotional understanding (Miller and Eisenberg, 1988) 
and with the finding that children with conduct disorder had significant deficits in 
emotional understanding as assessed by the Kusche Affective Interview (Kusche et al., 
1988). Despite the lack of Significant findings reported by Happe and U. Frith (1996) 
with regard to theory of mind and conduct disorder, the findings of the present study 
indicate that when tests of appropriate difficulty are used, such as the HSS, relationships 
between theory of mind and behavioural difficulties can be detected.
At the same time, the relationship between behavioural difficulties and theory of 
mind and affective understanding is weak, with children’s socio-cognitive abilities 
accounting for no more than 7% of the variance in children’s behavioural difficulties. 
This indicates that other factors account for the largest proportion of the variance in 
behaviour problems. As hypothesised by Klin et al. (2000), social competence involves 
multiple skills, both primitive and sophisticated, which have to act synergistically and 
which include the ability to process rapidly-shifting facial expressions, voice inflections 
and posture at an automatic, immediate and intuitive level. It may thus be that methods 
used to assess affective understanding skills in laboratory situations reflect a gross 
underestimation of the skills demanded by real-life emotional and social interactions, 
such as when children are teased and provoked by peers and there is the potential threat of 
humiliation. Another explanation, as suggested by LeDoux (1996), is that there are both 
a fast and dirty route to processing emotions, and a slower more reflective route. It is 
possible that the former is more relevant than the latter when it comes to behaviour 
problems, but that it is the reflective route that is assessed by the instruments presented 
here. As suggested by the research of Denham (1998) and Henshaw and Melnick (1995), 
the fast and dirty route proposed by LeDoux, may be more influenced by factors such as 
temperament and impulsivity, emotional intensity, aggressivity and negativity.
The findings of Dodge et al. (1984) that unpopular children tend to display 
negative attributional biases whereby they misinterpret prosocial intentions as being 
negative may be relevant to the present study. This may be because of early exposure to 
trauma and environments which promote anger, fear and hyperactivity (Dodge et al., 
1997) or because of positive aggressive role models (Dodge, 1991). It could be that some 
children with behavioural difficulties have good mentalisation abilities and are able to use
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these when in neutral experimental situations, but that their appraisal of intentions is 
disturbed. Thus, their interpretation of interpersonal intentions becomes negatively 
coloured by harsh family environments. Experiences of neglect or abuse by parents may 
have left these children with a relational schema in which aggressive relationships are the 
order of the day. There is also the possibility that attachment disorganisation accounts for 
why some children have good theory of mind, affective understanding and reflective 
functioning but decompensate in interpersonal contexts, becoming aggressive and violent 
when, for example, they feel rejected, humiliated or threatened. As suggested by 
Fonagy and Target (2003), it may be possible to acquire a superficial understanding of 
others using intellectual abilities, despite a self structure that is severely compromised.
Another hypothesis is that some children have the ability to understand the 
feelings and intentions of other, but, as suggested by Blair (1995), they lack empathic 
abilities, or have a theory of bad minds where they take pleasure in hurting others, as 
suggested by Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) and Happ6 and U. Frith (1996). Rather than 
having the pro-social goals that are commonly assumed to be associated with the ability 
to understand the affects and mental states of others, these children may have different 
goals and thus take pleasure in the distress of others. Richters and Cicchetti (1993) have 
suggested that in disenfranchised communities where violence is common there may be 
deviant pathways to social acceptance where aggression and brutality is glorified and 
admire. In these contexts, affective understanding may include different rules and 
attitudes toward violence and aggression than in mainstream culture, and children may 
use a complex set of double standards whereby affective understanding is used in certain 
contexts and suppressed in others.
In sum, the implications are that impulse control problem, negative appraisal, a 
theory of bad minds or a lack of empathy are at the root of the behavioural difficulties of 
these children.
Mentalisation, Intelligence and Expressive Language Abilities
The findings of this study demonstrate that when children’s theory of mind, 
affective understanding and reflective functioning are evaluated using the interview-based 
assessment methodologies presented here, children’s mentalisation emerges as an ability 
in its own right not unduly determined by intelligence and expressive language abilities. 
The findings indicate that, as expected, intelligence and expressive language abilities 
contribute to children’s theory of mind, affective understanding and reflective 
functioning. At the same time, the study findings put to rest the empirically based 
concerns that socio-cognitive abilities reflect little more than intelligence. It provides
258
additional weight to the small, but growing body of research, such as that of Jones and 
Day (1997), Lee et al. (2000), as well as Wong et al. (1995), indicating that it is possible 
to distinguish social intelligence from academic intelligence. It is thus of note that verbal 
intelligence accounted for 24% of variance in children’s theory of mind abilities (as 
assessed by the HSS) and 16% of the accuracy in their knowledge of which affects follow 
certain situations (on the AT Accuracy scale), but a much smaller percentage of the 
variance of more complex mentalisation abilities. Intelligence accounted for at the most 
7% of the variance in children’s ability to explain the causes of affective reaction in 
interpersonal contexts (on the AT Justification scale) and also their mental state thinking 
regarding themselves and their close relationships (on the CRFS).
One explanation of this pattern, as suggested by Klin et al. (2000) and also by 
Tager-Flusberg (2000), is that intelligent children can “hack out” solutions to theory of 
mind and other tests. These solutions are less likely to work on the AT Justification scale 
and on the CRFS, because the latter is specifically designed to make raters aware of 
canned and intellectual answers and rewards more complex answers containing references 
to interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions of experience. In general, the findings that 
intelligence makes a significant contribution to children’s mentalisation abilities are not 
surprising; they are in line with the expectation that intelligence facilitates the process of 
making sense of mental phenomena. These results also raise the question of the role 
played attachment. Fonagy (1997), Fonagy and Target (2003), H. Steele, et al. (1999), 
Meins et al. (1988), hypothesise that attachment history becomes an important when 
children are called on to consider more complex attributes of affects, both in interpersonal 
contexts and within themselves. The findings of this study which show that children’s 
mentalisation abilities are also associated with attachment security, provides general 
confirmation of this hypothesis.
The findings regarding the relationship between children’s mentalisation abilities 
and expressive language abilities are interesting, but difficult to interpret due to their 
complexity. Children’s expressive language abilities explained approximately 16% of the 
variance in their performance on the HSS, and 14% of the variance in their self reflective 
functioning. When it is considered that expressive language abilities were shown to be 
associated with attachment in the meta-analysis of attachment studies by van IJzendoom 
et al. (1999), this raises the question of whether expressive language abilities are also an 
index of attachment. An alternative and not mutually exclusive explanation is that 
expressive language abilities are an index of the narrative processes theorised to underlie 
the development of children mentalisation capacities. These abilities may be particularly
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important for self-reflective-functioning and for interpreting the intentions of the speaker 
in speech acts as assessed by the HSS, and less important for affective understanding as 
assessed by the AT. The finding that the ability to interpret the intentions of the speaker 
was related language abilities may reflect a deeper relationship between these abilities, as 
suggested by Sigman and Ruskin’s (1999) finding that the interest of infants in intentional 
communication predicted later language acquisition. According to Tager-Flusberg (2000), 
this is because early word learning depends on the interpretation of words and 
communicative gestures as intentional acts. As suggested by the work of Bretherton 
(1991), Trevarthen (1980), Fonagy, H. Steele, Moran et al. (1991), and Meins et al., 
(1998) it may also be that the quality of the intersubjective exchanges between the parent 
and child, and the parent’s contingent response to the child’s intentional actions, 
facilitates the development expressive language abilities and contributes to the 
development of self and agency.
Mentalisation and Attachment
The findings of this study show that primary school-aged children’s mentalisation 
abilities, whether assessed from the perspectives of theory of mind, affective 
understanding or reflective functioning, are closely associated with their attachment 
security. These findings provide further empirical support for the theoretical model that 
the development of children’s mentalisation abilities is closely related to attachment 
security. It provides new evidence that this is also the case for the primary school years. 
These findings build on earlier findings showing that attachment security predict theory 
of mind performance and understanding of mixed emotions at the end of the pre-school 
years (Fonagy, 1997; Meins, et al., 1998; H. Steele et al., 1997). They also provide new 
evidence indicating that securely attached children maintain advantages (demonstrated for 
the pre-school years) over a range of dimensions of mentalisation, including theory of 
mind, affective understanding and reflective functioning, on into the primary school 
years. As Fonagy (1997) hypothesised, securely attached children may, in part, develop 
superior theory of mind abilities because they feel at liberty to explore the minds of others 
and engage more frequently in pretend play and parent-child discussions involving mental 
states.
At the same time, the maternal factors which facilitate security of attachment, such 
as maternal “mind-mindedness” (Meins, 1997), or reflective functioning (Fonagy & 
Target, 2003) are also likely to facilitate parent-child emotion focused discussions which 
contribute to the development of children’s mentalisation abilities (Dunn, 1988; Fonagy, 
H. Steele, Moran et al., 1991; Slade, et al., 1999). The mother’s perception of the child as
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mentalising and her propensity to attribute intentionality to the infant and consider the 
infant's internal states, is considered to be a central factor in children’s attachment 
security. Mothers with these abilities, as suggested by Harris (2000), are also likely to 
engage their children in conversations rich in mental state talk and thus provide 
explanations of emotional reactions to situations. Securely attached children are then 
more likely to have the opportunities to learn the narratives regarding how affects work, 
and when and why certain emotions are evoked. Harris argues that these narratives act 
like scaffolding to help children organise their thinking about mental states. Parent-child 
narratives, and parental affect focused explanations and elaborations have been shown to 
be central in laying the foundation of subsequent memory structures (Bruner, 1990; 
Fivush et al., 1996), and to forming the conception of the self (Crittenden, 1994; Nelson,
1993). In their model, parent-child narratives become internalised and form the basis of 
both the perception of the self and various memory systems that are then used for the 
appraisal and interpretation of mental state phenomena.
The present study provides further evidence of the link between attachment 
security and development. At this stage, we can only speculation regarding the 
developmental processes underlying this association; it is unclear whether the advantages 
in mentalisation of securely attached children can be accounted for mainly in terms of 
parent-child narrative processes, or from earlier parent-infant processes..
The findings of this study leads to the following conclusions: 1) the measures have 
promising reliability; 2) children's mentalisation abilities are related to intelligence, 
expressive language abilities and attachment; 3) family composition is associated with 
differences in children’s mentalisation abilities, with different factors impacting on 
distinct aspects of mentalisation and sometimes in unexpected ways, suggesting that 
simple conclusions cannot be drawn in this regard; 4) performance on the HSS and AT 
are related to child psychopathology and adaptation; 5) the findings draw attention to the 
importance of a specific ability that up to now has not been focused on in this age group, 
namely children’s capacity to consider the intentions of the speaker when making sense 
of communication; 6) children’s reflective functioning appears to have a complex 
relationship with affective and behavioural difficulties; it may be that children with 
exceptionally low as well as exceptionally high reflective functioning are more likely to 
have affective and behavioural difficulties, although this requires further exploration.
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Limitations o f the Research
This thesis was undertaken with the primary aim of investigating whether or not 
the mentalisation abilities of primary school-aged children could be assessed in a reliable 
and valid way using the HSS, AT and CRFS. While the findings are promising, a number 
of important limitations need to be noted. In the discussion that follows, issues relating to 
internal validity will be addressed first. In this respect the questions of the reliability of 
the measures, selection of subjects, mortality and instrumentation change, and how this 
impacted on internal validity, will be considered. The question of statistical validity will 
then be discussed in relation to the sample sizes used in the studies reported on in this 
thesis.
With respect to sample selection, a number of issues need to be addressed. Firstly, 
the fact that HSS and CRFS data were only available for children from the referred 
sample imposes a number of limitations on the interpretation of the study findings. The 
HSS was introduced relatively late in the study and the Child Attachment Interview, 
which was used to code child reflective functioning, was still under development during 
the first part of the study. This accounts for why data for these measures are only 
available for the referred sample. The present results with respect to reliability are 
promising in that they suggest that children’s theory of mind, affective understanding and 
reflective functioning can be rated reliably using the coding manuals presented as part of 
this thesis. At the same time, it should be noted that the findings regarding the scale 
properties of the HSS and CRFS were obtained using a sample of children referred to 
mental health services. This raises the question as to whether or not the same results 
would be obtained with a normal sample. This is also the case for test-retest reliability 
results, and it could well be that the use of a normal sample will answer some of the 
questions regarding the test-retest results of the HSS.
The sample composition and study design were not optimal for establishing 
relationships between mentalisation abilities and other variables, such as intelligence, 
expressive language abilities, psychopathology and adaptation, making the interpretation 
of the current findings tentative. The relationship between intelligence and performance 
on the HSS and CRFS was investigated only in referred children. In addition, the range in 
terms of the presence and severity of psychopathology included in the present sample was 
probably too narrow to be optimal for the investigation of the relationship between 
mentalisation abilities and psychopathology. Two factors contributed to this problem, the
262
first being that, for the studies focusing on the HSS and CRFS, data was not available for 
children from the school sample. At the same time, the sample was not specifically 
selected to include children with significant levels of psychopathology. Only 25% of the 
families referred to mental health services and who met the selection criteria agreed to 
participate in the study; it is thus possible that high-risk families or children with more 
severe levels of psychopathology are under-represented in the present sample. The small 
number of children with symptoms of depression in the clinical range in the study 
focusing on the CRFS, illustrates this problem. As a result, it is not possible to conclude 
whether or not there is a relationship between child reflective functioning and symptoms 
of depression.
The samples recruited for the current thesis, especially the sample recruited from 
child referrals to mental health services, are largely representative in terms of the ethnic 
composition of the greater London area. One of the criteria for inclusion in the study was 
fluency in English; thus, children from certain ethnic backgrounds, including many recent 
immigrants, were excluded from study participation. Also, few children from ethnic 
minorities such as Indian and Pakistani populations participated in the study. This limits 
the extent to which the findings of this dissertation regarding primary school-aged 
children’s mentalisation abilities can be generalised to these and other minority 
populations. While there are, at present, no obvious reasons why the interviews would 
not be appropriate for use with children from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds in 
cosmopolitan contexts such as that of London, more thought needs to be given to the 
possible cultural influences impacting on children’s performance on these measures. For 
example, in traditional cultures that demand a formal style of address between children 
and parents, children may be much more reluctant to talk openly about their relationships 
with their parents because of the cultural norms of politeness in this regard. In these 
contexts, it could be conceivably difficult to distinguish between that which children are 
simply not permitted to express, and the inhibition of expression or thinking about 
significant relationships in mental state terms. Cultural norms may also influence whether 
or not children are at ease to share their thoughts with older interviewers or interviewers 
from other cultures. In communities which have been under threat of political violence, 
strangers who ask questions may be regarded suspiciously and the type of interview used 
here is also likely to produce a compromised reflection of children’s abilities. It would 
therefore be important to consider these influences when interviews such as the CAI are 
used to assess the reflective functioning of children from communities with different 
recent political histories as well as different cultural norms and practices.
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The issue of missing data was addressed earlier in this thesis. The late 
introduction of measures such as the HSS, as well as the fact that the CAI and AT were 
being developed during the first part of the study, contributed, in part, to this problem. 
The lengthy interview process also contributed to the problem; it required families to be 
patient, compliant and sufficiently well organised, given that three meetings generally 
were required to complete the interviews. This proved particularly difficult for children 
and families recruited from the referred sample. In response to this situation, the AMOS 
programme was used to optimise the HSS and CRFS data set; it used data estimates for 
missing data based on structural equation modelling. Very similar results were found 
using the smaller HSS sample with full data and the larger sample in which missing data 
was replaced with estimated data; this provides further support for the conclusion that this 
method of dealing with missing data is reliable and definitely preferable to the alternative 
of discarding these cases because of missing data.
With regard to statistical validity given the sample sizes, the small sample with 
CAI and CRFS data did, in fact, lead to situations in which the study lacked the power to 
detect weak relationships. This was the case when examining the relationship between 
child reflective functioning, intelligence and expressive language abilities. It is expected 
that significant correlations of a low strength will be found using a larger sample. In light 
of these difficulties, the results of this study should be considered as somewhat tentative. 
This also applies to the analyses relating to depression; too few children were classified as 
clinically depressed to be able to draw conclusions from this sample.
The small sample with CELF-R data limited the analyses which could be 
performed to investigate the relationship between children’s expressive language abilities 
and their mentalisation abilities as measured by the HSS, AT and CRFS. Only 
preliminary analyses could be undertaken to examine the relationship between expressive 
language abilities and mentalisation abilities, and the small sample size meant that weak 
relationships could not be detected. In view of the small sample sizes that were used to 
investigate the scale properties of the HSS and CRFS, and were also used to establish the 
test-retest reliability of the measures, the positive findings reported in this regard need to 
be considered with some caution until further replication with a larger sample.
At the level of measurement, one limitation of the present study was the fact that 
psychopathology data was based on child- and parent-report data, and that it was not 
possible to obtain assessments of psychopathology by mental health specialists using 
research interviews that have been designed for this purpose. Given that the data on 
children’s intelligence and mentalisation abilities was obtained using objective
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assessments, the use of psychopathology data obtained using a similar method would 
have reduced the impact of respondent and method variance. This would also have 
provided more reliable data with regard to the presence of child psychopathology.
Because the data on children’s behavioural difficulties was based only on parent- 
reports, this may have limited the sensitivity of data in this domain. The inclusion of 
information obtained from multiple sources, including peer reports and teacher reports, 
would have been preferable. The Teacher Report Form of the CBCL was initially 
included in the study interview battery, but the return rate was so low that it was not 
possible to use this data. The fact that children were recruited from referrals to mental 
health services, and thus came from many different schools, contributed to this problem, 
as these schools had not been canvassed with regard to study participation and were thus 
not in a position to release information about students. For similar reasons the inclusion 
of peer assessments of social and behavioural difficulties was not considered feasible. It 
remains to be seen whether there is a creative solution for this type of problem. Mental 
health specialists using clinical research interviews and collateral information from 
teachers may be able to make a sufficiently reliable assessment of children’s 
psychopathology and adaptation difficulties.
Other measures would have been considered for inclusion in the study if it was 
possible to go back to the drawing board with additional resources and plan a similar 
study again. The inclusion of Baron-Cohen’s Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (2001) 
would have provided an opportunity to investigate the relationships between children’s 
socio-cognitive abilities (as measured by the HSS, AT and CRFS) and their ability to 
identify people’s state of mind through the interpretation of the expression in their eyes 
and the surrounding areas of their faces. Furthermore, the inclusion of the Kusche 
Affective Interview (Kusche et al., 1988), would have made it possible to determine if 
performance on the AT converges with performance on the former measure and to 
compare both the measures with regard to their relationships with intelligence and 
sensitivity to psychopathology. The Kusche Affective Interview appears to be principally 
a measure of crystallised socio-cognitive abilities and, possibly, intelligence. The AT, in 
contrast, is likely to involve more fluid socio-cognitive capacities. The latter hypotheses 
require further investigation. As it was, the interview battery was already exceedingly 
time consuming, and the inclusion of additional measures might well have contributed to 
higher attrition rates. Longer interviews may also have threatened the integrity of the data 
being collected, with children losing motivation to engage with the tasks. Thus, the 
decision was made to focus on the development of measures of mentalisation.
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Directions fo r Future Research
The results of the present study are promising and suggest that children’s 
mentalisation abilities can be reliably assessed from theory of mind, affective 
understanding and reflective functioning perspectives. Furthermore, the study findings 
support the conclusion that the HSS, AT and CRFS provide valid measurements of 
children’s mentalisation abilities from theory of mind, affective understanding and 
reflective functioning perspectives. The findings of the three studies presented in this 
thesis confirmed that children’s mentalisation abilities, as assessed by the HSS, AT and 
CRFS, although related to intelligence, are distinct abilities. Associations between 
attachment security and mentalisation abilities were apparent across the different 
assessment approaches. Relationships between mentalisation abilities and both child- 
reports of depression and anxiety, and parent-reports of children’s adaptive functioning, 
were identified in spite of the fact that different methods were used in assessing 
psychopathology and children’s mentalisation abilities. This methodological limitation 
could have been expected to reduce the chances of finding relationships between 
psychopathology and mentalisation, because of the method variance introduced. These 
findings are thus very promising and provide general support for the construct and 
discriminatory validity of these three measures of mentalisation. The relationships 
between performance on the HSS, AT and CRFS also reflect good concurrent and 
convergent validity when mentalisation is assessed using these three different measures. 
The findings provide support for the argument that is possible to conduct scientifically 
meaningful and reliable investigations of children’s mentalisation abilities. The 
interesting pattern of results, especially in relation to psychopathology, suggests that 
further investigations are warranted. Accordingly, priorities for future research will be 
presented.
Replication o f Reliability Study
The first priority is the replication of the reliability studies to determine whether or 
not the findings of the present studies, with respect to interrater reliability, and internal 
consistency, can be replicated with a larger sample. With regard to the CRFS, it remains 
to be determined if the Self and Other factor structure that was identified in this thesis 
will be found to be robust and will be replicated with another sample. Similarly, the good 
test-retest results of the CRFS require replication with a larger sample.
With regard to the HSS and AT, it is still unclear why their test-retest reliability 
and stability over time was much lower than those of the CRFS. In the case of the HSS, 
further investigations using children recruited from schools or a community sample, and
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who have lower levels of psychopathology than the sample used here, may help explain 
why theory of mind abilities appear to be more state like than was expected, especially 
over shorter periods. The collection of additional information regarding life events could 
help to clarify whether this contributes to variation in a child’s motivation to think in 
mental state terms.
The findings with respect to the relationships between intelligence and both theory 
of mind abilities and reflective functioning also require replication with a sample that 
includes children recruited from the community or from schools in order to represent a 
wider range in terms of the presence or absence of psychopathology. Now that it has been 
demonstrated that it is possible to obtain reliable assessments of children’s mentalisation 
abilities using the manuals presented here, an important next step would be to conduct a 
factor analytic study using a similar methodology to that of Wong et al. (1995) and Jones 
and Day (1997).
In addition, the assessment of child psychopathology data based on clinical 
research interviews, rather than self- and parent-reports, is considered to be a priority for 
a future study of the relationship between children’s mentalisation abilities and 
psychopathology. This will not only lead to increased reliability of the child 
psychopathology data, but will also reduce method variance.
Further Development o f Measures o f Children’s Mentalisation
The low test-retest reliability of the AT Challenge, Impact and Internal/External 
scales suggests that, at present, the method for assessing these aspects of children’s 
affective understanding is not optimal and that further work at this level of scale 
development is required. In retrospect, it may be that assessing these abilities in a semi- 
structured way, in the context of children’s responses to the Accuracy and Justification 
questions, introduced unnecessary variation in the ways these abilities were addressed by 
the interviewers. Also, in an effort to explore these abilities in a more conversational 
way, the questions used to rate Challenge, Impact and Internal/External were asked in the 
context of the child’s responses, but this also meant that the emotions these questions 
were asked about, depended on the child’s narrative. The fact that the questions were not 
asked about the same emotions may have contributed to the low stability of performance 
on scales like the Impact scale. It is known, for example, that children struggle much 
more when considering the resolution of negative affects. The introduction of a more 
standard way of testing children’s understanding of the resolution of negative affects 
seems feasible and may well contribute to more useful and reliable results. The same 
applies to the Challenge and Internal/External scales. With regard to the Internal/External
267
scale, a clear emphasis on the understanding of emotional display rules, rather than on the 
more general understanding that it is possible to feel one feeling and show another, may 
also improve the reliability and validity of this scale. In sum, what is being suggested is 
that it may be possible to improve the test-retest reliability of the AT Challenge, Impact 
and Internal/External scales by using specific scenarios to assess these abilities, rather 
than assessing these important capacities in the context of children’s responses to the AT 
Justification questions. In addition, further research on the convergent validity of the AT 
and the Kusche Affective Interview (Kusche et al., 1988) is called for.
With regard to the CRFS, the question of children who seem to show 
exceptionally high reflective functioning and fall at the extreme upper end of the normal 
distribution, is intriguing and demands further examination. It possible that further scale 
development could take into account the positive arid negative valences of the affects and 
attributes used in describing the self and relationships this might help to unravel the 
apparent mystery of high reflective functioning being associated with psychopathology.
Theory o f Mind, Affective Understanding, Reflective Functioning and Mind-Reading
The inclusion of Baron-Cohen’s (2001) new Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task in 
future studies of children’s mentalisation abilities will provide an opportunity to explore 
to what extent, if any, children’s cognitive ability to understand the mental and affective 
states of others is associated with mind-reading abilities. It may also be possible to 
identify more naturalistic methods for assessing children’s ability to understand mental 
states and affects in everyday interactions when they have to process interpret and 
integrate information coming from multiple sources. Such a study would thus permit the 
investigation of how abilities involving different levels of penetration into the minds of 
others (Whiten, 1994) are linked. This would also provide an opportunity to determine if 
cognitive abilities are linked with mind-reading abilities, and the ability to understand the 
meaning of communication as it happens in everyday situations (where what is said 
verbally may convey a different message than what is said by the eyes, the posture, and 
tone of voice).
Mentalisation and Disorganised Attachment
The findings that children’s mentalisation abilities, as assessed from the 
perspectives of theory of mind, affective understanding and reflective functioning are 
associated with attachment security underscores the important links between attachment 
and mentalisation. Further work exploring the impact of attachment disorganisation is 
called for.
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Interactions between Mentalisation Abilities and Other Child Factors
Further research is also needed to clarify the developmental interactions between 
the mentalisation abilities assessed in this study and other child factors that have been 
identified in the literature as salient in terms of their contribution to psychopathology i.e., 
empathy, temperament, negative affect, executive control and impulsivity.
Family and Parental Factors
The present study focused mainly on child factors, and the relationships between 
different dimensions of children’s functioning, including theory of mind, affective 
understanding, reflective functioning, cognitive abilities, language skills and 
psychopathology. The finding that family composition impacts on primary school-aged 
children’s mentalisation abilities, underscores how sensitive the development of 
mentalisation abilities are to various family factors. The hypotheses regarding the 
mechanisms and processes that are the most critical for the development of children’s 
mentalisation abilities require verification. The inclusion of the following assessments, in 
addition to the child measures uses, could help to clarify the relationship between the 
parent’s engagement in behaviours known to contribute to children’s mentalisation 
abilities, and the parent’s capacity see the child in terms of his intentions, affects and 
mental states: 1) assessments of parent’s identification of children’s intentional behaviour 
and their contingent responses to this behaviour, as well as of parental engagement in 
pretend play and emotional discourse; these assessments would be based on naturalistic 
observation as used by Dunn (1988); 2) assessment of parental aggression, coercion and 
humiliation of the child; 3) parent measures which can be used to assess the complexity 
and quality of the parent’s representation of the child, such as the Parent Development 
Interview-Revised (PDI-R: Slade, Aber, Mayes, Target & Blatt, 2000).
A study focusing on sexually abused children is currently underway at Laval 
University, Quebec City, Canada; in this study the PDI is being used to obtain 
information on the parent’s mentalisation about the child. Preliminary results indicate that 
parental reflective functioning and representations interact with sexual abuse in the 
prediction of psychopathology.
Psychopathology
In light of the findings of this study that there is a relationship between child 
psychopathology and both theory of mind abilities, and affective understanding, this 
needs to be explored further in studies specially designed for this purpose. Ideally, such a 
study would include both children recruited from a normal sample and children with 
diagnosed psychopathology, possibly matched in terms of socio-economic background
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and intelligence.
The lack of significant findings in the present study with regard to behavioural 
difficulties also requires further consideration. It has been suggested that the use of 
parent-reports which are open to the impact of parental psychopathology, and distortions 
in parental representations of their children contributed to the lack of significant results. 
Assessment by teachers and peers or observations undertaken by researchers at home and 
at school may provide a more reliable indicator of behavioural and adaptation difficulties. 
Data on children’s behaviour in different contexts, obtained from multiple informants and 
using multiple methods, including direct observation, is necessary in order to obtain a 
more reliable picture of the relationship between children’s mentalisation abilities, as 
presented in this thesis, and specific externalising difficulties, including negative 
affectivity and poor impulse control in social settings. Accordingly, the inclusion of a 
measure of executive control (Posner & Rothbart, 2000) would help to elucidate the 
relationship between the mentalisation abilities presented in this thesis and self- 
regulation, an ability which has been identified as particularly relevant in terms of 
children’s efficacy and self-regulation in social contexts. Ideally, such a study would 
identify the contributions of mentalisation abilities, as assessed in this thesis, and 
executive control, as well as directly test more specific hypotheses that a theory of bad 
minds (Happe and U. Frith, 1996), deficits in empathy (Blair et al., 1996), negative 
attributional biases in the interpretation of the intentions of others (Dodge et al., 1984), 
and attachment disorganisation (Moss & St-Laurent, 1999) are implicated in conduct 
problems.
The findings from the current study suggest that there is a link between both 
depressive and anxiety, and theory of mind ability as reflected in children’s ability to 
consider the intentions of others in communication. However, it remains to be shown if 
affective symptomatology is also linked more generally to children’s ability to see 
themselves in intentional terms and to take an intentional stance. Given that the aim of 
this thesis was to evaluate the reliability and validity of the measures, it was not 
appropriate to discuss the relationships between performance on measures like the CRFS 
and subscales of the CDI and Harter, but at this level relationships emerged between self 
reflective functioning and personal efficacy, interpersonal problems and social acceptance 
that warrant further examination.
The question also remains as to the direction of the relationship between theory of 
mind and affective difficulties. Would the latter difficulties respond to treatments that 
included a focus on the development of these mentalising abilities? If affect and
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mentalisation are inextricably linked, as is suggested by present evidence from 
neuroscience (Klin et al., 2000), interventions which focus on facilitating mentalisation 
could be presumed to have an impact on affect, but this remains to be investigated. It also 
remains to be seen whether such interventions could impact on negative affectivity and 
impulse control.
Cross-Cultural Application o f the Tests
Further consideration needs to be given to the assessment of children from 
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. With regard to culture, different norms 
regarding politeness and different ways of addressing and talking about elders can be 
expected to affect the performance of children from different cultures on the measures 
that have been presented in this study. The reluctance of children from traditional 
cultures to talk about conflictual situations with parents, as in the CRFS interview, may 
therefore have a different meaning. This raises other interesting questions regarding 
possible cultural differences with regard to parent-child conversations involving 
emotions, and the possible impact of these different cultural styles on the development of 
children’s mentalisation about affects.
In addition, the measures used in this dissertation require that children have more 
than a working knowledge of the language used in the interview. Even children who are 
able to function well at school in a second language may not have the ease and confidence 
that is necessary use the second language to express thoughts about mental states, affects 
and interpersonal phenomena; they may thus appear to function at a much lower level 
than when they use their mother tongue. This implies that these present measures will not 
be reliable when used with children from refugee families and recent immigrants, unless 
the interview can be done in the child’s home language. At the same time this raises 
questions regarding the impact that learning a new language has on the development of 
theory of mind and affective understanding. This question is particularly pertinent in the 
context of international adoptions, where the native language of the child is frequently 
different from that of the adoptive family. Further research is needed to determine the 
impact of this on the development of the mental state language in these already vulnerable 
children.
Impact o f Abuse on Reflective Functioning
In light of the robust reliability results of the reflective functioning scale, further 
work is called for to investigate Fonagy and Target’s (2003) hypothesis that risk factors 
such as sexual abuse and low reflective functioning interact in the aetiology of personality 
disorders. Preliminary results of research presently being conducted at Laval University
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Quebec City, Canada, indicate that children with a .history of sexual abuse and who also 
have low reflective functioning are more likely to have affective and behaviour 
difficulties, and that dissociation of affect and thinking is implicated. On a more positive 
note, research on the impact of interventions informed by a reflective functioning 
perspective indicates that relatively short interventions can help many of these children 
regain their ability to use their mentalising abilities. Preliminary results suggest that 
interventions help to diminish dissociation and that these children, when followed up after 
a 1-year period no longer showed severe psychopathology. These findings, although 
preliminary, suggest that the reflective functioning perspective can inform interventions 
which target the development of mentalisation abilities. They also suggest that these 
interventions can be particularly helpful to children who have experienced trauma and 
abuse. Further research comparing the efficacy of this treatment with other interventions 
using a standard randomised control trial methodology is currently being planned.
Longitudinal Research
Longitudinal research will make it possible to investigate interactions between 
child, parent, family, contextual and demographic factors in the development of both 
mentalisation abilities and psychopathology. A study following children from birth to 
primary school could make a significant contribution to the understanding of these 
interactions. In addition, longitudinal research with children who had experienced sexual 
abuse during the pre-school years, will make it possible to address some of the questions 
regarding resilience and mentalisation abilities.
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Conclusion
This thesis reported on the development and adaptation of three measures and 
coding systems designed to assess primary school-aged children’s mentalisation abilities 
from theory of mind, affective understanding, and reflective functioning perspectives. 
The HSS, the AT and the CRFS emerged as very promising instruments when used to 
assess the mentalisation abilities of primary school-aged children. Moreover, the 
measures were shown to be generally reliable and valid. Further research using some of 
these measures is already under way and has underscored their usefulness. At the same 
time additional work on the development of the measures is warranted in order to 
standardise them and improve their psychometric properties.
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Ca m den  &  Islin g to n  /  U n iv ersity  Co llege  L o n d o n  Resea r c h  Stud y  
R e s e a r c h  I n f o r m a t io n : P a r e n t
The Study’s Purpose:
The purpose of this study is to understand child development and change. The tasks you and your 
child are invited to participate in will increase our knowledge of problems children are referred for 
and how they change following therapy. We will be able to share with you the overall results of the 
project as they become clear to us, if you would like us to.
What the Study Involves:
For you: You will be asked to complete questionnaires and to participate in interviews about your 
child’s behaviour and general milestones, as well as be interviewed about aspects of your own 
childhood and development This will take approximately five hours in total, completed over two or 
three sessions. We would be able to meet you and your child at the same time or separately, at our 
research facilities in Hampstead, or in your own home.
For your child: Most of these tasks are fun and administered in the manner of play. There are stories 
that will need to be completed using toys, stories with pictures needing matching faces as well as 
some self-administered questionnaires There are two interviews about how the child is able to th in k  
about significant relationships, with friends and family respectively. These tasks should take 
approximately five to six hours in total, completed over three sessions.
Participation:
Although we hope that you and your child will help us in carrying out the project, you are under no 
obligation to do so and are of course free to withdraw from the study at any time for any unstated 
reason. Your decision on whether or not to take part, or not to continue, will not affect your child’s 
care in any way. However, we are hoping to follow a group of children over three years, to look at 
change over time, and would greatly appreciate those families who feel able to stay involved for 
follow-up appointments.
Confidentiality:
Written records of all research appointments will be kept securely and anonymously, identified by 
serial numbers. Apart from exceptional cases, where the child might reveal that they are in danger 
(either in a dangerous situation, or a danger to themselves) so that it would be our responsibility to act 
appropriately in the interest of the child’s safety, the confidentiality will be strictly observed. Three of 
the tasks with your child will need to be video-taped, and two interviews with your self will need to be 
tape-recorded and in these cases, the material will be stored very securely without names. Apart from 
being the basis of some ratings for the project, they may also be used for research training purposes 
within the project. Publication of results will be based on statistical descriptions of groups, and not 
involve disclosure of individual or identifiable information.
The Research Team can answer any problems or queries, please contact 
Karin Ensink on 020 794 2313
** All proposals for research using human subjects are reviewed by an ethics committee before they 
can proceed. This proposal was reviewed by the Camden & Islington Community Health Services 
NHS Trust on the Ethics of Human Research as well as the Joint UCL /  UCLH Committees on the 
Ethics of Human Research: Committee Alpha **
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Camden Islington / University College London Research Study 
R e s e a r c h  In f o r m a t io n : C h il d
Why Are You Doing This Study?
We would like to know more about people like you, and the only way to find out is to ask. 
What Will I Be Asked About? What Will I Have To Do?
You will be asked to do a number of different things, including :
a) Be asked about your friendships and your family;
b) Listen to stories and use toys to make up the endings;
c) Listen to stories with pictures and put matching faces on the people in the stories;
d) Fill in questionnaires about how you feel and what you think.
We will also be seeing the person who looks after you, to ask them a few questions. But 
primarily, we are interested in what you have to say.
How Long Will It Take To Do This? Where Will I Do It?
It will take about five to six hours to complete all of the above games. You and your parents 
will decide where you want to do this.
What If I Don’t Want to Join or Change My Mind?
Whatever you decide to do will not affect your care at the Clinic, even if you decide later you 
don’t want to be part of the project any more. If you find anything distressing or you change 
your mind in the middle, just tell us and you can stop. It is no problem, and you wouldn’t 
need to tell us why.
Will Anyone Else Know What I Say?
Everything you do and say will be kept anonymously and confidentially - that means no one 
will know it is you - we use numbers and not your real names. Also, everything is kept 
locked away so no one can get to them.
* *  All proposals for research using human subjects are reviewed by an ethics committee before they can proceed 
This proposal was reviewed by the Camden & Islington Community Health Services NHS Trust on the Ethics of 
Human Research as well as the Joint UCL /  UCLH Committees on the Ethics o f Human Research:
Committee Alpha * *
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Confidentiality Agreem ent
I understand that, in having access to the Anna Freud Centre’s files, research 
tapes, and case  meetings, I am completely responsible for safeguarding the 
information that I am working with. This means that I will not discuss any of the 
confidential information disclosed to me with anyone, under any circumstances, 
and that I will not remove any confidential documents or material from the Centre. 
In working at the Centre, I will take all measures to uphold the standards of 
confidentiality set by the research staff, inclusive of using all techniques to 
disguise the names of individuals being tested here.
Should I come across personal information relating to somebody whom I know or 
would be likely to have dealings with, I will avoid reading or viewing it, and will inform 
Karin Ensink of the connection.
I realise that these restrictions are essential to protect the privacy of patients and 
research participants who have trusted the Centre to do this, and that the restrictions 
continue even after I have completed my work here at the Centre.
Print name:
Signature: Date:
Witness: Date:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
University College London 
CHILD CONSENT FORM
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH STUDY
I (name of Child) 
of (school)
agree to take part in the research project by the University of London.
I have been told what the Study is about and/or I have read the information sheet about 
this study which explains what I have to do. I have asked any questions I might have.
I understand that taking part in this project is not related to my treatment in any way.
I know that at any time I may decide not to continue if I do not want to.
Signed .............................................................. Date
Witnessed by  .........................................................   Date
INVESTIGATOR* S STATEMENT
I have explained the nature, demands and foreseeable risks of the above research to the 
subject.
Name ............................................................  Position................
Signed by ....................................................—..... Date ....................
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STRANGE STORIES ADMINISTRATION MANUAL
Strange Stories Administration Manual
Selection of Happe’s Strange Stories1 
used by Anna Freud Centre 
Standardisation Study Research Team
The Anna Freud Centre/University College London 
21 Maresfield Gardens, London NW3 5SD, UK
U n d e r  d ir e c t io n  o f  M a ry  T a rg et an d  P e te r  F o n a g y .
1 Happe, F. G. E. (1994) An Advanced Test of Theory of Mind: Understanding of story character’s 
thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped and normal children and adults. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. Vol 24,129-54.
Banana
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Katie and Emma are playing in the house.
Emma picks up a banana from the fruit bowl and holds it 
up to her ear.
She says to Katie, “Look! This banana is a telephone!"
Is  it true what Emma says?
Why does Emma say this?
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Vase
One day,while she is playing in the house, Anna
accidentally knocks over and breaks her mother's 
favourite crystal vase. Oh dear!
When mother finds out she will be very cross!
Anna's mother comes home and sees the broken vase and 
asks Anna what happened, Anna says, “The dog knocked 
it over, it wasn’t  my fault!"
Was it true, what Anna told her mother?
Why did she say this?
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Haircut
Daniel and Ian see Mrs Thompson coming out of the 
hairdresser's one day.
She is looking a bit funny because the hairdresser has 
cut her hair much too short.
Daniel says to Ian, “She must have been in a fight with a 
lawnmower!"
Is  it true, what Daniel says?
Why does he say this?
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Rabbit
Helen waited all year for Christmas because she knew 
that at Christmas she could ask her parents for a rabbit.
Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world.
At last Christmas day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap 
the big box her parents had given her.
She fe lt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage.
But when she opened it, with all the family standing 
around, she found her present was just a boring old se t 
of Encyclopaedias, which Helen did not want a t all!
Still, when Helen's parents asked her how she liked her 
Christmas present, she said, “It's  lovely, thank you. I t 's  
just what I  wanted".
Is  it true, what Helen said?
Why did she say that to her parents?
Pigsty
William is a very untidy boy.
One day his mother comes into his bedroom and it is even 
more messy than usual!
There are clothes, toys and comics everywhere.
William's mother says to William, "This room is a pig sty!"
Is  it true that William keeps pigs in his room?
Why does William's mother say this?
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Glove
A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his 
getaway.
As he is running home, a policeman on his beat sees him 
drop his glove. He doesn't know the man is a burglar, he 
just wants to tell him he has dropped his glove.
But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar, “Hey, 
you! Stop!" the burglar turns round, sees the policeman 
and gives himself up.
He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in 
at the local shop.
Was the policeman surprised by what the burglar did?
Why did the burglar do this, when the policeman just 
wanted to give him back his glove?
Politeness
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Ann’s mother has spent a long time cooking Ann's 
favourite meal, fish and chips.
But when she brings it in to Ann, she is watching TV and 
she doesn't even look up or say thank you.
Ann's mother is very cross and says, "Well that's very 
nice, isn't it! That's what I  call politeness!"
Is  it true, what Ann's mother says?
Why does Ann's mother say this?
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Kittens
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith 
who had lots of kittens she didn't want.
Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens and she wouldn't do 
anything to harm them, though she couldn't keep them all 
herself.
When Jill visited she wasn't sure she wanted one of Mrs. 
Smith's kittens, since they were all males and she had 
wanted a female.
But Mrs. Smith said, "If no one buys the kittens I'll just 
have to drown them!"
Was it true, what Mrs. Smith said?
Why did Mrs. Smith say this to Jill?
Swings
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Today, Katy wants to go on the swings in the playground.
But to get to the playground she knows she has to pass 
old Mr Jones' house.
Mr Jones has a nasty fierce dog and every time Katy 
walks past the house the dog jumps up a t the gate and 
barks.
I t  scares Katy awfully, and she hates walking past the 
house because of the nasty dog.
But Katy does so want to play on the swings.
Katy's mother asks her, "Do you want to go out to the 
playground?" Katy says, "No".
Is  it true what Katy says?
Why does she say she doesn't want to go to the 
playground, when she so wants to go on the swings that 
are there?
Ghost
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I t  is Halloween, and Chris is going to a fancy-dress party. 
He is going as a ghost.
He wears a big white sheet with eyes cut out to see 
through.
As he walks to the party in his ghost costume, he bumps 
into Mr. Brown.
I t  is dark, and Mr Brown says, “Oh! Who is it?"
Chris answers, “I'm a ghost, Mr Brown!"
Is  it true, what Chris says?
Why does Chris say this?
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APPENDIX B2
CODING MANUAL FOR HAPPE’S STRANGE STORIES: DEVELOPED AND 
USED BY THE ANNA FREUD CENTRE STANDARDISATION STUDY RESEARCH
TEAM
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Coding Manual for Happe’s Strange Stories1: 
Developed and used by the Anna Freud Centre 
Standardisation Study Research Team
The Anna Freud Centre/University College London 
21 Maresfield Gardens, London NW3 5SD , UK
r e v is e d  ( 16/ 10/02)  b y  
T a r g e t ,  M .,  F o n a g y . ,  P . ,  E n s in k ,  K .,  J a n e s ,  K . L .,
A c k n o w le d g in g  p r e v io u s  c o n t r ib u t io n s  b y
C h a r m a n , T . ,  S h a n d  P .,
S c h n e id e r ,  T . ,  &  C r o s s e ,  J .  L .
1 Happe, F. G. E. (1994) An Advanced Test of Theory of Mind: Understanding of story character’s 
thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped and normal children and adults. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. Vol 24,129-54.
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THE STRANGE STORIES: Coding Manual (4 Point Scale)
Revised Anna Freud Centre 4 point Coding Scheme
This coding manual is based on Happe*s (1994) original coding system which 
distinguishes between correct and incorrect responses, as well as between correct mental 
and correct mental and physical responses. We added a fourth category, after noting a 
number of bizarre responses in our clinical sample. The scale used in this manual 
distinguishes at the highest level between 1) correct answers that explain the protagonists 
motivation in mental state terms, 2) those that give correct but concrete or physical 
explanations, 3) incorrect answers, and 4) bizarre responses suggesting that more severe 
problems in thinking and understanding the communicative intentions of others are 
involved.
The child has to correctly answer the first question before the second question is asked. 
ALWAYS check that the first question is answered correctly before looking at the second 
question. The answer should be no to all of the questions except the Misunderstanding 
story (6). If the child incorrectly responds to the first question, then a scores of 0 is 
allocated.
2 = Correct Mental Response. This is defined as a response that explains the correct 
motivation and reasoning behind the behaviour. There is only 1 implied motivation for 
each story, but if the child explains the word, e.g. the story is about pretending and the 
child says they’re “making up a story”, then this would also score a 2.
1 = Correct Physical Response. This answer is correct but simply states the physical 
truth rather than displaying an understanding of the mental state of the protagonist or the 
motivation for their action.
0 = Incorrect Response. This includes incorrect physical and mental responses to the 
second question. Also includes statements that are true, but do not attempt to answer the 
question. Also no response, don’t know, or an incorrect answer to first question.
-1 = A Bizarre Response. Used for responses which suggests a breakdown or absence of 
reasoning and gross disturbance in understanding others.
While the stories are largely unambiguous, the responses of children in this age may not 
describe the intentions or mental states reflected in the stories in the most succinct way, 
although their answers may reflect a sense of the motivations for the utterances. Our 
approach has been not to insist on the child providing the best possible explanation, but 
rather to examine whether their responses reflect a reasonable awareness of the 
underlying motivations and what is involved.
The Ping-Pong (Double Bluff), Vase (Lie) and School (Forget) stories are not coded in 
the present study because of inconsistencies in the way these stories were presented.
Examples for scoring individual stories
344
Story 1: Pretend -  Banana
2: The child understands that Emma is pretending. (Although the story is not strictly
implying that she joking, we accept this response because it indicates the child 
understands that she doesn’t really think the banana is a telephone).
Examples: She is pretending
Because she just wants to play 
She’s being funny/silly/having a joke 
She wanted to make something funny up 
Just playing
1: The child gives a physical response to the second question.
Examples: Because it’s shaped like a phone
Because it looks like a telephone
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: Because it’s a banana not a phone
Because she’s mad/stupid and not intelligent 
She wants to telephone someone
-1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Examples: The banana rang
She wants everyone to know bananas are telephones
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Story 2: Joke -  Haircut
2: The child understands that the boy is making a joke about her hair.
Examples: He was trying to be funny/silly
Because he said it to make his friend laugh 
To make a joke 
To make fun of her
1: The child gives a correct physical response
Examples: Because it’s so short
Because it looks like a lawnmower’s cut it 
Because she had a haircut
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: Because he’s lying (IMS)
-1: The child gives a bizarre response
Examples: He knows it but doesn’t want to make the teacher upset, not to chat
with her, not a school day
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Story 3: White lie -  Rabbit
2: The child understands that the child in the story does not want to hurt her parents’
feelings, so tells a white lie.
Examples: She didn’t want to upset her parents
She wanted them to be happy with what they gave her 
She’s told a white lie
That’s just what you say, even if you don’t like it 
She wanted to please them
1: The child gives a response which can be considered correct at a more concrete
level.
Examples: Because her parents might shout at her
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: She really wanted a rabbit not an encyclopaedia
She said she wanted a rabbit and doesn’t want the books, but I 
think she wants the books instead of the rabbit 
She might not like rabbits
She could learn about rabbits’ intelligence in the encyclopaedia 
-1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Examples: She thought the encyclopaedia would talk
Story 4: Idiom/Figure of Speech -  Pigstv
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2: The child gives a response which shows that the child either knows that the
mother used a figure of speech, or is at least aware that it is an expression used or 
way of saying that his room is messy.
Examples: It’s an expression of his room being very untidy
That’s the way of saying it -  pigs are messy 
It’s a figure of speech/expression
Cause pigs are messy and so people will call your room a pigsty if 
it’s messy
Because it’s a pigsty and that’s what people say when it’s messy 
Pigsty’s are really messy and that’s what people say when it’s 
messy
1: The child gives a correct physical response.
Examples: Cos it looks like one
Because it doesn’t look nice 
She wants him to tidy up
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question. NB: Although the mental state may make sense, it is not explicitly 
implied by the story.
Examples: He probably acts like a pig
-1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Examples: She might have thought there was a pig in the room
Because he thinks she means pigs
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Story 5; Misunderstanding -  Glove
2: The child shows understanding that the burglar gave himself up because he
thought the policeman was going to arrest him.
Examples: He thought that the policeman knew he had burgled/done the break
in/was a burglar
He thought he was going to get arrested 
He thought the policeman was trying to stop him
1: The child gives a correct physical response.
Because he took the money
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: He just wanted to get away from him
Not to get arrested/put in jail
- 1: The child gives a bizarre response
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Story 6: Sarcasm -  Politeness
2: The child shows an understanding that the mother is using sarcasm.
Example: She’s being sarcastic
Sometimes what you say isn’t what you mean 
To make Ann feel bad about what she did
1: The child gives a physical response.
Examples: Because Anne didn’t say thank-you
(In this case we also rate responses which refer simply to anger, without any 
further explanation, here. For example: She was being angry)
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: Not saying thank-you is wasting her mother’s time of making
dinner
She’s just saying that 
She wants to tease her
1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Examples: Just like she did wrong, Mum and Ann aren’t intelligent
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Story 7: Persuasion -  Kittens
2: The child shows understanding that Mrs Smith is trying to persuade Jill to buy a
kitten.
Examples: She’s trying to persuade her to buy one.
She wants Jill to buy one
1: The child gives a correct physical response.
Examples: She had too many kittens
She couldn’t look after them.
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: She won’t harm them
Because she can’t have them all 
She lied
She’s getting annoyed with the cats because there are too many 
She just wanted to make money
-1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Examples: The cat kept breaking things
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Story 8: Contrary emotion -  swings
2: The child shows that they understand that Katy doesn’t want to go the playground
because she has to walk past the house and she is scared of the dog.
Examples: She’s scared of the dog
She doesn’t want to walk past the house because the dog will jump 
at her.
She is frightened
She doesn’t want to go past the dog
She doesn’t want the dog to bite her or jump at her
She doesn’t want to go past the man’s house because he has a dog
that barks
1: The child gives a correct physical response.
Example: Because of the nasty dog
Because the dog barks.
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples: Because she decided she didn’t want to play on the swings after all
1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Example: The swings bite
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Story 9: Appearance/Reality -  Ghost
2: The child understands that Chris is trying to scare Mr Brown or pretending to be a
ghost.
Examples: He wants to scare him
He’s pretending he’s a ghost.
He’s pretending to be a ghost
Because he wants him to think he’s a ghost
1: The child gives a correct physical response.
Example: Because it’s Halloween
Because he’s dressed as a ghost 
Because he’s in a costume
0: The child gives an incorrect physical or mental response, does not answer, or
incorrectly answers the first question, or gives a response which does not answer 
the question.
Examples:
He is a ghost
-1: The child gives a bizarre response.
Example: Because his best friend’s a ghost
REFERENCES:
Happe, F. G. E. (1994) An Advanced Test of Theory of Mind: Understanding of story character’s 
thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped and normal children and adults. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. Vol 24,129-54.
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It is the responses to the 2nd question that are scored, as the 2nd question is not asked until a correct response is given to the 1st question.
If a child does not give a correct response to the 1st question then 0 is scored.
2 Correct Mental Response.
1 Correct Phy sical Response.
0 incorrect Response (ph ysical or mental). Don’t know or no response.
-1 =Bizarre response, e.g. for Pretend stor y -  She wanted everyone to know that bananas are telephones.”
Question 7 (Double BlufD and Question 12 (Forget) do not need to be scored.
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THE AFFECT TASK 
CODING MANUAL
Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., Steele,
M., Charman, T., Ensink, K. and Leeuwerik, T. l’2
1 Correspondence should be addressed to K. Ensink, The Anna Freud Centre, 21 Maresfield Gardens, 
London NW3 5SD. Telephone: 020 7794 2313.
2 The authors gratefully acknowledge contributions from: Tiffany Schneider, John Crosse, Polly Shand, 
Sonia Aguirre, Lise Haagen, and Lucia Mathes.
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THE AFFECT TASK 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEASURE
The Affect Task has been developed over the past several years at the Anna Freud Centre, 
primarily by Peter Fonagy, Howard Steele, Miriam Steele, and Mary Target. Fonagy, 
Steele and Steele used an earlier version in work on infant attachment with children up to 
age six. The current manual reflects discussions and development carried out to adapt the 
task for children in middle childhood (aged six to eleven years) in a group led by Mary 
Target and Peter Fonagy. The Affect Task was designed to provide a test of children's 
attribution and understanding of feelings and mentai states to cartoon characters portrayed 
in emotionally charged everyday situations.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE
The Affect Task has two components. The first component involves the child n am ing the 
emotional expressions shown on nine cartoon faces. The faces were derived from Ekman 
and Friesen (1975) and show a range of expressions from happy to shocked. An initial 
investigation of the task revealed that not all the faces were recognised consistently by 
children between the ages of six and ten. This part of the task is therefore only used to 
familiarise the child with the different faces and the idea that each face is meant to 
represent a different mental state and is not scored. The responses the child gives are 
accepted, whether they are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The same nine faces are then used in 
acetate form for the next part of the task.
The second and central component of the Affect Task presents the child with six cartoon 
drawings of children without facial expressions drawn in. The interviewer reads a short 
narrated script that accompanies each picture. There are four different stories, two of 
which have two parts to them. There are parallel versions of the six scenarios and 
accompanying cartoons for boys and girls.
Story One is about a bully who pushes over a younger child in front of his/her friends in 
the school playground.
Story Two describes an athletic child being selected by his/her teacher to be a swimming 
team captain from amongst a group of other children.
360
Story Three is a continuation of the previous story where one child, who is not very good 
at swimming, is the last person to get picked to be in a team.
Story Four is about a child, who flicks a piece of paper that stings the neck of the child 
sitting in front of him/her, during a maths lesson.
Story Five follows on from story four and involves the protagonist from this story being 
caught by the teacher and having to stay in and work during playtime. The previous 
victim and another child observe him through the window.
Story Six is about a child who mistakenly wears the wrong sort of clothes to an outdoor 
children's party and who is observed to arrive with his/her mother by a group of 
appropriately dressed children.
After the interviewer has read out the short narrated script that accompanies each picture 
the child is asked to choose appropriate acetate faces to show how all the children in the 
story might be feeling. He/she is invited to place as many faces, or feelings, on each of 
the characters as he/she may want. The child is then asked a number of questions about 
the feeling(s) that they have chosen.
1. What is that feeling? /How do you think that child is feeling? [accuracy]
2. Why do you think they are feeling like that (i.e. the justification for each face)? 
[justification]
3. Do you think they might be feeling anything else?
4. What happens to the feeling (i.e. what was the impact of the feeling)?3 [impact]
5. Do you think that he/she may be feeling something different on the inside than s/he is 
showing on the outside? Why? [internal/external]
6. The ‘challenge* question then asks the child to imagine that the story character was 
‘quite a different sort of child’ from the one previously talked about, who had a 
different feeling to that which the child had ascribed to the character. The child is then 
asked for a justification as to why he/she thought, for example, that the victim of 
bullying might feel fiappy' when he/she was pushed over in the playground.
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Question 6 was added to the original Affect Task to determine whether the child is 
capable of being recursive and flexible in his/her capacity to think about and consider the 
emotions of other children, or if he/she is only capable of considering the feelings he/she 
would have had in the same situation. Simply put, the authors are interested in whether 
the child can shift mental frames if challenged. The impact question (question 4) has been 
added to the Affect Task as a further opportunity to measure whether the child provides a 
description in terms of mental states (e.g. “the feeling stays until later, when he thinks 
about something else like football and then he’s happy”), or a more behavioural or 
physicalistic response to questions about feelings (e.g. “she just kicked the wall for a 
while “her friend gave her some sweets ”.)
3 Q uestions 4, 5 &  6 are asked only in reference to  the protagonist o f  the story
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CODING: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHEME AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The aim of this coding system is to provide a systematic approach for scoring children’s 
justifications for the choices of facial expressions and their concomitant inner states, in 
terms of their ability to mentalise. The coding system has been developed using a 
hierarchical approach, which accesses the child’s ability to mentalise with increasing 
elaboration, across a number of domains. Failure to attribute feelings, or physicalistic or 
’canned' responses to the justification, impact and challenge questions, are scored at the 
lowest level. To score within any of the higher levels, the justification given has to fall 
clearly within that level: a suggestion of understanding is not considered a sufficient 
grounds for scoring, only explicit verbal material illustrating understanding is scored.
Answers are regarded as equally valid whether they are given voluntarily or as a result of 
further questioning by the interviewer. Answers elicited in response to one question or 
coding scale, should also be considered for the scoring of other scales to which the 
answer might apply, e.g. if the child offers a response for Accuracy that is accompanied 
by an explanation, such a description should be used to score Justification. Also, answers 
to the internal/external question are to be taken into consideration when scoring Accuracy 
and Justification. This ensures careful consideration of all the relevant information that 
the child provides. It is therefore important to consider all responses to a story before 
proceeding to code. In all cases, the highest level the child achieves on each section is 
scored.
Coding should be based on the affects that the child names, not on the acetate faces that 
are put on the characters. If the child makes an unambiguous facial expression to 
demonstrate how the character is feeling, the codei* can take this into consideration and 
regard it as equal to a verbalised affect.
There are a number of codes that are used when an answer can not be scored reliably, for 
the following reasons:
♦ Code “6W: The question was omitted by the interviewer, or asked in such a way that 
the answer cannot be scored reliably (e.g. when the interviewer states questions or 
prompts in a suggestive, steering manner to the extent that the child’s abilities cannot 
be assessed reliably).
♦ Code “7”: The child refused to answer.
♦ Code “8”: The coder is unable to hear the answer or the answer is uncodable for 
reasons other than those that apply to code 6.
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In a small number of cases, children may give answers of a markedly bizarre quality. For 
specific populations Research Co-ordinators may wish to use a special code (-1) to 
identify these responses.
ACCURACY OF THE ATTRIBUTED AFFECT
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This score is based on a response to the question “How do you think [the character] 
feels?”
In considering the child’s response to this question, the following guidelines should be 
adhered to;
• Terms counted as emotions are:
1. conventional emotion-descriptive terms: happy, sad, angry
2. synesthetic terms that draw upon analogies between sensory experiences (blue) and 
mood states (sad)
3. words that refer to emotions experienced during particular activities or circumstances 
by referring to the activities or circumstances themselves, e.g. cruel, cool, evil, 
wicked, smart, friendly, left out, bossy, lazy, bored, chuffed, cocky. (Ridgeway, 
Waters and Kuczaj, 1985)
• If during the interview the child changes his/her mind about what the character feels 
(i.e. “he feels sad... no, he feels angry”)  this should be scored as two different affects 
assigned to the same character.
Level One: Absent or minimal
The child is unable to attribute any affect to the character. May respond “don't know”, 
“what do you think” or “nothing”. Child seems to give random answers; e.g. the bully is 
‘eager’ or ‘interesting’. Inappropriate/nonsensical affect (to the situation), will also be 
scored at level 1, e.g. “The boy who was pushed over by the bully feels happy because he 
likes being hurt”.
Level Two: Imprecise
The child is able to entertain the idea that the character has a reaction to the events 
described in the narrative, but the answer does not include an emotional component, even 
when prompted {“he wants to go back inside”, “he wishes the bully would stop or get in 
trouble'). Answers that are affectively vague and do not make the emotion explicit {“he 
feels like he wants to push the bully off a cliff”, “feels like being sick and crying ”, "he 
feels Oohh ”, “horrible”, “greedy” or “not good’), or do not clearly fit the context of the
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story ( “Bully feels hopeless”) are also coded at this level.
Level Three: Obvious
The child is able to attribute an affect to a character and provide a specific emotional 
label, such as ‘angry’, ‘disappointed’ or ‘scared’. These responses are at the level of the 
most obvious affects that might be attributed given the scenario; bully is ‘happy’, victim 
is ‘sad’. If two affects are mentioned that are essentially synonymous ( “[bully] is happy 
and content”, “[character] not picked for team is angry and cross>r) the response should 
be scored at this level.
If the observer group are all given the same affect, the response should also be scored at 
this level.
Level Four: Subtle
Child describes differentiated affect states that indicate a mixture and richness of feelings. 
However the child does not resolve contradictions if these affective states are opposed as 
justifications are not offered, are mutually exclusive or identical, e.g. “[the character] is 
sad and cross” [no explanation offered], “She's upset because she doesn't get to play 
games and she's happy, because she might not like to play sports, and she doesn't have to 
do them” [mutually exclusive], “[character] is a bit sad, because he's the slowest and no 
one picks him, he is also angry for the same reason ” [identical].
Sometimes, a child might respond to this question by attributing one (out of two or more) 
affect that is meant to conceal the character's true feelings, e.g. : uShe's cross. (Anything 
else?) She is pretending to be happy so that they don't think she's a baby” or "Happy, 
because she knows they're watching, but inside she's sad, because she wasn ’tpicked."
In this case, the ‘happy’ affect is a pretense used to conceal the ‘real’ emotion previously 
identified, rather than another ‘real’ emotion. However, the fact that the child did 
spontaneously come up with the idea of a pretense emotion, should be credited. Code at 
level 4 (answers like this should also be used for scoring internal/external).
To score at this level for the observer group, the child must attribute different affects to 
the different characters.
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Five: Sophisticated
Child describes differentiated affect states. Any apparent contradiction between affect 
states is addressed as the child offers justifications that allow for the affects to occur 
simultaneously, e.g. “[the character] feels sad that he’s pushed over and he's angry with 
the bully for making him cry and spoiling his game
Regarding the observer group, the child attributes more than one affect to at least one of 
the characters in the observer group. Any noticeable contradictions between affect states 
are also addressed.
Further coding issues and examples:
Feeling 'okay1 or 'fine1 is accepted as an affect as it is similar to feeling 'normal' which is 
among the 9 basic affects that Ekman and Friesen (1975) identified.
Level 3: “he feels no shame.
“He can't feel upset because upset is for wimps! ”
Level 4: all observers are happy, but the reasons for happiness are different [different 
lands' of happy].
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JUSTIFICATION
This score is based on a response to the question “Why do you think [the character] feels 
that way?”
Higher level answers include a reference to mental states, while the highest level answers 
are reserved for demonstrations of an understanding of 'minds in relation'. Mental states 
are beliefs (understood broadly as including the actor’s knowledge, convictions, 
suppositions, ideas and opinions, i.e., mental verbs such as to think, pretend, imagine, 
expect, suspect, realise, notice, recognise, guess, wonder) and desires (understood 
broadly as including all pro and con attitudes, such as lusts, wants, wishes, preferences, 
goals and hopes as well as self-imposed obligations, values and aspirations, i.e. mental 
verbs such as to wish, want, like, care, prefer) (Wellman, 1992).
• Sometimes a child will respond to the (accuracy and) justification question with an 
answer that focuses on a reason for the concealment of an affect, e.g.: [the victim] 
feels cross because she's been pushed over. (Anything else?). Happy (why?) because 
she doesn ft want the others to think that she's a wimp'.
This answer does not include a justification for the happy affect, as the happy affect is 
only explained in terms of pretence and concealment of another emotion. So, even though 
we score the answer under accuracy and internal/external, we do not consider the reason 
for the concealment as a justification for the affect. Other examples: 'she feels scared, but 
doesn't want to show it in case the bully will hurt her again"
• Occasionally answers do not justify the affect, but instead link the affect to a 
motivation for action, e.g. “he is angry (admin.: why?) he wants to push the bully 
over". In this case the child is not explaining why the character is angry, but talks 
about an action that the affect might be associated with. Do not rate this under 
justification, but include the response for the rating of'impact'.
Level One: Unjustified & parroting
Child doesn’t give an answer, or provides a situational answer that closely resembles a 
parroting back of the story; “because he has been pushed by the bully", “because he has 
been hurt", “because he's trying to work and got a bang on the head" (child changes one 
or two words of original phrasing but does not ‘rise above’ the original story line). 
Unjustified answers are simple physical or imitative answers, that do not require the child 
to really think about the situation, and 'create' an explanation, "[observers] are happy
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because they are wearing the right clothes." "[observers] are happy because they don't 
have to do the writing."
Level Two: Limited explanations from context
The affect is explained as a function of the given physical situation or in a very simple 
way related to the personality of the character. These answers are slightly more 
sophisticated than those at level one and/or bring in mental/feeling states but in a very 
simple way: “he is sad because it doesn’t feel nice to be picked-on ”. Justifications of 
responses can mention feelings, but the explanations are limited to situations rather than 
mental states, e.g. Character feels sad [why?] because he’s scared o f the bully’.
Answers based on trait attributions or usual behaviour also come under this heading (e.g. 
“he feels angry because he's a bully -  he’s always rough and cross ”).
Level Three: Reference to mental states
Answers explain feelings in terms of mental states, such as desires and beliefs, attributed 
to the character. Answers thus demonstrate the child’s ability to mentalise in relation to 
affect states.
“[The character] is angry because he wants (desires) to fight back but isn’t allowed to ”, 
“[the character] is sad because he thinks no one can stop the bully”, “he wishes one o f  
this friends would've picked him ”.
This level is also scored if the child verbalises the thoughts of the character without 
explicitly referring to mental verbs, e.g. “[the character] is like *why don’t I  get 
picked? ” [the equivalent o f
‘ thinking’].
Level Four; Reference to mental states and Implicit interpersonal orientation
The affective reaction of the central character is based on the anticipated/imputed mental 
state of other, but this is implicit rather than explicit, i.e. the child acknowledges the 
interaction between two minds in his/her explanation and refers to the imputed state of 
other at least by implication (reflects on the affect of the ‘other’). Second order affect is 
thus illustrated in the answers.
“[The character] feels sad because he thinks the bully probably doesn’t have any 
friends, so [the character] feels sorry for him”, ”[observer] is upset, because she’s
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thinking about how [the victim] feels ”, “She might want to know why the bully threw the 
paper at her ", “[the character] feels guilty because he used to pick on the bully, and now 
he knows what it felt like to him ”.
Alternatively, the answer incorporates mental states of others, but can be considered 
‘implicit’, as there is no explicit interaction between the mental state of the central 
character and the mental states he/she attributes to others, e.g. “the character feels sad” 
(Why?) “because the others didn't want her on the team”. “She's feeling embarrassed, 
because they will think she's stupid”. "[The bully] is happy because he's throwing balls 
at [the victim] and she doesn't like it. ”
Answers such as “Mum is upset, because Jane is upset”, “Susan is surprised (adm: 
why?) because Rachel is angry with her” might be less sophisticated as the feelings are 
not linked to speculations about the thinking behind the mental state of the other person, 
but clearly demonstrate that the affect of the main character is explained by a belief about 
the other’s feelings.
Level Five: Reference to mental states and explicit interpersonal orientation
Answers include explicit ‘minds in relation’; in the explanation of the affective reaction 
of the central character the child relates the character’s mental state to the mental state(s) 
of other and these mental states are spelled out, e.g. “The boy who wasn ’t picked feels sad 
because he thinks the others didn't want him on the team ” (mentalistic response) versus 
“He feels sad because the other(s) didn't pick him” (physicalistic response). Other 
examples are: “[the bully] is happy because he knows that John [victim] doesn't like it”, 
“she [victim] is scared because she might think that now she (the bully) might want to do 
it to her”, “she is feeling sad, because she thinks: ” they don't think I  can swim.
Further coding examples
Level 3:
(unhappyj because he feels he shouldn't have flicked the paper at David.
He thinks he might get hit by the bully [there is a reference to an anticipated action of 
other, but the anticipated action does not clearly relate to a mental state (the bully might 
be feeling angry, upset or cheeky) and therefore does not warrant a level 4 coding.]
Level 4:
“She thinks that i f  she tells him, he might become aggressive ”, “she wants to know why 
Rachel is acting this way”, “[observers] are shocked. They didn't think that the bully
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would do something like that”, "mum is upset, because she knows her daughter is going 
to get teased', " he is sad and embarrassed, because I  should've remembered, and 
everyone is gonna laugh at me, and spread rumours, and he's going to become the 
laughing stock", "She [bully] thinks it's a bit offun to annoy people". [The reference to 
actions of others such as blaming and spreading rumours, reveal the mental states of the 
'other'].
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IMPACT
This score is based on a response to the question ‘What happens to [the character’s angry] 
feeling?’
Level One: Absent
Child either cannot answer, or says “Don't know”. Answers such as ”[the character] 
feels sadfor ever and ever”, “it might turn into a happy feeling, or sadfeeling or a cross 
feeling, or... ”, “[her feelings] go whizzing round in her head”, “He pushes [the feelings] 
down the drain ” are also coded at this level.
Level Two: Behavioural
Answer continues the story line, but it does not mention affect directly, e.g. “He goes and 
tells the teacher”.
Level Three: Affective sequel (simple!
Answer describes what the character would feel like afterwards or how he/she might deal 
with his/her feeling(s) in simple mental state terms. Answers do not demonstrate an 
understanding of the contingency of the emotion upon behaviour. It is a simple 
description of a state of mind, e.g. “[the character] pretends he's not angry”, “[the 
character] sulks ”, “it goes away after a while ”, “[the character] stays sad”.
N.B. Although answers such as “[the feeling] turns into a smile”, or “she starts to cry” 
do not mention affect directly, they are directly linked to certain affects. For that reason 
they can be considered as level 3 answers.
Level Four: Affective sequel (complex)
Answer describes in subtle ways how the character would cope with the feeling. This 
might involve acknowledging the feeling and the way it affects behaviour, e.g. “[the 
character] feels angry and this makes him pick a fight with his friend”, “he lets his 
feelings out and beats the boy up after school”, “she tries not to do much, because she 
doesn't like everyone staring at her, she tries to make herself feel more happy, make 
herself calm down, sit down on a bench and tell the teacher”, “she tries to forget about it, 
tries to put it in the back o f her mind”. Alternatively, it may describe how one feeling 
changes into another and demonstrate an awareness of different possible feeling states 
depending on context and the process involved in changing feelings:
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“The boy who was pickedfor team captain felt really big and proudfor a while, but then 
he started thinking about the races and got worried about doing well ” “[the character] is 
happy because he’s the best swimmer, but the other team might win and then he feels a bit 
sad”, “if  he's back playing football, having fun, he’s sort o f happy. But i f  the bully did it 
to someone else, he ’d  feel like that again. His feelings haven’t gone away, they ’re still 
there, ready”, “depends on i f  he wins the race or not, i f  not he’ll feel angry”, “feeling 
stays until later, when he thinks about something else like football and then he’s happy”. 
“His feelings change, because they start being nice to him and say sorry and he's happy 
then ”.
Answers that describe in a subtle way the continuing impact of one feeling or expectation 
on another, e.g. “[the character] is worried for a long time because he thinks the bully 
might do it again ” are also coded at this level.
Level Five: Affective sequel (complex with interpersonal dimension)
Answer describes in subtle ways how the feeling might change or persist and involves an 
explicit relationship between the mental state of the character and the mental states of 
others in the story, e.g. “the boy who was picked for team captain felt really big and 
proud for a while, but then he got worried that the others wouldn’t like him because he 
always gets picked for everything”, “she gets angry, because she doesn’t want the bully 
to think that she can just come and knock her over”.
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CHALLENGE
This score is based on the interviewer changing the affect that the child has ascribed to 
the story’s protagonist, to one that is approximately opposite. For example, if the child 
said the main character was sad, the child is then asked “You said [the character] feels 
sad, but let us imagine that [the character] is a very different sort of person from the one 
that you and I have been talking about and for some reason s/he feels happy. Can you 
give me a reason why s/he would feel like this?”
The definition of the 5 coding levels is generally the same as for ‘Justification’.
Level One: No answer
The child provides no response. This includes responses such as, “Don 7 know”, or “That 
doesn 7 make sense ”.
Level Two: Limited explanations from context
The affect is explained as a function of the given physical situation or in a very simple 
way related to the personality of the character. These answers are slightly more 
sophisticated then those at level one and/or bring in mental/feeling states but in a very 
simple way. Answers that contradict the story framework are also scored at this level, 
regardless of whether the child refers to mental states, e.g. “he wasn 7 picked to be team 
captain ”, “he doesn 7 know how to be team captain, because he wasn 7 really a good 
swimmer” [the story framework states that the character is a very good swimmer], or 
“[the character] likes to stay in because he likes doing maths ” [the original story states 
that the bully does not like maths and is bored with it].
As for justification, responses sometimes take the form of'internal/external' answers, e.g.: 
'(Why could she be happy?) She doesn't want her friends to think that she's unhappy."
Strictly speaking, the answer doesn't justify the happy feeling. This might indicate that the 
child is not able to ‘shift mental framework’ and incapable of conceiving that a character 
might feel happy in that situation. The child 'explains' the affect as concealing the ‘real’ 
emotion, which the child originally attributed to the character. Code at level 2. Other 
examples: “he’d be sad on the inside, he doesn 7 want to be embarrassed by crying in 
front o f his friends so he’s happy, he smiles about it. “, he’s got a happy face, just to say 
‘I'm  glad to be doing this, it's worth staying in' but inside she's sad. ” , ‘i f  he's sad that 
he doesn 7 want to do the work, the teacher will tell him off, so i f  he looks happy, the 
teacher won 7 notice ”.
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Answers that justify the affect by continuing the story line to explain the ‘challenge 
affect’, are also scored at this level, regardless of whether the child refers to mental states. 
These answer should be considered for impact. For example;
(Left Out): Administrator: "Can you think o f a reason why [the victim] might feel happy?
t t
Child: “Because his mother picked him up from swimming and they went to the movies ”. 
Level Three: Reference to mental states
These answers explain feelings in terms of mental states. Answers therefore show 
evidence of mentalising about affect states, e.g. “the boy who was picked as team captain 
felt worried because he gets very nervous during competitions and doesn 7 perform as 
well as he could so he is afraid he will make a fool o f himself’, “He thinks he’s a really 
good swimmer and he’s gonna show them how good he is’’, or “He doesn’t want to be 
team captain, because he thinks he's not a good swimmer’’. In the latter two answers the 
story framework is not contradicted as the child refers to the character’s interpretation of 
the event, and not to the actual facts of the situation.
This level is also scored if the child verbalises the thoughts of the character without 
explicitly referring to mental verbs, e.g. “He may be in a bad mood after something 
happened, so he was like *why do I  have to do this?”’
Level Four; Reference to mental states and implicit interpersonal orientation
The affective reaction of the central character is based on the anticipated/imputed mental 
state of other, but this is implicit rather than explicit, i.e. the child acknowledges the 
interaction between two minds in his/her explanation and refers to the imputed state of 
other at least by implication (reflects on the affect of the ‘other’), e.g. "She doesn’t want 
to choose, say one is her friend and not very strong, she wants her in her team but i f  they 
lose, she might get blamed", “She doesn’t want everyone to be get upset. She’s worried, i f  
she chooses the wrong people. She wouldn’t feel very happy because she might make 
other people jealous”. Second order affect is thus illustrated in the answers. 
Alternatively, the answer incorporates mental states of others, but can be considered 
‘implicit’, as there is no explicit interaction between the mental state of the central 
character and the mental states he/she attributes to others.
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Level Five; Reference to mental states and explicit interpersonal orientation
Answers scored on this level include explicit ‘minds in relation’; in the explanation of the 
affective reaction of the central character the child relates the character’s mental state to 
the mental state(s) of other and these mental states are spelled out, e.g. “H e’s angry 
because the others always say he is teacher’s pet, and he doesn’t like them thinking that 
so he didn ’t want to be picked to be captain ’’.
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INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
This score is a response to the question “ Do you think [the character] may be feeling 
something different on the inside than s/he might be showing on the outside” which can 
also be asked as “Do you think [the character] might have feelings that he is not showing 
to others?” In case the child answers yes, a prompt (“What does he/she feel inside that 
the others cannot see?”) must be asked in order to elicit more information.
• Some children respond to this question by referring to a ’thought' that they do not 
show, e.g.: "She thinks they're all horrible but she doesn't want to show it in case they 
get really upset with her and don't want to be her friends."
These answers are considered equal to answers that refer to an affect that is concealed.
• Some answers focus on an ’impulse’ or intention that is concealed, e.g. "he wants to
get up and kick the bully, but he knows it's not the right thing ”. Even though the 
answer doesn’t mention affect explicitly, it strongly implies that the child is angry, so 
you code it as if the child has mentioned an affect.
• As a general rule, the additional attribution of affect to the character, in response to 
this question, is included in rating the 'accuracy' and "justification' scale, e.g. "She 
might also feel worried, because she thinks that she might not be a good captain,
but she doesn't want to show it because then they'll think she is a baby".
The 'worried' affect and the reason for the worried affect ('she thinks that she might not be
a good captain') can be rated under accuracy and justification. However, this is not 
allowed when additional affects are mentioned that are not related to the situation as 
presented by the interviewer, but to subsequent events the child has talked about. For 
example, the child says that the character who is not picked (left out) is really angry 
because he wasn't picked. This makes him shout at the teacher, who then makes him get 
dressed again and sends him to the head teacher. If the child then says for 
internal/external: “she is really upset on the inside because the teacher is angry with her 
but she doesn't want the other children to know”, the 'upset' feeling can not really be rated 
under accuracy as to do so, would give the impression that the 'upset' feeling was a 
response to the original situation (being left out) in conjunction with the angry feeling. 
This is not the case. Often answers like this can be coded under 'impact', (in addition to 
internal/external, if possible, as with the example stated above: '...but she doesn't want
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the other children to know'.)
Level One: No answer
Child gives no answer, simply answers either yes or no, or clearly does not understand the 
question, even with a prompt. Answers such as “she’s feeling sore inside” (victim in the 
bully story), or “sorry on the inside, sad on the outside” are also scored at this level.
Level Two: Answer without explanation:
Level two is scored when the child identifies an internal feeling state which is not shown 
on the outside, but gives no explanation as to why this is the case or the answer does not 
make sense. Answers such as “she’s more angry inside [than she’s showing]” are also 
scored at this level.
Responses that indicate that the child understands the notion of hiding feelings, but insists 
that in this particular case the feeling inside and the one shown outside is the same, are 
also coded at this level.
Level Three: Answer with minimal explanation
Child gives an acceptable but very limited explanation as to why a feeling is internal and 
not shown on the outside, e.g. “the girl who is chosen to be captain feels happy on the 
outside and scared on the inside, she wants to look pleased”.
Level Four: Answer with more complex explanation
The child answers as for level three, but the explanation is fuller and appears more 
sophisticated. It may involve a number of different considerations about the situation, e.g. 
“[the boy in the wrong party clothes] feels embarrassed and scared about what the 
others will say when his mum’s gone, but he only looks embarrassed. He was worried but 
he wants to try to look normal, he can ’t help looking embarrassed because he ’s gone red, 
but he tries to look as i f  he doesn’t care”, “the bully feels pleased on the outside but 
inside upset, bullies only pick on other people because they’re unhappy, like they might 
have a broken home or something, but they want to look tough so they don ’t show they’re 
upset” The character] feels angry and sad, but only looks angry, he doesn’t want his 
friends to know he’s feeling sad”.
N.B. Answers that include a consideration of the social implications normally warrant a 
score of 5 (see below). However, if this consideration is stated in a “simple” way, i.e. 
without referring to mental states, answers are scored at level 4 in order to distinguish
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them from the more sophisticated answers that typically score at level 5. Examples are: 
“...otherpeople might laugh at her”, “he doesn ’t look like that, because his mum might 
tell him off”.
Level Five; Answer with explanation and explicit consideration of interpersonal 
impact of concealment
As for level three or four, but the child also considers the effect of concealment of one or 
more of the affects, giving a reason that shows that his/her motivation is social, e.g. “[the 
boy who got pushed over] feels angry and sad, but only looks angry, he doesn’t want his 
friends to know he’s feeling sad or they may think he’s a wuss [youth-speak for wimp, 
idiot etc] ”, “the girl who got picked for captain feels really happy that she got chosen 
and she also wants the others to do well so the team will win, she probably shows more 
her wanting the others to do their best because that is what the captain is meant to do, 
and i f  she shows she thinks she’s better than everyone else they might think she’s stuck up 
and not want to be on her side”, “the boy who was punished by the teacher feels unhappy 
and angry, but he hides the anger so the teacher won 7 see or she might punish him for  
longer”, “he might feel sorry for him, but doesn 7 show it, because the others might think 
he’s a wimp", “she wants to cry, she might not want to show it, because people may think 
she’s silly for crying ”.
GLOBAL SCORE
This score is meant to reflect a clinical impression of the child’s potential for affective 
understanding. A global score of 1 to 5 can be awarded, using the same 5-level scale as 
used for the rest of the task.
It is up to the discretion of the individual group of researchers to decide whether to use a 
global score or any other individual parameter for analysis and reports.
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Affect Task: Coding Sheet
Child Number:
Rater:
Date:
Attach summaries of responses for each story, used for coding purposes.
Score 6: The interviewer did not ask the question or the question was asked in a
way so that the answer cannot be scored reliably
Score 7: The child refuses to answer
Score 8: The coder is unable to hear the answer
NB. Please add a to your score if you are not sure.
(Detail of all queries (?) must be provided on an attached sheet for discussion)
Bully Captain Left out Flicking Detention Party GLOBAL
Order of admin.
Accuracy
Hero/Victim N/A
Bully/Mother N/A N/A
Observers N/A.
Justification
Hero/Victim N/A
Bully/Mother N/A N/A
Observers N/A
Impact
Hero/Victim
Challenge
Hero/Victim
Internal/external
Hero/Victim
Please indicate the order in which the stories were administered
APPENDIX C2 
AFFECT TASK : ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE
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A f f e c t  T a sk
A d m in is t r a t io n  P r o c e d u r e  
r e v is e d  28/9/2001
Introduce yourself and the task. Explain to the child that you are going to hear some short 
stories in which people are feeling different things and then you would like to talk about 
why the child thinks the people could be doing it.
Bring out the Eckman faces. Ask the child what he thinks each of the faces are feeling. 
There are no wrong or right answers. This is not for coding purposes, but to help the child 
associate emotions with the faces and begin to talk about them as well as a warm-up for 
both of you.
A d m in is t r a t io n  I ssu es
1. Remember to always say out aloud the faces the child chooses for the cartoons, 
(i.e. which face are you using for this one? - the children may alter meaning of 
faces, and the camera cannot see them).
2. Do not tell the stories (or use the script) verbatim. Tell them as you would a story 
in any kind of situation, use eye-contact, point to the characters you are referring 
to, etc.
3. Let the child lead. The prompts do not have to be asked in order, allow the child to
lead the conversation and steer in a direction that seems natural/appropriate. 
Make sure you ask all of the prompts by the end, this is vital! You can also ask 
probing questions that are not on the protocol if you feel that they will elaborate 
what the child is saying, for coding purposes. It is your role to understand clearly 
how the child understands the dynamics in the story/their world but beware of 
leading questions.
4. Although the administration is child-led, it may be helpful to think about what
sequence you ask the prompts in. For example, asking all the protagonist prompts 
one after the other may increase an older child’s interest and enthusiasm, but may 
intimidate a more shy or younger child. Also, if the child’s narrative begins to 
wane, prompting for putting on an acetate is often a helpful way of ‘un-sticking’ 
the child’s focus.
5. It is sometimes helpful to repeat that the child can use as many faces on as many
characters as they wish on the odd occasion.
6. If child shares the same name as any of the characters change it to something 
different.
7. For each of the stories, the format is the same.
>  All the characters are asked:
1. How they feel
2. Why
3. Anything else
> While the protagonist is asked a series of more elaborate questions.
383
1. What happens to the feeling?
2. Is the character feeling something different on the inside than 
they are showing on the outside?
3. Why?
4. Can child justify reason for socially unacceptable face?
> Acetate faces are chosen.
Administration of the Task
With each stoiy the child is asked to choose appropriate acetate faces to show how all the 
children in the story might be feeling. He/she is invited to place as many faces, or 
feelings, on each of the characters as he/she may want. The child is then asked a number 
of questions about the feeling(s) that they have chosen
1) What is that feeling? /How do you think that child is feeling?
2) Why do you think they are feeling like that (i.e. the justification for each face)?
3) Do you think they might be feeling anything else?
4) What happens to the feeling (i.e. what its impact was)?
5) Do you think that he/she may be feeling something different on the inside than s/he is 
showing on the outside? Why?
6) The challenge question then asks the child to imagine that the story character was 
‘quite a different sort of child’ from the one previously talked about, who had a 
different feeling to that the child had ascribed to the character. The child is then asked 
for a justification as to why he/she thought, for example, that the victim of bullying 
might feel happy'when he/she was pushed over in the playground.
Question 6 has been added to the original Affect Task to determine whether the child can 
be recursive and flexible in his/her capacity to attribute emotions to children, or if he/she 
is simply extrapolating from the feelings he/she would have had in the same situation. 
Simply put, the authors are interested in whether the child can shift mental frames if 
challenged. The impact question has been added to the Affect Task as a further 
opportunity to measure whether the child provides a description in terms of mental states
e.g. she carried on feeling sad till her friends were kind to her, they said the bully 
just picks on everybody - that made her feel better.
Or whether they use a more behavioural or physicalistic response to questions about 
feelings : e.g. she just kicked the wall a while; her friend gave her some sweets.
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I n t r o d u c t io n
I would like to tell you some stories about children your age and what happens to them 
and then talk about what you think the children in the stories might be feeling. For each 
story you can put as many faces on each person as you wish, on as many of the people as 
you want.
Example Story:
S c h o o l  B u l l y
John/Jane is a boy/girl about your age and s/he goes to a school a bit like yours. One day 
when s/he is happily playing with his/her friends in the playground the school bully 
comes along. S/He is much bigger and older than John/Jane and likes to pick on people 
for no reason at all. Today s/he picks on John/Jane. S/He comes right up to him/her and 
pushes him/her over so that John/Jane falls over onto the ground. It really hurts John/Jane 
and the school bully just laughs.
John/Jane
> How do you think that makes John/Jane feel? Why?
Anything else? Why?
> What happened to the ... feeling? What does Jane/John do with the ... feeling? 
(Jane/John does not feel this way forever, what happens?)
1. Do you think John/Jane feels different on the outside than s/he feels on the 
inside? Why?
2. Now, you said John/Jane fe lt..., which is a good answer. What if I change the 
way John/Jane looks and I put a happy face on him/her. (Change face, putting 
child's to the side. Choose happy or sad/angry faces - whichever feels most 
inappropriate. I f  child has used this face spontaneously when discussing 
mixed emotions, choose something similar, such as shocked). Can you think of 
a reason why John/Jane might be feeling like this?
(After the child answers, and i f  you feel they might be concerned with you 
changing their story or that you are telling them they are incorrect, put child's 
face back on andfinish with their face.)
Bully / Friends
> What about the bully / friends, how do you think s/he feels? Why? Anything else? 
Why?
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Affect Task Crib Sheet
Sc h o o l  B u ll y
John/Jane is a boy/girl about your age and s/he goes to a school a bit like yours. One day 
when s/he is happily playing with his/her friends in the playground the school bully 
comes along. S/He is much bigger and older than John/Jane and likes to pick on people 
for no reason at all. Today s/he picks on John/Jane. S/He comes right up to him/her and 
pushes him/her over so that John/Jane falls over onto the ground. It really hurts John/Jane 
and the school bully just laughs.
Swimming Team Part I
In this story it is Thursday afternoon and all the class are going for swimming lessons. 
The teacher has decided to organise two teams so that the children can race against each 
other. One of the boys/girls in the class is called Mike/Sarah and s/he is a very good 
swimmer. Mike/Sarah is chosen to be one of the team captains and s/he gets to pick 
his/her team from the other children.
Swimming Team Part II
The teams are getting picked and Steve/Ann who can’t swim very well is not getting 
picked for any of the teams. S/He ends up being the very last person to get picked.
D e t e n t io n  P a r t  I
The class is having a maths lesson and the children are having to work hard so that they 
can pass their tests. But one of the boys/girls called Carl/Cathy, who is sitting at the back 
of the class, hates maths and is bored of working. When s/he thinks nobody is looking 
s/he screws up a piece of paper and flicks it at Dave/Rachel, the boy/girl sitting in front of 
him/her. It hits David/Rachel and stings the back of his/her neck.
D e t e n t io n  P a r t  II
OK, now let’s continue the story. The teacher sees what happens and is very cross with 
Carl/Cathy and makes him/her stay in to do extra work when all the other children get to 
go out and play. Two of the children are at the window and can see that Carl/Cathy is 
being kept inside.
C h il d r e n ’s P a r t y
This is a story about a boy/girl called Martin/Maria who has been invited to a friend’s 
party after school. He has put on all his best clothes so that s/he looks very smart. His 
Mum takes him/her to the party but when s/he gets there s/he finds that all the other 
children are dressed in scruffy out-door clothes. Martin/Marie had forgotten that it was an 
out-door party and is wearing the wrong clothes. The other children all look round at 
him/her when he comes to the door.
>  How might Martin’s/Marie’s Mother be feeling? Anything else? Why?
In all cases the character whose name is bold is the story’s protagonist and this is who the 
main prompts should be asked about.
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P r o m p t s
For every character:
For the Protagonist:
How do they feel?
Why?
Anything else?
What happens to the ... feeling?
Do they look differently on the outside than the way they feel 
on the inside? Why?
Challenge (Change the face to an inappropriate emotion)
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0
• •
Acetate of Ekman’s Faces
388
Detention Story
389
School Bully Story
Captain Story
391
Left Out Story
Party Clothes Story
Flicking Story
APPENDIX C3 
AFFECT TASK: CODING SHEET
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Affect Task: Coding Sheet
Child Number:
Rater:
Date:
Attach summaries of responses for each story, used for coding purposes.
Score 6: The interviewer did not ask the question or the question was asked in a
way so that the answer cannot be scored reliably
Score 7: The child refuses to answer
Score 8: The coder is unable to hear the answer
NB. Please add a “?” to your score if you are not sure.
(Detail of all queries (?) must be provided on an attached sheet for discussion)
Bully Captain Left out Flicking Detention Party GLOBAL
O rder of admin.
Accuracy
Hero/Victim N/A
Bully/Mother N/A N/A
Observers N/A
Justification
Hero/Victim N/A
Bully/Mother N/A N/A
Observers N/A
Impact
Hero/Victim
Challenge
Hero/Victim
Internal/external
Hero/Victim
Please indicate the order in which the stories were administered
APPENDIX D1
THE CHILD ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW (CAI) PROTOCOL
THE CHILD ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW (CAI) PROTOCOL
Devised By
Mary Target, Peter Fonagy, Yael Shmueli-Goetz, 
Adrian Datta, and Tiffany Schneider.
The Sub Department of Clinical Health Psychology, 
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C h il d h o o d  A t t a c h m e n t  In t e r v ie w  (CAD P r o t o c o l  
( 8  t o  12 YEAR OLDS) (Revised Edition VI, 1/5/99)
The CAI aims to access children’s mental representations of attachment figures and 
significant others (if appropriate). One way of trying to access these representations is to 
ask children about their experiences with, and perceptions of, their parents.
The CAI is not predominantly designed to elicit biographical or episodic information, 
rather it attempts to capture the affective and procedural qualities of the relationships 
described.
Central to the CAI is the degree to which the child conceives of his or her parents as 
emotionally available and responsive, and is thereby able to use them as a secure base. 
More specifically, the CAI seeks to tap into memories (or fantasies) the child may have 
concerning times of crisis (e.g., personal injury, bullying), losses, and separations from 
parents, in addition to positive aspects of their relationships with their parents (cuddling, 
talking, spending time together).
The interviewer should consistently hold in mind the importance of assessing the child’s 
view of the Relationship Episodes (REs). Therefore, prompts should reflect this emphasis.
Some children are able to recount coherently and sequentially the events within which the 
REs are contained. However, others may require additional help in the form of 
scaffolding from the interviewer in order for them to tell the story in a way that can easily 
be understood and subsequently coded. The questions ask the child about his or her 
relationship with attachment figures and about specific situations in that relationship, such 
as when Mum gets upset or when Mum and Dad argue.
During the interview it is extremely important to obtain specific examples from the child 
in response to EACH question. This is VERY important particularly for questions 2 
which asks the child for three words to describe themselves and questions 3 and 5 which 
ask what it’s like to be with Mum and Dad respectively. You MUST ask the child for an 
example for each of the words they give, as the coding system for this interview relies 
upon the child giving specific examples to illustrate each of the words he/she uses. For
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instance, in question 3 the child might say that it feels safe, happy and relaxing to be with 
Mum so you must ask the child for an example of when it felt safe, an example of when it 
felt happy and an example of when if felt relaxing to be with Mum. If the child finds this 
difficult, then you can ask him/her to “describe a time when it f e l t , or “tell me about
the last time it felt ” to be with Mum. Always follow up brief answers to questions by
asking for examples. The coherence of the interview can only be assessed if the child 
provides examples for his/her answers -  if the child says that when Mum gets upset, she 
shouts and he/she gets sent to his/her room where he/she plays computer games, then ask 
for a specific example of when Mum became upset. Remember, an interview that only 
produces answers like “it feels happy to be with Mum because she is nice and does things 
for me” is likely to be rendered uncodable due to insufficient information.
Some questions have alternative phrasings if the child doesn’t understand what you mean. 
It is not necessary to strictly adhere to the format of the questions, and you can re-phrase 
the question if you need to, in order for the child to understand. Use some of the 
suggestions in the text (e.g. question 10) if the child fails to respond or says “no”. For 
example, if the child says no one they cared about has died, just check by asking about 
grandparents, uncles, aunts etc. Children who have said “no” quickly realise that their 
grandfather did actually die last year when asked specifically about grandparents! Be 
careful about putting words into the children’s mouths though.
The interview is sometimes a little stressful for the children; you should ask for specific 
examples and use the prompts. If the child says “no” or doesn’t reply to a particular 
question, use the prompt or re-phrase the question to ensure that the child’s failure to 
respond is not due lack of comprehension. DO NOT however, prompt more that once or 
twice since the child’s reported inability to recall may reflect a particular defensive 
strategy which in itself provides useful information for subsequent coding. You must be 
aware that particular questions may be more difficult for some children and you therefore 
need to prompt gently and move on to another question if necessary but without 
compromising the data.
It is important to note that the CAI is a semi-structured interview and hence affords some 
flexibility in the use of prompts depending upon the child’s responses. Some children 
may describe episodes early in the interview that are relevant to subsequent questions. To 
illustrate, a child may describe the loss of his/her grandparent when describing why
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he/she chose the word caring to describe his/her relationship with mum. Although it is not 
recounted in the loss question, it is perfectly acceptable for the child to describe the event. 
However, it is unnecessary to prompt further for loss there and then and you MUST NOT 
skip over the loss question. Rather when you get to the loss question you may say “I 
know you’ve talked before about the death of your grandfather and I would like to ask 
you a few more questions about it”, thereby acknowledging the child’s earlier description. 
A child may also recount an episode where mum was upset with him/her in response to 
the question asking for 3 adjectives of what its like to be with mum. In this case, when 
you get to the question about a time when mum was upset, say “I know you’ve told me 
before about that time your mum got upset with you but I wonder if you can remember 
another time when that happened”.
Finally, It is often the case that interviewers ask closed or leading questions when 
confronted with a child who clearly finds it difficult to engage in the task and often 
reports lack of memory. You MUST AVOID at all cost asking LEADING QUESTIONS 
or re-phrasing adjectives or descriptions the child may provide. Asking the child “did you 
feel upset” not only implies that the child was upset at the time but also can only lead to a 
yes/no response. Asking the child “How did you feel when that happened?” enables the 
child to express his/her feeling in more detail.
IMPORTANT GENERAL PROMPTS
Prompts are not principally given to find out more episodic information. Instead they are 
offered to provide clarity concerning the nature and quality of the child’s attachment 
representations. In other words, there is an emphasis within the CAI on quality not 
quantity.
♦ If the child responds with concrete, physical attributes or purely factual information 
(see for example question 2) then attempt to explore the affective nature of the 
description relayed. If the child does not respond with a RE, do not persist, simply 
move on.
If potential REs are identified anywhere throughout the interview then:
1. Initially ask the child to tell the story from the beginning.
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2. If the child has problems with sequencing their narrative orientate them by asking 
for specific details surrounding the events (e.g., Who was there? What happened? 
What was there? What did you do?)
3. Ask how the child and other (if relevant) felt in the situation.
Presenting the interview
Present the interview by saying:
“This is an interview about you and your family. I am going to ask you some questions 
about yourself first and then I will ask questions about your relationship with your 
parents. For each question I will ask you to give me some examples. This interview is not 
a test and there are no right or wrong answers. I would just like you to tell me how you 
really think and feel about what you and your family are like. The interview will last 
about half an hour (30 minutes)”.
1) Can you tell me about the people in your family? (May need to qualify by saying 
“That is the people living together in your house” if child starts describing extended 
family members. If child only names one parent, ask about 2nd parent, how much 
contact, etc.).
If the child’s parents are separated or divorced, ask about step parents. It is 
important to establish who the child considers to be the primary caregivers and ask 
all subsequent questions about them. It may mean that you ask not only about the 
biological parens but also about the step mum or grandmother.
This is a warm-up question and its therefore not aimed at trying to obtain detailed 
biographical information but rather to establish who are the primary caregivers and 
to engage the child in the interview and reduce any anxiety.
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2) Tell me three words that describe yourself, that is not what you look like, but 
what sort of person you are (It may be useful to say “that is your personality”. 
Some children may find it helpful to imagine writing a letter to a pen pal).
1............... 2.............  3................
a) Ask for specific examples to support each adjective, i.e., “Can you give me 
an example of when you felt” 1........ 2.......  3..........
Prompts: After each example, prompt the child as appropriate focusing on any specific 
relationship episodes (See introduction).
3) Can you tell me three words to describe your relationship with you mum? (can 
add “that is, what it’s like to be with your Mum?”).
1............ 2.............  3...............
a) Ask for specific examples to support each adjective, i.e., “Tell me about a 
time when you felt” 1..... 2.......  3........ with her”
Prompts: Immediately after each example prompt the child for more detailed description 
of the relationship episode as necessary (See introduction).
4) What happens when Mum gets cross with you or tells you off?
a) Prompt: If you’ve done something wrong or done something to upset her,
what does she usually say or do?
Ask for a specific example, can say “Tell me the last time mum got upset 
with you”.
b) How did you feel when that happens?
c) How did you think your mum feels when that happens?
d) Why do you think she does_______(whatever the child says mother does,
e,g., shouts at you)?
e) If child does NOT take this to mean getting angry:- Further prompt:
What happens when your Mum tells you off/is angry with you?
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f) Do you know why she tells you off or what you have done wrong?
g) Do you think It’s fair?
5) Can you tell me three words to describe your relationship with you Dad? (can 
add “that is, what it’s like to be with your Dad?”).
1............ 2.............  3...............
a) Ask for specific examples to support each adjective, i.e., “Tell me about a 
time when you felt 1..... 2.......  3.......  with him”
Prompts: Immediately after each example prompt the child for more detailed description 
of the relationship episode as necessary (See introduction).
6) What happens when Dad gets cross with you or tells you off?
a) Prompt: If you’ve done something wrong or done something to upset him, 
what does he usually say or do?
Ask for a specific example, can say “Tell me the last time mum got upset 
with you”.
b) How did you feel when that happens?
c) How do you think your dad feels when that happens?
d) Why do you think he does_______(whatever the child said father does
e.g., shouts at you)?
e) If  child does NOT take this to mean getting angry:- Further prompt: 
W hat happens when your dad tells you off/is angry with you?
f) Do you know why he tells you off or what you have done wrong?
g) Do you think it’s fair?
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7) Can you tell me about a time when you were upset and wanted help?
Prompt: You were trying to tell someone something and no one understood what you 
meant? Or, there was something you wanted someone to do and no one understood you?
If the child says that this hasn’t happened, offer suggestions: e.g.,how would you feel if; 
your teacher told you off in front of the whole class, or you asked your friend to play after 
school and they said no because they didn’t like you anymore, or you were bullied at 
school.
Prompt for a specific example when child felt upset or misunderstood.
8) Do you ever feel that your parents really don’t love you?
a) Prompt: Can you tell me when you felt like that?
b) Do you often feel like that?
9) What happens when you’re ill?
Prompt for a specific example i.e., “Can you tell me what happened?” What did you do? 
Does anyone stay at home with you?
10) What happens when you hurt yourself?
Prompt for a specific example, i.e., “Can you tell me about a time when...?”
What did you do? Who was there?
11) Have you ever been hit by an older child or grown up in your family?
Prompt to get as much information as possible about the incident and how the child feels 
about what happened. If the reply in NO, move to the next question.
a) Did it happen once or twice or more often?
b) Can you tell me what happened?
c) How did you feel?
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12) Have you ever been hit or hurt by someone else, an older child or adult 
outside your family?
Prompt to get as much information as possible about the incident and how the child feels 
about what happened. If the reply is NO, move to the next question.
a) Did it happen once or twice or more often?
b) Can you tell me what happened?
c) How did you feel?
13) Has anyone close to you ever died? Has an animal ever died?
a) What happened? Was the death sudden? Did you go to the 
funeral?
b) How did you feel about it?
c) How do you think it made other people feel? (e.g. Mum, Dad, 
sibling?).
14) Is there anyone that you cared about who isn’t around anymore? (This should 
be asked as an extension of question 10 only if this issue has not been covered 
previously).
a) How did it feel when they went away? Did things change 
much?
b) Do you keep in touch? If yes, how, if no why do you think that 
is?
If child says no: Tell me about a time when things changed, (e.g. 
moved house, went to new school, parents separating, friend left).
a) How did you feel?
b) Do you keep in touch? If yes, how, if no why do you think that 
is?
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16) Have you ever been away from your parents for longer than a day? (very 
important question concerning separation from parents, try therefore to get as 
much information as possible).
Prompts: Prompt to get a clear idea of the incident the child is describing (i.e., 
When, Who they were with, Where to, How long for, What they did)
a) What was it like to be away from you parent/s?
b) What do you think it was like for your mum and dad?
c) What was it like seeing mum and dad again?
17) Do your parents sometimes argue?
Prompt for a specific example, can say “Can you tell me about the last time your 
parents were arguing”
a) How do you feel? Why do you feel like that?
b) Why do you think they do that?
c) How do you think they feel?
d) Do they know how you feel?
18) a. In what ways would you like to be like you mum?
b. In what ways would you not like to be like you mum?
c. In what ways would you like to be like your dad?
d. In what ways would you not like to be like your dad?
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19) Ending Question: If you could make three wishes when you are older what 
would they be?
(finish up question, should be asked in playful manner and affirm the child’s 
answers, e.g., “ah, that sounds really good”.
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INTRODUCTION
This manual is based upon the Adult Reflective Functioning Manual developed by 
Fonagy, Target, Steele and Steele (1996). Modifications have been made, and 
illustrations from children’s narratives are used to demonstrate the application of the 
manual and scale in researching the reflective functioning of children. A very good and 
comprehensive introduction to concept of Reflective Functioning has been included in the 
Adult Reflective Functioning Manual and is appended to this manual. We would strongly 
recommend the first eleven pages of the Adult Manual as essential reading for those who 
do not have a background in this area as it clarifies the questions about the origin about 
the concept and the context and reasons for its development. The reference list of the 
Adult Manual has also been included to encourage fiirther reading.
To Summarise: Reflective Functioning or ‘mentalisation’ is the active expression of the 
psychological capacity to organise experience of one’s own or others’ behaviour in terms 
of mental state constructs.
In other words, reflective functioning pertains to the dynamic process of experiencing 
oneself or others in terms of the psychological basis which underlie interactions or 
behaviour.
Reflective Functioning (RF) is inherently a dynamic skill used interpersonally to make 
meaning of behaviour and interactions. Theories of RF development point towards an 
interpersonal origin, arising from the interactions between infant and a caregiver who 
experiences him/her as a psychological being and thus attributes mental states to the 
infant and reflects this understanding back to the infant through verbal or behavioural 
interactions. Through these interactions, the infant develops the core psychological 
structure needed to build a viable sense of self. There is also some research evidence 
suggesting that the development of RF is facilitated under the pressure of sibling and peer 
interaction.
As such, basic RF involves the capacity to distinguish:
=> inner from outer reality;
=> pretend from ‘real’ modes of functioning;
=> intra-personal mental and emotional processes from interpersonal
communications.
Furthermore, implicit to RF is the awareness of qualities of mental states such as:
=> opacity,
=> susceptibility to disguise,
=> limitations on insight,
=> the awareness of expectable psychological responses,
=> the defensive nature of certain mental states.
RF is a developmentally acquired and dynamic skill that builds upon the development of 
Theory of Mind. While it may be useful to conceptualise it as the process of Theorising 
of the Mind, it is important to recognise that it is quite different from intellectualisation 
with which it is often confused. Rather than it being a conscious deliberate cognitive 
process, we see RF as more like an overleamed skill like walking or driving a car, where 
you are not consciously thinking about doing. It is a process where the essential
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components are non-conscious, although they may be called to consciousness. This 
recall to consciousness may involve some effort or may be accompanied by a sense of 
awe, and surprise at our usual unawareness of the processes involved in making sense of 
behaviour or interactions.
As such, RF entails an understanding that:
• mental states underlie one’s own and others behaviour
• perceptions of behaviour or situations are dependent upon mental state attribution
• distortions of mental state attribution and perception of behaviour may occur and 
may be influenced by one’s own mental state
• one’s mental state may influence an individual’s perception of self and other’s 
perceptions of an individual..
REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING IN ADULTS
A characteristic of RF identified in the narratives of reflective adults is the recognition of 
developmental aspects of mental states, such as:
=> intergenerational and psychobiological developmental
=> unconscious factors which affect mental states.
Furthermore, RF functioning in adults may be manifested in the awareness of other 
potential factors which could influence psychological understanding, such as:
=> transactional processes between parent and child
=> awareness of family dynamics or social dynamics.
Such examples are rare in children, but are occasionally seen and would be rated highly.
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GENERAL GUIDELINES
1. Children of the 8-12 age range are actively developing cognitively, emotionally, and 
socially, and their narratives reflect this dynamic process. In contrast to adult 
reflective functioning, children’s narratives may not be counted upon to be explicitly 
elaborate and coherent in the verbalization of the links between states of mind and 
one’s own and other’s behaviour.
E.g. “I think that she was angry because she thought that...”
Therefore for the purpose of this manual, statements which implicitly display a 
reflection on mental states are coded as potentially reflective statements provided that 
the actual mental state is explicitly stated. This may be manifested by such means as 
two statements in approximation to one another but pertaining to die same mental 
state or the need for prompt questions by the interviewer to help the child elaborate 
his or her answer.
E.g. Is there anyone you cannot get along with? “There is this one girl in my 
class who is always mean to me and saying mean and nasty things for no 
reason...”
Why do you think she is like that? “ She likes to get attention and tries to get the 
attention of the Year 6 girls. She has two older brothers who ignore her and are 
quite mean to her, maybe it has something to do with that.”
2. Dynamic or elaborate behavioural explanations or descriptions of personality, 
however accurate and perceptive they may seem, cannot be scored as instances of 
reflective functioning unless accompanied bv specific references to mental states. 
Children may implicitly refer to a mental state through the animated acting out of a 
situation and using changes of intonation of voice and facial expression when relating 
what someone has said. In these instances, the child seems to be mimicking not only 
what one has said but also how they think the person felt, for example using an angry, 
sad, or sarcastic and hostile voice. In these instances the reference to a mental state is 
present but implicit and as such may qualify as a moderate to high RF statement 
providing there is additional evidence of thinking about the mental state implied.
3. There must be some demonstration of thinking about feelings or thoughts either 
explicitly or implicitly for a statement to qualify as moderately to highly reflective. 
Statements which simply refer to or report mental states are considered as examples 
of low reflective functioning. Those statements which do not refer to mental states at 
all are considered to be examples of absent reflective functioning.
4. Each demand question is coded based upon the highest RF response found in the 
reply. (See Appendix). The manual is designed for coding from videotaped interviews 
of children as the implicit references to mental states may be more difficult to 
ascertain using only transcriptions of interviews. However, we have found using 
transcriptions alongside rating from video, the most effective.
It is vital not to rate a child lower because they or their attitudes are unappealing. If 
their statements are reflective, they must be credited.
PARTI
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REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING IN INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES
Specific Areas of Reflective Functioning
CATEGORIES:
A. Awareness of qualities of mental states.
1. Recognition of the opaqueness of mental states and limitations on insight.
2. Mental states as susceptible to disguise
3. Mental states tied to expressions of appropriate normative judgements
4. Awareness of the defensive nature of certain mental states
5. Recognising the interactional aspects of mental states.
B. The explicit effort to tease out mental states underlying behaviour.
A. Attributions of mental states to other’s or the child’s own behaviour.
B. Recognising that one’s mental state may influence one’s own behaviour 
and/or the behaviour of others.
C. Recognising that one’s mental states related to one situation may influence 
one’s behaviour or feelings about another separate situation.
D. Recognition of diverse perspectives.
E. Understanding that an interpersonal behavioural interaction may be used to 
regulate negative affect.
C. Recognizing that mental states develop in the context of developmental, 
psychobiological, and social processes.
1. Taking an intergenerational perspective, making links across generations
2. Taking a developmental perspective
3. Awareness of family dynamics or peer group dynamics
4. A freshness of recall and thinking about mental states.
D. Mental states in relation to the interviewer
1. Acknowledging the separateness of minds and not assuming knowledge
2. Emotional attunement
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GUIDE TO RATING RF STATEMENTS
The utility of this manual is dependent upon the coders* knowledge of the following 
qualities of mentalisation and reflective functioning. These qualities must be elucidated 
from narrative passages to qualify as moderate to highly reflective statements.
NB: Statements fulfilling these criteria should be rated 5 and above.
A. Awareness of qualities of mental states 
OVERVIEW:
An awareness of distinct qualities of mental or psychological states as an example 
of reflective functioning. The understanding that mental states are different from 
behavioural or physical states is not enough, responses must show an 
understanding of at least one of the unique aspects of mental states as outlined 
below.
SUBCATEGORIES:
1. Recognition of the opaqueness of mental states and limitations on insight.
The child acknowledges the difficulty one has in being sure of what the other’s intention 
or mental state is or was, while being prepared to guess. Often these responses are 
characterized by the child’s insight that there may be limitations in being able to 
understand our own and others mental states.
Other indications of opaqueness and limitations on insight may emerge through qualifiers 
such as “pretend he...” or “maybe he feels...” - prefacing an explanation in terms of 
mental states. Even more convincingly, alternative mental states may be offered, with 
the implication that it is hard to know which one lay behind the behaviour.
One limitation on insight that is rare, but notable, if seen in children’s interviews, is the 
attribution of unconscious mental states as limiting factor for insight.
The statement must make clear that the child considers an active unconscious process 
working and not simply saying “he didn’t know he was doing it” as a means of answering 
a question. In these instances where responses reflect an understanding of unconscious 
processes, a rating of 6 or above would apply.
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EXAMPLES : Eg. How do you know if X is feeling sad or afraid? “Well, sometimes he 
looks really red and is quiet...I don’t really know sometimes if that’s because he is hot or 
something.. .but I tell him about a show to cheer him up but I don’t really know if he’s 
actually feeling sad or just not speaking or something.” (8)
2. Mental states as susceptible to disguise
The child’s response indicates awareness that internal states may be deliberately 
disguised. The response reflects awareness that one may experience different emotions 
to the one displayed.
EXAMPLES: I am so angry at her ... but I would never show that to her.”(6) [BASIC 
BUT CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE RF RESPONSE]
3. Mental states tied to expressions of appropriate normative judgements
The child’s response may indicate an awareness of an expectable psychological response. 
When a response refers to what would be a commonly expected reaction in a specific 
situation, this is rated as evidence of reflective-functioning.
EXAMPLES: We went swimming and we didn’t know that the current was dangerous 
and my dad was so angry, he was looking for us because he was worried as he knew 
about the current. (8). [RICHNESS AND SOME INDICATION OF THE CAUSE OF 
THE MENTAL STATE. GOOD EXAMPLE OF OCCASION WHEN CHILD 
THOUGHT ANOTHER’S RESPONSE WAS APPROPRIATE]
4. Awareness of the defensive nature of certain mental states
A child’s response may reflect an understanding of people’s tendency to modify their 
mental states in order to reduce negative affect. This reflective understanding may be 
applied to the self and/or others.
EXAMPLES: No one really likes him and he is probably quite sad about that... so he 
does those mean things to stand up for himself.. .to feel better about himself. (8)
5. Recognising the interactional aspects of mental states
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A child’s response may show an understanding that mental states can interact with one 
another in a causal way. Responses can focus on: .
1. How the mental state of one person may impact on the mental state of another. For 
example, this may be in the context of the feelings of one person affecting the 
feeling state of another,
2. The interactions of mental states within a single mind are considered. Common 
examples involve:
a. Responses show the child acknowledges conflicting perceptions/ desires or 
mixed emotions being held in mind
b. The child’s responses may show one feeling leading to another in a causal 
sequence.
c. Some children may show some reconciliation of these and the capacity to 
have more than one feeling about an experience at the same time.
EXAMPLES: What happens when she gets upset with you? When she gets cross with me 
I usually feel upset and then when I think about it I feel guilty. (6)
What happens when she gets upset with you? When she gets upset with me she says, she 
says I’m about to lose my cool with you so you just better behave yourself (in angry voice 
and wagging finger). And if I’m going out, if I’m going out, she says to me, like, (in 
angry voice) “ you’re not going there anymore”.. .and then when I come upstairs and I go, 
“ mum, please let me go and she says, “ oh okay.”
Why do you think she does it that way? To punish me.. .no not to punish me but to say, 
like, to teach me a lesson. But she’s so kind and everything and she doesn’t like hurting 
my feelings that she always ends up letting me go so I don’t really worry. 
[INTERACTIONS OF MENTAL STATES WITHIN MOTHER’S MIND]
And how do you feel when she’s upset with you? I feel like I’ve been... sometimes when 
she’s upset with me she just goes off and she doesn’t say nothing , she just goes to her 
room and she just sits down. And then I know that I’ve made her really really angry, 
cause she won’t say nothing and she just goes up and then I go say , “sorry, sorry, sorry 
“and then we make up again (8) [MENTAL STATE OF ONE IMPACTING ON 
MENTAL STATE OF ANOTHER; DEFENSIVE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES; 
MENTAL STATES ELICITING A MENTAL STATE REACTION AND 
BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE IN ANOTHER]
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B. The explicit effort to tease out mental states underlying behaviour.
OVERVIEW:
The child’s response identifies possible mental states that may account for 
behaviour, and offers accurate or plausible links between mental states and 
behaviours of the self and others. In contrast to the above category, these 
responses may have as their focus the behaviour with subsequent elaboration of 
mental states. This is evident in a range of statements illustrated below.
SUBCATEGORIES:
1. Attributions of mental states to other’s or the child’s own behaviour
All plausible causal accounts of behaviour in terms of mental states should be considered. 
The causal account should be regarding a specific incident and should clearly guide the 
rater coherently to an understanding of the behaviour based upon the mental state 
underlying it.
[NB: Less explicit accounts, where the rater must fill in the gaps to make the linkage 
between behaviour and mental state would only qualify for a rating of 4-5.]
EXAMPLES: Well I don’t think she wanted to cry in front of her friends she didn’t want 
to get embarrassed sort of, maybe... (6)
2. Recognising that one’s mental state mav influence one’s own behaviour and/or the 
behaviour of others
The child’s response shows a recognition of the role their own mental states might have 
had on their own behaviour or the behaviour of others. Implicit, but not necessarily 
explicit, is that the mental state would have had behavioural manifestations. This category 
is similar to A5- the interactional aspects of mental states however, here, the focus is on 
mental states impacting on behaviour.
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EXAMPLES: My mom, she doesn’t like me to, like, (said with emphasis) want things. 
Like, if I like go to a shop and I see something, she wouldn’t like me to want it, so she 
likes to give me things so I have the opportunity to get things... so like an example is the 
other day when I was sitting in the kitchen talking with my mom and I said I want a new 
pair of trainers. And she said she could give me the money next week. She’s quite good 
like that. (6) [CHILD’S MENTAL STATE OF WANTING ELICITS A 
BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE FROM MOTHER]
3. Recognising that one’s mental states related to one situation may influence one’s 
behaviour or feelings about another separate situation
The child’s response may indicate an understanding that the way one behaves in a 
situation may be affected by their feelings about another situation which may or may not 
be directly linked to the one at hand.
EXAMPLES: I was very angry as I thought he had done it on purpose and I felt I hated 
him.. .Thinking back now, why do you think the argument happened? ...I think I was 
angry and was too upset to listen to him explain.. ..I was really in a bad mood as earlier a 
teacher had told me off and I was having a bad day.” (8) [MENTAL STATES AND 
BEHAVIOUR IN ONE SITUATION AFFECTED BY THOSE FROM ANOTHER 
SITUATION, DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES, INTERACTIONAL ASPECTS OF 
MENTAL STATES WITHIN SELF.]
4. Recognition of different or diverse perspectives
The child’s response reflects an understanding that different people may perceive a given 
behaviour or situation differently often based on differing knowledge of the situation or 
false belief.
EXAMPLES: She was upset because she thought the secret was about her but it wasn’t. 
(6).
5. Understanding that an interpersonal behavioural interaction may be used to regulate 
negative affect
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The child’s response indicates an understanding that behavioural interactions with others 
may help to reduce painful or negative feelings. This type of response assumes an 
awareness of mental states underlying behaviour, the understanding that behavioural 
manifestations of affect may evoke and elicit emotional and behavioural responses in 
others, and that behavioural interactions of this sort are performed with the intention to 
soothe or regulate negative feelings or affect. [NB: As such, responses of this kind are 
deemed to be of higher reflective function and are scored 7 or above]
There are two main types of responses in this category:
1. The child may recognize that when they experience a negative affect, their own 
behaviour may elicit responses from others, which in turn can help to soothe or 
regulate the child’s affect in various ways.
2. The child may recognize behaviours in others (parent or peer), which in turn 
prompts the child to seek to regulate or soothe the other.
The child’s response must show this dynamic in the context of a specific situation or with 
specific description to the type of behavioural interaction and an explicit account of how 
it regulates negative affect. Thus general statements would not be rated as reflective.
E.g. “When I get sad, she like, comforts me.” (4).
EXAMPLES: What do you do when you’re not feeling well like when you’re feeling 
scared or upset? Well usually I just like want to be alone and um if it’s something I can 
talk to someone about I’ll talk to one of my friends. And then if you talk about... pretend 
if you’re scared that something is going to happen, like sometimes... I don’t remember if 
that happened, I think it has but I don’t remember why... umm, I talk to my friends. So 
does Claire usually know if you're feeling sad or afraid? Well she can tell because she’s 
been around me for so long and then she’ll ask me like why, is there something wrong. 
And sometimes I’ll say like , ‘Oh nothing’ and then sometimes I’ll tell her. Sometimes I 
just like, ..usually it helps me if I’m alone and then sometimes if I’m just like walking 
alone or something and then she’ll ask me and then I’ll tell her. (8) [BEHAVIOUR 
INTERACTION FOR REGULATION OF NEGATIVE AFFECT, MENTAL STATES 
AS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DISGUISE, PEER DYNAMICS, ELABORATION OF 
RESPONSE] Sometimes I just can’t make her feel better... so instead of wasting ... or 
spending time thinking about it, I’ll say why don’t we go out and play. She’s still feeling 
pretty bad but she won’t be thinking about it as much. (8).
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C. Recognizing that mental states develop in the context of developmental,
psychobiological, and social processes
OVERVIEW:
Though rarer in children of latency age, responses which make reference to 
developmental, psychobiological and social processes that can potentially affect 
aspects of mental states are considered to be demonstrative of reflective 
functioning. These include acknowledging the influence of one generation upon 
the next, showing an understanding of how mental states of others’ change, 
showing an appreciation of family dynamics or peer dynamics, and distinguishing 
between the thinking of a young child and older child or person.
SUBCATEGORIES:
1. Taking an intergenerational perspective, making links across generations
Although rarely found in interviews with children, statements showing awareness of this 
intergenerational exchange of ideas, feelings and behaviour is considered reflective as 
long as the references made are explicit and specific.
[NB: As such, responses of this kind are deemed to be of higher reflective function and 
are scored 7 or above]
EXAMPLES: Mom and dad had an argument, yeah... every time I said, “Shut up” they’d 
shout again and I’d say (louder voice) “Shut up!” And they wouldn’t listen. So what did 
they do? They kept on arguing and they said “Tell.her to shut up , tell him to shut up’” . 
So what ends up happening? Dad always usually sorts it out and stops it. So how do you 
feel when they argue? I feel upset but I feel, I feel upset but then I feel as I normally feel - 
happy. Yeah. Because I know it will always end up happy. There have been really no 
arguments that have gone on too far. So how do you think they feel when they argue? 
Angry, angry with each other. Yeah, they’re shouting at each other. So why would they 
fight? I don’t know. (Shaking head) Do they know how you feel about them fighting? 
Yeah because mum usually in our conversations she usually says stuff like “I know how 
you feel” because that happened with her mum and dad. Do you mean her mum and 
dad? Yeah. So you were able to talk about it. What about your dad, do you think he
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knows how you feel? Yeah. Because my dad’s mom had left him when he was 8 too and 
he’d know they wouldn’t have split up without an argument. (9) 
[INTERGENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, FAMILY DYNAMICS, 
INTERACTIONAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL STATES, ELABORATION OF 
RESPONSE]
2. Taking a developmental perspective
Some children’s responses show awareness of developmental changes in certain mental 
states. This is regarded as reflective because it assumes that the subject is making 
assessments of either their own or others’ changing perspective with age.
EXAMPLES: My grandmother died when I was just a baby and I wasn’t upset about it 
then. I wasn’t sad about it ‘ til I was 8 years old ... since I saw that other kids had their 
grandparents around.”(6) [SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF RF USING DEVELOPMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVE BUT NOT ELABORATED]
Has anyone close to you ever died? Umm well when I was veiy little my granddad died 
because he was ill. Can you remember that? Yeah just about. Can you remember what 
happened? Well I can remember him laying in bed a lot and being ill um and the doctor 
had to come every day and check him but I can’t remember much more. So was he ill for 
quite a while? Yeah he was. And did you go to the funeral? Uh, I don’t think so I can’t 
remember. How did you feel about it? I felt pretty upset but I didn’t really understand 
then but I understand now and I still get a bit upset. (8) [DEVELOPMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVE, ELABORATION OF ANSWER]
3. Awareness of family dynamics or peer group dynamics
The child shows an awareness of the interdependence of mental states within family 
systems or peer group systems. Seeing the family or a peer group as an interdependent 
system, where the mental states of the individual members interact and create attitudes 
and feelings that each individual member is affected by indicates a high level of 
reflection. These examples are rare, but when present, are highly compelling. The 
description and explanation of mental states is placed in the context of a description of 
family or peer dynamics.
NB: These examples should be highly rated if seen - 7 or above.
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EXAMPLES : Three words to describe your relationship with your dad. ...No 
communication because like I don’t really talk to him... I do but, it’s like we live in the 
same house but we’re not... I mean it’s not that bad but...it’s not like a normal....It 
sounds like you can imagine it being better. Yeah I could, it was before, when I was 
little. Why do you think it changed? Don’t know maybe because I’ve grown up, maybe 
because my mum started going to University and everything. That sounds like a lot of 
changes. Also she doesn’t work anymore and my dad doesn’t work anymore and my 
brother goes to Nursery and my dad has to pick them up almost everyday.. .How do you 
think it changed your relationship? I don’t know. ...I don’t know really....” (7) 
[IMPLIES AN AWARENESS OF FAMILY DYNAMICS].
I ask my Dad about things when he was growing up and things and when he passed his 
driving test or when he first learned to drive so.. .And he tells you about it? Sometimes he 
tells me, sometimes he says I’m too young to know about them and I’m too young to 
understand -  he said that about 2 years go and I says ‘what was it that you said that I 
didn’t understand? And he said, “I can’t remember”. But I think that he can remember 
and but he, he still doesn’t want to tell me. (8) [STRONG IMPLIED AWARENESS OF 
FAMILY DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE]
4. A freshness of recall and thinking about mental states
A child’s response may give the impression of thinking spontaneously and vividly about 
people’s thoughts and feelings. This is the opposite of merely learned or cliched 
expressions. There is a quality of something currently thought, and real to the subject, 
which makes it feel alive to the rater. This will often be conveyed, for instance, when a 
subject changes their perspective on an event or relationship during the interview itself, 
and is often marked by dysfluency, as the subject struggles to formulate a new 
understanding.
EXAMPLES: Can you give me an example of a time when she couldn’t admit her 
mistakes? Well one of the times was like, if she was doing this, like we had to all draw I 
think it was some kind of a like a way of advertising and she knew she made a mistake 
and she would show and say (in a boastful voice) “Oh isn’t this so good” and like we
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would say, (tentative voice) “well like yeah it’s pretty good’” and then she would say 
like, (accusatory voice) “Why is it pretty good?” And then we would say, well like you 
sort of made this little mistake and she would say like, (defensive tone of voice)“Oh no I 
didn’t.” Oh Okay. And how did you feel then? I felt like, like that she just doesn’t care 
that anyone like that anyone really thinks that she made a mistake and that she just 
doesn’t care that people are trying to help her. Oh, so that was the way you felt? Yeah. 
What do you think she was feeling when this happened? She might have felt a little badly 
of what she was saying but she kept going because she didn’t want to seem really silly 
like, ‘Oh I didn’t mean to say that’. Why do you think she’s like that? Umm..maybe 
there’s something happening in her family... and... because one of her really good friends 
is sort of like that, like if someone is sort of mean to her then she’s always mean back at 
them for the rest of the day and maybe she’s like sort of copying that a little. (9) 
[FRESHNESS OF RECALL; FAMILY DYNAMICS AND PEER DYNAMICS; 
MENTAL STATES AS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DISGUISE; INTERACTIONAL ASPECTS 
OF MENTAL STATES; ELABORATION OF RESPONSE]
D. Mental states in relation to the interviewer
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OVERVIEW:
A child’s recognition of mental states might be shown by their interaction with the 
interviewer, which we take as an indication of the child’s willingness to entertain 
mental states in the context of other relationships.
SUBCATEGORIES:
1. Acknowledging the separateness of minds and not assuming knowledge
Explicit efforts by the subject to help the interviewer keep track of the material by 
stepping outside the narrative and spontaneously clarifying confusing aspects should be 
credited as an acknowledgement of a separateness of minds and knowledge. This is clear 
when a subject acknowledges ambiguities or anomalies in a narrative, and provides 
additional information which either clarifies or explains.
Less persuasive examples are when a speaker pauses to ask whether the interviewer is 
following the narrative.
This should only be the case, however, when, in the rater’s view, the subject is accurately 
and selectively responding during particularly complex sections of the narrative.
Constant clarifications for the sake of the interviewer, may reflect a defensive style of 
narration rather than actual concern for the interviewer’s level of knowledge.
EXAMPLES: “Have I got off the question?”(6).
2. Emotional attunement
Children’s responses which make accurate references to the likely impact upon the 
interviewer of the material they have provided should also be credited. The rater must 
take care not to mistake common courtesy or a wish to please for such attunement. It is 
important that the subject should manifest an internal model or a hypothesis as to why the 
interviewer may be upset, bored, irritated, frustrated etc.
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EXAMPLES: A child, in the midst of relating a complicated interaction about friends 
took a thoughtful pause and commented, this example could be complicated and 
confusing for you...” (10) [VERY UNUSUAL OBSERVATION FOR A CHILD]
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PART 2
GUIDELINES FOR RATING OVERALL REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF
PASSAGES
Specific Guidelines for rating passages
We are now going to give examples of Reflective Functioning for the six major 
definitions o f RF along with examples of what we are really looking for in higher 
functioning children - although in a lot of clinical children it is not found.
0: Repudiated RF
Passages which are rated as negative or ‘0’ must be distinctly anti-reflective or
bizarre/inappropri ate.
• Responses of this type are marked by active evasiveness of mentalising questions 
and probes with no effort or contemplation of the question. This may be shown 
through the child’s lack of contemplation of the question i.e. immediately says “I 
don’t know” or “No”. The child may state they do not want to talk about the 
question or may perceive the question as an assault or perceived attack. 
Sometimes the subject may express overt hostility by criticising the interviewer or 
the task. Alternatively, these reactions may be non-verbal, for example: going 
totally silent.
• For some children, because they are frightened of being overwhelmed by powerful 
feelings, may be unable or unwilling to be reflective about family relationships 
but may be willing to be reflective in other circumstances, i.e. with peers.
• Some children might refuse to co-operate defensively but be willing to co-operate 
in other tasks, suggesting their unwillingness is related to defensive evasion of the 
emotional content of the task. On these occasions it is not possible to correctly 
assess their reflective functioning capabilities.
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EXAMPLES : How did you feel about it? I felt sad. I can’t speak about it anymore...is it 
over now -  I can’t answer anymore...”(0) [INTERVIEW ENDED AT THIS POINT AS 
CHILD REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER]
What happens when Dad gets upset with you?
I said I don’t want to do it.. .giving you words is enough. (0)
• More commonly, however, active evasion consists of trying to distract the interviewer 
from the task by, for example, starting a conversation on an irrelevant topic or 
disengaging from the task by engaging in any activity which precludes complying 
with the demands of the task.
EXAMPLES : The following examples came from one child’s interview: So when was 
the last time... When was the last time I felt worried? Today really, Why was that? I 
looked at the sky and I thought that there would be a tornado I mean a hurricane or a 
tornado, I mean a hurricane or a tornado come down from the sky the sky. I went inside. 
I didn’t want a hurricane or a tornado to suck me up. Are there other things that worry 
you? Do you want me to show you what my mum done on my shoe? Mum is best 
(pointing to shoe). (0)
When was the last time you felt it was fun to be with mom? Uhhh.. .there’s a poem there, 
fun to be with mom...I’m fun to be with mum...I’ve got this video of Sesame street....” 
(0) [DOES NOT PROCEED TO ANSWER THE QUESTION]
Sad, Yeah, why would you feel sad? Because they played with me and then they said no. 
And why does that, why if they say no why does that make you feel sad? Cause they were 
my friends and I like them very much and they played with me. I think I’ll have another 
biscuit.”(l)
• Bizarre explanations of behaviour unequivocally invoke mental states in self or other 
which are beyond the bounds of common-sense psychology or even poorly-applied 
theory-driven insight. To be rated negative , the passage must be impossible to 
understand without making the assumption of ‘irrationality’ on the part of the 
interviewee. Completely non-specific responses, overly concrete and literal 
interpretations of the questions, over-familiarity, gross assumptions about the 
interviewer on the part of the subject are examples.
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EXAMPLES : Has there been a time when your parents were confusing or frightening? 
Yes I have, when they died... no...my mummy and daddy are alive (dramatic and raising 
arms) THEY’RE ALIVE.. .my granny is dead.(O)
1: Absent RF
The child is unable to give a response, although there is evidence that they have 
considered the question.
2 - 3 : Absent but not repudiated reflective functioning response
The child’s response preferentially makes use of physical or behavioural terms to 
describe themselves and others.
■ Responses are framed in terms of external, physical circumstances - i.e. “I am ‘x’ 
years old.. .1 play soccer” even when probed for qualities of personality.
■ Conflicts and interactions are described with concrete and physical descriptions of 
what a person said or did and the child will be unable to elaborate about 
underlying mental states even with the aid of probing questions.
■ Responses are distinctly non-reflective but not in a hostile or actively evasive way 
but rather leaves the interviewer with the impression that the child does not yet 
know how to use a capacity to understand mental states to further understand 
behaviour. The child may have difficulties understanding some questions which 
focus on mental states and do appear to make an effort to contemplate the 
question noted either by pausing or asking the interviewer such questions as 
“What do you mean?” yet even with probes the child is unable to provide a 
reflective response and may respond with “I don’t know” answers.
■ In the cases where simple one-word reports of mental states are offered with no 
elaboration even with prompts, a score of (3) would be warranted.
EXAMPLES: What happens when you are ill? I stay home from school and my mum 
stays with me and I stay in bed all day and my mum checks on me. (2)
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Can you give me an example of when it felt kind to be with your mum? Yesterday 
because she took me and my cousin to the shop and we looked around, we didn’t actually 
buy anything but we walked around and then she said we could go for tea and she took us 
there. (2) She’s really fun, she’s weird when she’s fun. When we walk down the street 
she makes funny faces. (2) When I first met my dad, I had chicken pox. I was only 3 .. .he 
brought a friend and I was shy because he brought me a present. (3) [ONE WORD 
REPORT OF MENTAL STATE - SHY]
4- 5:  Questionable or low reflective functioning response
The passage may make use of mental state language and be more elaborated than 
responses rated (3). but there is an absence of material which would support the 
assumption that the child genuinely understands the implications of their statement.
■ Even with the use of probes asking for explicit examples designed to elicit 
reflective psychological responses, the child is unable to elaborate reflectively on 
short reports of mental states.
■ In general this rating would be given when the passage contains no evidence of: 
a) awareness of the nature of mental states, b) an explicit effort to tease out mental 
states underlying behaviour, c) recognising the developmental, psychobiological, 
social and unconscious processes which may affect mental states, d) taking into 
account mental states in relation to the interviewer.
EXAMPLES : “When I get sad, she like, comforts me.” (4) [BASIC DESCRIPTION OF 
MENTAL STATE OF CHILD AND RESPONSE OF PARENT]
This is a borderline category.
■ The rater is uncertain whether the passage represents genuine RF or just a 
“canned” statement, produced in response to the interviewer’s prompt but not 
underpinned by genuine reflective functioning. The rater should focus on whether 
the statement is ‘obvious’ and could be said simply as a ‘manner of speaking’. If 
a statement is counter-intuitive in that context even though it is ‘canned’ a higher 
rating may be appropriate.
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Factors, which, if present in a response, would suggest a rating of 5 to be more 
appropriate:
■ Statements which are more elaborative but only imply an understanding of 
aforementioned categories of RF responses, and do so in an ill defined manner, 
o Usually this is noted as the interviewer must make a mental effort to fill in 
the gaps of narrative content in order to make linkages between the mental 
state content in the child’s response and qualities of mental state, 
behaviour, developmental frame, or interactions with the interviewer.
EXAMPLES: ...at school I was kind of rude most of the time but because I’m out of that 
school now I’m happy because it was, kind of, the company I was around. (5) Do your 
parents sometimes argue? Not very often. They did have a big argument and I was 
worried but it got solved. Feel anything else but worried? I felt a bit scared that they 
might... I asked what happened and how the argument broke out. He didn’t tell me but I 
think I know why...Well um -  I don’t really understand it...it’s not that I don’t really 
want to talk about it. They were shouting at each other because, I mean, it was really me 
and my sister being a bit tactful cause my sister said there’s a lady in our school and she 
weighs a certain amount and she wants to lose weight but it was actually a perfect weight 
for a lady like that and um and I said why would she want to lose weight cause that’s such 
a good weight and then my mum said go upstairs to me and my sister and I didn’t really 
understand. Umm but it was actually me and my sister being a bit tactful because my 
mum is a bit overweight and my mum got angry with my dad and they used to share a 
bedroom but now they’ve got separate bedrooms. (5) Well, my mum and dad had a court 
case that she can have enough money to buy a house. How does that show how it is a 
loving relationship? She kept listening to me and what I wanted her to say in court. She 
stood up for us and she used to order -  she exaggerated some of the things we said so she 
would win. (5)
I think because I really wanted to know if I got in and I wanted to know like (changes 
voice) I might get In and then when I didn’t I was sort of a^d and stuff. And so how does 
that connect with you and Claire? Because Claire was sort of like being happy and it was 
like (changes voice) ‘Oh I wish I got in’ and stuff. (5)
6 - 7 : Definite / ordinary reflective functioning response
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The passage must fall under one of the following categories:
a. Awareness of the nature of mental states,
b. An explicit effort to tease out mental states underlying behaviour,
c. Recognising the developmental, psychobiological, social and unconscious 
processes which may affect mental states,
d. Taking into account mental states in relation to the interviewer - either the 
nature of mental states, how mental states relate to behaviour, the properties of 
mental states or mental states in relation to the interviewer.
■ Even if the mental state is fairly simple, if it is described clearly and briefly 
reflected on in a genuine and not ‘canned’ manner, this rating is appropriate.
■ Other than being explicit, the statement does not need to reflect sophistication. 
Although the statement should not be a cliche, it may be fairly ordinary, not 
reflecting particular insights or sensitivities. Normally the passage fits fairly 
well under one of the categories listed under the examples of moderate to high 
reflective function given in the previous section.
■ If the passage contains a number of the features within a category the rater 
should consider giving the passage a higher rating (7), unless it is also flawed in 
an important way (e.g. over-analytical style, incoherent answer).
EXAMPLES : I feel close to him and happy when I’m with him because I don’t really get 
to see him a lot. At least I get to see him on Saturdays. So do you miss him? Mmm, a lot. 
(6) He might have been a bit angry at me because he might have thought I was accusing 
him of something he didn’t say and... maybe... he might be thinking that maybe he did say 
it or something.(6) How did you feel when she shouted at you like that? Upset. Why did 
you feel upset?
She can shout pretty loud but she can make it go right into you and it’s like somebody 
smacking you around on the inside. How do you think your mom feels when that 
happens? She feels upset for doing it... Why do you think she feels like that? She loves 
me so much she don’t want to shout at me but she has to. So why do you think she has 
to? Because I’ve done something wrong and she’s got to discipline, because I wasn’t that 
disciplined back then...(6)
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Three words to describe you relationship with your dad. It’s very bad, I really think it is 
bad. We do talk and everything, but we don’t really get along. Sometimes we do, 
sometimes we don’t ... And like sometimes we really scream and shout but sometimes we 
get along okay. So a word to describe it is not very good, unbalanced... (6)
Can you tell me of a time when you felt funny? What funny strange or funny ha-ha... 
Funny ha ha. You used the word funny to describe yourself. Sometimes when I make 
jokes or something and I tell people jokes that I think they probably know and they think 
it’s sort of funny and I don’t think it’s that funny.. .1 told a joke to my dad’s friend and he 
laughed and my dad laughed .. .he heard it before...but I just smiled. I didn’t think it was 
that funny, when I first heard it, it was funny. (6)
Is Claire able to help you to feel better? Sometimes, like if you’re talking to someone it’s 
sort of like well why am I afraid of that, you sort of feel like it’s not a big a deal as you 
think it is. How does that happen? I don’t know it’s just like...I’m telling Claire then it 
must not be a big deal...cause if Claire isn’t going ‘Oh my gosh” then it’s not a big deal. 
(6)
8 - 9 : Marked reflective functioning response
Passages rated ‘8’ are usually broader than those rated ‘6’ but essentially they meet 
similar criteria. These passages may be rated higher for one of the following reasons:
1) The passage may contain a sophisticated statement concerning mental states. Here 
the rater is looking for passages readily classifiable as being reflective. The statement 
owes its ‘obviously’ reflective nature to combining several features of mentalising 
such as awareness of the limitations of knowledge of another’s mental states, as well 
as indicating a recognition that individual perspectives on the same objective event 
may differ.
EXAMPLES: How do you feel when your dad gets upset with you? I can’t decide, he is 
grumpy, next I feel upset, next I feel like he must be playing a joke or something because 
sometimes he, like, plays jokes on me and pretends to be angry with me but he’s not 
really angry at me. And how does that make you feel when he pretends to be angry with 
you? Weird, because I can kind of tell when he’s angry like that because he makes it 
more, he exaggerates it more than how he normally does it. (8) [QUALITIES OF 
MENTAL STATES, DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES, FAMILY DYNAMICS]
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2) The passage may be ‘marked’ in reflective-functioning because the view of mental 
states presented by the subject is unusual and surprising to the rater. Passages which 
cast an original perspective, which nevertheless is readily understandable to the rater, 
reflect mentalization on the part of the subject. Raters should however be aware of the 
possibility of “borrowed” reflective-functioning, where the subject is repeating ideas 
presented to him/her in other contexts (family legends, therapeutic consultations, 
etc.). In such instances a rating of ‘4’ would probably be more appropriate.
EXAMPLES : Can you tell me about a time when it felt caring with your mom? Like 
when I was in hospital, she wouldn’t stop, she kept on coming to see me. And when was 
that? When I was 8 years old. Right. She wouldn’t stop seeing me and like when it was 
the end of visiting hours she had to leave and sh,e she burst into tears. She even wanted, 
she even told the doctors that she wanted to stay there with me ...night and day. Really. 
Yes it was that good Like my dad, he wouldn’t stop coming either. Because they were 
too worried about me. Like they were too worried that if I had an operation and it went 
wrong that they’d stay there all night, they’d stay there and watch the operation and see if 
it went well and if it went wrong they’d just rush out of there, they wouldn’t care about 
security, they’d just rush out of there to see what happened. (8)
3) The passage may be complex or elaborate in that the mental state of the self or the 
other is described in unusual detail. Raters should look out for the presentation of 
complex, multi-layered mental states, conflicts, mixed emotions, false beliefs and the 
like.
EXAMPLES : Can you give me an example of a time when X made a mistake and 
annoyed you? Well one of the times was like, if she was doing this, like we had to all 
draw I think it was some kind of a like a way of advertising and she knew she made a 
mistake and she would show and say ‘Oh isn’t this so good’ and like we would say, ‘well 
like yeah it’s pretty good* and then she would say like, ‘Why is it pretty good?’ And then 
we would say well like you sort of made this little mistake and she would say like, “Oh 
no I didn’t.” Oh Okay...and how did you feel then? I felt like like like that she just 
doesn’t care that anyone like that anyone really thinks that she made a mistake and that 
she just doesn’t care that people are trying to help her... Oh, so that was the way you felt? 
Yeah. What do you think she was feeling when this happened? She might have felt a
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little badly of what she was saying but she kept going because she didn’t want to seem 
really silly like, ‘Oh I didn’t mean to say that’. Why do you think she’s like that? 
Umm... maybe there’s something happening in her family.. .and because one of her really 
good friends is sort of like that, like if someone is sort of mean to her then she’s always 
mean back at them for the rest of the day and maybe she’s like sort of copying that a 
little. (9)
4) A rating of at least ‘8’ should be given to passages where mental states are 
spontaneously placed within a causal sequence. By this we mean that the subject 
considers (a) how the mental states arose (what perceptions of reality lead to the 
belief or desire assumed), (b) how the mental state influenced behaviour and (c) what 
impact or implication the mental state has subsequent perceptions, beliefs and desires. 
The response must be forwarded prior to the use of probes or subsequent questions in 
a question cluster which have been specifically designed to elicit responses of this 
nature.
EXAMPLES : When have you felt it was annoying to be with your mum? It was when 
umm... a whole pack of cheese strings was gone which is these... I know what they are 
the snack, yeah, yeah like a long thing like a long wiggly worm...a fat one. And... umm, 
and she looked in the fridge and it was some kind of food and my mom I think it was., 
.and she said...she said ( in angry voice) “Stephan, you’ve eaten all”- of whatever it 
was, all of the whatever it was and she said oh it was a ten pack and, “I mean, how could 
you eat it in three days” and I was like, I said, “but mom” and she said, “no buts, go up 
to your room”. And she was really angry at me because I had eaten... uh.... and I didn’t 
even know what she was talking about. And later I said, “Mom, I did not do it.” And I 
felt really angry with her and fed up ...and umm... and it turned out to be it had been my 
sister’s fault and she had blamed me for something that I didn’t do. Right, so how was it 
resolved, how did you sort it out? Well when she found out she said, “Listen Stephan, I’m 
really sorry I made a mistake.” (8)
5) If a subject acknowledges a particularly difficult situation, with the thoughts or 
feelings appropriate to that, then credit is given for the subject’s willingness to accept 
experiences rather than defend against them, avoid justifying the behaviour of 
significant others, especially family members, who hurt him or her, etc.
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EXAMPLES : How did you feel when he gets cross with you? Scared. Why do you feel 
scared? Because he might hit me but he promised never to hit me again. Yeah on one 
occasion that was when I was about 4, I didn’t like to lose games and so when we were 
playing football I started crying because I was losing and he was making jokes and I was 
putting him off and he slapped me and shouted at me and then he kicked me in my ribs 
and I fell and I burst out in tears. Did it hurt a lot? I was in bruises... and I said if he does 
that once more that I had to call the police because you’re not supposed to do that to a 
child. Mmm. So he only did it once? Yeah. So now do you feel scared that he might do it 
again? Ah, I don’t really know if I feel scared because if he does... I think He’s scared 
because I will call the police. (9)
10 : Full / Exceptional RF
The same reasons which may lead a rater to assign a (8) rating may lead him/her to 
consider awarding an “exceptional” score.
■ The difference lies in the amount of sophistication shown, the degree of 
complexity presented, the completeness of the causal account, the degree of 
‘surprise’ the rater experiences at the subject’s understanding, the intricacy of the 
interaction between mental states offered etc. For a rating of ‘ 10’ the passage must 
be unusual in at least one of these respects.
■ A further circumstance which might justify the award of this rating even to 
passages which would normally be rated (8) is the context in which the passage 
appears. If the rater sees the part of the narrative as particularly emotionally 
charged and difficult for the subject then showing even marked levels of mental 
state understanding may be considered “exceptional”.
■ Examples might include the understanding of rejection, neglect or abuse by the 
caregiver or peer, or understanding feelings of current anger or resentment from or 
toward the attachment figure or peer. The rater should note that the presence of 
mentalising may give the impression that the experience recounted was not 
exceptionally difficult. To circumvent this the rater should take an “objective” 
(almost sociological) view of the difficulty involved in the experience for that 
person and adjust ratings accordingly. For example rejection by one parent may
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not be quite so difficult for someone who appears to be assured of the love and 
commitment of the other parental figure. By contrast, an individual whose history 
reveals no such ameliorating factor might be more readily credited with an 
“exceptional” rating if the understanding they show of the experience of rejection 
meets the criteria for “marked” RF, even if the understanding does not come 
across as hard-won.
■ The most common justification for an “exceptional” rating is the apparent 
awareness of the subject of important aspects of the mental states of all 
protagonists within an interaction, where the protagonists are placed in relation to 
one another in terms of their feelings and beliefs and these are sufficiently 
complex and elaborate for the rater to be persuaded of their accuracy. The subject 
offering such a “full” picture may not be exceptionally insightful, although the 
passage must contain sufficient “surprise” and coherence for the rater to feel it is 
unlikely to have come from contaminating sources (e.g. regurgitation of a 
therapist’s or parent’s view). The passage should therefore have a personal 
character, i.e., experienced as personally significant and meaningful, and may 
seem to be developing further during the interview itself.
■ Examples where children reflect on the process of the interview in a surprisingly 
insightful way would rate a ‘10’. For example, concern that the narrative may be 
confusing for the interviewer, as seen in the example on page 19.
EXAMPLES : Can you give me an example of when it felt close to be with Claire? Well, 
if she gets hurt or something, like, I really care. It’s not like I’m going to say, oh she just 
got hurt, she can take care of herself and stuff. Can you tell me about a time when that has 
happened? Well I think also one of the times, once when we were skipping, she fell and 
scraped her knee and she just like walked off and some people didn’t notice and I went 
after her.. .one of us took her in to the office to get some ice and I said Are you okay, do 
you need a teacher? What was it like for you? I didn’t know what to do exactly, I knew I 
should go but like, it was like ..is she really hurt? Did anything really happen? What was 
it like for Claire? Well I don’t think she wanted to cry in front of her friends she didn’t 
want to get embarrassed sort of, maybe... that’s what I felt like. (10)
Why do you think he is like that? Well because he just likes bugging everybody and like 
he just bugs everybody for fun and if anyone bugs him he gets all stiff and angry about it.
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And like that’s the way he’s always been really but now he’s sort of changing ... Now 
he’s changing? Now like he sort of makes it out into a joke if anyone bugs him so now it 
usually doesn’t happen.
Well like everyone, sometimes people didn’t like it and then they wouldn’t be his friend a 
little bit and then I think it’s because he saw that people really didn’t like when he did 
that so he probably changed because of that. (10) [SURPRISING, INSIGHTFUL; 
MENTAL STATES AS SUBJECT TO CHANGE, PEOPLE CAN CHANGE THE WAY 
THEY DEAL WITH MENTAL STATES]
Summary of Reflective Functioning Scale for Individual Responses
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Rating Description
0
■ Response marked by active evasion of mentalising and no effort to 
contemplate the question.
■ Evasion may be shown through hostile criticism of the interview or 
interviewer, behavioural or verbal efforts to distract the interviewer, or 
non-verbal measures such as becoming completely silent.
■ Bizarre explanations of behaviour and mental states would also fall under 
this category and are considered a type of active evasion o f reflective 
functioning.
1
■ Child unable to give an adjective or example -  there has to be some 
evidence that they tried to think of a word or example
■ There is no evidence of active evasion, and no hostility, for example, the 
child may contemplate the question and then respond by saying ‘I dont 
know4 or ‘I can not think of any other example4
2
■ Response preferentially makes use of physical or behavioural terms to 
describe mental states.
■ No evidence of active evasion.
5
■ Response includes references to mental states but with limited 
elaboration of the response.
■ Alternatively, an elaboration of the response only approximates a clear 
RF type and the rater must ‘fill in the gaps’ in the child’s response in 
order to clearly define the response as an RF response type.
6
■ Response may be clearly identified as one of the RF response types.
■ The response may be fairly simple and unsophisticated, but must be 
described clearly and briefly reflected upon.
■ Responses denoting more than one quality of an RF category would be 
rated higher.
9
■ The response is clearly identified as one of the RF response types.
■ The response is more descriptive and elaborated such that the passage 
likely includes:
o more than one type of RF category,
o a surprising or unusual view of a mental state which is not 
bizarre,
o an account of complex multi-layered mental states, or 
o an account where mental states are placed within a causal 
sequence.
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The response clearly rates a ‘7’ and is more sophisticated in description 
and elaboration either:
o in the degree of complexity presented, 
o the completeness of the causal account,
o the account of mental states of all the protagonists within an 
interaction,
o the degree of surprise the rater experiences at the subject’s 
understanding, or 
o the intricacy of the interaction between mental states presented. 
The response may be of an emotionally charged or difficult subject, 
which the child nonetheless relates and is able to reflect upon in an 
elaborative and descriptive RF response.
NB: The rater can use discretion if they feel that the child falls between 2 scales and rate 
as a 4 or an 8, for example.
PART 3
441
SCORING, CODING SHEETS, INTERVIEW SCRIPT and RELIABILITY EXAMPLES
Interviews are coded from videotape.
Only delineate questions are coded:
THE CHILD ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW
1. Questions 2a -  7 and question 13 on the Interview Script are to be coded in all cases.
2. In those cases where the child never had a relationship with a parent, and is therefore 
unable to answer related questions, rate as ‘100’.
3. Questions are coded as 777 if the absence of an answer is due to the interviewer 
having failed to answer the question.
4. Questions 8, 9, 10/11, and 14 are to be examined and if RF is found which is rated 5 
or above, these scores are to be entered on the score sheet in the lower box.
5. On occasions, questions 15 (Do you ever feel your parents don’t love you) and 16 
(Have you ever been hit by a member of your family) are asked. These questions may 
be numbered differently depending on the version of interview script used.
6. RF scores for questions 2a -  7 + 13 are to be entered onto the scoring profile graph.
NB. THE NUMBERING OF THE QUESTIONS MAY BE DIFFERENT DEPENDING
ON THE INTERVIEW SCRIPT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RATE THE CORRECT
QUESTIONS.
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CODING RF FROM THE CHILD ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW
QUESTION DESCRIPTION
Q2 (not coded) Three words to describe yourself
Q2a Give example - First word IF CHILD GIVES TWO 
EXAMPLES BUT FAILS TO 
FIND A THIRD, SCORE 
MISSING EXAMPLE AS ‘100’ - 
NOT SCORED
Q2b Give example - Second word
Q2c Give example - Third word
Q3 (not coded) Three words to describe what it’s like to be with Mum
Q3a Give example - First word IF CHILD GIVES TWO 
EXAMPLES BUT FAILS TO 
FIND A THIRD, SCORE 
MISSING EXAMPLE AS ‘100’ - 
NOT SCORED
Q3b Give example - Second word
Q3c Give example - Third word
Q4 What happens when Mum gets upset with you?
Q5 Three words to describe what it’s like to be with Dad
Q5a Give example - First word IF CHILD GIVES TWO 
EXAMPLES BUT FAILS TO 
FIND A THIRD, SCORE 
MISSING EXAMPLE AS ‘100’ - 
NOT SCORED
Q5b Give example - Second word
Q5c Give example - Third word
Q6 What happens when Dad gets upset with you?
Q7 Can you tell me about a time when you were upset and wanted help?
Q13 Do your parents sometimes argue?
IF CHILD DOES NOT HAVE AN EXAMPLE, SCORE AS ‘100’ - 
NOT SCORED
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Extra Questions
Q8 What happens when you’re ill?
Q9 What happens when you hurt yourself?
Q10/11 Has anyone close to you ever died? Has an animal 
ever died?
Q12 Have you ever been away from your parents for 
the night or for longer than a day?
Q14 What kind of Dad/Mum would you like to be?
Q15 Do you ever feel that your parents really don’t 
love you?
Q16 Have you ever been hit by a grown up in your 
family?
IF CHILD 
DOESNOT 
HAVE 
EXAMPLES 
FOR THESE 
CATEGORIES, 
LEAVE 
BLANK ON 
THE SCORING 
SHEET.
IF THE CHILD 
GIVES AN 
EXAMPLE 
BUT IT IS NOT 
CONSIDERED 
DEFINITE RF 
(I.E. UNDER 5) 
LEAVE
BLANK ON 
THE ANSWER 
SHEET.
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Overall Child Reflective Functioning Rating Profiles
Overall Rating PROFILE
0 = Redupiated RF ■ The interview is marked by persistent anti-reflective 
examples of active evasiveness to questions and 
subsequent prompts to mentalise - or
■ The interview is marked by hostile resistance to answering 
questions shown by lack of contemplation of questions 
and outright refusal to answer.
■ Bizarre or inappropriate responses to questions may be 
present.
■ Majority of responses have been rated 0 or 1, with no 
responses rated above 3.
1-2 = Absent RF 
(New 2-3)
■ The interview is predominated by physical and 
behavioural descriptions.
■ When mental states are mentioned they are simply 
reported with little spontaneous elaboration unless 
prompted and the elaboration remains on a physical 
descriptive level.
■ Non-responsive answers are not accompanied by hostility 
or evasion and the child presents some effort to respond to 
questions.
■ Majority of responses fall in the range of 0 - 3.
■ Responses rated ‘0’ may be present but are balanced out 
by ratings of 3 or above.
3-4 = Low RF 
(New 4-5)
■ The interview includes several examples of spontaneous 
mental state reports and simple elaboration of mental state 
responses, often using other adjectives of similar valence 
in further elaboration of an example
■ Clear evidence that the child can independently reflect on 
the underlying factors relating to the mental state is 
lacking.
■ The majority of responses fall within the 3 - 4 range.
■ Alternatively, the interview may contain a wide range of  
RF response ratings from 2 -8 , suggesting that the child’s 
reflective functioning is not yet firmly established as the 
primary mode of understanding experience.
■ There may be several responses rated 2, which are 
balanced out by responses rated 6 or above.
5-6 = Definite RF 
(New 6-7)
■ The interview includes clear examples of reflective 
functioning rated 6 and above.
■ The capacity to reflect and elaborate independently on the 
underlying factors relating to mental states is present, 
however the child often needs the encouragement to do so.
■ RF responses rated 6 and above likely fall under the 
categories of qualities of mental states or teasing out 
mental states underlying behaviour.
■ The range of responses is likely broad with a few
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responses rating below 4, which are balanced out by 
responses rated 7 and above.
■ The majority of responses are rated 4 - 7 .
7-8 = High RF 
(New 8-9)
■ The interview contains several examples of definite 
reflective functioning rated 6 and above.
■ Descriptions and responses consistently make use of 
mental state language and elaboration of mental states.
■ The child shows an ability to independently 
psychologically reflect on mental states with responses 
often starting out at a 6 rating.
■ The child is more likely to take into account 
developmental and dynamic factors influencing mental 
states and behaviours. This is reflected in the 
contextualisation of responses with descriptions often 
being presented with the family and peer group dynamics 
taken into account.
■ Interviews in the top level of this rating will have no 
responses rated ‘0’ and no more than two responses rated 
‘3’ or below.*
9 = Exceptional RF 
(new 10)
■ The interview presents an exceptional ability to reflect on 
mental states even when relating difficult events or 
feelings.
■ Responses are spontaneously elaborated and coherent.
■ The child assumes a reflective stance, which dominates 
the child’s understanding of experience.
■ There is an impression of the child actively reflecting on 
his or her responses during the interview which is noted 
by a freshness of recall and spontaneous consideration of 
varying perspectives, including the interviewer’s.
■ There are likely no individual ratings of 4 or below.
■ The majority of responses are rated 6 and above.
■ Prompts do not greatly enhance response ratings.
APPENDIX D3
CHILD REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING SCALE -  SCORE SHEET
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CHILD REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING SCALE -  Score Sheet
ID: AGE: Y M
Using CHILD ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW SEX: M F
? Details RFS Comment
q2 Describe Self
q2a Self 1
q2b Self 2
q2c Self 3
q3 Describe Mum
q3a Mum 1
q3b Mum 2
q3c Mum 3
q4 Mum upset/cross
q5 Describe Dad
q5a Dad 1
q5b Dad 2
q5c Dad 3
q6 Dad upset/cross
q7 Self upset
q13 Parents argue
Note: Code 777 for Question not asked; 100 for Question not answered because of non- 
occurrence
APPENDIX El 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Test-Retest Reliability o f the HSS, AT and CRFS (based on Pearson’s Correlations)
HSS AT AT CRF CRF
Accuracy Justification Self Other
3 Months .40 .50 .61 .67 .86
1 Year .59 .52 .44 .59 .63
Family Composition Factors associated with Higher Test Scores (based on t-tests)
HSS AT
Accuracy
AT
Justification
CRF
Self
CRF
Other
Children o f 
Single Parents
— — Children o f  
Single Parents
—
Children with 
Siblings
— Children with 
Siblings
— —
Children with 
Caregivers 
without Formal 
Employment
Relationship between HSS, AT and CRFS performance and Age, IQ and Language 
Abilities (using Pearson’s Correlations)
HSS AT AT CRF CRF
Accuracy Justification Self Other
Age .38 .45 .53 .18 .21
Verbal IQ .42 .40 .29 .24 .18
Exp Language .40 .19 .12 .28 .37
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Contribution o f Age, IQ, Attachment and Psychopathology to the Prediction ofHSS, AT  
and CRFS performance (based on regression analyses)
HSS AT
Accuracy
AT
Justification
CRF
Self
CRF
Other
Age 18% 20% 28% significant
(based on 
AMOS)
significant
(based on 
AMOS)
IQ 12% 12% 5% . — —
CAI 5% 8% — — —
CAFAS — 6% — — —
CBCL — — — — —
Differences in Attachment Security: Variance explained by Performance on the HSS, AT  
and CRFS (based on ANCOVA with Age and IQ as co-variables, and attachment security 
on the CAI as the independent variable)
HSS AT Justification CRF Self CRF Other
CAI
(secure/insecure)
7% 7% 15% 14%
Relationship between children’s performance on the HSS, AT and CRFS ( using 
Pearson’s Correlations)
AT
Accuracy
AT
Justification
CRF
Self
CRF
Other
HSS .47 .54 .36 .33
A T Accuracy .49 .30 .36
A T Justification .40 .41
CRFS Self .59
